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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on British identity in the context of Muslim integration 
into British society. It is an interdisciplinary study of English, Welsh, 
Scottish and Muslim identity. 
The first section comprises an overview of psychological, social 
psychological and sociological concepts of identity. It provides an insight 
into classical essentialist theories and recent studies on Muslim minority 
identity, as well as the most recent interdisciplinary construct of an identity 
model. Furthermore, the contemporary 'post-modern' notion of 
fragmented identities is discussed. The chapter concludes with a detailed 
description of the. methodology used in this study. 
In the second section British identity is analysed using British history to 
determine objects of identity that have evolved in. the past and interviews 
to determine national identity at present. British history offers a variety of 
examples of how ethnically and culturally defined peoples were integrated 
into British society over centuries and how social crises have been resolved. 
Interviews with English, Welsh and Scottish respondents are analysed to 
determine the current perception of Britishness and ethnic identity. 
In the third section Muslim identity is studied by means of analysing 
interviews conducted with Muslims in England, Wales and Scotland. A 
case study on the identity of Yemenis in Cardiff, with members of the first, 
second and third generations serves as an example of how the second and 
third generations have already integrated into British society. The 
investigation of South Asian Muslims in Britain focuses on. the difference 
of identity development between the first and the second generations. It is 
an analysis of how young Muslims cope with the tension created by the two 
different cultures within which they have to assert themselves. 
III 
Dedicated to my parents and my grandmother for their love and support, 
and in memory of Prof. DDr. Charlotte Teuber and Günter Jullmann. 
IV 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my deep thanks to my supervisor Dr. Colin Turner 
for his invaluable help in all the stages of this thesis. His academic 
expertise, guidance, support, generosity with time and effort, 
encouragement and particularly his patience are greatly appreciated. Thanks 
also go to Prof. T. Niblock whose kind understanding, especially in difficult 
times, was of enormous support. 
I am grateful to Steven Moss, Marion Moss and Jane Pattison for sacrificing 
their time to proof-read my work. 
Thanks are also due to Barbara Minto and Barbara Farnworth for their 
indispensable help with administrative issues. 
I wish to acknowledge the financial support of "The Austrian Federal 
Ministry for Science and Research", which funded the first two years of my 
PhD and the University of Vienna, which granted me a research scholarship 
in my third year. 
I am indebted to all the interviewees who have shared their time and 
thoughts and without whom this study could not have been realised. I 
apologise for not naming them individually. 
I am deeply thankful to my parents, as well as my grandmother, who have 
supported me morally and financially in every possible way they could. 
V 
The material contained in this thesis is the author's own work and has not 
been submitted for a degree in this or any other university. 
Copyright ©1999 by Cosima Eggers 
"The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it 
should be published without their prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. " 
VI 






Identifying the Problem 2 
Focus of Study 5 
The Structure 8 
PART I 
1. Theory and Methodology 10 
1.1. Theories and Studies on Identity 12 
1.1.1. The Psychological Approach 14 
1.1.1.1. Erikson's Concept of Identity Crisis 14 
1.1.1.2. Marcia and the Identity Status Approach 21 
1.1.1.2.1. Summary 25 
1.1.1.3. Weinreich's Study on Threatened Identities 26 
VII 
1.1.1.3.1. Summary 35 
1.1.2. The Social Psychological Approach 36 
1.1.2.1. Mead and the Development of Self during Symbolic 37 
Interaction 
1.1.2.1.1 Summary 42 
1.1.2.2. Strauss' Concept of Status Passage 43 
1.1.2.2.1. Summary 57 
1.1.2.3. Tajfel's Concept of Social Categorisation 58 
1.1.2.4. Hutnik's Study on Ethnic Minority Identity 63 
1.1.2.4.1. Summary 74 
1.1.3. The Sociological Approach 75 
1.1.3.1. Goffman's Theory of Stigmatisation 76 
1.1.3.1.1. Summary 84 
1.1.3.2. Krappmann's Concept of Ambiguity Tolerance 86 
1.1.3.3. Modood's Study on Changing Ethnic Identities 89 
1.1.3.3.1. Summary 96 
1.1.4. Conceptualising Identity 97 
1.1.5. Social Identity and Minorities 113 
1.1.6. The Fragmented Individual? 122 
1.2. Hypotheses 127 
1.3. Meta-Theory 131 
1.4. Methodology 135 
VIII 
1.4.1. Grounded Theory 136 
1.4.2. Interviews 138 
1.4.3. Experiences and Comments 143 
PART II 
2. British Identity 150 
2.1. The Historic Development of British Identity 151 
2.2. The Psychology of Inhabiting an Island 153 
2.3. British Identity Pre-Union 157 
2.3.1. The Thirteenth Century and the Development of a Political 158 
Culture 
2.3.2. Social Transformation in the Sixteenth Century . 163 
2.3.3. The Seventeenth Century and the Consolidation of. an 173 
English Identity 
2.4. The Eighteenth Century and the Forging of a British Identity 186 
2.4.1. When Identity becomes Profitable 191 
2.4.2. Loyalty as a Precondition for Acceptance 192 
2.4.3. The Nineteenth Century: Enlightenment, Reform and 198 
Revolution 
2.5. Islam in British India 211 
2.6. The Prelude to Identity Crisis 220 
2.6.1. The Twentieth Century: Identity at Stake 230 
2.7. Do the English have a National Identity? 242 
2.7.1. The Monarchy 248 
IX 
2.7.2. The House of Lords 249 
2.7.3. Beneath the Threshold of Consciousness 251 
2.8. How Strong is Scottish National Identity? 254 
2.8.1. A Parliament as an Identity Anchor 258 
2.8.2. No Monarchy for Scotland 259 
2.8.3. History can Hurt 259 
2.9. Welsh Identity 261 
2.9.1. The Monarchy 264 
2.9.2. The Non-Assimilative Welsh 265 
2.10. British Identity 267 
2.10.1. Is British Society in Crisis? 271 
2.11. Preliminary Conclusions 283 
PART III 
3. Muslims in Britain 298 
3.1. The Geography of Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain 299 
3.2. Historic Overview of Muslim Settlement in Britain 302 
3.3. Cardiff: A Case Study 305 
3.4. The South Asian Community in Britain 324 
3.4.1. The Muslim Population in Britain: Statistics 325 
3.4.2. The First Generation and their Identity 329 
X 
3.4.2.1. Kinship and Biraderi 334 
3.4.2.2. Cultural, Sectarian and Class Divisions 336 
3.4.2.3. The Islamic Identity of the First Generation 338 
3.4.2.4. The Muslim College: An Example 346 
3.4.3. Muslim Organisations and the Institutionalisation of Islam 349 
3.4.3.1. Muslim Umbrella Organisations and their Political Aims 353 
3.4.3.2. Identity and Politics 362 
3.4.4. The Identity of the Second Generation 365 
3.4.4.1. Education 366 
3.4.4.2. The Second Generation and their Social Identity 373 
3.4.4.3. The Islamic Identity of the Second Generation 376 
3.4.4.4. Cultural verses Religious Identifications 377 
3.4.4.5. Islam as the Source of Orientation 387 
3.4.4.6. Self-Actualisation and Islam 395 
3.4.4.7. An Islamic Solution to Social Problems 397 
3.4.4.8. The Second Generation and the Dilemma of Integration 400 
3.5. Preliminary Conclusion 407 
Conclusion 415 
Appendix 1 424 
Erikson's Diagram of the Life Cycle 
Appendix II 425 
XI 
List of Organisations 
Appendix III 427 
Interview Topics for Muslim Organisations 
Appendix IV 429 
Interview Guideline 
Appendix V 430 
Personal Communication: Tony Benn 
Appendix VI 
Interview: Muslim Parliament 
Appendix VII 
Interview with F. and K. in Cardiff 
431 
437 -- 
Appendix VIII 457 
Table 1 Regional ethnic group distributions of total population of 
Great Britain, 1991 
Appendix IX 458 





The collapse of the Soviet system in the east and large-scale immigration to 
west European countries has opened an agenda, which was considered to 
have been closed with the end of the Second World War. The old and new 
presence of ethnic and religious minorities in European nation states forces 
eastern and western societies to reassess their concepts of community, 
citizenship and national identity. 
While the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked the end of the physical and 
ideological division between Eastern and Western Europe, the fatwa issued 
by Ayatollah Khomeini in the same year, calling for the execution of 
Salman Rushdie, came to symbolise new potential divisions in the midst of 
European cities. ' With the end of the Cold War, the notion of Islam posing 
a new threat to the West has become rather popular. " Thus this perception 
of Islam is leading to the marginalisation of Muslims throughout the 
Western World. 
It is the aim of this thesis to reach beyond such stigmatisation and to 
understand Islam in Europe as a challenge to reassess the question of ethnic, 
national and religious identity in the light of Muslim integration in the 
framework of a west European nation state: The United Kingdom. 
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Identifying the Problem 
Although Muslim settlement in Britain can be traced back to the mid- 
nineteenth century, it was the need for cheap labour to fuel the thriving 
British economy during the late 1940's and 1950's which brought the first 
wave of labour immigrants from other continents to this country. The 
majority of labour migrants of Muslim background originate from the 
Indian subcontinent. 
While migration from the West Indies-started in the :. 
late 1940's, South 
Asian immigration took off with the partition of the Indian subcontinent 
into India and Pakistan in 1947 and the construction of the Mangla Dam 
during the 1960's. 
In Britain, the economic decline during the late 1950's reduced the need for 
labour migrants and growing public concern with large-scale immigration of 
'coloureds' led to the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigration Act 
of 1962. The prospect of legislative restrictions on entry for citizens of 
British colonies and member countries of the Commonwealth in turn 
provoked a sudden rise in immigration during 1961 and 1962. 
However, the Immigration Act did allow for the reunification of families. 
Wives and children came to Britain to join their men folk and subsequently 
introduced the institutionalisation of their religion and native culture. 
Both the host community and the minority communities, which prior to 
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the arrival of their dependants were predominantly composed of men, were 
faced with the task of providing for the social, cultural and religious needs 
of the second generation. 
Although the Muslim minorities flourished, they grew into rather secluded 
communities. One essential feature of the Muslim communities, which 
also weakened their position in dealing with local authorities, was the lack 
of unity. The Muslim communities in Britain continuously had to struggle 
in order to achieve a compromise with regard to provisions made by wider 
society for their cultural and religious needs. Especially in the education 
and... health sectors the host community seemed rather reluctant to 
accommodate their requests. 
Until today the Muslim community is segmented into cultural, religious 
and social groups, which to a large extent have established their separate 
organisations and institutions. Consequently it is a gross generalisation to 
speak of 'the Muslim community' as such. However, the attempt to 
overcome difference and to unify on the grounds of religious principles can 
be observed among the young Muslim generation. 
The Salman Rushdie affair has shown that wide reaching support in 
defence of Islam can be obtained. This does not mean that all British 
Muslims were in favour of the 'book burning incident' in Bradford or the 
fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Rather, Muslims from various 
cultural backgrounds and Islamic movements were motivated to join the 
campaign for the protection of Islam by the blasphemy law. Unfortunately 
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the support sought from the Muslim world backfired on the Muslim 
communities in Britain and in the rest of Western Europe. Ayatollah 
Khomeini's death sentence against a British citizen, for a book that had been 
written and published in the United Kingdom, hardened the position of the 
British government and produced a proclamation of solidarity throughout 
Europe. The Rushdie affair intensified Western fear that members of 
Muslim minorities could become subject to political manipulation from 
abroad and came to symbolise the cleavage between Islamic and Western 
secular- values. 
In Europe the common belief prevailed that progressive modernisation of 
society might lead to the decline of emotional, descent-oriented and 
collective attachments. Consequently it was expected that both native and 
immigrant ethnic identity would erode, once identification with personal 
progress within society and with the perpetuation of that society as such had 
taken place. As a matter of fact the opposite seems to be true. Hondrich 
demonstrated that both latent descent-oriented and collective feelings, 
which by nature are not chosen, gain significance with the accumulation of 
attachments that are consciously and rationally chosen? Within the most 
industrialised and advanced European countries ethnic and cultural 
identities are reasserted and immigrant minorities tend to create self- 
sufficient, withdrawn communities. This process does not only complicate 
the integration of minorities, but also threatens to accelerate the vicious 
circle of mutual rejection. 
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However, different ethnic minorities have produced social tensions to 
varying degrees during their integration process. For example, both Chinese 
and South Asian communities aim to maintain their cultural and social 
heritage, live according to a strict moral code, and tend to foster the cohesion 
among their own minority community. Nevertheless the integration of 
Muslim minorities into British society seems to occur with far more friction 
than the integration of other minorities. 
Focus of Study 
This observation leads to a series of questions: 
" Why is there a stroiiger tension between wider society and the Muslim 
communities? 
" How has Muslim identity developed in a Western secular democracy? 
Into what kind of society do we expect the minorities to integrate? 
" What constitutes British identity (with special reference to its adaptability 
by immigrants)? 
The integration of a minority is a two way process. Labour immigrants to 
west European countries were expected to live temporarily in their host 
societies, therefore it has not been anticipated that large numbers would 
settle. Consequently no provisions had been made for their integration and 
accommodation of cultural needs. In general, the host communities 
expected the immigrants to make the effort to integrate and, if possible, to 
assimilate. As a result, immigrants searched for the support of their own 
kind to cope with the economic pressures, especially once their sometimes 
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very large families came to join them. In Britain, in particular, immigrant 
minorities were left to their own devices. 
The development of ethno-cultural communities and the assertion of 
ethnic and religious identities have practically produced a multicultural 
communal society in Britain. This development has in turn been 
encouraged by British politics, which legally and financially fosters the 
institutionalisation of ethnic identities and the building of community 
- organisation? Without doubt Britain is perpetuating the `culture of 
difference' which is deeply rooted in its political tradition. In the past the 
United Kingdom had to accommodate Welsh, Scottish, Irish and English 
identities and to form a sense of unity by creating an allegiance to the British 
nation. Today, British identity and unity is being threatened by increasing 
nationalism and society seems to fragment into ethno-cultural 
communities. At this point the following questions arise: 
" What has traditionally marked British identity? What does British 
identity entail today? And what is to become of it in the future? 
" Why is British society falling back onto its ethno-cultural roots at this 
stage of social development? 
" Is the assertion of ethno-cultural identities among minority 
communities an indication for -a similar development in wider society? 
" And is the fragmentation of society a symptom of modernity? 
The social developments in the United Kingdom show that society is not 
only struggling to integrate immigrant minorities but also to maintain 
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social cohesion among the indigenous population as such. As mentioned 
above, integration is a two way process, which demands a thorough analysis 
of social processes among the immigrant community as well as among 
wider society. 
This thesis will focus on the identity development of both Muslim 
minorities and British society. Theories on identity provide an insight into 
individual as well as collective attachments to culture, language, nation- 
states, political parties, etc., and explain assertions of ethnic belonging. Both 
individual and collective identity are integral parts of an integration process 
_ and . 
determine the degree of cohesion among society. _ 
Identification as well as integration processes have an emotional and a 
rational moment. Therefore both processes can be rationally controlled at 
an individual and a collective level. Problems related to integration are not 
of a biological nature but a question of how resulting conflicts are 
rationalised. Historic continental examples show very clearly that the 
consolidation into political systems have been acts of conscious and rational 
decisions. In 1707, the Scots agreed on the Act of Union due to economic 
advantages despite ethnic difference. Thus economic, political and social 
developments influence identification and integration. 
The identity development of Muslim minorities is the product of their 
economic and social status as well as the social processes within wider 
society. Consequently British society is equally subject to the analysis of this 
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thesis in order to gain a better understanding of Muslim minority identity 
and their integration process. 
The Structure 
This thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, 'Theory and 
Methodology', terms used through out this theses are defined and theories 
on identity, integration and prejudice are discussed. Further more the 
hypotheses, which evolved throughout research, are formulated and the 
methodology of the fieldwork is described in detail. Part two focuses on 
British identity, which entails a discussion of history in the light of national 
identity development and the evaluation of interviews with English, 
Scottish and Welsh subjects. In the third part Muslim identity development 
in England, Scotland and Wales will be analysed in detail, on the grounds of 
evaluated interviews, so that conclusions can be drawn about the 
development of Muslim minority identity in Britain and how the process of 
integration will proceed. 
' G. Kepel, Allah in the West, Cambridge, 1997, p. 1. 
2 K. O. Hondrich, 'Die Nicht-Hintergehbarkeit von Wir-Gefühlen', in: W. Heitmeyer, and R. 
Dollase (eds), Die bedrängte Toleranz, Frankfurt/Main, 1996, pp. 100-101. And N. 
Wilterdink, 'Nationalitäten in alltäglichen Gegen- und Miteinander, Nationale Identität in 
einer Internationalen Organisation', in: R. Blomert, H. Kuzmics, A. Treibel (eds), 
Transformationen des Wir-Gefühls, Frankfurt/Main, 1993. 
1 G. Kepel, op. cit, p. 101. 
PART 
Theory and Methodology 
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1. Theory and Methodology 
Identity comprises a system of social beliefs, social roles, values, emotions, 
and has both a personal and social dimension. It is an essential agent, which 
determines attitudes, actions and an individual's psychological and 
emotional well being. The development of identity is intrinsically social 
and is determined by external and internal processes. Identity influences the 
decision-making process and provides a frame of reference for social and 
political orientation. It is a key element for social bonds and a -prerogative 
for the development öf personal and collective responsibility. - 
Identity (LL identitas, sameness) is the feeling of sameness with one's self, 
and is the core of one's personality. The verb 'to identify', to be emotionally 
in sympathy with a particular 'object", is the active feature of identity. To 
identify with a particular object, is to feel a sense of sameness with the 
essence of this object. Thus identity, the feeling of sameness with one's self 
is an internal process, whereas identifications relate the individual to its 
environment. The personal and social elements of identity evolve through 
interaction with the environment and are subjected to life-long evolution 
and revaluation. 
As identity is influenced by and influences every aspect of human life, 
theorists have conceptualised and focused on various aspects of human 
identity. The first part of this chapter discusses identity from the perspective 
of psychology, social psychology and sociology to introduce the most 
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important theories employed to support the arguments of this thesis. This 
will provide a framework for defining the identity concept in this study. 
Erikson, Marcia and Weinreich have been chosen to illustrate the 
psychological approach. Mead, Strauss, Tajfel and Hutnik are the social 
psychological and Goffman, Krappmann and Modood the sociological 
theorists referred to in detail. The pioneers of identity research will be 
discussed in depth for a simple reason: whilst present social theorists focus 
on particular identity components or stages of identity development, early 
theorists sought to produce an-all encompassing model that attempted to 
consider every stage of development. Although their models may lack 
depth, they generate awareness for . the 
influences on the. development of 
identity. The studies of Marcia, Weinreich, Hutnik and Modood on ethnic 
minority identity have been chosen to illustrate how contemporary 
theorists from different fields approach the study of minority identity. They 
have shown that increasing social complexity demands increasing 
interdisciplinary awareness. The findings of these theorists are 
indispensable for the understanding of identity development among 
Muslim minorities in Britain. Nevertheless this study seeks to understand 
the socio-economic and historic factors which contribute to the identity 
development of both British society and Muslim minorities. Therefore this 
study is taking a broad approach to identity in the light of recent findings. 
The second part of this chapter will discuss the hypotheses and aspects of 
identity, with special reference to Breakwell's model of identity. Her model 
is based on an interdisciplinary approach and focuses on mechanisms of 
coping with threatened identities. This perspective is of particular value in 
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the light of the ever increasing pace of socio-economic change that 
constantly forces the modern individual to reassess their identifications, 
which poses a challenge to identity development. 
In the third part of this chapter the methodology and fieldwork will be 
described. 
1.1. Theories and Studies on Identity 
The concept of identity is deeply rooted in philosophy. Throughout the 
centuries philosophers have tried to analyse the nature. of the_. self and 
personal identity. Descartes' conclusion: cogito, ergo sum, is probably the 
most famous assertion of self-knowledge in the history of human thought. 
The Cartesian concept of a singular and unvarying self has become the 
foundation of Western philosophy of, and scientific research on, the human 
mind. This does not imply that the notion of unity and continuity of the 
self has remained uncontested. Contrary to Descartes (1596-1650), Hume 
(1711-1776) did not support the idea of the self as a united whole, 
unchangeable throughout time. For Hume the self was composed of the 
mind and its contents. New knowledge and impressions change the 
contents of the mind and consequently the self is no longer the same. 
Hume believed that the continuity of the self is imagined and therefore the 
identity ascribed to the mind of man is fictitious. Although Kant (1724-1804) 
agreed with Hume that the self cannot perceive itself directly, he argued that 
the self can perceive events. Based on the assumption that perception is an 
event, the self can perceive its own action and thus gain indirect self- 
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knowledge. Kant differentiates between the 'phenomenal self' and the 
'noumenal self'. The latter is the unconscious real self, which cannot be 
directly perceived by anyone, while the `phenomenal self' is the self that we 
become aware of. The moments of self-awareness provide knowledge 
regarding the unity of the self. As this unity is not inherent, but created, 
Kant referred to it as the synthetic unity of apperception. 
The controversy over the unity and continuity of the self and its identity has 
regained actuality among post-modern theorists. However, prior to the 
contemporary . discourse on the fragmentation of identities, the most 
important theories on identity will be outlined. 
The modern concept of identity was developed within American social 
psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Based on the work of 
James, Mead, Strauss and Goffman, identity was - conceptualised in the 
context of social organisation. Thus identity develops in interaction with 
the environment, based on reciprocal expectations of particular behaviour. 
In the field of psychoanalysis it was primarily Erik H. Erikson, who laid the 
foundations for identity research. Within this tradition identity was 
analysed in terms of its psychodynamic function. However, psychoanalysts 
and psychologists formulate their theories on the grounds of clinical data, 
which do not encompass wider social and cultural relationships. 
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1.1.1. The Psychological Approach 
In psychology, identity research originates in the psychology of personality 
development. Erik Erikson suggested that Freud incidentally introduced the 
term 'identity'. In an address to the society of B'nai B'rith Freud tried to 
explain the nature of his personal link to Judaism as "... die klare 
Bewusstheit der inneren Identität". ' That is based not on religion or culture 
but on deep feelings of communality and common mental as well as inner 
constructions. The context of Freud's psychosocial reference to the 'inner 
identity' suggests that the inner identity comprises a unique set of values, 
which evolved through the particular history of his people. 
In his psychoanalytical theory on personality, Freud mentioned briefly the 
process of 'identification' in relation to his conceptualisation of the 
superego, ego and id. According to Freud it is the superego that is largely a 
derivative of identifications, constructed during the oedipal phase. 
However, Freud never defined thorough concepts of identity and 
identification. 
1.1.1.1. Erikson's Concept of Identity Crisis 
Erik Erikson was the first to develop a detailed concept of identity in clinical 
literature. As an ego psychoanalyst and student of Freud, his research was 
directed towards an elaborate description of the ego and related personality 
processes with particular focus on development during childhood and 
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adolescence. Erikson formulated a scheme of life cycle development°, 
which outlines the ego growth and the change of individual need and 
capability. This is paralleled by the change of societal demands, during the 
successive stages across an individual's life span. Although identity 
formation during adulthood and mature age are part of the scheme, Erikson 
payed particular attention to the developmental phase of adolescence. 
According to Erikson adolescence is the concluding stage of childhood, 
during which childhood identifications are synthesised to form a new kind 
of identity achieved in interaction and competition with one's 
contemporaries. It is also the stage at which identity formation has its 
normative crisis, sometimes expressed by rebellion and the rejection of 
parental values. 
Erik Erikson derived his theories on identity from three main sources: 1) the 
autobiographies of extraordinary individuals (such as George Bernard 
Shaw), 2) pathology and 3) studies of personality development in children. 
In defining identity he differentiates between the concept of personal 
identity and that of ego identity. 
The conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous 
observations: the perception of the selfsameness and continuity of one's existence in time 
and space and the perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and 
continuity. 5 
While the concept of personal identity describes the basic mechanisms 
involved in knowing that one has a coherent identity, ego identity is related 
to the ego quality of this existence. Hence, ego identity 
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... in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of 
the fact that there is a self-sameness and 
continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods, the style of one's individuality, and that 
this style coincides with the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for significant 
others in the immediate community. 
The ego's most important psychological function is to synthesise childhood 
identifications with new experiences and to balance the power between the 
post-pubertal id, the superego and the often unrealistic ego-ideal. The ego 
must also construct an ego identity, which is structured by an ideological 
world image, promising continuity in the foreseeable future. Therefore the 
loss of personal selfsameness and historical continuity is an expression of a 
loss of ego identity. ' 
Identity formation is a process of increasing differentiation and takes place 
on all levels of mental functioning. The process 'begins' once the infant 
realises that it is a separate entity and no longer a part of its mother. From 
then on the individual's identity will continue to evolve throughout his or 
her lifetime. Erikson suggests a schedule which entails interjection, 
identification, and identity formation as three steps by which the ego 
expands its functional capacity. Interjection is the primitive 'incorporation' 
of another's image. During infancy and early childhood, this mechanism 
allows the child to develop a sense of self-feeling. The successful integration 
of this process depends on satisfactory mutuality between mothering adult 
and mothered child. Identification is the mechanism by which the 
individual learns to comprehend the hierarchy of roles within the family. It 
enables the child to develop expectations of its role in the future. 
Identifications are constructed during childhood, usually with aspects of the 
people that affect the child the most. However, according to Erikson, the 
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process of identification ends with adolescence, when identity formation 
begins! 
Adolescence is the most formative phase of identity formation. The 
psychological task during this stage of development is the formation of a 
coherent identity. This comprises assimilated childhood identifications, 
correct assessment of personal ability and development of intimacy. It is 
noteworthy that the coherent identity that should emerge at the end of 
adolescence is not a mere sum of childhood identifications. It is rather a 
synthesis of earlier identifications, forming a new and unique Gestalt. 
At this stage resistance against authority and those who represent 
traditional values is part of the process. Moral, religious and political 
values, which up to this stage the child's super-ego has adopted 
unquestioned from the parents; are then re-evaluated and sometimes 
abandoned. During adolescence the recognition of the environment, 
especially of same-aged peers, becomes more important as part of the 
individual's self-definition. Erikson referred to this process as the 
psychosocial identity, which is complementary to the personal identity and 
is built by role relationships. Therefore inner ego synthesis and establishing 
oneself within the social environment produces a coherent identity. 
The social demand on the adolescent to define his or her future by choosing 
a career, a life partner and an ideology, combined with the re-evaluation of 
previous identifications, creates a situation of instability and may lead to a 
crisis of identity. Those individuals, who wish to delay adult commitments, 
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create a psychosocial moratorium to gain more time to define their choices 
'for life'. The psychosocial moratorium is a socially sanctioned period for 
free role experimentation, a phase of prolonged adolescence, during which 
the individual can find a unique niche in society. How an individual 
masters their identity crisis decisively determines later life. For an 
individual to develop a healthy sense of identity, society must reinforce the 
integration of the individual in the societal system and encourage the ego to 
expand and to test its boundaries. 
The danger that accompanies this phase, is identity diffusion. Young people 
suffering from an identity crisis may over-identify with groups or cliques. 
that enrich their interaction with symbols, coded language, specific dress, 
music and rituals. Such identity anchors usually gain importance when no 
other values have been found to take their place. During a crisis of identity 
the adolescent searches for guidance. It is during this time when the 
individual is looking for idols and ideas that s/he is most vulnerable to 
radical ideology. 
If an individual is unable to master his or her identity crisis, one of the 
pathological expressions of this failure would be a crisis of intimacy. For 
Erikson intimacy not only meant sexual intimacy, but also the capacity to 
engage in mutual psychological intimacy. The inability to develop intimate 
relationships leads to the choice of highly stereotyped interpersonal 
relations during adulthood. A deep sense of isolation creates what Erikson 
calls, distantiation. Distantiation entails the readiness to protect one's social 
circle by emphasising small differences to demarcate boundaries between 
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those who do and do not belong. As adolescents these individuals can 
become extremely intolerant. To perpetuate group identity, the obvious 
communal traits have to be protected by excluding all that is different. Such 
intolerance and group protectionism are obvious defence mechanisms 
against identity diffusion. However, it can be exploited by politics and can 
become a dangerous weapon against a defined 'other'. ' 
Further clinical problems relating to identity crisis are diffusion of time 
perspective and industry and the choice of a negative identity altogether. 
The diffusion of time perspective consists of "a sense of great urgency and 
-. yet also of a loss of consideration for time as a dimension of livingi10. The 
individual may feel concurrently baby-like and extremely old. Activity -is 
slowed down and falling asleep as well as getting up the next morning to 
face the daily tasks becomes a burden for the young person. The wish to die 
has even been expressed by some of Erikson's patients, however it rarely 
becomes an actual identity choice in itself. 
Diffusion of industry regularly accompanies severe identity confusion. It 
expresses itself as an acute upset in one's sense of workmanship. The 
inability to concentrate on work, compensated for by a preoccupation with 
self-destructive one-sided activites, are symptoms, which Erikson observed 
among his patients. " 
The choice of a negative identity can sometimes serve as a compensation for 
the loss of a sense of coherent identity. An individual who opts for a 
negative identity, develops a hostile attitude towards the desirable roles that , 
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family and community offer. This reaction is a defence mechanism against 
excessive idealistic demands by over ambitious parents, which the 
individual feels that s/he cannot fulfil. 1.2 The psychological motive 
underlying the development of a negative identity is: If I can't be perfect at 
being good, then I will be perfect at being bad. 
With regard to identity formation among ethnic minorities, Erikson13 
suggested that the problems relating to identity crisis during adolescence 
originate in the doubt of ethnic dignity. An individual can respond to this 
problem by adopting either extreme of behaviour, being antisocial, 
aggressive and destructive or prosocial, heroic and creative. The positive 
approach, is a desperate attempt to gain acknowledgement for one's 
individuality and to encourage people to look beyond the colour of skin. 
When parents demonstrate to their children that they themselves have lost 
confidence in their ethnic identity, the sense of inferiority will be stored as a 
'value' by the individual's super-ego and causes a premature identity crisis 
that can emerge as early as at the age of three or four years. Pathological 
denial of appropriate ethnic identification and self-hatred result from this 
crisis. The adolescent may express an identity crisis by surrendering to the 
perceptions and prejudice of society and thus adopt a negative identity. 
Vandalism, drug addiction, withdrawal, tempers and dropping out of school 
are signs of such a negative identity. If positive qualities are not recognised 
and find no acknowledgement in the environment, the individual will 
attempt to be good at being bad by adopting the prejudically defined role. " 
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Although Erikson was the first psychoanalyst to develop an extended theory 
on identity formation throughout a human lifecycle, he admitted using the 
term identity with many different connotations. He referred to it as a 
conscious sense of individual uniqueness, but also as an unconscious 
striving of continuity or alternatively as solidarity with a group's ideals. " 
This made it very difficult to apply Erikson's theoretical construct of identity 
in clinical research. 
1.1.1.2. Marcia and the Identity Status Approach 
Marcia's research-on ego identity development is based on the identity status 
approach. This approach has been derived from Erikson's fifth stage of 
psychological development, which occurs during late adolescence. 16 The 
identity status approach is based on the assumption that any adolescent 
emerging from an identity crisis can be categorised into different modes of 
identity formation, referred to as the four identity statuses. The ultimate 
status of an adolescent's identity development is that of identity 
achievement. The individual successfully defines his or her commitments, 
after exploring and investigating putative alternatives. It was found that 
identity achievers have a higher capability than others to engage in intimate 
relationships and are most advanced in terms of their ego development. 
The second status is that of the moratorium. The individual tries to 
prolong the period of exploration, to gain time to define potential 
commitments. The subjects of that category were found to be overtly 
anxious and most sensitive with regard to interpersonal relationships. An 
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ambivalent relationship with parents and a tendency to either rebel or 
behave submissively were further traits found among individuals of this 
category. When an adolescent holds on to childhood-based values and has 
not yet explored the adult world, then the third status applies, foreclosure. 
Those subjects concerned continue to dwell in a sheltered family life and 
have close relationships with their parents. Other relationships they engage 
in tend to be superficial and stereotyped. Such individuals adopt 
authoritarian values and are cognitively rigid. 
Identity diffusion is the status attributed to an individual who is unable to 
define any direction in life and is retarded in his or her identity 
development. Individuals of this category feel isolated and rejected by their 
families, particularly from the parent of the same sex. They display the 
lowest levels of cognitive, moral and ego development and the 
environment can easily manipulate the self-esteem of such subjects. " 
In order to categorise individuals into the four identity statuses Marcia used 
semi-standardised and semi-structured interviewing methods. This 
method is sufficiently flexible to adjust to the different and sometimes 
changing social conditions of the interviewee and allows the interviewer to 
ask probing questions. Marcia outlined six aspects of identity development, 
which he derived from his own identity status research and that of others. 
1. Based on Erikson's theory "Identity formation occurs within a sequence 
of developmental stagesi78. Marcia assumed that the style of identity, 
which does not entail content, and future psychosocial modes of 
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development, can be predicted from the outcome of previous 
psychosocial stages. This is given that the nature of resolution of each 
psychosocial stage determines to a great extent the style of resolution of 
those stages that follow. 
2. An individual is not usually aware of his or her identity until 
contradictory experiences create a 'crisis'. Given that "Identity is a 
psychological structure -a process with a slow rate of change" 19 , the 
individual is expected to modify the identity structure, so that the new 
experience can be accommodated. 
3. A mature identity cannot be formed until late adolescence because only 
then are the necessary cognitive, social and psychological conditions 
given for it to occur. This does not necessarily means that an will 
individual achieve identity during late adolescence or that new 
contradictory experiences will not cause new identity crises throughout 
later life. However, the successful resolution of identity during 
adolescence in its full configuration will allow the individual to cope 
with future crises of identity and initiate a cycle of Moratorium - 
Achievement - Moratorium - Achievement, to guarantee a positive 
identity formation throughout adulthood. If an individual has not 
achieved identity during late adolescence, then disequilibrating events 
may initiate a crisis during early adulthood. If that is not the case then it 
will become rather difficult for an individual, e. g. with a severe identity 
diffusion, to achieve full identity configuration, unless s/he has an 
24 
environment that provides self-affirming support, which the parents 
refused to give? ° 
4. The initial identity formation at late adolescence may be the result of either a sum or a 
synthesis of childhood identifications, social appraisals, unique abilities and needs, 
psychological givens, and positive and negative results of social experimentation. 1 
Identity as a sum of childhood identifications is the result of family 
prescribed ideology and occupational choice. The individual did not have 
the opportunity to make his or her own choices in such matters, so that 
identity just 'happens' as the adolescent gradually becomes aware of it. In 
contrast, an identity based on ego synthetic processes is best formed when 
the individual is encouraged by his or her environment to make 
independent decisions for the future. Thus many individuals have an 
identity, although only some have a self-constructed identity. 
5. Conclusions about an individual's identity were previously drawn from 
the most frequent identity status assigned to each interview content area 
(e. g. occupation, religion, sexuality, etc. ). For example, it is possible for an 
individual to be assigned to moratorium in one area and an identity 
achiever in another. If an individual was revealed to be an identity 
achiever in the majority of the interview content areas, then s/he was 
rated as such. However, Marcia suggests that the results obtained from 
this method reflect the nature of the underlying structure of identity, 
rather than the nature of identity itself. 22 




Identity research in the field of psychology is predominantly based on 
Erikson's theory. It focuses on the psychological prerequisites and 
mechanisms underlying identity formation. The majority of the research 
on identity concentrates on identity development during childhood and 
adolescence. This is because radical changes occur less frequently in later life 
and that identity formation during adulthood is a slower process that is 
more difficult to analyse. However, more research is ongoing on identity 
development of women24 and their phase of transition to motherhood25. 
The essential aspects that can be isolated with regard to the psychological 
conceptualisation of identity formation are as follows: 
1. Identity is a dynamic process, yet maintains its continuity and sameness 
by assimilating and accommodating new, potentially disconfirming 
experiences by means of ego-synthesis. 
2. Identity formation takes place on all levels of mental functioning. It is 
predominantly a subconscious process, which one usually becomes 
aware of when it is in a state of crisis. 
3. Identity is the product of an individual's psychological resolution of 
experiences made during social interaction. 
4. The full configuration of identity may be formed for the first time during 
late adolescence. Identity crises are then most severe and their 
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resolution determines the nature of identity resolution during 
subsequent stages of the lifecycle. 
5. Identity based on ego synthetic processes, is the result of a social 
environment, which encourages individual choice. Identity, as the mere 
sum of childhood identifications, is the result of a social environment 
that predetermines the future of an individual. 
6. After adolescence identity formation takes place at a progressively slower 
rate. 
1.1.1.3. Weinreich's Study on Threatened Identities 
Peter Weinreich's study investigates the process of self-redefinition under 
circumstances that pose a threat to the identity of adolescents belonging to 
ethnic minorities. To do so he compared the identity development of 37 
indigenous English (15 boys and 22 girls), 32 'West Indian' (14 boys and 18 
girls), and 13 'Asian' (7 boys and 6 girls) adolescents from a school in Bristol. 
For his study Weinreich derived his definition of identity from Erikson 
(1958,1961) and Laing (1961) and incorporates the process of construal: 
One's identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one 
construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes 
oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the 
future. 6 
He developd two postulates with regard to the resolution of conflicted 
identifications and the formation of new identifications. The first states that 
one attempts to resolve one's conflicting identifications with others and 
does so by re-evaluating one's self in relation to the others within the 
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limitations of one's currently existing value system. The latter states that 
one's value system broadens as a result of further identifications with new 
individuals, which establishes a new context for one's self-definition. The 
consequent reappraisal of self and others depend on fundamental changes 
in one's value system. 7 
Weinreich further identified two sociopsychological factors that affect the 
socialisation of second generation ethnic minority adolescents as they 
become established in Britain. The first one is the nature of the intergroup 
relationship between the majority and minority group, and the second one 
is the confrontation with the differences between cultural values of distinct 
communities. 
The classic theories on identity and culture conflict, the majority of which 
are based on the study of black youth in the United States, support the idea 
that discriminated against ethnic minorities, internalise the derogatory 
images the majority has of them. The offspring of ethnic minorities are 
viewed as individuals who are torn between two cultures that they have 
internalised. They are forced to come to terms with the conflicting values of 
both cultures. 
Weinreich produced individually tailored rating sheets of bipolar constructs 
for his subjects (sampled as described above), based on their subjective value 
system to construe their perception of significant others. He found that the 
results did not support the discrimination/self-devaluation proposition. 
Discrimination on the grounds of neither 'race', nor sex results in self- 
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devaluation among second generation ethnic minority adolescents. On the 
contrary, the results demonstrated that West Indian and Asian youth rated 
higher in their mean self-esteem than their English counterparts. Although 
the English adolescents devalue Asian and West Indian adults and youth, 
such devaluation is not reflected by the West Indian results. Also girls from 
every ethnic background did not reveal any signs of low self-esteem, when 
compared to boys. Thus self-devaluation does not seem to be a direct 
consequence of discrimination, as assumed by previous studies. However, 
Weinreich found that girls have lower evaluations of their own sex, and of 
large segments of their environment without internalising this as.. a 
devaluation of the self. Girls were also found to have lower evaluations of 
boys. In comparison boys have a higher evaluation of their social 
environment and do not devaluate girls. 28 
Furthermore, Weinreich investigated whether ethnic minority adolescents 
face conflicts in identification with others and whether any identification 
conflicts have an impact on their self-esteem. For this purpose Weinreich 
defined identification, contra-identification, and identification conflict as 
follows: 
the extent of one's current identification with another is defined as the degree of 
similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other (whether 'good' or 'bad') 
and those of one's current self-image (me as I am now). 
Here the term identification circumscribes empathetic identification, which 
entails the recognition of common qualities with another person. 
Weinreich also referred to a second meaning of identification that entails an 
individual's desire to become like another admired person. This process is 
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referred to as role model identification, or idealistic-identification as it 
emphasises an individual's identification with another person's qualities, 
which are incorporated into the individual's ideal self-image. Conversely, 
an individual may also identify qualities in another person that are 
employed to form contrasting standards. Weinreich defines this process as 
follows: 
the extent of one's contra-identification with another is defined as the degree of 
similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those from which one 
would wish to dissociate. 29 
For Weinreich identification conflict constitutes the simultaneous processes 
of current- and contra-identifications, and therefore: 
the extent of a person's identification conflict with another is defined as a 
multiplicative function of that person's current- and contra-identifications with the 
other 30 
According to these definitions Weinreich's subjects were asked to create 
their own bipolar constructs of their current, past, and ideal self-image. The 
current construct of their self-image was then compared with the bipolar 
constructs previously created for the construal of significant other to 
determine the degree of identification with these significant others. The 
contra-value system is expected to correspond to the polar contrast of the 
positive value system derived from the construct of the ideal self-image. 
The contra-identification is determined by attributing contra-values to the 
other. Therefore the magnitude of identification conflict with others is the 
product of the degree of current- and contra-identification with 'others'. 
Weinreich interpreted a broad range of identification conflicts with 'others', 
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especially those conflicts where the magnitude is significant, as an analytic 
equivalent of Erikson's identity diffusion 31 
The results of Weinreich's study show that identification conflicts with 
individuals of their own ethnicity were salient in nearly all of the West 
Indian and Asian adolescents. However, Asian youths revealed a very low 
level of identification conflict with their parents compared to West Indian 
girls. Surprisingly West Indian boys, who also exhibited a low frequency of 
identification conflicts with parents, had the highest proportion of conflicts 
with the English. 
Weinreich hypothesised that this finding was a result of dual socialisation, 
as the first identifications made during primary socialisation with close 
family and members of their own cultural group are increasingly altered by 
the second socialisation process with members of the indigenous culture. 
Part-identifications and the adoption of some of the values of the 
indigenous population can lead to conflicts with primary identifications. 
Although this identity conflict is a result of growing up between two 
cultures, the results of this study show that it does not imply a devalued 
self-image and that ethnic identification conflicts vary according to both 
ethnicity and gender. As 'dual socialisation' results in greater identification 
conflicts, Weinreich assumed that youths of immigrant parentage will 
consequently exhibit greater degrees of 'identity diffusion' than indigenous 
adolescents. Weinreich found that his hypotheses held for girls, but not for 
boys. Weinreich interpreted the low level of identity diffusion among boys 
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as an expression of defensive high self-esteem. Girls may acknowledge their 
state of conflict more than boys who defensively deny it. 
Ethnic minority youth have a positive self-evaluation despite possible 
threats to their identity development. Weinreich tested the intensity of ego- 
involvement and idealistic-identification of youth with parents, siblings, 
teachers, peers, and others from both the minority and majority groups, to 
investigate which factors enable ethnic minority youth to maintain a 
positive self-evaluation. He-found that all the adolescents of the sample 
revealed less ego-involvement and idealistic-identification with teachers 
than with parents. All the girls exhibited less ego-involvement with both 
parents and teachers than boys. West Indian girls showed the lowest level 
of idealistic-identification with both parents and teachers and therefore 
seem to have the poorest orientation towards authority. In contrast Asian 
adolescents revealed the highest ego-involvement with parents and 
teachers. For all three ethnic groups their own peer group was more 
important than other peer groups, but for the West Indian and Asian 
adolescents, ethnic labelling had greater significance. The results of the 
West Indian youths indicated the least discrepancy between their own and 
other ethnic group preferences. Asian adolescents were consistent in their 
more positive orientation towards both Asian and English adults. With 
regard to siblings, all adolescents exhibited high ego-involvement with their 
most favoured sibling and same sex friend. Siblings are positive reference 
models, especially for Asian boys and English girls 32 
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Weinreich concluded that contrary to the discrimination/self-devaluation 
proposition, adolescents of immigrant parentage maintain a positive self- 
conception. This is because the adolescents do not draw their significant 
'others' from the indigenous population, as assumed by the proposition, but 
from their own ethnic group. For all ethnic minority youth ethnic labelling 
is salient in their identities. However, for the Asian youngsters their 
favoured siblings and same sex friends are positive reference models and 
reinforce their orientation towards parents. For West Indian girls these 
siblings and friends compensate for a poor orientation towards parents. The 
devaluation of ethnic minorities among the English had no impact on the 
self-conceptualisation of minority adolescents, due to. mutual low ego- 
involvement. Also 'discrimination against women' does not have an 
impact on the girl's self-conception. Compared to boys, girls revealed less 
ego-involvement with authority and adults, than with a favoured same sex 
friend. 
West Indian girls showed little ego-involvement with authority figures. 
Asian adolescents exhibited most respect for authority figures, which also 
transcended ethnic boundaries. The antiauthoritarian orientation of the 
West Indian girls is interpreted as diffused orientation and identity 
diffusion. The stronger identification with whites among West Indian boys 
is an indication for the salience of identification conflict with whites. These 
arguments may also explain why the West Indian youth is less successful at 
school than Asian adolescents 33 
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As the ethnic minority adolescents of the Bristol sample revealed conflicting 
identifications, Weinreich investigated further, whether these individuals 
strive to redefine their identities, in order to resolve conflict. Weinreich 
made six suggestions concerning ethnicity and changes of self-conception. 
" If any commonalty of identification conflicts exist with the primary 
ethnic group, then minority adolescents will attempts to resolve them by 
redefining themselves, particularly with regard to ethnically related 
issues. 
" Partial identification with values of the dominant culture will be 
included in their ethnic redefinition. 
" The re-identification of gender roles in accordance with -primary and 
secondary identifications is essential in the redefinition of ethnic 
identity. 
" The nature of ethnic re-definitions depend on the nature of 
identification with significant others and subsequent individual 
possibilities available to the person. 
" Common elements of ethnic redefinition, based on self-chosen but 
shared values, provide a source of 'inner strength' and result in a new 
ethnic coherence. 
" The indigenous population feels challenged by this process and will 
respond by reasserting their national identity 34 
Weinreich pointed out that although it is possible to make generalisations 
about the importance of ethnic awareness to an ethnic group, no common 
outcome or uniform concept can be established with regard to the 
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redefinition of ethnic identity. To illustrate the first four propositions 
concerning self-concept change, Weinreich referred to two case studies, a 
West Indian boy and girl, from the Bristol sample. He found that for the 
Jamaican boy ethnicity was salient in his first and second construal of self- 
concept. He had a strong affiliation with both Jamaican girls and a white 
woman and he also rejected 'black boys who steal'. During the second 
interview, after the boy had left school, a change of self-concept became 
apparent. As he was expecting a baby with a white girl and had been 
convicted of Actual Bodily Harm, he identified more strongly with his 
masculinity and was more aware of gender division according to both 
English and Jamaican norms. His self-evaluation had deteriorated and 
identifications with members of the indigenous population constitute an 
essential part of his re-identification. The different route of ethnic 
identification are illustrated by the contrast of the boy's and the girl's cases. 
During the first interview the girl was in a state of identity crisis. She had 
strongly identified with white girls who went out with West Indian boys. 
The former she perceived as passive and good and the latter as aggressive 
and bad. Her own self-evaluation was rather negative during the first 
interview, but had improved as she had radically altered her self-image and 
developed a robust ideal self-image, by the second interview. She managed 
to reappraise herself and instead of maintaining a passive role she came to 
feel that she could "control English girlsi35. According to the criteria of the 
propositions both case studies have illustrated the first three points and 
their comparison served as an illustration of the fourth. 
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Weinreich concluded that ethnic minority adolescents in Bristol perceived 
themselves, in many respects, like the English. They wish to be identified 
with various English characteristics but are conscious of their ethnic origins. 
Their Black British or Asian British distinctiveness will continue to evolve through 
processes of further redefinitions, predicted on their attempts to resolve identification 
conflicts grounded in their primary ethnic identifications, but subsequently associated 
with people representing different cultural values 36. 
Although such ethnic distinctiveness is not uniform, it will become a 
distinctively British subculture. 
1.1.1.3.1. Summary 
1. One's identity is the totality of one's self-construal. 
2. Discrimination does not result in self-devaluation because ethnic 
minority adolescents search for their significant 'other' among their own 
group. 
3. A person's identification conflict with another is a multiplicative 
function of that person's current- and contra-identifications with the 
other. 
4. Almost all the ethnic minority adolescents exhibited salient conflicting 
identifications with representatives of their own ethnicity, which is a 
consequence of growing up between two cultures. 
5. West Indian girls have an individualistic and antiauthoritarian 
orientation, while the respect for authority among Asian youth 
transcends ethnic boundaries. 
6. Ethnic identity is not a uniform concept. 
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7. To resolve identification conflicts individuals change their self-concept, 
which entails a change in salience of ethnicity; partial identification with 
dominant cultural values; dialogue of gender roles across ethnic 
boundaries; and variable routes towards ethnic re-definitions. 
1.1.2. The Social Psychological Approach 
Social psychology was only defined around the beginning of this century. 
Consequently, early authors such as George H. Mead, who were previously 
defined as social behaviourists, were categorised as social psychologists in 
. 
later years. Prior to Mead, 'sociological' theories were based on Darwin and 
the evolutionary conceptions. Accordingly, human interaction was based 
on biological stimulation and response. Mead placed that biological 
experience into a social context. Therefore he contributed a mental and 
individual dimension to human experience and built a bridge between 
social behaviourism and psychology. 
Mead also influenced a 'school of thought', which became known as 
'Symbolic Interactionism'. Herbert Blumer, introduced this term in 1937, to 
circumscribe a particular approach of pragmatic philosophers and social 
scientists alike. The difference in approach of mainstream and interactionist 
social psychology, is as follows. Methodologically symbolic interactionists 
create a theoretical framework that aims to make human social 
relationships generally comprehensible. This theoretical framework is then 
tested on individual case studies that either confirm, modify or falsify the 
theory. In contrast mainstream social psychologists do not accept case 
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studies as proof for the viability of a theory. Their methodology is more 
closely related to that of the natural sciences, and therefore hypotheses have 
to be tested by quantitative means to establish an acceptable theory. 
The interactionist approach views the human being as the "prime 
communicating animali37, which is able to employ shared significant 
symbols and is consequently capable of engaging in reflexive behaviour. 
Symbolic interactionism builds its theoretical framework on the human 
need to join into groups and to engage in social interaction, in order to 
secure survival and improve living conditions. To optimise interaction 
mutually. comprehensible symbols have to be employed. Thus symbolic 
interactionists investigate the meanings individuals attribute to situations 
that occur during interaction with other people. It is assumed that an 
individual's response to a situation is determined by previous experiences 
with similar situations. Therefore theorists aim to interpret peoples social 
interaction on the grounds of their biographies. Social groups are viewed by 
this approach, as a dynamic field. This dynamic field of social interaction is 
subjected to continuous change and formation as a result of human 
interaction. 
1.1.2.1. Mead and the Development of Self during Symbolic Interaction 
Mead influenced this approach by introducing the concepts of 'mind' and 
'self' as forms of activity, which are products of social interaction. According 
to Mead the identity or (used in the same way) the self, of an individual is 
not yet present at birth because it can only develop in a social context. Thus 
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an individual's self (= identity) develops during interaction with the 
environment and is the product of social experience. 38 
Mead introduced the concept of reflexivity and the distinction between a 
conscious and a subconscious identity. The subconscious identity is the 
product of the unreflected internalisation of social norms and behaviour. 
However, to develop a conscious identity the individual must be capable of 
self-reflection by becoming an object of analyses to himself. According to 
Mead, an individual cannot experience himself directly by becoming a 
subject to himself, but indirectly by becoming an object to himself. S/he 
does so, by taking the attitudes of other individuals, or the generalised 
standpoint of the social group as a whole, towards him- or herself within 
the commonly shared social environment. Therefore becoming a perceived 
object to him- or herself as much as the other individuals are objects within 
the realm of his or her experience 39 
For such 'self'-consciousness to occur, the symbols employed during 
interaction must have significance and commonly shared meanings. What 
Mead calls significant symbols are more than the mere stimulation of, and 
response to, gestures. The basic process of interaction can also be found 
among animals in that a gesture of a group member will cause other group 
members to respond and these responses are again stimuli for new 
responses. In the process of human interaction, gestures have to have 
meanings, which are shared by all the participants alike. For example, a 
vocal gesture gains meaning and becomes a significant symbol, if the 
individual has experienced in the past that it will cause the same typical 
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response in others as it does in him or herself. Thus the individual is able 
to anticipate the response of the other to his or her stimulus and can 
therefore mentally control this phase of interaction. Therefore the gesture 
or symbol has initiated both stimulus and response in the same person who 
introduced the stimulus. Mead referred to the exchange of significant 
symbols as significant communication, because the content of such 
communication reflects the common social experience of the individuals 
involved. Hence, significant communication is the precondition for 
anticipating the response of others in order to plan the course of interaction, 
which determines reflective intelligence. " 
It was highlighted that the employment of significant symbols is essential 
for an individual to develop 'self'-consciousness. Reflective intelligence is 
in turn a necessary condition for the development of a conscious identity. 
To develop a conscious identity and subsequently resolve a crisis of identity, 
an individual must be able to think about his or her 'self' nd in the case of 
an identity crisis, think about its possible sources. As consciousness is 
achieved through the use of significant symbols i. e. language, conscious 
identity is also an indirect result of significant communication. In order for 
an individual to think about and to reflect on his or her identity, s/he has to 
internalise the significant communication process to interpret his or her 
self. To develop a conscious identity is to reflect on one's self using the 
categories which were adopted through the social process of 
communication. 41 Thus a conscious identity is not an autonomous identity, 
as it is not based on a self that developed in independence from the social 
environment. The conscious identity remains embedded in the social 
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environment in which the individual acquired the significant 
communication process and the categories that determine his or her 
thought processes. Consequently identity crises would usually occur when 
an individual moves to a social environment, where the process of 
communication differs from that of his or her home environment. 
Compared to unconscious identity, conscious identity does have a moment 
of relative personal freedom. The social environment solely determines the 
unconscious identity. It is a product of adopted social conduct, which is 
determined by the general pattern of organised social activity and may take 
on rather ritualised forms of behaviour. In contrast, the conscious identity 
allows the individual to step outside of this ritualised form of interaction by 
reflecting the aim and tactic of his or her action 42 
To explain the relationship between the socially determined self and the 
aspect of individuality, Mead introduced the concepts of the 'I' and 'me'. 
The 'me' is the sum of organised sets of attitudes of others and it is the 
agent, which calls for the individual's responses to a specific situation. Thus 
the 'me' is the aspect of the self, of which an individual becomes aware, 
when s/he gains self-consciousness. It is always present and stores all social 
conventions, habits, and responses and represents the values of the group. 
The 'me' is "a member of the community, which represents the 'I' in the 
experience of the self. "43 The 'me' gives the T its form. The 'I' is aware of 
the social 'me', it is the response to social situations and reaction towards the 
attitudes of others which the 'me' internally represents. However, the 'I' is 
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more or less uncertain, although it responds to the 'me' as it calls for certain 
action, it maintains the freedom of initiative, which the 'me' does not. 44 
The conversation between the 'P and the 'me' constitute the self or the 
personality as it appears in social experience. For an individual to develop 
the ability to think and become an integral part of his or her community, 
s/he must be able to internalise the outer social world and adopt the rational 
social processes. At the same time the individual constantly changes his or 
her environment by reacting to social attitudes. The individual is little 
more than the 'me', s/he is conventional and mirrors the values of his or 
her environment and the slight adjustments which take place happen 
unconsciously. Conversely the individual has a definite personality and 
changes the environment by responding to organised attitudes. In this 
phase the 'I' is the more important aspect of the experience. Thus these two 
interacting aspects are-the important phases of the self, which constitute 
identity. " 
The dialectic between the 'me' and the 'I' within the self allows a person to 
feel sympathy for another. When an individual feels sympathy, his or her 
self is aroused by the attitudes of the other. S/he is then able to feel with the 
other person, as the attitude of the other was aroused within him or herself 
by his or her own attitude. 
To take a distinctively human, that is, self-conscious, social attitude toward another 
individual, or to become aware of him as such, is to identify yourself sympathetically 
with him, by taking his attitude toward, and his role in, the given social situation, and 
by thus responding to that situation implicitly as he does or is about to do explicitly; in 
essentially the same way you take his attitude towards yourself in gestural 
46 conversation with him, and are thus made self-conscious 
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Thus we feel sympathy when we can identify with another person, or feel a 
kind of selfsameness. According to Mead the identification with another 
person makes us in turn more aware of our self, our own identity. 
1.1.2.1.1. Summary 
1. At birth no identity is present. 
2. Identity is formed during interaction with the social environment. It is 
the ability to perceive one's life as a unity and as a part of the 
community. 
3. A person may or may not be conscious of his or her identity. The 
identity remains unconscious when an individual adopts social 
behaviour and conventions without reflecting on the social processes 
involved. In contrast, a conscious identity, or self-consciousness as Mead 
would refer to it, is achieved when the individual thinks about his or 
her behaviour. 
4. An individual becomes conscious of his or her identity through the 
language s/he acquired in social interaction, with which s/he can think 
about his or her self. The language is a system of significant symbols. A 
gesture becomes a significant symbol when the individual can anticipate 
the response of others to the gesture, and can therefore plan the process 
of interaction. 
5. The human ability to gain self-consciousness is based on reflective 
intelligence. Reflective intelligence is the ability to postpone response in 
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order to act in a planned fashion. Therefore conscious identity is the 
result of cognitive processes. 
6. Conscious identity does not develop independently from the 
environment, as the categories with which self-consciousness is 
achieved, are acquired through processes of social interaction. 
7. Mead tried to resolve the contradiction between social determination and 
individuality by introducing the 'I' and the 'me' as aspects of the self. 
8. The 'me' is determined by social conventions and values, while the 'I' is 
the response to social situations, it has the freedom of initiative. The 
conversation between the 'I' and the 'me' constitute the self - the identity. 
9. An individual feels sympathy for another when the attitudes of the other 
are also aroused within him/her. The feeling of sympathy for another 
allows an individual to identify with that person and thus to gain more 
self-consciousness. 
1.1.2.2. Strauss' Concept of Status Passage 
Anselm Strauss aimed to fuse symbolic interactionism and social 
organisational perspectives and integrate them into social psychology. Like 
most social psychologists and sociologists Strauss did not approach the 
question of identity from the viewpoint of the structure and organisation of 
personality, but focused on the social processes from which identity 
emerges, namely the symbolic and cultural foundations of its structure. 
Thus Strauss aims to develop a framework for the analyses of the social and 
cultural influences which determine change of adult identity. 
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For Strauss, language is central to the discussion of identity. Alone the 
name of an individual can reveal significant information about both the 
donor and the owner. Strauss gave the example of first generation Jewish 
immigrants to the United States, who had Biblical names such as Isaac, 
Benjamin, and Ruth; however, among the third generation these names are 
very uncommon. The name of an individual carries the judgement of the 
namer and it can evoke various reactions as to how 'others' expect the 
individual, who received the name, to be. Individuals, who change their 
name voluntarily, usually do so to make particular statements about their 
'new' self-image. The change of name usually marks passage, for instance 
when criminals serve as state witnesses and receive in return a new name 
and identity under the witness protection program, or ex-terrorists or 
revolutionists publicly bury their past by adopting different names. 
However, passage does not always entail burying a negative past. It can also 
be the expression of a change in status for example, when a bride receives 
the surname of her husband, or a convert wishes to signify the inner change 
by adopting a name, which emphasised his or her conviction. Sometimes a 
title is added to a name that usually indicates the membership of a status- 
group or a social class. Thus names also reveal qualities and 
classifications. 47 
The attribution of names to 'objects' facilitates the identification of the 
object. By identifying an object we classify it, or place it within a category, 
thus marking its boundaries. Whenever we classify, our experiences of the 
past and expectations of the future are employed. Our expectations are the 






T as a subject reviews the 'me' as an object, lead to new decisions and 
possibly to new courses of action. 
Strauss suggested that the danger of dispossession essentially influences an 
individual's relationship with his or her environment. Individuals tend to 
express their self-regard and social status by acquiring particular possessions. 
Following a catastrophe, people who lost property, in which they had 
invested a lot of time and effort, are often not quite themselves any more. 
Also the reverse is true. When people undergo personal change, the 
meaning of previous possessions and relationships lose their meaning to 
the individual. Therefore the change of identity demands a reconstitution 
of human relationships, possessions and other people's regard. 
Strauss did not restrict potential losses to material objects, but included the 
possibility of losing one's world. Here an individual is temporarily unable 
to evaluate or characterise an important aspect of his or her 'me'. S/he is 
aware of a gap between the experience of critical events and his or her 
understanding of them. Conventional explanations seem inadequate, 
which leads the individual to question the explanatory terminology that 
s/he was taught. When that process leads to the rejection of most of the 
explanations s/he once believed in, then Strauss referred to the state of this 
individual as alienated and as having lost his or her world. In such a 
situation, an individual's commitments to significant others and to him or 
herself have been weakened. In contrast, a person who 'knows his or her 
world' is able to make strong commitments, has a strong particular 
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conception of his or her self, and has expectations of how to respond to 
situations. Thus one of the prerequisites for commitment is conviction. 49 
Commitment entails making 'investments', that is to involve oneself with, 
to care for, to be concerned with, and to identify with something. In this 
sense 'action' is more than just a means of doing, it is a way of being. It 
follows that there is a link between commitments and a sense of identity. 
Commitment related identity becomes particularly apparent when an 
individual is strongly involved in a group or company with well defined 
goals. Others identify such an individual with his or her activities and 
consequently with the group itself. Some individuals may devote 
themselves exclusively to the realisation of group goals and are prepared to 
sacrifice other commitments that are also dear to them. For Strauss self- 
sacrifice is the ultimate expression of devotion and "signifies often the 
firmest of identities and the most total of commitments"so 
A less drastic, but nevertheless constant, determinant of adult identity is, 
according to Strauss, face-to-face interaction. Face-to-face interaction is a 
fluid process, during which individuals take successive stances vis-a-vis 
each other. In this process, objects and situations have to be identified and 
one's own identity has to be established for oneself and others. The 
recognition of another person's identity provides orientation for action. 
Both one's own identity and that of others are not always given in every 
situation. For example, when a known person responds in an unfamiliar or 
cold manner although conversation was polite, a number of questions 
emerge. What is going on? Have I said something wrong? Who am I in 
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this situation? Or is something else worrying the other? As a result this 
ambiguous situation will serve as motivation to take further steps in the 
flow of communication. In turn one's own motives are also scrutinised by 
others. The "placement of identities in undefined situations also involves 
questions of self placementi51. For Strauss the anticipation of 
consummations and consequences, the interpretation of a situation by 
interpreting past and future behaviour, were motivational statements. 
Motivational statements serve as a justification of any overt actions that 
follow. Thus individuals, the self, and the interpretation of situations, 
determine the structure of an act. 
Strauss highlighted the fact that during face-to-face interaction errors of 
judgement may occur. During the process of assessing another individual's 
intent in a situation, a person has to avoid delusion and anxiety. The same 
applies to the process of self-assessment, in which an individual adopts the 
viewpoint of the other and of his or her self. These elements are phases 
through which participants move, in the course of their interaction. It 
follows that these phases can signify temporal changes in the relationship 
between the participants. Strauss does not view the interaction between two 
individuals as two separate actions, but as an interrelationship that 
constitutes singleness. Therefore a whole conversation in a developing 
relationship can also be considered as one phase. When such an interaction 
evolves into an involvement, then new complications may arise. There 
may be a dissonance of commitment or intensity between the two actors and 
consequently the phases will proceed at different paces for each individual. 
By moving through phases of interaction, 'self-other' involvements are also 
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marked by gradual movement. Such movement can be accelerated. by 
certain events, like falling in love. Crucial events, whether positive or 
negative, can mark turning points in self-regard and personal identity 52 
Some interactions are easy to interpret and the individual is aware of the 
status s/he has in this process. Yet, situations may emerge during which the 
status of an individual is redefined. Generally the passage from one status 
to another is socially controlled, individuals are sensitive to interactional 
cues and comply within the social rules. However, every kind of group is 
able to force a member into various temporary or lasting identities. Strauss 
referred to this process as 'status-forcing'. A person can be forced in or out of 
a group and his or her status can be degraded or enhanced. The strategy 
employed for this purpose is to induce shame in a person, by categorising an 
individual's actions as foolish or shameful to maximum effect. Those 
individuals who manipulate the status of others are either certified agents, 
such as judges and priests, or have certified themselves, such as a lynching 
mob. Status forcing usually results in the reassessment of identities. It may 
be triggered by satirical judgements of others or by crucial events during 
interaction. Even if the previous position of an individual is restored (e. g. 
by apology), the participating individuals and their relationships, will never 
be the same as when they entered interaction. 
To avoid a negative status placement individuals aim to control their 
interactions. Sometimes others are less inclined to acknowledge an 
individual's presentation of his or her identity, leading him or her to doubt 
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whether s/he has control over the interaction process. Thus control and 
loss of control over interaction have an impact on self-regard and identity. 
When Strauss investigated transformation of identity, he assumed that a 
person will essentially be the same, but can nevertheless change 
considerably during a lifetime. Some identity transformations tend to be 
fostered by institutions, whilst others take place outside of regulated spheres 
of influence. The most obvious transformation of adult identity occurs 
when critical incidents produce turning points during the onward 
movement of personal careers. While lesser changes (i. e. in relationships 
_ with others) may pass unnoticed, more striking shifts are recognised as 
`milestones' and lead to new viewpoints and alignments. One example, 
which Strauss provided to illustrate institutionalised transformation, is that 
of conversion. When institutionalised changes take place, the path of 
development is foretold. Often such a forecast is received with disbelief as 
implications and future are not yet fully understood. Predictions are 
generally formulated with new vocabulary, which gradually will be adopted 
by the convert to provide a new context for the perception of environment. 
The predictions are then compared to the subsequent experiences made and 
as experiences confirm the predictions, the individual is able to recognise 
his or her transformation. Rituals that give meaning and constitute turning 
points in self-conception mark institutionalised paths. If self-change occurs 
outside of an organised sphere then individuals announce it to make a 
stance, blocking an unwanted return to the previous self. Turning points 
are usually followed by imposed or self-imposed challenges, which if passed, 
confirm the newly acquired status. Deliberate courting of temptation thus 
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tests moral and ideological transformations, as the social environment can 
more easily detect overt resistance than covered desire. 'Backsliding', or 
failure to resist temptation, results in reassessment of self-regard. In turn, 
when an individual is unexpectedly entrusted with new tasks and manages 
to handle them well, then the environment will view him from a new 
perspective and realignment in self-regard is due. 
According to Strauss, ambivalence in self-regard occurs once an individual's 
personal career exceeds that of another after whom s/he had formally 
patterned him or herself. Overtaking a model can paralyse an individual 
who then returns to the status s/he departed from. 
Another cause for transformation can be an experience of betrayal by a 
highly regarded 'object' of identification. In relation to such betrayal Strauss 
names three varieties of implications. 
9 Identification with a model involves internalisation of his or her values 
and motives. If the model abandoned his or her values, then the 
individual can continue on this path and possibly chose a new model. 
However, if the model had built an illusory hierarchy of values and 
deceived the individual, then self-hate and subsequent abandonment of 
the former self may be the consequence. The individual's perception of 
the self and self-classification is disoriented. In this case the degree of 
negative impact on an individual's identity depends on the extent that 
which major self-referential terms were destroyed. 
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" The second variety of betrayal Strauss described in terms of the response 
it elicits. An individual, who cannot rationalise how a beloved one 
could betray his or her values, will search for atonement. This search 
could entail the repetition of the very act of betrayal in order to eradicate 
the separating contradiction between the individual and the beloved 
one. 
" The third form of betrayal is that of rejection. If an individual is rejected 
by his/her role model, then s/he will feel inadequate which in turn has a 
destructive impact on self-regard 53 
For Strauss, every individual experiences status-passage during his or her 
personal career. For instance a woman will leave her family to marry and 
become a wife and eventually a mother. During all kinds of personal 
careers someone else was at this stage of development before. The support 
and advice of more experienced individuals provides a sense of continuity. 
Most experiences are rationalised by those who were there before, to prepare 
the newcomer for the tasks ahead. Passage involves a change of action, 
demeanour and language related to the new task. The passage from one 
status to another, or the frustration related to unwillingly remaining in a 
status, changes the development of identities. 
Some status-passages are presupposed by periods during which an 
individual is coached. A coaching relationship. involves mutual trust and 
faith, which are the foundations for identification. The pupil is inclined to 
model the self after the coach or some of his or her aspects. The coach 
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defines direction and aims, and eventually creates a new identity for the 
pupil. The dangers accompanying such a relationship are improper 
counselling, premature separation, and too strong positive or negative 
emotional ties, all of which can leave a pupil helpless or lead him or her 
into a learning crisis. In the course of coaching the trainer has to challenge 
old modes of thinking and doing by which s/he challenges old identities. 
The coach then introduces new perspectives, thus not only conveying new 
skills but preparing the foundation for a change in identity. At a certain 
stage the pupil will discover his or her own style and become more 
independent. Although the coach may think that s/he has control over the 
development of the student, the nature of coaching as a matter of fact 
initiates unpredictable changes of identity. 
To illustrate a fundamental change of identity, namely that of dis- 
identification and identification, Strauss cited the example of brainwashing 
in China following the Cultural Revolution. In this context identity is 
closely related to specific group loyalties. External agents such as 
governments are concerned with securing the allegiance of the population, 
especially during phases of crises. When an individual has to cope with the 
existence of contradictory loyalties, such as the Japanese-Americans during 
the Second World War, an oath of allegiance to one of the parties can elicit a 
tremendous battle of conscience, as it entails the official and irrevocable 
burning of bridges. In China the government destroyed class loyalties by 
applying particular methods of 'brainwashing' on students. To achieve dis- 
identification with one's family and social class and to foster new 
identifications with country and party, students at school and university 
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were engaged in extensive political discussions. Apart from attending 
lectures and keeping diaries available for inspection, students had to 
participate in 'field work' to experience the true value of hard labour. 
Students had to witness executed punishments of landlords. When girls 
broke down in tears they were scolded for having too sentimental feelings 
for their enemies. Self-criticism was demanded and essays were assigned in 
which students had to report about their parents, grand-parents and friends. 
These essays were collected, criticised by the class, and later compared to 
previous essays in order to illustrate progress in development. Students 
were also encouraged to talk about their views on society to the rest of the 
class. In the course of these presentations students were introduced to new 
vocabulary with which they had to rename and thus re-evaluate 'objects' 
and events. Past actions had to be re-categorised and old motives reassessed, 
which forced the individual to interpret his or her reasons for past actions 
in a different light. Past interaction processes whereby former identities 
received validation were eroded to create a foundation for approved 
substitutes and turning points were enforced by coercing individuals into 
betraying their family and friends. 
Strauss noted that the process of religious conversion also involves dis- 
identification with previous values and ways of life. Individuals undergo 
different stages as they change their identity. Consequently old allegiances 
are abandoned while new ones are formed. Those individuals who are 'lost' 
on the way of conversion are usually unable to return to their old selves 
and have to search for a new identity altogether 5a 
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In his chapter 'Phases: Institutional and Personal' Strauss introduced the 
concept of temporal identity. He argued that different statuses and identities 
are socially scheduled and have therefore a temporal dimension. As 
mentioned previously, a status influences the behaviour of an individual. 
Thus the company manager behaves differently to his or her colleagues 
than he does at home where he assumes the status as a father, brother or 
son. A status has in turn a phase-like character. The Prime Minister, for 
example, should attempt to fulfil electoral pledges during the first two years 
in office, while in his or her final year s/he prepares for re-election. 
Although the status as Prime Minister does not change during the period of 
office years, the phases change, from proving viability to seeking 
maintenance in office. Therefore certain identities are temporal and the 
demand on the individual is to juggle different temporal placement ss 
As individuals undergo change a certain degree of continuity is maintained. 
Individuals live with people of their own generation and different ages. 
Although generational differences do exist, every generation forms the next 
in their own image. Strauss identified three generational relations: vertical, 
horizontal, and diagonal. The vertical relation is obviously marked by the 
hierarchy of age and the horizontal one is the relation with peers. The 
diagonal and the horizontal relations are interesting with regard to 
interaction between minority groups and wider society. Not only do older 
generations serve as advisors due to their experience, they are also an 
example of how to deal with the occurrences of the 'same' time in a different 
way, as they are confronted with these at different stages of their lives. 
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A way of actively minimising identity change is to acquire a reputation. If 
an individual is able to make his or her abilities recognised s/he will be 
employed in these areas and thus avoid failure in other areas. As most 
group memberships are voluntary, individuals can join groups in which 
their potentials are recognised and withdraw from other groups where they 
are not fully accepted or where their weaknesses are emphasised. At the 
same time an individual may fail to recognise the change. Strauss pointed 
out that: 
Awareness of significant change is a symbolic matter. A change must be deemed 
important before it and kindred changes can be perceived as vitally important s6 
An individual makes sense of his or her past by symbolic ordering of events. 
In the light of an overriding purpose of life, the individual tends to 
interpret past action in a convincingly coherent way. Although motives 
change over the years, new meanings are discovered with new experiences 
and the diversity of past identities are reconciled in a new overall 
framework. Thus perceived constancy of identity is not a result of actual 
constant behaviour, but of interpretation. 7 
Strauss emphasised that for the study of identity, historical research is 
essential, as both personal and social histories have to be taken into 
consideration. Each individual is a member of a group that is a product of 
the past. Thus every individual is defined by a historical context. Even 
when individuals are ignorant of their family histories, still impacts on 
their identity. Examples include the numerous Americans who came to 
Europe during the past decade to research their family trees. Collectives, 
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who have newly unified, tend to invent a historical past in the image of the 
idealised present and future. Nationalistic movements have repeatedly 
illustrated this phenomenon. A further component of human history is 
that every generation perceives the past in new terms. Personal identity is 
closely related to group identity, as people's identities are built around their 
stance toward their historical past. Some may identify with it, some may 
reject it, while others may want to escape it. However, no matter which 
position an individual takes toward his or her historical past, it constitutes a 
part of his or her identity 58 
1.1.2.2.1 Summary 
1. Strauss investigated influences that change adult identity, but did not 
define identity itself. 
2. For Strauss language is essential for the formation of identity. He 
challenged Mead by arguing that symbols do not always have the same 
meaning for all participants and therefore situations may frequently be 
ambiguous. Ambiguity is the source of innovation and creativity. 
3. Identity comprises the classifications individuals make which direct the 
course of their actions. 
4. Dispossession of property and losing one's world can change an 
individual's identity. The reverse is also true, where the change of 
identity can alter an individual's relation to property and to other people. 
Thus relationships have to be reconstituted. 
5. Personal conviction is a presupposition for the ability to invest and 
commit oneself. Commitment is closely linked to identity. 
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6. Face-to-face interactions entail the placement of one's own identity and 
that of others. 
7. Critical events during face-to-face interactions can lead to loss of status or 
force an individual into another status. Such processes as well as an 
individual's ability or inability to control them, change an individual's 
identity. 
8. Conversion entails dis-identification with old values and the previous 
ways of life and the adaptation of new vocabulary, which both encourage 
the re-categorisation of past experiences. 
9. An individual can adopt temporal identities during different phases of 
development within a status. 
10. Historical research is essential for the study of identity, as every 
individual is defined by a historical context, which influences his of her 
identity. 
1.1.2.3. Tajfel's Concept of Social Categorisation 
In his analyses of the social psychology of minorities Henri Tajfel provided 
valuable insight into how internal and external factors of inter-group 
relations influence minority group identity. However, Tajfel maintained 
that all the assumptions and generalisations made in his framework cannot 
apply to all members of all minority groups. His aim was to define some of 
the problems that members of minorities have in common and possible 
psychological solutions available under the social conditions that these 
minorities live. 
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According to Tajfel, everyone divides their social world into social 
categories. It follows that a complex society can be perceived as the sum of 
different kinds of minority groups defined by region, profession, age, or 
political affiliation. Individuals are assigned or self-assigned as members of 
a group with common criteria, which instigates discriminatory treatment 
from others. These individuals then become aware of belonging to a 
minority group and thus develop internal group cohesion as a result. 
Whether or not individuals accept being placed in a low-status minority 
group depends upon the awareness and clarity of boundaries between the 
minority and the majority. Members of the majority will always find it 
easier to develop a positive social identity than members of a minority, as 
minorities are usually attributed to an inferior status. 
According to Tajfel, those minority individuals who accept their inferior 
status exhibit a high level of self-hatred, as they desire satisfactory self- 
realisation but are aware of the fact that their minority status will inhibit 
them from achieving it. For Tajfel such self-hatred is not necessarily 
absorbed in the personal identity of the individual but remains part of social 
identity. Tajfel described two extreme ways in which individuals may 
respond to their acceptance of such a status. The majority of them would 
fall somewhere between these two extremes. On one extreme, individuals 
may refrain from making any social comparison with wider society, 
rejecting their norms and values, and reasserting their own group values or 
creating new groups in which values and norms are fostered to provide a 
sense of personal worth. Conversely, a minority group may disintegrate 
because it is unable to maintain its social identity within the system. 
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Tajfel identified three systems of belief according to which the minority 
group perceives itself and wider society. 
Firstly, individual social mobility cannot change an individual's social 
membership. The criteria for categorisation are so salient that it is 
considered to be impossible for an individual to become an 
indistinguishable member of the majority. 
Secondly, the assigned category is based on defining criteria, which are 
shared by all members of the minority and has social consequences for most 
members of the group, despite the fact that there are individual differences 
between the group members. 
For the third system of beliefs, which relates to. the minority's own 
perception of difference, Tajfel distinguished between three different types 
of minorities and their respective beliefs. 
" Assimilative type of minority groups, such as the West Indian students59 
who expected to merge with other students at university. However, due 
to their skin colour their sense of separateness and common identity was 
imposed from the outside. The barriers erected by the majority did not 
allow these students to assimilate into their environment and forced 
them to become aware of a new affiliation, that of `black consciousness'. 
As a result of their marginalisation these minority individuals 
developed separate group cohesion. 
" Religious, national or ethnic groups who wish to preserve their cultural 
or social identity and complement the social restraints exerted by the 
majority by employing additional internal pressure on their members. 
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" Minorities that try to eradicate some of the differences and merge with 
wider society, provided no barriers are evident. They are aware of their 
cultural or social distinctiveness and even maintain some of their 
characteristics as they merge, but the clear boundaries that confined the 
group in the past were weakened. Examples of such a type of minority 
would be the Scots or Catholics living in England. When the attempt to 
merge is met with strong social and psychological opposition by the 
majority, then this kind of minority will develop a new consciousness of 
belonging and reassert their old group affiliations. 
For Tajfel these group identities consist psychologically of cognitive, 
evaluative and emotional components. The cognitive component 
represents the individuals' awareness of being distinctly different from 
others. The evaluative components are the values assigned to the 
membership of this group such as social status and unfavourable 
judgements about their characteristics. The emotional component also 
consists of the emotional investments made in one's membership. 60 
When a minority was assigned an inferior social and psychological status its 
members will see no alternative other than to accept or reject it. Tajfel 
suggested that for those minority members who subordinate to the 
inferiority status, the system of inequality must be perceived as stable and 
legitimate. Thus the minority cannot conceive any cognitive alternatives to 
the existing system of intergroup relations. Those minority individuals, 
who are able to improve their mode of life within the existing system and 
are respected, tend to be perceived as exceptions to the rule by members of 
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the wider society. Their personal career does not affect the attitude of the 
majority towards their group. 
Tajfel identified four processes, which are essential to intergroup relations 
and the social psychology of minorities, namely social categorisation, social 
identity, social comparison, and psychological distinctiveness. Tajfel defines 
social identity of an individual 
as consisting of those aspects of their self-image and its evaluation which derive from 
membership of social groups that are salient to them; and, in turn, much of that self- 
image and of the values attached to it derive from comparisons with other groups 
which are present in the social environment. 1 
The comparisons involved in the formation of social identity elicit a 
reflection of the past, present and future of inferiority, which enforce the 
desire to defend one's right to self respect. Tajfel stated that all individuals 
seek to establish a positive social identity. As social comparison and social 
categorisation are the means of acquiring a social identity, an individual has 
to come to a favourable conclusion with regard to the social comparison 
made between the in-group and other social groups. To come to a positive 
evaluation of one's own minority group, the individuals concerned have to 
acknowledge and assert existing differences. Especially when the system is 
essentially unstable the minority will reject the status quo, which is to their 
disadvantage. When the minority individuals' evaluations of social 
comparison are positive they are able to develop and maintain a positive 
self-image and sense of social identity. To achieve an honourable and 
acceptable form of separateness or differentiation and to become accepted in 
society as equals, the minority can adopt the following strategies: 
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1. To try to change the values in the social system, entailing encouraging 
social change. 
2. To develop social creativity by creating new forms of comparison by 
which to enhance a sense of positive social identity. For that purpose, 
Tajfel identified two forms of social creativity: the first is to attempt a re- 
evaluation of the existing group characteristics that carry an 
unfavourable connotation; the second is to revitalise old traditions and 
to give them a positive significance or create new characteristics to 
produce positive psychological distinctiveness. 
3. To be mobile and to leave or distance oneself from the group. 
Irrespective of the outcome and_ consequence of social. comparison every , 
individual will strive for a positive psychological distinctiveness. 62 
1.1.2.4. Hutnik's Study on Ethnic Minority Identity 
In her study Nimmi Hutnik investigated the social identity of second 
generation South Asian adolescents and compared it to that of their English 
peers. Hutnik approaches the analyses of identity by focusing on the 
individuals' self-esteem, ethnic salience, and styles of cultural adaptation. 
For Hutnik one fundamental aspect of social identity was the identification 
with one's ethnic group. However, ethnic identity only becomes salient 
when individuals are confronted with other ethnic groups. For members of 
an ethnic majority identification with their ethnic group develops naturally 
and without conflict, whereas for ethnic minorities this process is more 
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complicated, for their group usually suffers inferior status relative to the 
majority group 63 
Experiments with black children in the United States have shown that 
many had internalised white values about their group. Consequently they 
also identified with the white group and rejected their own. Psychologists 
thus came to believe that this pattern of identification must have a harmful 
and sometimes destructive impact on the individual's level of self-esteem. 
To illustrate this point Hutnik referred to Milner's research of 1975 on 
`identity', -'preferences', 'stereotypes' and 'aspiration' among 100 West .. 
Indians, 100 Indians and Pakistanis, and 100 white English children aged 
between five and eight in Britain. These children attended multi-racial 
infant and junior schools in Brixton and Southall, in London. Milner used 
the doll and picture techniques, to elucidate the children's identity. The 
children were asked to attribute value judgements to both the black and 
white doll, to pick the preferred doll, to point out the doll which looks most 
like the child, parents, sisters and friends and to chose the doll which 
represents the family the child wants to live next door to when s/he is 
grown up, etc.. Milner's experiment demonstrates that Asian and West 
Indian children show an obvious preference for and aspirations to the white 
majority group. Their stereotypes about whites were positive and about 
their own group negative. The proportion of misidentifications with whites 
as an ideal identification was far less among the Asian group than among 
the West Indian group. In response to the question 'Which doll looks most 
like you? ' 100 per cent of the white children, 76 per cent of the Indian and 
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Pakistani children and only 52 per cent of the black children made the 
correct choice. As far as ethnic preference is concerned all the white 
children, 82 per cent of the black children, and 65 per cent of the Asians 
would rather be white. While none of the white children had negative 
stereotypes about their own group, 72 per cent of the black children and 65 
per cent of the Asians did. These results clearly show that Asian and black 
children tend to devalue their own group and show a preference for the 
white majority. " 
Although these results fall in line with many previous and subsequent 
studies such as those of Clark and Clark (1947),. Fox-and Jordan . 
(1973),, Gitter 
et a!. (1972), Gregor and McPherson (166a), Morland (1962) and Vaughan 
(1964). They -interpret the preference for the white stimuli and 
misidentification of racial category as evidence for self-rejection and self- 
hatred in minority group children and as prejudice in the white subjects. 
More recent studies show that ethnic minority children no longer opt to 
identify with the majority group. Davey and Mullin (1980), Epstein et al. 
(1976), Hraba and Grant (1970), Milner (1983), Rice et al. (1974) and Ward and 
Brown (1972) supported the theory that the socio-political climate of the 
Black Liberation Movement of the 1960s had an essential impact on the self- 
esteem of the black minority groups. Consequently the promotion of a black 
consciousness, 'Black is beautiful', encourages the trend to an own-group 
preference. Ward and Brown (1972) found that those children who chose 
the black dolls revealed higher levels of self-esteem. However, the results of 
Branch and Newcombe (1980), showed that children of black activist parents 
were more inclined to make white doll preferences than children of less 
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activist parents. Nevertheless, studies made by Gaskell and Smith (1981), 
Louden (1978a, b), Porter and Washington (1979), Rosenberg (1965) and 
Williams-Burns (1980) show that there is little difference between black and 
white self-esteem 65 
In the light of these findings Hutnik (1991) investigated minority identity of 
second generation South Asian youth. In eleven in-depth interviews with 
second generation Asians, Hutnik tried to determine the intensity of her 
subjects' ties to their country of ethnic origin and of their inter-ethnic 
relations. Questions referring to friendships with white and South Asian 
youth. revealed that the majority of the South Asians had close friends 
among white youth and six out of eleven claimed to have a higher 
proportion of white than Asian friends. As far as projections for future 
brides and bridegrooms are concerned, there was a general preference for 
British born Asians as potential partners. 66 
As previous studies on ethnic minority identity showed that a high 
percentage of coloured children manifested self-hatred and denial of their 
ethnic origin, Hutnik posed an undisguised and very direct question about 
their ethnic identity: Do you sometimes wish that you were white? The 
majority responded with 'no' to this question, although three replied with 
'yes'. Their reasons were very pragmatic and related to the advantages and 
liberties white youth enjoy. 
Hutnik's investigation on how the youngsters describe their position in 
society revealed a high level of assimilation of some individuals, while 
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others showed a high level of dissociation. In turn some felt different from 
the white community but at the same time felt that they fit into and 
belonged to both. All in all Hutnik came to the conclusion that 
... many of them had achieved a healthy level of adjustment without a loss of their 
ethnic identity ... and achieved a creative synthesis of the two, sometimes very 
disparate, cultures. 7 
The youngsters consider Britain as their home although more than half of 
them had experienced some form of racially motivated verbal abuse. 
To elicit more detailed information about the identity components of her 34 
English native, 44 South Asian (originating from India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh) and 32 Afro-Caribbean (originating from Africa but having 
lived over many generations in the West Indies before entering Britain) 
subjects, Hutnik used a modification of the Twenty Statements Test (TST). 68 
The average age of her subjects was 14.6 years old and only 18 were born 
outside of Britain. The subjects were drawn from two schools in Oxford and 
two schools in Birmingham. 69 The results of this test showed that race and 
nationality were not as salient as inter-personal style, physical self, psychic 
style and competence. So the response of the minority individuals was 
similar to that of their English peers in so far as their impact on their 
environment and the other sex were more important. Hutnik concluded 
from these identity profiles: 
(1) that there is no 'racial' or particularly 'ethnic' personality profile that is typical 
of any of the three ethnic groups studied here; and 
(2) that although nationality and race are mentioned by some South Asians and some 
Afro-Caribbeans, ethnicity as measured on these dimensions is by no means of 
overriding concern to the whole South Asian or whole Afro-Caribbean group 70 
68 
As the self-conception of these ethnic minority adolescents did not focus on 
ethnicity, Hutnik coded the dimensions of ethnicity, race, nationality, and 
religion of each individual's protocol. Subjects from all three ethnic groups 
were assigned to one of two mutually exclusive groups, those referring to 
that dimension and those who did not. For independent samples, the chi- 
squared (x2) test was used to analyse the data. " 
The results showed that in both groups ethnicity is salient, but in different 
dimensions. While 55 per cent of the South Asians mentioned aspects of 
national identity-in the positively phrased section, only 28 per cent of the 
Afro-Caribbeans did. For the negation 36 per cent of the South Asians 
differed themselves from other national -groups, in contrast to only 9 per 
cent of Afro-Caribbeans. In comparison, the English participants showed 
higher national self-consciousness than the Afro-Caribbeans, leaving the 
Afro-Caribbeans with the lowest sense of national identity. As for religion, 
the second highest dimension, 62 per cent of South Asians referred to it as 
an aspect of self-definition, compared to 39 per cent of Afro-Caribbeans and 
38 per cent of the English. In the form of negation religion was no major 
marker. The race dimension was most significant for the Afro-Caribbean 
group. Fifty-three per cent referred to their colour and 30 per cent 
dissociated themselves from being white. While the declaration of their 
race seemed important for 21 per cent of the English, only 9 per cent of the 
Asian participants mentioned it and 6 per cent differentiated themselves 
from others. These results revealed that ethnicity is more salient in each 
minority group than in the English group, but South Asians do not identify 
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themselves as being 'coloured'. The results of the chi-squared test on 
ideology towards other groups were non-significant, showing that members 
of all three groups feel free from prejudice. 
Salience of ethnicity depends to a large extent on the response of wider 
society to the individuals. When the environment treats the individual as 
one of them, without referring to his/her ethnic or cultural background (no 
matter whether this occurs in a positive or negative way) ethnicity will no 
longer be salient. " Whether South Asians and the Afro-Caribbeans are 
intrinsically more conscious of their ethnicity, or whether ethnicity becomes 
more -salient due to their minority status and the -prejudice they experience, 
was addressed by Hutnik in an additional study. 
It was hypothesized that assertion of national identity will occur more frequently in 
the self-description of the South Asian adolescents than in those of Indian adolescents, 
that is, for Indians in Britain nationality is amore salient dimension of the self than 
for Indians in India because the former belong to an ethnic minority group, with all the 
disadvantages this entails. 3 
Ninety-four students, from two different schools in India were given the 
same TST translated into Hindi. The two schools were chosen in such a way 
that the sample would reflect a similar social background and Western 
orientation as the British subjects. The chi-squared test was applied again, 
comparing each Indian school with their South Asian peers in Britain and 
then both Indian schools were collapsed into a single category to make new 
chi-squared comparisons. The results proved that the South Asian subjects 
in Britain mentioned nationality more frequently than their Indian 
counterparts. When the Indian students were compared with their English 
peers the chi-squared analysis revealed non-significant results. These 
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results support the argument that the frequency with which nationality is 
mentioned should be similar for both groups as they represent the majority 
in their own countries. " 
These results seem to confirm the argument that an individual's ethnic 
distinctiveness becomes more salient where the majority is different. As a 
member of the majority one's own ethnicity ceases to be important. 
However, Hutnik's study of 198575 seemed to disconfirm this theory. Her 
results indicated that when a minority group consists of a small number of 
people, ethnicity is less salient than when the number of ethnic minority 
Y- members is high. This may be so because the feeling of ethnic 
distinctiveness is avoided among a small minority group, as they lack the 
'critical mass' that makes ethnicity salient. " 
To determine the centrality of ethnicity to her subjects, Hutnik used the 
protocols of her previous study (1991) and modified the TST. The subjects 
had to return to their completed statements in order to tick 5 of the 
statements, which best describe them as a person. They then had to rank 
these from 1 to 5 according to the importance of the statements. By adding a 
positive or negative sign to the five ranked statements, the subjects were 
asked to identify the mentioned statements as positive or negative qualities 
of their person. 
The results show that most frequently chosen categories were Religion (46), 
Inter-personal style (43), Psychic style (25), Competence (21), Abstract category 
(19), Nationality (18), Age (15), Ideological and belief references (14). The test 
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for centrality, by computing the mean assigned and the mean hierarchical 
rank, revealed that the categories 'Religion' and 'Nationality' were central 
for those who chose them. The results also showed that the hierarchical 
position of dimensions mentioned is no reliable index for their importance 
to the subject. Self-hatred could not be detected among the subjects. " 
To test the centrality of ethnicity in a consonant and dissonant context 
another chi-squared test was made, comparing the South Asian subjects 
when in a majority and minority situation. The results showed that the 
consonant or dissonant context does not affect the centrality of ethnicity _ 
although it has an effect on its salience.:. 
To investigate the degree of adaptation of her subjects, Hutnik chose one- 
hundred-and-eighteen girls from the fourth, fifth, and sixth forms of a 
school in Birmingham, with a mean age of 16.2 years. One girl was from 
Pakistan, 2.9 per cent were East African Indians, 3.9 per cent came from 
mixed race background, and 91.3 per cent were of Indian extraction. The 
religious affiliation of the subjects was a mixture of Hindus, Sikhs, and 
Muslims. These subjects were asked to rate ten pairs of statements about 
cultural behaviour of the ethnic minority group and the majority group. 
The results of this study show that the majority of the Indian adolescents in 
this sample of cultural adaptation variables learnt to affirm both the ethnic 
minority and majority culture successfully. Preference for the majority 
group culture over the minority group culture was indicated by only 17.5 per 
cent of the girls. 78 
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To investigate their self-categorisation Hutnik has undertaken a further 
study with the same subjects. An additional pair of bi-polar statements were 
added to the questionnaire to which the individuals were asked to express 
their level of agreement on a five-point scale, which in turn was collapsed 
into a three-point scale. 
The results show that social self-categorisation persists although 
acculturation and even assimilation had already taken place. Individuals 
can be dissociative with regard to their social identity, while being highly 
acculturative with regard to their behaviour. Hutnik could not identify any 
significant correspondence between cultural. adaptation and self- 
categorisation. 79 
Hutnik pointed to the potential conflicts related to the assimilative and the 
dissociative strategy of self-categorisation. The assimilative strategy produces 
psychological tension as the discrepancy between the individual's self- 
perception and the perception others have of him/her can be big. Whereas 
the dissociative strategy can expose the individual to recurring attack and 
their identity with the minority group, which suffers low status in the social 
hierarchy, produces another area of tension. Hutnik therefore concluded 
that the acculturative and the marginal strategy are more flexible. An 
individual using multiple ethnic labels can defend all labels equally and 
therefore does not have to adopt a defensive stance like individuals do who 
have used an assimilative or dissociative strategy. Hutnik stated that being 
'under attack' is a non-issue for marginal individuals. 80 
73 
In a further study Hutnik found that 
Indian British adolescents rated Indians living in India (with whom they had little or 
no contact) very favourably. Next highest were Indians living in Britain, and least 
favourably rated were English people, who averaged around the neutral point of the 
bi-polar adjective scale presented to the subjects. 1 
Stereotyping has its roots in social categorisation. Social categorisation is 
used to organise and interpret the environment. Differentiation and 
categorisation of the environment enables the individual to produce a self- 
concept. One's own group would be positively attributed as there is a need 
for a positive social identity. The drive towards psychological 
distinctiveness results in in-group favouritism. Consequently stereotyping 
cannot be eliminated. To eliminate prejudice and discrimination, Hutnik 
suggested that multiple categories that emphasise the commonalties 
between groups have to be found 82 
In conclusion Hutnik suggested a new model of ethnic minority identity. 
She supported Wallman's (1983) argument that a multiple identity is a 
healthy choice. For Hutnik ethnic minority identity is 
not necessarily a singular, fixed, inflexible given but may be constituted of hyphenated 
identities that indicate varying de rees of identification with both the ethnic 
minority group and the majority group. 3 
As the traditional bi-polar model is obsolete Hutnik introduced a model 
which considers four strategies of self-categorisation: acculturative, 
dissociative, assimilative and marginal. The acculturative individual 
chooses a hyphenated identity such as Indian-British. The assimilative 
individual adopts majority group identifications, while the dissociative one 
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identifies entirely with the minority group. However, the marginal 
individual feels indifferent or does not wish to identify with either group 84 
Hutnik pointed to the danger of confusing two different aspects, the 
consciously articulated strategy and the underlying system of beliefs, in the 
course of research on ethnic minority identity. Hutnik suggested that the 
model described above could also be applied in further research on cultural 
adaptation. For cultural adaptation is, to a certain extent, necessary for social 
survival. Therefore it develops earlier than an identity with the new 
environment and may not be consistent. When the individual returns to 
his/her minority community, the individual will behave again the way . 
s/he is expected to. Although ethnic identity may not be salient, 
identifications with one's family history seem important. They are part of 
our personal history and identity and help determine where we are going. 
Thus the model takes into account that self-categorisation can be 
independent of styles of cultural adaptation. 85 
1.1.2.4.1. Summary 
1. Ethnicity was not of overriding concern to neither the South Asian nor 
to the Afro-Caribbean group under scrutiny. 
2. The Afro-Caribbeans had the lowest sense of national identity and 
referred to their colour most, while the South Asians revealed the 
strongest sense of national identity and did not seem to perceive 
themselves as 'coloured'. 
3. Ethnic identity becomes salient in a minority situation. 
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4. An ethnic minority group has to be numerically preponderant to reassert 
their ethnic identity. 
5. The majority of South Asian adolescents learnt to affirm both cultures 
successfully. 
6. Self-categorisation, especially of the dissociative type, can persist 
although acculturation has taken place. 
7. British-Indian adolescents categorised native Indians and the British- 
Indian most favourably. 
8. Multiple identity is a healthy choice, as ethnic identity can encompass 
more than one cultural identity. 
1.1.3. The Sociological Approach 
In contrast to all the authors mentioned above Erving Goffman investigated 
identity formation of stigmatised individuals. Although Goffman is a 
Sociologist, his concern with how an individual masters the consequences 
of his or her stigmatisation, places his concept of identity in the field of 
social psychology. Like the work of Mead, Goffman's identity research has 
been characterised as interactionist social psychology, as Goffman contrary to 
mainstream social psychology, has made the stigmatised individual object of 
his analyses, rather than investigating the development of attitude among 
the prejudiced individual. 
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1.1.3.1 Goffman's Theory of Stigmatisation 
In his book titled Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, 
Goffman introduced the reader to the dilemma stigmatised individuals 
have to cope with, by placing the following shattering letter of a young girl 
at its beginning. 
I am sixteen years old now and I dont know what to do and would appreciate it if you 
could tell me what to do. When I was a little girl it was not so bad because I got used to 
the kids on the block makeing fun of me, but now I would like to- have boy friends like 
the other girls and go out on Saturday nites, but no boy will take me because I was born 
without a nose - although I am a good dancer and have a nice shape and my father buys 
me pretty clothes. I 
I sit and look at myself all day and cry. I have a big hole in the middle of my face that 
scares people even myself so I cant blame the boys for not wanting to take me out. My 
mother loves me, but she crys terrible when she looks at me. 
What did I do to deserve such a terrible bad fate? Even if I did do some bad things I 
didn't do any before I was a year old and I was born this way. I asked Papa and he says 
he doesnt know, but that maybe I did something in the other world before I was bom or 
that maybe I was being punished for his sins. I dont believe that because he is a very 
nice man. Ought I commit suicide? 
Sincerely yours, 
Desperate86 
Goffman not only focused on physical attributes, but also on social categories 
such as unemployment, which could become object of stigmatisation. 
According to Goffmän society defines attributes, matching the predominant 
social norms, in order to facilitate the categorisation of individuals. These 
categories are determined by the particular social setting and allow us to 
engage in a routine of social intercourse because we are able to anticipate 
what kind of persons we are most likely to encounter. Thus a stranger is 
immediately assessed by his or her appearances and categorised. The 
stranger becomes an anticipated other with an anticipated social identity. 
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Hence Goffman distinguished between a virtual social identity and the 
actual social identity. While the former represents the normative 
expectations based on anticipations made and the character, that are 
imputed to the individual by the environment, the latter represents the 
category and the attributes, which the individual actually possesses. 
When a stranger reveals an attribute that makes him or her deviant from 
the norm and causes this individual to be categorised in such a way that 
s/he will be looked upon as tainted, then such an attribute is referred to by 
Goffman as a stigma. Goffman distinguished between abhorred -physical 
traits; -defects in character, such as dishonesty or alcoholism, etc., and tribal - 
stigma, such as race, nation, or religion. However, not every undesirable 
attribute is a stigma, but only those which do not match with the stereotype 
that was anticipated. The stigma "constitutes a special discrepancy between 
virtual and actual social identityi87, which spoils the individual's social 
identity when it is known about. 
When the undesirable attribute of a stigmatised individual is obviously 
apparent or s/he is aware of the fact that it is known, then Goffman referred 
to this individual as discredited. A person is referred to as discreditable if 
s/he may assume that his or her undesirable attribute is not obviously 
apparent and is not yet known by those present. 
To which degree stigmatised individuals become self-conscious of their 
undesirable attribute depends on the environment they are in. The 
'normals', individuals who do not share the same stigma but do not 
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respond negatively to the stigmatised person, may nevertheless create an 
atmosphere of unease by responding with exaggerated helpfulness, or by 
hesitating to refer to anything related to the particular stigma when the 
concerned individual is present. The 'normals' develop a stigma-theory, 
which rationalises animosities and justifies why the particular attributes 
represent a threat and why certain discriminations are exercised. 
The stigmatised individual in turn realises that s/he is not 'accepted' and 
met on 'equal grounds'. Thus the stigmatised individual holds his or her 
own undesirable attributes responsible for not receiving the respect s/he has 
anticipated on the ground of the uncontaminated aspects of his or her social 
identity. As a response the person can attempt to correct his or her 
condition directly, for example by undergoing plastic surgery, or indirectly by 
trying to master the particular area of activity which is limited by his or her 
shortcoming. 
On the other hand there are those individuals who share the plight of 
stigma, and people, also referred to as the 'wise', among whom a stigmatised 
individual can relax. The 'wise' are normal people who are sympathetic 
with the stigmatised individuals and who are accepted among them. 
Usually such a relationship is initiated by the 'normals'. 88 
Compared to the socialisation process of discredited individuals, that of 
discreditables is more complex. The discreditable individual, such as an ex- 
mental patient, has to face the problems related to the management of 
disclosure of discrediting information about him/her. The information at 
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issue is information about an individual's permanent characteristics, 
conveyed by him/herself through bodily signs to those immediately present. 
Goffman called such reflexive and embodied information social 
information. The signs that are steadily available and employed in this 
process are referred to as symbols. Those symbols that represent the claim to 
prestige are status symbols, while stigma symbols, in contrast, represent 
signs that indicate identity discrepancy. The attempt to cast doubt on 
undesirable attributes by employing signs to break up the picture of an 
individual in a positive way, Goffman referred to as disidentifiers. 
Signs are designed. to convey social information. However, sometimes a 
sign, such as a tattoo, can be a source of pride for one, while having a 
negative connotation for another. Some signs can be temporary (e. g. a black 
eye on a female or a convict's shaven head), permanent (e. g. duelling scars) 
or congenital (e. g. skin colour). A further source of information is the 
company of an individual. The social identity of a group an individual 
socialises with, is frequently used as a source of information about the social 
identity of the particular individual, according to the motto: show me your 
friends and I'll tell you who you are. 
Stigma management is relatively easy among passive strangers, provided 
the stigma is not immediately visible. Once relationships become more 
intimate stigma management is more stressful for the concerned 
individual. Often discreditable individuals, such as homosexuals, are more 
concerned with concealing their attribute from their closest family, although 
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they display it in public. There is evidence that both intimates and strangers 
can be put off by an individual's stigma. 
In close relationships the virtual social identity is gradually replaced by the 
real social identity, as the environment is able to make more realistic 
assessments of the actual personal qualities. Thus physically handicapped 
individuals may try to break through superficial politeness and attempt to 
take conversation to a more personal level in order to make 'normals' look 
beyond their defect. When the social environment no longer feels 
uncomfortable in the presence of the stigmatised individual, then this 
process is referred to as a process of normalisation. 89 
The strategies an individual applies for the management of his or her 
stigma depend on the depth of relationships. At this point Goffman 
introduced the concept of personal identity. In long-standing relationships 
an individual is perceived as a unique person. Goffman ascribed three 
aspects to the notion of uniqueness. 
1. Every individual has a 'positive mark' or 'identity peg' such as the 
individual's photographic image and his or her place among kin. 
2. Although most facts about an individual may also apply to others, the 
combination of facts does not apply to any other person in the world and 
thus distinguishes the individual from everybody else. The information 
can be name-bound as well as body-bound. 
3. And the core of an individual's being, is the essential aspect, which 
distinguishes him or her from other people. 90 
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However, Goffman only integrated the first two aspects of uniqueness into 
his concept of personal identity: 
positive marks or identity pegs, and the unique combination of life history items that 
comes to be attached to the individual with the help of these pegs for his identity91. 
Most of the information about personal identity, as defined above, can be 
strictly documented, which limits the individual in the way s/he can 
present him or herself. As a result, misrepresentation of social identity is 
largely prohibited. The environment primarily draws upon aspects from 
the social identity to construct an individual's personal identity. _ 
As the_ 
discovery of a discreditable secret may destroy the reputation of an 
individual, s/he will attempt to conceal it. Thus the effort to conceal the 
stigma will in itself become an element of the individual's personal identity. 
However, the concepts of social and personal identity do not give a complete 
picture of the individual. To complete the picture Goffman introduced the 
third concept of identity, namely that of ego identity. Ego identity, according 
to Goffman, is 
the subjective sense of his own situation and his own continuity and character that an 
individual comes to obtain as a result of his various social experiences92. 
Both social and personal identity are closely related to the way the 
environment perceives the individual. The analysis of social identity 
enables us to consider stigma, while the concept of personal identity 
provides an insight into information control in the course of stigma 
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management. In contrast ego identity is the element that reveals the 
feelings an individual has with regard to his or her stigma and its 
management. Ego identity is the product of the same material from which 
others construct social and personal identifications of the individual. 
Nevertheless, it is subjective and reflexive, and therefore flexible in terms of 
how the individual interprets this material. 93 
Stigmatised individuals frequently apply higher identity standards to 
themselves than they are able to conform with. The stronger the ties are, 
which an individual develops with normals, the stronger s/he will identify 
with non-stigmatised standards. -The stigmatised 
individual tends to 
categorise other stigmatised people according to the severity of their 
stigmatised attributes and to adopt the attitudes that 'normals' have towards 
him or her in order to project them onto those whose stigma is more 
apparent or obtrusive than his or her own. The oscillation of identification 
becomes most apparent in the extreme forms of separation from, or 
affiliation with those who are worse off than s/he is. Identity ambivalence 
occurs when the stigmatised individual witnesses the particular behaviour 
of his or her own kind, from which the normals have derived their 
stereotypes. Although the stigmatised, who supports the norms of wider 
society is tied to these offenders due to his or her social and psychological 
identification, s/he may feel repelled by this observation. Thus the 
individual will turn his or her repulsion into shame and in turn become 
ashamed for this feeling of shame. S/he is neither able to escape from, nor 
to commit him or herself fully to the 'own' group, which results in a 
tendency towards ambivalent feelings about the own self. 9a 
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The stigmatised individual's ego identity is composed of two further aspects: 
the in-group and the out-group. The in-group is, according to its 
spokesmen, the group to which the individual naturally belongs. 
Sometimes professionals, who have strong in-group affiliations, tend to 
take a militant stance. However, the problem with militancy is that the 
more an individual seeks separateness, the more s/he will employ the 
language, style and culture of politics of wider society - the 'enemy'. Thus 
the in-group imposes in-group cohesion and political representation on the 
stigmatised member. 
The out-group imposes on the stigmatised individual a kind of 'phantom 
acceptance' of him or herself and of his or her position in wider society. The 
language employed in interaction with the stigmatised is psychiatric and the 
expectation on the individual is that of mental hygiene. This entails a self- 
acceptance by him/her as a full human being, bearing his or her plight on 
the grounds of a coherent life philosophy and not presenting the pain of 
stigmatisation to the environment. Thus the fate of the stigmatised is that 
s/he is permanently told what to make of his or her ego identity. Wider 
society insists that s/he is a normal human being, but also different (of 
course this 'differentness' has first been conceptualised by society), which 
s/he has to accept. Conversely, professionals and spokesmen of his or her 
group engage in politics of identity and draw the individual into their 
group, which s/he must not neglect. 5 
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Compared to Mead, who developed a general concept of identity that payed 
less attention to particular identity problems, and Erikson, who focused on 
the successive stages of crises during a life cycle, Goffman created a 
theoretical framework that allows for an analyses of particular identity 
problems - that of stigmatisation. While Mead granted an individual a 
certain degree of freedom to shape his or her identity, due to the human 
ability to gain identity consciousness, Goffman viewed the individual, in his 
or her attempt to solve identity problems, as socially determined. Goffman 
interpreted the behaviour of stigmatised individuals as a strategy to solve 
their identity problems. His concept of identity does not consider reflexive 
intelligence and- the relationship . between social determination and 
autonomy. Theoretically there was no need for Goffman to adopt Mead's 
distinction between a conscious and subconscious identity. Deviant 
behaviour is always interpreted as a reaction to stigmatisation and as socially 
determined, no matter whether the person is conscious or not conscious of 
his or her behaviour. 
1.1.3.1.1. Summary 
1. Goffman's theory explained how stigmatised individuals attempt to 
resolve their identity problems. 
2. He distinguished between three identity concepts: the social, personal, 
and ego identity. An individual's social identity is the product of the 
category ascribed and the character imputed to him or her according to 
his or her attributes. The personal identity constitutes an individual's 
identity pegs, his or her identifiable markings combined with unique life 
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history items. The ego identity is determined by the individual's 
subjective feelings about his or her situation. 
3. An attribute becomes a stigma when an individual reveals an attribute 
during social interaction that does not correspond with the category and 
attributes anticipated by the environment. 
4. Goffman distinguished between virtual and actual social identity. The 
virtual social identity is the stereotype, or category, in which the 
environment expects a person to fit into, according to their anticipations. 
The actual social identity is constituted of the actual category and 
attributes, which the individual can prove to possess. 
5.. Goffman also distinguished between discredited - and. - 
discreditable 
--. 
individuals. The discredited are individuals who know about their 
stigma and who may assume that the environment knows about it. A 
discreditable individual does not possess a stigma that is immediately 
perceivable, thus the environment may not know about it. 
6. Stigma management is the control of information about one's stigma. 
To employ symbols as disidentifiers in order to improve one's position 
in the desired direction is a particular strategy of stigma management. 
7. An individual, who has adopted the position of wider society and 
observes his or her group behaving in the stereotyped manner, may 
exhibit identity ambivalence. S/he may feel repelled by this sight, but at 
the same time cannot detach him or herself from this group. 
86 
1.1.3.2. Krappmann's Concept of Ambiguity Tolerance 
Following Habermas' discussion on symbolic interactionism, Krappmann 
aimed to expand on Mead's idea of a successfully developed identity 
consciousness. While Goffman primarily focused on spoiled identities, 
Krappmann's analyses was dedicated to the social conditions and the 
personal skills required for an individual to maintain and assert a healthy 
identity. According to Krappmann, an individual has to reassert his or her 
identity during every social interaction. A person will maintain his or her 
identity during 
-interactions, if s/he can successfully present-his or her 'self' 
without denying any discrepancies or conflicts. Thus the successful 
assertion of identity depends on the individual's creative ability to bring his 
or her personal experiences and life history to bear, and to readjust these to 
the conditions of every new interaction process that may emerge. 
Mead interpreted human interaction as a process during which all 
participants communicate by means of employing significant symbols. 
According to Mead, the prerequisite for successful interaction is that the 
symbols employed have the same meaning to all participants. However, 
Krappmann argued that communication without any inconsistencies, with 
regard to the participants' common understanding of symbols, does not 
correspond to reality. Krappmann suggested that during every social 
situation individuals have ambiguous and sometimes contradictory ideas of 
what the symbols employed may mean. Thus Krappmann had to resolve 
the resulting problem of how interaction is maintained if ambiguity and 
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contradictions hamper the process. According to Krappmann, two skills are 
necessary. The individuals involved must be able to adjust to the others' 
expectations and the definition of particular situation, while simultaneously 
presenting their own expectations, needs, and definition of the situation. 
The interaction is successful if an individual is able to take diverging 
expectations into consideration while maintaining consistency and 
continuity. S/he should temporarily consent to a common interpretation of 
the situation and at the same time indicate any reservations. S/he should 
endeavour for a common, unambiguous orientation for interaction by 
presenting his or her expectation in an, identifiable manner, while 
simultaneously indicating that a complete agreement is not possible. 9' All 
this should be part of the identity with which the individual engages in 
interaction and that has to be formulated anew for every interaction. 
Krappmann proposed that identity is an individual's creative ability to 
interpret, balance and manage new situations and subsequent expectations, 
drawing from his or her life history and experience. A person has a healthy 
identity if s/he is able to present her or himself adequately in a given 
situation without denying any discrepancies or conflicts. Krappmann 
identified four skills, which are necessary to master identity assertion: 
'taking role-distance', empathy, tolerance for ambiguity, and identity 
presentation. The first skill entails rising above given norms and expected 
'role-taking' in order to make these subject to reflection and interpretation, 
to make choices available and to change them if necessary. An individual 
can internalise numerous roles, thus there is ample opportunity to take 
role-distance. However, whether an individual is able to reflect on norms, 
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although s/he has internalised them, depends on how the individual 
adopted these role-norms. 7 To take distance enables the individual to 
become aware that s/he is a person who can understand and interact with 
someone else. This ability grants the individual some freedom with regard 
to the expectations related to the roles and openness towards other potential 
social roles. 
Empathy is, as defined by Krappmann, the ability to view norms, 
expectations and needs from the perspective of the 'other'. Although 
empathy is primarily a cognitive process, it is also influenced by factors such 
as affection. " 
The skill to tolerate ambiguity entails enduring conflicting needs and 
contradicting expectations of roles during interaction, but nevertheless, 
being able to interpret one's own and the 'other's' position during this 
process. 99 Tolerance toward ambiguity is not possible without empathy. 
For Krappmann, identity presentation is the general ability to bring one's 
identity to bear during interaction. This is the phase of identity assertion, 
during which the individual must present his or her identity on the 
grounds of the adopted expectations of the 'others'. During identity 
presentation the individual must make it visible to others that s/he is able 
to tolerate ambiguity, to feel empathy, and to take role-distance. 
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1.1.3.3. Modood's Study on Changing Ethnic Identities 
Tariq Modood's study investigated the changes of ethnic identity in Britain. 
The five potential areas of change under scrutiny were family life and social 
contacts, community language, religion, marriage partners, and experiences 
of difference, commonalty and exclusion. The study was based on semi- 
structured interviews and group discussions with 74 individuals of 
Caribbean and South Asian origin, in Birmingham and Southall. The 
sample was divided into five groups. One group was of Caribbean origin 
and the remaining four groups were of Asian decent: Pakistani Muslims, 
Bangladeshi Muslims, Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus. The sample was 
further divided by gender and by generation. The researchers, who 
conducted the interviews, were members of the respective minority 
communities and spoke their language. 
With regard to changes in family life, Modood et al. found that there was a 
radical contrast between Caribbean and South Asian families. While the 
Caribbean respondents had lost their extended family in the migratory 
process, the South Asians were partially able to maintain their community 
networks due to 'chain-migration'. Asian families make more demands, 
but also provide more support to their members. However, Modood also 
found that there is a significant difference in how the first and second 
generations of South Asians kept contact with their extended family. For 
the second generation the main support system was the immediate nuclear 
family. The extended family had far less significance with regard to value or 
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emotional and moral support for them than for the first generation. Work 
and education have become more important, so more friendships are 
formed around these contexts of socialisation. Nevertheless, according to 
the census (1991) an Asian household consists of more family members 
than an English or even a Caribbean would. While Asians have adapted to 
the traditional Western family pattern (parents and children), Caribbeans 
tend towards single-parent families. The majority of Caribbean in 
Modood's sample also exhibited a greater readiness to choose non-Caribbean 
friends. Two-thirds of the second generation had close friends among non- 
Caribbeans and most of the first generation had non-Caribbean friends. In 
contrast the first generation Asians chose their. friends exclusively from 
within their ethno-religious community and although most of the second 
generation had non-Asian friends, their close circle of friends were still of 
Asian origin. 
Within the context of socialisation, individualism and racism in Britain, 
ethnic minority family life has its own structural dynamics and is subject to 
change by every successive generation. Modood et al. suggested that 
the subjective experience of racism, including perceived racism and anticipated racism, 
is closely bound up with ethnic group bonds and ethnic identity; with preference for 
members of one's own group and with the desire to affirm one's origins and cultural 
heritage. 100 
Although ethnic identity as such is not a product of racism, the nature of its 
development is. Individuals who experienced racism and exclusion will 
inevitably racialise their ethnic identity and alter it in response to the 
treatment they receive. 
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With regard to the fate of community languages Modood et al. found that 
the first generation of Caribbeans were either bi-lingual with English and 
Creole or Patois, or monolingual English speakers. The majority of the 
interviewees reported that their facility in Creole or Patois had deteriorated 
and that half of them did not attribute sufficient importance to those 
languages in order to maintain or teach them to their children. However, 
the second generation Caribbeans held the view that these languages should 
be taught through supplementary classes at school. For them their linguistic 
heritage signified an integral part of their cultural identity and ethnic pride. 
The languages spoken by the four South Asian groups were Punjabi, 
Gujarati, Urdu and Bengali or Sylheti dialect. The majority of South Asians 
in Britain employ an Urdu-Hindi lingua franca to communicate amongst 
each other. Compared to the Caribbeans, the first generation of Asians had 
to learn English as they settled in Britain. Their Asian language is 
important to their cultural identity and is thus a part of their children's 
upbringing and the main language spoken at home. Nevertheless, the 
Asian second generation has greater facility in English. Although most of 
them speak the language of their parents, far less are able to read or write it. 
Much like the second generation Caribbeans they supported the view that 
their ancestral language should be taught at school to enable them to 
maintain their cultural heritage. Modood et al. suggested that although 
these ethnic languages are losing their instrumental importance, their value 
as bearers of ethnic heritage will grow. This will be the case when ethnic 
minorities become aware of their cultural loss due to deteriorating 
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knowledge of their ancestral language and parents then increase pressure on 
schools to offer instructions in these languages. Thus these languages may 
experience a revival among members of the third and fourth generations. '°' 
For the majority of first generation immigrants, religion is an essential 
source for personal values and cultural identity. The study demonstrated 
that both first generation Asians and Caribbeans felt that religion is 
important in their lives. Nevertheless, there was a distinct difference in 
their approach to religion and social as well as ethnic centrality of religion 
between the two ethnic groups. For the Caribbeans, Christianity was not a 
marker for ethnic distinctiveness with respect to the rest of the British 
population. On their arrival, Christian places of worship were available 
although racism within the existing institutions gradually led to the 
formation of separate black-led churches. The interviewees of the first 
generation declared that Christianity provides spiritual and moral support 
in times of hardship. They attended church, participated in religious 
activities and raised their children in their religious faith. Nevertheless, 
they did not expect their children to practice Christianity. 
For the Asian first generation religion is more closely linked with their 
ethnic identity. On their arrival, places of worship and religious education 
for their children were not available, but had to be organised by the minority 
community. The Asian interviewees reported that their religion 
determines the routine and pattern of their lives and defines their 
responsibilities to their family and others. Among the Asians, religious 
rules determine both personal and social life of every community member. 
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Therefore Asian children are under more pressure to comply with these 
rules than their Caribbean counter parts. To Muslim interviewees 
conformity to religious laws was far more important than to Sikhs and 
Hindus. 
On the whole, the accounts of the second generation indicated that the 
importance of religion is in decline. Among the Punjabi Sikhs, none 
included their religious affiliation in their immediate self-concept and 
although some Caribbeans were practising Christians, none of the first 
generation interviewees perceived Christianity as part of their ethnic 
identity. Compared to the Asian. sample, the non-practising Christian 
Caribbeans did not identify or have any non-religious positive feelings for 
their religion, neither were they searching for an alternative. For the Asian 
second generation their religion enforced their ethnic pride and was 
perceived as part of their distinctive heritage and ethnic identity. Although 
only a few of them observed religious regulations (e. g. prohibition of 
alcohol) and most of them interpreted their religious traditions flexibly, they 
all wished to pass their religion on to their children. Counter to 
expectations, the second generation Asians did not fulfil religious duties to 
avoid family conflicts, but had actually incorporated them in their own 
ethnic identity. Also to the Muslim interviewees Islam was an integral part 
of their social identity and provided symbolic solidarity with other Muslims, 
thus enforcing ethnic pride. '02 
Religious and ethnic boundaries are usually maintained by in-group 
marriage. The study clearly showed that for the first generation of South 
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Asians marriage within the community is a way of securing a closely-knit 
family network which will support them in old age. Mixed marriages 
threaten their material and emotional investment in their children and 
dilute their cultural heritage. Asian parents, and especially Muslim parents, 
continue to exercise considerable control over their child's choice of 
marriage partner. Asian parents do not approve of mixed marriages, as this 
would result in a loss of face in their community, however there is a trend 
towards compromise within acceptable limits. The Second generation 
Asians hold more liberal views than their parents. Half of the Indian 
sample had a positive attitude towards mixed marriages, whilst only a few 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. were in favour of such an idea. The majority of 
the Muslim interviewees intended to marry a Muslim, preferably of the 
same ethnic group, but feel that they should have more of a choice within 
these limits. However, other studies showed that these more liberal views 
usually give way to parental authority and many young Muslims agree to 
arranged marriages out of family loyalty. In contrast nearly half of the first 
generation Caribbeans accepted the idea of mixed marriage. Although the 
majority voiced concerns over the prejudice that mixed-marriage couples 
would face; they felt that ultimately the choice was up to the individual. 
The majority of the second generation held a positive view about mixed 
marriages, but added that the biggest obstacle was racism from the white 
environment. 103 
Modood et a!. reflected the diversity of perceived difference and 
commonalty among ethnic minority individuals. Among the Caribbean 
respondents the predominant and positive term of self-identity was 'Black'. 
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While among the first generation references to their West Indian origin 
were more common, the second generation used hyphenated terms like 
Afro-Caribbean and Black-British to describe themselves. As the Caribbean 
immigrants have, to a large extent, adopted British culture and attempted to 
integrate into wider society, the conspicuous marker of difference and cause 
for exclusion is their colour. Thus for some second generation interviewees 
the description 'Black' circumscribed all who are of different colour and 
suffer from racism, including South Asians. Although the Caribbean 
respondents were aware of the social and cultural commonalties with the 
white British, many did not feel that they were British. The experience of 
racism prevented the development of unity with the white majority. 
The majority of Pakistanis of the first and second generations used the term 
Pakistani-British. Ethnic self-identification among South Asians has little to 
do with colour. Both generations pointed to Islam as their commonalty 
with the Bangladeshi and vice versa. In turn Sikhs and Hindus referred to 
each other as the group they had most in common with. Compared to the 
Caribbean interviewees, the Asian respondents pointed to cultural and 
religious differences among South Asians. The term Asian was mostly used 
to describe the community as a whole. Although most of the South Asian 
interviewees felt that they had nothing in common with the Caribbeans, 
some second generation Punjabis, who seemed to have no strong religious 
identity, noted that 'Black' was an important political identity. Their 
experience of exclusion was rather based on being a non-white minority 
than culturally different. 
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For the majority of respondents being British was based not only on the 
legal definition. They felt that the white population did not accept them as 
British and most of the Asian first generation neither felt nor wanted to be 
British in the extra-legal sense. As much as they perceived themselves as 
law-abiding citizens and appreciated the economic and educational 
advantages in Britain, the Asian interviewees of that generation had a 
stronger sense of belonging to their country of origin. Most of the second 
generation Asians felt that they had adopted a lot of British culture, but 
perceived their British identity as a problematic one. Some referred to their 
identity as bi-cultural and found that this double affiliation was 
unproblematic. However, a few second generation Asians "felt alienated 
from British culture which they perceived as hostile to their family-centred 
and religious values"104 
1.1.3.3.1. Summary 
1. The extended family is most important to the Asians of the first 
generation. The second generation Asians derive their emotional and 
material support primarily from the nuclear family. 
2. The experience of racism is closely bound up with ethnic group bonds 
and ethnic identity. 
3. The second generation is usually more fluent in English than in any 
other language, but wishes to maintain their ancestral language as a part 
of their ethnic identity. 
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4. Whilst for the Caribbeans, Christianity is not a marker for their ethnic 
identity, South Asians closely associate their religion with their ethnic 
identity. 
5. For the Muslim second generation, Islam is an integral part of both their 
ethnic and social identity. It enforces ethnic pride and provides symbolic 
solidarity with other Muslims. 
6. South Asians, and especially Muslims, perceive mixed marriages as a 
threat to their ethnic identity; this is in contrast to the Caribbeans. The 
second generation Asians hold more liberal views on this topic than 
their parents. 
7. For Caribbeans the most salient aspect of their ethnic identity is their 
colour, whereas for South Asians it is their culture and religion. 
8. Among the second generation a hyphenated self-description prevails, 
indicating a trend towards a bi-cultural identity. 
1.1.4. Conceptualising Identity 
The summary of theories and studies on identity has shown that different 
theorists conceptualise identity in different ways. Since Mead, many 
valuable contributions to the study of human identity have been made. To 
summarise all of them would be beyond the scope of this thesis, especially 
because a number of authors, including Harre and Holland, already made 
such an undertaking their primary objective. "-' The theories summarised 
above were selected to introduce the most essential theorists from the 
different traditions of thought. The studies described in detail were chosen 
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to illustrate how every tradition evolved and is currently employed for the 
study of ethnic, as well as Muslim, identity in Britain. 
Glynis Breakwell produced a concept of identity linking intrapsychic and 
socio-political processes, merging ideas from various traditions of thought. 
She attempted to construct a social psychological model of identity through 
description of its structural components and dominant processes. 106 The 
propositions, which emerge from this model of identity, are an ideal 
foundation for a more specific discourse on identity, which will follow the 
summary. 
For Breakwell107, the structure of identity -- 
is a dynamic social product of the interaction of the capacities for memory, 
consciousness and organized construal which are characteristic of the biological 
organism with the physical and societal structures and influence processes which 
constitute the social context. The identity resides in psychological processes but is 
manifested through thought, action and affect. 108 
Generally speaking individuals are self-aware and monitor the status of 
their identity. Breakwell suggested that levels of self-awareness differ 
according to development and across different cultures. 
Identity can be described in terms of its structure and its processes. Its 
structure is constituted of two planes: the content and the value 
dimensions. The former consists of the properties that define an individual 
as unique. Breakwell abandoned the distinction between social and 
personal identity. She suggested that this distinction is only of temporary 
significance until social identity is eventually incorporated into personal 
1. 
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identity. The content dimension encompasses both the social identity 
components (e. g. group membership) and the personal ones (e. g. values and 
attitudes). The organisation of the content dimension is flexible and 
adaptable to the social context. The content dimension is organised in 
hierarchical arrangements of elements, salience of components and degree 
of centrality. The value dimension is constituted of all the positive or 
negative values attributed to each element in the content dimension. These 
attributed values are subject to revision as the social value system and the 
individual's position in relation to it changes. 
Dynamic psychological assimilation-accommodation and evaluation 
processes form. the identity structure. New identity components are 
assimilated into the existing identity structure. Simultaneously, the existing 
structure has to be accommodated or adjusted in order to fit the new 
component into the structure. The new and old identity contents are then 
evaluated by attribution of meaning and values. Thus the interaction of the 
two processes allows for changes in content and value of identity. 
According to Breakwell, the accommodation-assimilation process can be 
described as a memory system, which is susceptible to biases in information 
recall. These biases are regulated by identity principles that define the 
desirable states of identity structure. In Western industrialised societies, the 
current principles are continuity, distinctiveness, and self-esteem. They 
vary in their salience over time, according to situations and development. 
However, the principles and the desirable states of identity structure are 
temporally and culturally specific, as identity is formed both within a 
particular social context and historical period. 
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The social context provides interpersonal and intergroup relationships, 
social-category memberships as well as the ideological milieu and system of 
beliefs. This generates roles, beliefs, and values, which are assimilated into 
the identity content and evaluated. Depending on the personal relevance, 
the immediacy of involvement, the extent of change, the negative impact 
involved and changes in the social context, result in changes in identity. 
Social mobility also bears a change of social influences, which inevitably has 
an impact on identity. Yet, identity is not solely a product of social 
influences. Contradictions within the ideological milieu and tensions 
... 
between groups force . the 
individual to make choices and create the freedom 
for an individualistic formulation of identity. 
Breakwell suggested that identity is under threat when the processes of 
assimilation-accommodation and evaluation cannot satisfy the need for 
continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem. Threat can originate externally 
when social changes force changes in identity upon an individual and do 
not satisfy any of the three principles. Threat is of internal origin when an 
individual attempts to introduce change, in accordance with one of the 
principles, but discovers that such change violates one or both of the other 
principles. 
An individual can only respond to threat once s/he is conscious of it. 
Breakwell defined coping strategy as: "Any activity, in thought or deed, 
which has as its goal the removal or modification of a threat to 
identity 
... 
i10'. Coping strategies can be developed on the intra-psychic, 
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interpersonal and group/intergroup level. The intra-psychic coping 
strategies of deflection, acceptance and rearrangement of salience are 
determined by the assimilation-accommodation and evaluation processes. 
Deflection is the attempt to avoid any modification of the value and content 
dimensions. Some tactics to deflect threat would be denial, transient 
depersonalisation, belief in the unreality of the self, fantasy, reconstrual and 
reattribution. Acceptance tactics rarely entail fundamental changes in 
identity, but rather seek a compromise between threat and identity needs. 
Therefore, the most common tactics would be. anticipatory restructuring, 
compartmentalism and compromise changes. The third strategy implies 
.. rearranging the salience of the three 
identity principles.. If, for. example, self--.. _. 
esteem is threatened, then one of the unthreatened principles such as 
distinctiveness is emphasis instead. 
Depending on the kind of threat, either interpersonal strategies 
(isolationism, negativism, passing and compliance) or group and intergroup 
strategies may help to cope. Multiple group membership and group support 
in the form of self-help, consciousness-raising, information network and 
group action are ways by which an individual can bring about change within 
him/herself and society to fight or to cope with the threat. Coping strategies 
are usually derived from social-comparison and are governed by the need 
for cognitive consistency. Which coping strategy an individual will choose 
depends on the combination of factors such as the type of threat, the social 
context, his or her identity structure and cognitive capacity. The individual 
tends to maintain the chosen strategy as long as the combination of factors 
does not change. 
-. : t; ý . "ý ,. ' . 
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Breakwell concluded that when coping strategies fail, a change of identity 
structure will occur. This violates the principles of continuity, 
distinctiveness and self-esteem and thus may limit an individual's power to 
control such change. If then, the same threat persists, individuals may 
resort to extreme forms of withdrawal or suppression of self-awareness. 
Breakwell's model of identity and her analysis of threat and coping strategies 
is of particular help with regard to the study of Muslim minority identity. 
Also her methodological approach is relevant for this study, as she seeks to 
employ an integrated set of methods, where each method provides 
information about a particular aspect of identity. "' Before engaging in a 
more detailed methodological discussion it is important to emphasise that it 
is not the object of this thesis to create a fundamentally new concept of 
identity. It is rather the endeavour, like Breakwell, to merge and apply all 
those traditions of thought which enable a thorough analyses of the identity 
conflicts involved in the integration process of Muslim minorities in 
Britain. The following theoretical discourse on identity will point to the 
processes, which particularly apply to this research and to those that have 
previously not been discussed in this context. 
This study focuses on the identity content and attached value dimensions 
of young adults and adults. Although human identity is constantly exposed 
to change and revaluation due to new experiences made, by the time the 
individual reached adulthood a sound frame of orientation has been 
established. In order to understand why the content and value dimension 
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of identity can evolve in different ways, important mechanisms of identity 
development will be included into this discourse. 
Identity has a personal and a social dimension. Personal identity is based on 
the individual's nature of embodiment and of emotions, values, attitudes 
and goals, etc.. At a young age, personal identity evolves around the 
individual's experience with his or her biological organism. The social 
environment influences attitudes and the values attached to emotions and 
the nature of the body. As the individual grows into a social being, 
knowledge and experience become more significant in the way that identity 
is determined. "' The social determinants. that influence identity can be 
categorised into three major factors: family, economy, and the state. 11' The 
social dimension of identity is largely reflected by group membership, roles, 
and social interaction patterns. It is apparent that personal and social 
identity are inter-dependent and inter-related with each other. 1' Although 
it is justified to differ between these two dimensions, it always has to be kept 
in mind that identity dimensions and components (e. g. cultural, religious or 
ethnic identifications) form a unity. Any changes that occur along the line 
of one of these dimensions will influence the identity of an individual as a 
whole. 
As mentioned above, identity is influenced by social, economic and political 
factors. Primarily the family, but also friends and acquaintances, convey 
values of religious, ethical and political nature as well as social norms and 
regulations; they serve as good or bad examples for relationships and 
prepare the individual for his or her social role and appropriate labour. The 
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economy determines the nature of employment available and influences an 
individual's social place in society. The nature of an individual's labour 
defines social status and sets limits to the accumulation of wealth, which 
shapes the self-concept. Recession can force people into unemployment and 
can destroy their self-esteem, while economic growth promises prosperity 
and encourages positive aspirations for the future. The impact of the state 
and the political culture on identity are also of fundamental importance. 
Different political systems, such as monarchy, democracy or dictatorship 
shape personal and social identity in different ways. If we analyse the . 
historic impact of monarchy and dictatorship on identity, it may become 
more apparent which influence democracy has on present identity - ._. 
formation. 
Historically, monarchies provided a solid hierarchical social structure in 
which values and norms were stable and of continuity. The Church dictated 
values and provided spiritual guidance so that people could make sense of 
their lives. Any structural change occurred slowly and the political ruling 
class remained constant. In Britain, up until the First World War, virtues 
such as modesty, sincerity and honesty were ranked highly in the value 
system. Family, society and the Church nourished an individual's super- 
ego (using Freud's terminology) with appropriate values, which determined 
social behaviour and action within an authoritarian social system. The 
social hierarchy of a monarchy demarcated every individual's place in 
society and produced a deeply rooted identity with a specific class and 
occupation. The career of a craftsman ranged from the apprentice to the 
skilled master. In other words an individual's ambition in life was 
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attainable and within reach. This aspect is of vital importance to the 
psychological wellbeing of an individual. A large discrepancy between the 
ideal 'self-concept' and the real 7' generates dissatisfaction and aggression. 
The more coherent the ideal 'self-concept' and the reality of the T are, the 
more coherent an individual's identity will be. 
For those who suffered under this system, religion promised salvation in 
the after-life. Cultural identities within an empire and a monarchy are 
manifold. Diversity of language and plurality of tradition were natural 
phenomena. Firm religious, orientation and class division did not give the 
individual much room to define an . 
individualistic and eccentric identity. 
For example, a man may have been the baker of village X, the son of the 
master who owned the bakery, as well as husband and the father of a 
number of children. The social roles were limited and the individual was 
offered a clear frame of orientation, in which religion provided the sole 
explanation for the causality of the universe. The individual was part of a 
well-structured 'whole' which conveyed a sense of belonging and security. 
The Fascist and Communist governments of the 1930's are the best examples 
of dictatorships. These dictatorships clearly defined who belonged to the 'in- 
group' and who did not. They reasserted the superiority of the in-group and 
emphasised the inferiority of, and hostility towards, the out-group. These 
dictatorships conveyed emotional and economic security. Explicit 
symbolism and mystical mass rituals strengthened unity and transferred 
masses into a state of ecstasy. In the midst of the massed, a weak and 
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disoriented individual had the opportunity to become part of a powerful 
'whole'. 
Authoritarian regimes organise society, dictate identity, manipulate the 
attitude towards the state; they clearly define the roles of men and women, 
and every individual's duties and obligations to society. Ideology strictly 
defines 'good' and 'bad', social and political goals, as well as identities to 
strive for. 
Democracies, as legal frameworks, exert little constraint on identity 
formation. An individual has the freedom to choose (within the -legal 
framework) group affiliations, can strive for individualistic careers, and live 
a lifestyle of his or her own choice. The freedom of choice, to determine 
one's own destiny according to the means available, is the most liberal 
precondition for free identity development that society has ever created. 
However, the political and social structures are based on change. The 
political stability is constantly jeopardised by the multi-party system. 
Political leaders change and their weaknesses are exposed to public criticism. 
Modern society allows for social mobility, individuals can choose their place 
within society, but at the same time their lives are also subjected to the 
change which the strive for progress entails. Although this system provides 
unprecedented opportunities for the majority of the population, one's 
position in this society is unstable. According to Erich Fromm, the modern 
social system influences man in two ways: While individuals are more 
independent, can rely on their own judgement and critical observations, 
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they too become more isolated, lonely and fearful. 114 He suggested that 
especially among the middle classes, lack of security can cause neurosis. 
The system neither imposes a rigid structure nor does it supply predefined 
values for orientation. Although democracies are based on some generally 
accepted principal values in order to allow for the system to function, 
individuals have to rely on themselves to make sense of their lives and to 
search for an appropriate niche in society. If a system of values and a frame 
of orientation are not home nurtured, society will offer little support for 
young adolescents in. their search for identity. Young insecure individuals 
with no profound orientation. -tend - 
to support strong.. leadership. . It is the 
desire to overcome their own powerlessness in the light of increasing social 
and political complexity, which leads to a radical counteraction - to seek 
control. This contradiction - the ambivalence between the lust for power 
and the desire to subjugate, nurtures authoritarian systems. 15 The feeling 
of powerlessness, which is constituted by feelings of helplessness, weakness, 
defencelessness, ineffectiveness, inadequacy, and vulnerability, generates 
frustration, anger, and anxiety. Individuals may deny these weaknesses and 
direct their anger outwards, projecting their resentments and exasperations 
onto the establishment or society. The product of this lack of orientation 
and powerlessness are delinquencies, drug addicts (who have directed their 
aggression against themselves) and violent as well as racist youth groups. 
The freedom to choose holds many dangers, especially when the family and 
social environment have failed to convey a belief system to the individual, 
which provides orientation for future decision-making processes. 
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In our highly industrialised and technological society, in which the service 
sector provides a large proportion of the employment, we have come to 
accept that ability alone does not guarantee employment and success, but 
that we have to learn how to 'sell' our abilities. The individual is aware of 
the fact that s/he may not remain in the same economic sector for which 
s/he had originally been trained. The present economic system is in need of 
employees who adjust to the needs of the market and are prepared to switch 
from one profession to another. Different areas of employment require 
different qualities. Identity management is a skill and an essential tool to 
survive in modern mass society. The coaching and orientation that youth 
- ,. receive are 
based. on the progress of careers. Graduates are trained to write - 
an impressive curriculum vitae and present themselves well in interviews. 
Self-presentation is adjusted to the environment to which the individual 
seeks access. Short-lived fashions and trends determine what is 'in' and to 
which criteria one has to adjust to. The anonymity of today's mass society 
provides enough space for the manipulation of identity presentation. The 
frequent encounter of strangers of whom we do not know what significance 
they may have for us at present or in the future determines self- 
presentation in every-day interaction. 
Whether verbal or not, our actions are the social expression of our 
identity. 7' Furthermore, while our identity determines our actions, our 
social interaction has in turn, an impact on our identity. As on most 
occasions, our actions are rationally controlled for the purpose of social, 
political and economic advantages or aspirations, the response we get 
during our interaction is the response to our successful or unsuccessful 
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identity management. The response is also controlled by the other, unless it 
is a spontaneous expression of joy or pain. Thus if our interaction has an 
impact on our identity and our identity management determines our 
interaction, then our identity will be influenced by the identity we construct 
for others. The combination of an anonymous society and the need to 'sell' 
oneself, as a flexible work force, encourages a trend towards the 
'artificialisation' of identity. "' 
Inevitably the question emerges: if the state, the economy and the social 
environment have such a strong influence on identity, how free is an 
individual to determine his_ or her future and identity development?. The 
solution to this theoretical dilemma lies in the conflicts that arise from 
social reality. People frequently find themselves in situations that do not 
satisfy their material or emotional needs. In the course of the search for 
personal fulfilment choices have to be made. For example, an unemployed 
history graduate, who wanted to become a lecturer and philosopher, chose 
to train as an accountant to pay off his student loan; a wife chose to divorce 
her husband, although she loved him, because he became a notorious 
gambler, faked her signature and financially bankrupted the family; or a 
dissatisfied emancipated activist chose to convert to Islam and married a 
stranger at the advice of her Sufi Sheikh. All these individuals made their 
own choice, which changed their lives. They all discovered hidden talents 
and personality traits that had not been fostered in the past. Their decisions 
will essentially influence their identity. It is worth noting here that in all 
three of these real cases the individuals were forced to make a choice due to 
the situations they were in. At the same time all of them had alternatives to 
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choose from. Consequently, the decisions that they made were based on 
their evaluation of their situation and self-evaluation. Identity comprises of 
values, attitudes and beliefs that influence the decision-making process. Yet, 
on many occasions decisions are preceded and followed by changes in 
economic or social status and in the social environment. New experiences 
lead to a re-evaluation of the old system of beliefs and thus can change 
attitudes towards past actions and future experiences. 
Every individual strives for a satisfactory self-concept or identity. Most 
people seek to assimilate and accommodate new identifications into the 
_. __: _ existing- 
identity structure and subsequently. evaluate both old-and new 
identifications. When actions or decisions are coherent with the existing 
identity, then this process is free of conflict and occurs relatively unnoticed. 
If actions and decisions do not fit into the self-concept, then identity conflicts 
complicate the process of identity formation. Once new identifications seem 
more promising, although they are incoherent with the existing identity, an 
individual can opt to re-evaluate the past as a necessary path towards the 
present and thus maintain a sense of continuity in the course of identity 
development. When re-evaluation of the past is not sufficient to 
incorporate new and conflicting identifications, then the individual can 
resolve the conflict by disidentifying18 with the previous system of beliefs. 
This entails a re-interpretation of the past because accommodation, in other 
words, the adjustment of existing structures to incorporate new 
identifications, is not sufficient enough to maintain a sense of continuity. 
The past course of life is interpreted in such a way that at best, opportunities 
were just not there to discover the present option and at worst, the 
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individual was deluded and misguided, but has now found the true 
meaning to life. The latter interpretation is frequently found among 
converts and among individuals subjected to brainwashing. 19 However, 
these coping strategies apply to situations in which individuals believe that 
their new identifications represent positive turning points in their lives. 
When a person discovers that his or her decision led to a negative turning 
point in his or her life or when the individual was forced into a status, 
which is incompatible with the existing identity, then several intra-psychic 
and interpersonal coping strategies are available. As mentioned above, 
Breakwell12° offered four- main -interpersonal- coping strategies, which are 
isolation, negativism, passing and compliance. With regard to the intra- 
psychic coping strategies she pointed to four central strategies: deflection, 
acceptance, re-evaluation of current identity contents and re-evaluation of 
prospective identity contents. These strategies can in turn be subdivided in 
a range of more concrete strategies. Some of the most relevant strategies 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
Denial is a frequently employed strategy to cope with contradictions or 
threatening situations at the cognitive and emotional levels. Such 
contradictions or threats cause, what Festinger12' referred to as, cognitive 
dissonance. As a result, individuals who hold strong personal or ideological 
opinions commonly reject information that contradicts their point of view. 
They may deny or repress the information, which would otherwise force 
them to question their position. 
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Denial as a strategy to protect one's self-esteem was also observed among 
children of ethnic minority groups. Coloured children, between the ages of 
4 and 10 years, in the United States and in Britain were found to hold a 
more negative view of their own racial group and misidentified themselves 
as members of the white majority. 122 Such misidentification is a form 
denying one's ethnic origin. These children adopted the negative 
stereotypes from the attitudes wider society has towards each race. "' 
According to Festinger124, new opinions are subjected to social testing, they 
are compared with the opinions of others. The process of social testing 
allows the individual to identify relative similarities in opinion among 
other individuals. When a positive self-image- of a minority is. -negated by .. 
wider society, a minority individual has the option to either resist the 
adaptation of negative attitudes or to deny his or her belonging to the group. 
Young children lack rational arguments against negative stereotypes, they 
seek refuge in denying their ethnic affiliation. However, more recent 
studies suggested that children at the age of 9 already hold a more positive 
view of themselves and their peoples. 1 So, as a child grows older, s/he has 
to accept that denial is no long-term strategy to protect one's self-esteem. 
Another way to cope with discontinuity and identity conflicts is to shift 
salience between the desire for continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem. "" 
An identity threatening situation, in which an individual must sacrifice his 
or her sense of continuity and self-esteem, can thus be accepted by 
emphasising distinctiveness. The woman who divorced her husband, 
mentioned in the example above, sacrificed the continuity of her family life 
and felt that she had failed to protect her family, which eroded her self- 
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esteem. In turn she discovered new social skill, went on to further 
education, and improved her social status as well as her future prospects. 
She emphasised her increased sense of distinctiveness that subsequently 
boosted her self-esteem. The loss of continuity in her role as a house-wife 
had become less important. 
A similar strategy is to focus upon a particular identity component and to 
inflate its value. 127 This strategy is found among second generation Muslin{ 
youth. Muslim youth, who have not found employment according to their 
expectations or who will leave university and search for employment, fear 
that they. will not-be able to make the -careers they envisage because of racial 
discrimination and `Islamophobia'. On many occasions, these young adults 
emphasise the importance of Islam in their lives. They direct their 
attention to the self-esteem that they gain through being a pious Muslim to 
protect against the anticipated loss of self-esteem in the future. 
1.1.5. Social Identity and Minorities 
Before discussing social and group identity and their significance for 
minorities, it may be important to note that theories regarding ethnic 
identity are frequently the object of criticism. The reproach is based on the 
fact that Psychology and Sociology, as known today, were developed to study 
Western societies. Thus when ethnic minorities are investigated the 
methodologies and analyses are conducted from a Western perspective. 
Also theorists of different cultural backgrounds such as Nimmi Hutnik, 
Henri Tajfel, Tariq Modood and Steward Hall, were all educated by Western 
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institutions. They base their studies on Western schools of thought. Thus 
existing theories may be criticised as insufficient for the study of Muslim 
identity, nevertheless they are the only tools presently available to serve this 
study. To counter balance this deficiency more space will be provided in 
later chapters for Muslims to speak about their identity for themselves. First 
though, social identity will be discussed on theoretical grounds. 
The identification with groups or a collective is generally summarised for 
the sake of clarity, as social identity. It encompasses social status, roles and 
norms, as well as ethnic, both national and cultural affiliation and group 
... membership. 
Social identity, in essence, is. the product. of differentiation ..... _ 
between 'as' and 'them'. Social identity can be conceived in demarcation to 
others. By social categorisation the individual can segment his or her social 
environment into his or her own group and others. 128 Among people who 
share the same norms and values, an individual experiences the 
reaffirmation of his or her identity, which provides emotional comfort. 
Therefore an essential aspect of social identity is that it provides a sense of 
security and protection when an individual is embedded in a group of equal 
minded people who acknowledge his or her social position. 
When considering cultural identity, it becomes apparent that collective 
identities are not necessarily based on absolute commonalties, but on 
approximate criteria, which are sufficient to create social cohesion among 
groups and societies. This aspect of social identity is best explained by an 
argument used in logic: 
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If indiscriminability is a shadow of identity, the shape of the latter is distorted 
but 
recognisable in the shape of the former. The logic of identity generates a logic of 
approximate criteria of identity, in some way similar and in some different, 
129 
For Williamson discriminability is a criteria for distinctness, while, 
indiscriminability is an indication of identity, 'an approximate criterion'. 
However, indiscriminability is non-transitive. 
It is not always the case that when a is indiscriminable from b and b is indiscriminable 
from c then a is indiscriminable from c, for otherwise there could not be series in which 
the differences between successive members are both too small to be discriminated and 
yet add up to a discriminable difference between the first member and the last. 
30 
When transferring this argument to human identity, the external 
identification--of groups or the attribution of an - individual to a group is 
based on the indiscriminability between individuals in contrast to others. 
The human mind tries to isolate the approximate criteria of identity in 
order to categorise the environment. Thus individuals categorise the 
environment in order to facilitate orientation. 
The 'approximate criterion of identity' implies that the ordinary observer 
does not have full knowledge of the identity of the 'object'. This gives credit 
to the imperfection of human knowledge and judgement and is partly an 
elucidation of the cognitive presupposition of social categorisation. Social 
identity is based on generalisation, social categorisation and an in-group 
consensus on who is 'in' and who is 'out'. 
Although social identity is certainly non-transitive, as member a of a group 
is not identical with member b etc., the identity with specific values which 
unify a group can be described as indiscriminable. Every member of a group. 
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identifies with the same values and symbols of that group, and consequently 
with the group itself. Yet, every member will impute their own meanings 
to symbols and values, as every individual assimilates them to the 
idiosyncrasies of their own experiences and personalities. This is best 
illustrated by highlighting differences in regional-cultural identities. 
Frequently, gross stereotypes are attributed to identities of larger social 
groups, which results in a faulty categorisation. When, for example, 
references are made to Scottish, Welsh or English identity, it is often ignored 
that a Highland Scot feels much stronger about his Gaelic background than a 
Lowland Scot, who has far more in common with the northern English due 
to trade and intermarriage. Also an Englishman.. from the Northeast may 
feel that he has a lot more in common with a Lowland Scot than with an 
Englishman from the South, yet this doesn't mean that a Highland Scot 
could identify with an Englishman from the Northeast. Collectives are 
internally divided, thus it depends on against whom identities are 
compared in order to determine the difference between groups and to 
understand when certain group or collective identities become more salient. 
Anthony Cohen suggested that "the boundary as the community's public 
face is symbolically simple; but, as the object of internal discourse, it is 
symbolically complex". 131 
It has to be emphasised that an individual can identify with a variety of 
groups. He may identify with a group that is defined by class, a particular 
fashion, its support for a particular football team or political party, etc.. 
With all such groups an individual may share some common symbols, 
values, interests and goals. Each group affiliation may satisfy a different 
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cognitive or emotional need. At the same time this individual is able to 
develop a broader collective identity, such as a national or ethnic identity, 
which encompasses people with whom s/he would otherwise have very 
little in common on a day to day basis. This is the point where the line 
between sameness and difference becomes blurred and identities begin to 
overlap. A collective identity, which encompasses a large social group, is 
based on minimal common denominators. The salience of collective and 
group identities usually depend on the social environment in which they 
are stimulated. While the British identity of a Briton is not consciously 
present on a day to day basis in the UK, it will become salient when this 
individual. -moves abroad. 
A collective is not simply the sum of various social groups, which would 
rather be an indication for the fragmentation of a society than for its unity. 
Identity is manifold, as identifications take place in many different forms. 
While embodied differences such as gender or skin colour are obvious 
visual markers, it is far more difficult to determine the precise criteria for 
cultural boundaries of communities. Anthony Cohen suggested that people 
'construct' their communities symbolically. Within the community's social 
discourse, meanings can be fabricated and almost any perceived difference 
between 'us' and 'them' can be transformed into symbolic markers for 
boundaries. The semantics of these symbols purposely remain vague in 
order to be generally accepted. Community members can consequently 
interpret them according to their needs. 132 Thus these boundaries derive 
from an imagined communality which finds a real expression in interaction 
with the 'others'. Cohen pointed out that communal cultural identity does 
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not always reflect in the way in which individuals behave or do things, but 
rather in the way they think about the community, its symbols and culture. 
He referred to communal identity as a "masking symbol"133 , which is 
presented to the outside world in such a way that it represents what the 
members think that it is or what they want it to be. Individuals living at the 
cultural boundaries of their community have the most precise definition of 
what their cultural identity is, as they are most aware of the distinction 
between 'them' and 'us'. Consequently nationalism is found to be the 
strongest in regions close to national borders. 
As the construction of symbolic commonalties among large societies is far. 
more impersonal than among smaller communities, individuals search for 
attachments to groups which are more ascertainable and in which its 
members can develop interpersonal ties. Such small communities or 
groups are far more specific in their definition of shared identity. The 
human, as a social being seeks inclusion and group support. Although 
various individuals experience marginalisation for different reasons, these 
people aspire to compensate such exclusion by forming new groups in order 
to create social and emotional security. Thus identity also becomes 
comprehensible in the form of social attachments. 
The most obvious marker for the development of group identity is 
ethnicity. Contrary to the common argument that the reassertion of ethnic 
identities is a consequence of modernisation, Hondrich suggested that it is 
an accompanying phenomenon of social modernisation processes. He 
argued that latent origin-related attachments134 gain significance with the 
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accumulation of rational and individual future-oriented attachments. 
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Origin-related attachments (e. g. to family and ethnic community) are not 
chosen. As individuals make choices, such as to move to another country 
or decide on a particular occupational career, new chosen attachments are 
established. However, chosen attachments may fail, cause disappointment 
or can lead to experiences of rejection. In this case the individual can fall 
back on the origin-related attachments, which cannot be lost and therefore 
provide security and protection. Once a number of chosen attachments 
accumulate, no matter whether they were positive or not, they tend to 
_ cancel each other's 
impact. Lack of time and the mere quantity of 
attachments allow for only.. the most recent -ones. to remain significant. 
The 
more chosen attachments an individual accumulates, the less significant 
they become in relation to origin-oriented attachments. The latter have the 
advantage of lasting influence, as they accompanied the individual from the 
beginning. Their scope is more far reaching and the individual cannot lose 
or detach himself from them. 136 
This phenomenon becomes most apparent among ethnic minorities. 
Members of ethnic minorities strive for acceptance by wider society as much 
as every other individual does. For example, West Indian students 
expressed their disillusion in Disappointed Guests13' after numerous efforts 
to integrate into university life and to mix with English students. An 
increasing number of members of ethnic minorities succeed in higher 
education, but do not receive adequate employment afterwards. Their 
attempt to integrate and to participate in building society is frequently 
rejected. Chosen attachments lead to disappointment and aspired identities 
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cannot be realised. The majority seek refuge in their community and fall 
back onto their ethnic identity. 
In general minority identity becomes most apparent in the realm of group 
and social identity. It is within inter-group dynamics that identity may be 
threatened or that strategies are developed to protect, bolster and perpetuate 
identity. For example, the cultural and religious identity of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi Muslims become more salient during contact with wider 
society, as public discern of Islam reflects on social interaction. By fostering 
their religious and cultural identity within the family and community they 
seek to protect their heritage. The creation of numerous organisations, of., 
which the majority operate as social, informational, religious and 
educational networks or pressure groups, serve this objective. 
Individuals have several intra-psychic strategies available to -build. and 
passively protect their identity. However, groups are more efficient in 
maintaining identity as well as minimising and eradicating external threats. 
Pressure groups are formed to concentrate the power of a `minority' in order 
to promote the interest of these people in a more powerful environment. 
Such groups seek to influence legislation in their own interest and to affect 
public opinion by lobbying or propaganda. 138 
Minorities, Tajfel suggested, adopt several strategies to maintain a positive 
self-image and sense of social identity, which have similarities with 
strategies applied by pressure groups. Before pressure groups are able to 
influence legislation, they seek to re-evaluate unfavourable connotations 
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attributed to existing group characteristics, revitalise old traditions with a 
positive significance or create new characteristics to produce a more positive 
public image. In essence, pressure groups try to change the values within 
the social system to become acknowledged by society as equals. 
As groups have more power to promote interests, their activity and success 
fosters a feeling of self-worth. Group Action aims to counter stigmatisation 
and prejudice among society and the political elite. By promoting a positive 
self-image via mass media, the attempt is made to alleviate the stigma and 
to protect minority identity. In order to make it easier for wider society to 
acknowledge the minority group,. old traditions or norms that have 
similarity with those of the majority or are more acceptable, are revived and 
attributed with positive values. Group Action has to convince both the 
audience in and outside the social category. However, no matter whether 
members of the in-group agree to the activity of their action groups or not, 
once the audience outside the social category revised its stereotypes of the 
category, minority members experience new patterns of treatment. This 
becomes most apparent when unwanted mistakes are made and activities 
backlash on the initiators. Usually, artisans and more liberal segments of 
society are the first to support minority groups in their effort to restructure 
the social value system and serve as mediators between the minority and 
wider society. The experience of positive change in social interaction 
patterns eventually strengthens minority identity. When group action fails 
to persuade wider society, but does convince the minority group, then the 
preconditions are created for a new subculture to emerge. Such a new 
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subculture is then destined to co-exist beside the dominant culture with 
limited influence on wider society. 139 
1.1.6. The Fragmented Individual? 
During the past decade theorists have observed the social, political and 
economic changes brought about by the process of globalisation and the 
subsequent impact on identity. However, change is usually accompanied by 
crisis. There is a general consensus that old traditions and norms are 
declining in order to give way to the formation of new social structures and 
identities. That there is a lingering 'crisis of identity' was recognised, but 
what it will lead to is subject of vigorous debate. Stewart Hall belongs to 
those theorists who support the claim that modern identities are being 
dislocated or fragmented. He argued that a distinctive type of structural 
change, which transforms modern societies, is 
fragmenting the cultural landscapes of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, and 
nationality which gave us firm locations as social individuals. These transformations 
are also shifting our personal identities, undermining our sense of ourselves as 
integrated subjects. This loss of a stable 'sense of self' is sometimes called the 
dislocation or de-centring of the subject. 14° 
The 'sense of self' is being undermined by repeated questioning and 
subsequent obliteration of deep rooted and generally accepted norms, which 
have provided orientation and guidance in the past. At the same time these 
norms are not yet replaced by equally immanent values, causing insecurity, 
destabilisation, ambivalence, and disorientation, which are typical 
symptoms of both collective and personal identity crises. Hall suggested that 
with the entrance into the post-modern era, modern society has also reached 
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the stage of a post-essentialist conception of identity. 141 Identification with 
one's place in the cultural environment has become more problematic due 
to the fragmentation of the social landscape. The post-modern subject. is 
thus conceptualised "as having no fixed, essential or permanent identity"'az 
An individual's identity is transformed according to different situations and 
the way s/he is addressed in the cultural system. 
The subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not 
unified around a coherent 'self'. Within us are contradictory identities, pullin in 
different directions, so that our identifications are continuously being shifted about. 43 
There is no doubt about the fact that identity formation is becoming more 
complex in present society, although it would be exaggerated to declare that 
the generally accepted notion of a unified identity, or rather that identity in 
a healthy state should form a unity, has become obsolete. A fragmented 
identity would entail a broken identity, operating in separate parts. When 
different identities develop in separation, it is referred to as a multiple 
personality syndrome by psychologists. Thus one should not make the 
mistake to interpret the human ability to present 'the self' in different ways 
according to the various social situations (well elaborated among symbolic 
interactionists), as a switch between different identities. It is rather a. change 
in salience between appropriate role identifications. These identifications 
can sometimes be contradictory, but nevertheless coexist as long as they do 
not emerge simultaneously, because intra-psychic and interpersonal 
strategies are available to cope with threatening situation. 
Unity is also not threatened if individuals reveal a history of contradictory 
identifications. For it solely depends on how this inconsistency is . 
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interpreted. Buddha, for example, was a rich young man who became an 
ascetic, then a rich merchant and then again an ascetic. The result of these 
contradictory identifications was, according to Buddhists, absolute wisdom. 
Thus the interpretation of, and the values attributed to, the discontinuity of 
identifications determines whether an individual is disoriented, in crisis, or 
not. The most common response to past contradictory identifications is: 'it 
was a phase I had to go through, it was an experience'. An individual's 
identity is not static or has fixed structure, but can assimilate and evaluate 
experience. Change and adjustment are a natural part of identity formation, 
so it is not the change as such that creates insecurity and produces a crisis of 
identity. 
_ 
The 'post-modern subject' does not suffer from a fragmented identity, but 
from disorientation. However, the analyses related to the concept of a 
fragmented identity recognise the presuppositions of a crisis of identity, 
which can be observed in present society. It is not the inadequacy of the 
present concepts of identity that are a problem. Certainly, due to the 
multiplicity of systems of meanings and cultural representations, which 
have become an integral part of modern society, more potential identities 
are offered to individuals. In addition, an accelerating pace of change 
pressurises the post-modern subject (as the contemporary individual is 
frequently referred to) to adjust. The vacuum during transition irritates and 
paralyses the individual. The deconstruction of knowledge and putting key 
concepts 'under erasure"" without superseding them with qualified 
alternatives, are characteristic features of 'post-modernity'. However, the 
deconstruction of every 'truth' and the acknowledgement of multiple 
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truths, as intellectual values, do not provide orientation for the struggle of 
day to day life. 
The current desire to deconstruct generally accepted concepts of identity and 
especially cultural identity, derives from the dilemma that identity is 
constructed on the basis of, and is defined by, 'difference'. The increasing 
number of ethnic minorities that settle in Western nation states find it 
problematic to integrate into a new culture and simultaneously maintain 
their own. The host societies also face the problem of accepting that their 
culture is no longer a 'homogenous' entity, as negotiated to represent their 
national identity. Western societies are presently forced to cope with. a 
cultural plurality that 'intruded' into . their 'imagined and constructed 
homogeneity'. Never before were Western nation states confronted with 
`difference' and the consequences of cultural difference on such a regular 
basis as during recent years. 
Whenever theorists see no solution for a problem they attempt to 
compensate this deficiency by deconstructing old concepts and creating new 
terminology for increasingly vague ideas. This is not to devalue positive 
and well-intended attempts to create culturally all embracing concepts. It is 
rather an effort to prevent a conceptual denial of conflicts that arise from the 
social reality of difference. The social reality of such conflicts can be 
observed on a small scale in most Western major cities and on a large scale 
in Rwanda, Bonsnia and Kosovo. 
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The refusal to acknowledge the nature of 'difference' and that too much 
'difference' within small space can create conflict, is a danger in itself. 
However, it is not 'difference' as such that is a source of conflict, but the 
values attributed to the one who is different. Reoccurring relapses into 
nationalism and ethnicity are also indications that individuals seek 
continuity and unity of identity, even if it is only imagined. 
Hondrich's theory on chosen and decent oriented attachments may be used 
to explain this phenomenon. He argued that when individuals lose their 
orientation and feel insecure because their chosen identifications have 
brought rejection,. disappointment or. resulted. in__ failure, they retreat back 
into their ethnic identities. This theory indicated that an individual will 
rather attempt to escape the fragmentation of identity and restore a sense of 
unity by reviving origin-oriented identifications. This process by itself does 
not bear social conflict. Identity does not only entail exclusion of the 
'different', but also provides the comfort of familiarity. Yet, disappointing 
identifications entail a reduction in self-esteem. Thus the desire to boost 
self-esteem by claiming superiority of one's inherited origin-oriented 
identifications bears the seeds of conflict. At this point 'difference' begins to 
receive value attributions. 
Identity is such a complicated issue because it is the psychological expression 
of the human need to be able to place, locate and define one's distinctive 
'self' within the social environment. Conversely, both personal and 
collective identity are subject to political and/or collective manipulation. 
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1.2. Hypotheses 
Modern society is permanently subjected to rapid change, generated by the 
desperate urge for progress and both economic and intellectual growth. The 
progress of globalisation and technological innovation have increased the 
pace and scope of change that is unprecedented by previous epochs. 145 
Change is unsettling, it is accompanied by the continuous re-evaluation of 
the past, present and aspirations of the future. Change creates 
disorientation, anxiety, fear and a sense of powerlessness and confusion. 
Disorientation and the feeling _of powerlessness may encourage individuals 
to seek protection and guidance from charismatic leaders from within like 
minded groups. 146 The reassertion of ethnic identity among British society 
and immigrant minorities alike, is an indication of the search for stability 
and continuity. 
During the last decade 'identity' has become a popular issue within public 
discourse, because, as Kobena Mercer rightly observed 
identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, 
coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty 147. 
Rapid social, political and economic change force Western societies to 
redefine their national and cultural identities, as well as their position in 
the international arena. The need to integrate different ethnic minorities 
into wider society, to counteract the progress of poverty among some social 
sectors, to avoid social fragmentation along the lines of class, region and 
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ethnicity and to foster loyalty to the state and its society will necessarily bring 
about a redefinition of values and a change in social structure and national 
identity. 
Western society developed an ambivalent attitude towards faith. On the 
one hand observant believers are perceived as backward and potentially 
radical and are treated with caution. On the other an increasing number of 
west Europeans convert to Buddhism, Islam and more radical Christian 
sects. Immigrants, of a. faith other than Christianity, receive little 
understanding from wider society for strict observance. Modood et al. 
highlighted the shift from. one view of 'integration' to another, _as__, 
they 
compared the patterns of exclusion of West Indians and South Asians. 748 
Whilst West Indians were assimilative and yet excluded because of their 
colour, South Asians, and especially Muslims, seem to be marginalised due 
to their cultural and religious difference. It is noteworthy that Muslims in 
Europe, and in Britain in particular, are of more public and political concern 
than the Chinese, West Indians and other minorities. 
After preliminary field work the following hypotheses were defined: 
" Muslim minority identity in Europe, and Britain in particular, elicits 
hostility and mistrust, as it impinges on the most fragile Western 
identity components in a time of social change. 
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The integration of Muslim minorities into British society creates 
friction; both parties perceive the other as a threat to their identity 
and thus respond with mutual rejection. 
" Identityentails the possibilityof choice with regard to the emphasis of 
particular identifications. The emphasis of origin-oriented 
identifications such as ethnicity, culture or religion is a coping 
strategy in the face of disorientation and a threatened sense of self- 
worth. 
British- identity is a very fragile yet flexible construction. It has been created 
to accommodate and incorporate English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish national 
sentiments. At present Britain is still struggling to resolve the Northern 
Ireland conflict and growing nationalism in Wales and Scotland is 
threatening the -unity of the 
United Kingdom. At the same time, ethnic 
minorities from former colonies and the Commonwealth settled in Britain 
and introduced a new ethnic and cultural plurality that is leading to a 
redefinition of British identity. 
In a time when 'traditional' British identity seems to 'dissolve', Muslim 
minorities maintain their strong cultural and religious identity amongst 
their communities in Britain. Their family ties are strong and extend back 
to their countries of origin. The majority of Muslims are reluctant to 
develop close ties with members of wider society and despise what 
Westerners would describe as the liberties of the individual, but Muslims 
refer to as decadence and immorality. Violence in Muslim countries and 
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'Islamic Fundamentalism' are the focus of Western media reports. The 
picture Western societies have of Islam, is that of intolerance and violent 
fanaticism. Terrorism against Western institutions, tourists, and secular 
governments in the Arab world produce mistrust against Muslim 
minorities in the West. The fear that Muslims lack loyalty to their country 
of residence and could become subjected to manipulation by Islamist 
movements, prevails among Western society. On these grounds, Muslims 
experience rejection and discrimination, which by no means facilitates the 
integration process. 
This thesis will therefore investigate how national-. and religious identity 
determines how British Muslims and the indigenous British perceive each 
other and how these views affect the integration of Muslim minorities in 
Britain. In the context of this thesis the term integration will be defined as 
follows: 
A minority individual is fully integrated in wider society when s/he 
has acquired the native language, adopted the majority of the socio- 
cultural behaviourisms (without having to neglect his/her culture of 
ethnic origin) and is accepted by the native environment as a member 
of society. 
This definition is based on the concept of acculturation, but purposely does 
not include it. The term acculturation seems insufficient as it only 
circumscribes the efforts. made by the minority individual to adopt the 
culture of wider society. Yet to be accepted by the native environment 
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implies that an effort must be made by members of wider society to integrate 
the minority individual and therefore introduces a mutuality with regard to 
the integration process. Thus this concept tries to acknowledge the fact that 
British born children have to a large extent acculturated, but do not 
necessarily feel integrated in British society. 
1.3. Meta-Theory 
At this point it is appropriate to declare from which meta-theoretical 
perspective this research is being approached. For the purpose of the field 
research, two theoretical positions have been merged: Symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenology. Due to its explorative nature symbolic 
interactionism is most coherent with qualitative research. As mentioned 
above symbolic interactionism is based on Mead's theoretical social 
psychological approach. It is the attempt to explain individual behaviour 
and consciousness on the grounds of social processes. These processes are 
structured in accordance with the principles of action and response. Such 
principles have been conveyed to the individual by language, which allows 
him or her to anticipate the responses his or her action cause within 
someone else. This anticipated response serves as a control mechanism for 
one's own action. Symbols (signs used to represent something) are cultural 
constructs. Every society negotiated, in the course of long term historic 
processes, and agreed on basic meanings for symbols that every member of 
society must learn.. The central hypothesis of symbolic interactionism is that 
social interaction is strongly influenced by, and dependent on, these basic 
meanings of employed symbols. Symbolic interaction is to be understood as 
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a reciprocal behaviour of people and groups, employing common symbols 
and generating expectations of successive responses. 
Symbolic interactionism is not related to a particular methodology. 
However, the examination of categories, hypotheses, data and interpretation 
should be approached alternately with common sense and scientific 
understanding. The reason being that the scientific approach to an issue 
alone could lead to its theoretical reconstruction detached from reality. 
Therefore common sense should serve as a control mechanism. The 
research should not be based on preconceived theoretical concepts but on 
exploration and inspection. ., _.,... ý. 
Exploration, in this context entails a flexible and reflexive approach. The 
researcher should check on and reflect upon results, their interrelation and 
methods, then improve the latter if necessary. Methods should be adapted 
to the situation and the researcher should adjust his or her theoretical 
expectations to reality. The researcher should be able to identify with the 
particular group under scrutiny, but also create the necessary distance to 
every phase of research. The intention is to create a clear picture of the 
research subject in order to choose appropriate concepts. 
Inspection is the simultaneous analytical activity of the researcher. 
Empirical data are analysed with regard to their inter-relation in order to 
create theory. Concepts are continuously corrected in accordance with the 
`real empirical world'. 149 Blumer15° stated three methodological premises 
on which symbolic interactionism is based: 
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" People respond to the subjective meaning of a 'thing' and not to the 
'thing' itself. Therefore it is not essential to explore 'what it is' but 'what 
people think it is'. Thus 'things' always have to be explored in the 
context of meanings associated with them. An 'object' receives meaning 
once it becomes a topic in conversation. As long as something is not 
incorporated into communication, no meanings are attributed to it and 
therefore it does not exist socially. In other words, it is irrelevant to the 
interaction process. 
" The meaning of 'things' may be derived from social interaction. This 
entails that no meanings are inate, but that all meanings are conveyed 
during social interaction. Therefore the exploration of processes are 
important. 
" Meanings are employed and changed during an interpretative process. 
Thus the meanings of definitions and symbols are not fixed, but must be 
acquired during interactive processes. Reality must therefore be 
conceived as a social construct. 
In this context researchers must choose a method which enables involved 
subjects to interpret the given situation themselves. 
The most favoured scientific theory employed by social interactionists is 
phenomenology. For Husserl, who developed this theoretical approach in 
opposition to positivism, phenomenology is the methodological foundation 
for all sciences and philosophy. Phenomenology seeks to conceive the 
essence of a `thing', not only in its material form, but also as a conscious 
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manifestation. Therefore it is the researchers task to analyse the 
phenomenon the way it is and not the way theories picture it. Background 
knowledge about the topic has to be pushed aside so that it does not bias the 
researcher's perspective. Reality as such is not being explored, but the way 
individuals perceive it. 
When applied, the researcher has to go through two phases of reduction. 
The first is to refrain from introducing one's theoretical perspective to the 
research process and develop a neutral attitude towards the subject, free 
from bias and pre-conceptualisations. It is important to make oneself aware 
of one's assumptions and theoretical anticipations-about the research area. 
The second phase of reduction is the description of meanings in order to 
develop an understanding of the essence. 
From the perspective of phenomenology the 'subject' itself cannot be 
directly examined, but only their verbal expression or representation in 
language. This is why a researcher can never be completely objective, but 
can only develop an unbiased attitude towards his or her subject. Observing 
and describing the subject from an uncritical and unbiased perspective thus 
create the preconditions for analyses and explanations. "' 
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1.4. Methodology 
The analyses of identity and integration can be approached from the 
perspective of various disciplines. Identity must be understood as a 
psychological process that operates within a social context in relation to its 
historical perspective. Therefore the investigation of Muslim and British 
identity is best approached from an integrative stance. Fortunately, the need 
for an inter-disciplinary approach to identity has already become more 
widely accepted, in particular among social psychologists. 152 
The material. for this thesis was drawn from three areas: 
1. history, 
2. previous studies and 
3. field research. 
1. When focusing on Muslim and British identity, the salient identity 
components under scrutiny are cultural, religious and national. These 
three identity components will be examined in their historical context. 
British history and that of the Muslim minorities is therefore an 
important aspect of this thesis. 
2. Theories and studies on identity, which were introduced above, provide 
additional material and serve as a foundation for analyses and 
interpretation. These theories, which are of psychological, sociological 
and social psychological origin, will help to relate personal psychological 
demands to the concrete social environment, and illustrate how this 
inter-relationship influences integration. 
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3. The field research was approached from the position of symbolic 
interactionism, in so far that it is being recognised that meanings are 
being negotiated within a social context. Researching identity is 
effectively the search for, and analyses of, meanings that mirror the 
psychological reality of the interviewee. It is assumed that what 
respondents say is a reflection of their 'reality' and is thus a 
representation of their psychological world. This point of view can also 
be referred to as the phenomenological perspective. 
In order to create a more comprehensive picture of what British and 
Muslim identity are, a qualitative method seemed most appropriate. 
Quantitative methods, such as questionnaires or surveys, are applied to 
determine the frequency of a certain response but provide little opportunity 
for the respondents to describe their 'reality' and to express their point of 
view. Such methods are ideal when the researcher has sufficient knowledge 
of the causes and consequences of a problem under scrutiny and seeks to 
make a representative statement about a given population. Qualitative 
methods do not lead to representative results, but provide a more detailed 
picture of the topic area, which the researcher is trying to investigate. 
1.4.1. Grounded Theory 
Glaser and Strauss developed grounded theory153 as they sought to improve 
the development of theory by bridging theory development and empirical 
research. Glaser and Strauss did not attempt to resolve this problem by 







Within the qualitative paradigm, participating observation is the method 
par excellence. However, qualitative interviews are becoming more 
acknowledged, because information can be recorded in statu nascendi, thus 
serving as documentary evidence and therefore may be proven authentic. 
As it is possible to compare texts and their interpretations, qualitative 
interviews are gradually gaining higher methodological status. 15' 
- -- . Depending on the 
kind of information- a researcher. seeks, there are three 
types of interviews s/he can choose from: informational, analytical or 
diagnostic. While the informational interview belongs to the spectrum of 
quantitative methods, analytical and diagnostic interviews can be used 
within both the qualitative and quantitative paradigms. The informational 
interview is the type that journalists would use, while the diagnostic 
interview serves to establish well-defined characteristics, as doctors would 
do in conversation with their patients. The analytical interview aims to 
reveal motivations, beliefs and attitudes to determine the cause of a given 
problem. "' 
The different types of interviews can also differ in their standardisation. 
They can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. The structured 
interview is based on a detailed schedule, much like a questionnaire. The 
questions have to be both short and specific and the interviewer has to read 
these questions as formulated and ordered in the schedule. The responses 
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in a structured interview are usually short. Ideally the researcher has 
produced response categories so that they can immediately categorise the 
answers. 'S9 The advantage of the structured interview is that it takes less 
time, is easier to quantify and the interviewer has minimal impact on the 
response. The disadvantage is that this method limits what the respondent 
can talk about and can therefore miss important information. 
The unstructured interview is not based on any predefined questions. 
Instead the interviewee is invited to talk about his or her experience with, 
or knowledge of, a particular problem .. in as much detail as possible. The 
atmosphere of the communication- between- the interviewer and the 
interviewee is informal. The advantage here is that the response is not 
predetermined in any way. The method is flexible and may yield a lot of 
information. The disadvantage is that the researcher has less control over 
the situation, the interview takes longer and it is virtually impossible to 
compare the content of these interviews. Unstructured interviews are 
generally used for oral history and single case studies. 
The semi-structured interview seeks to merge the advantages of both the 
structured and unstructured interview. The investigator uses an interview 
schedule, with a set of questions. However, the interviewer does not have 
to follow a set order of questions, but is able to probe interesting areas, which 
arise and can follow the concerns of the respondent. Thus the advantage of 
the semi-structured interview is that the researcher has more control over 
the interview process and at the same time the method is flexible enough to 
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produce informative data. The disadvantage is that these interviews are 
more difficult to analyse. 'bo 
For this study three series of interviews have been conducted with: 
" leaders of Muslim organisations (21), 
" members of Muslim minorities and members of the public (160) and 
" British politicians (2). 
The interviews with leaders of Muslim organisations were intended to 
provide insight into the objectives of those who claim to represent Muslim 
minorities in Britain. Therefore the semi-structured informational 
interviewing technique was deemed the appropriate method. These 
interviews also provide initial orientation for which topic areas are salient 
among the community and seem to be important for Muslim self- 
conceptualisation. Twenty-one of such interviews were conducted. The 
organisations have been selected according to their communal importance 
and area of activity in various regions in Britain. These interviews were 
conducted in the environment of the interviewee and were taped after 
permission had been sought. The questions were based on a guideline that 
was prepared beforehand and was consistent for all interviews. Open 
questions were posed to give the interviewee an opportunity to raise topics 
of particular concern that may not have been considered by the interviewer. 
These semi-structured interviews were primarily intended to provide 
information about the organisations themselves and are not subject to 
analytical interpretation. The list of organisations is in appendix II and the 
guideline of the interviews in appendix III. 
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The interviews with British Muslims concerning Muslim identity in Britain 
and their attitudes towards Britain, as well as the interviews with native 
British about British identity and their attitudes towards Muslims were 
methodologically approached from the perspective of the grounded theory. 
They were intended to provide an insight into the interviewees' self- 
conceptualisation and their concepts of British identity in terms of culture 
and/or religion for comparison. 
In order to develop first categories and criteria for theoretical sampling, 
those parts of the interviews with leaders of Muslim organisations that 
focused on Muslim identity and the future of Islam in Britain were used. 
This data provided sufficient material to create guidelines or interview 
schedules with open questions for further interviews. The interviews with 
British Muslims and natives were analytical and semi-structured. - The 
schedule remained in essence the same for all interviews, but was been 
adjusted to the interests of the interviewees, the geographical area in which 
the interviews took place (London / Birmingham / Glasgow / Cardiff) and 
to the cultural background of the interviewee (Muslim / native-Welsh, etc. ). 
The interviews took between half an hour and three hours. The interview 
guideline is in appendix IV. 
Methodologically grounded theory relies on small samples. Therefore the 
analyses of data for the development of categories and theory was based on 
the transcription of interviews, line-by-line coding or focused coding and 
memo-writing. From the series of interview with leaders of Muslim 
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organisations only two interviews are completely transcribed due to the 
volume of material. These interviews were coded and categories were 
developed. Based on these categories the relevant parts of all the other 
interviews were then analytically compared by auditive means. Therefore 
immediate memo-writing was even more important for the improvement 
of the categories and the creation of mid-range theories. 
The interviews with British Muslims and natives were coded and analysed 
according to the same strategy as previously described. Only the most 
valuable interviews, during which interviewees explained their . 
feelings 
and thoughts in detail, are completely transcribed and the 
categories/ improved categories were used to analyse the rest of the 
interviews by auditive means. The sampling of the interviews have been 
chosen according to the following criteria: generation, region and gender. In 
total one hundred and sixty individuals were interviewed of which one half 
are British nationals of Islamic faith and the remainder belong to the native 
population. . The sample was divided into equal numbers of males and 
females. Both the male and the female samples were in turn split into two 
age groups; half the interviewees were aged between eighteen and thirty- 
five and the other half between thirty-five and sixty. The division between 
the age groups was important to determine generational differences in 
general and the difference in identity development between the first and the 
second generations of Muslim immigrants in particular. 
The sample was divided according to regions in order to consider differences 
between regional identities in Britain. Forty analytical semi-structured 
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interviews (sampled as described above) were conducted in each of the 
following major cities with a high percentage of Muslim minorities: Cardiff, 
Glasgow, Birmingham and London. 
Interviews with politicians followed an interview schedule prepared for 
semi-structured informational interviews. However, only Lord Tebbit CH 
was prepared to be interviewed. Mr O'Brien MP from the Home Office 
offered to respond to any questions in written form. The prepared questions 
were therefore summarised and posted. The summarised questions were 
also sent to Tony Benn MP. The response of Tony Benn MP is in appendix 
V. 
The data from all the interviews and their qualitative analyses will be 
integrated into a wider historic context and not presented in the form of a 
report. 
1.4.3. Experiences and Comments 
Although researchers applying qualitative methodologies seek to neutralise 
the influence of interviewers as much as researchers using quantitative 
methods do, there are some aspects that just cannot be changed. As the 
author was the sole interviewer during this research, the data produced by 
the interviewees have to be analysed with the knowledge that these 
interviewees have responded to a west European woman, neither Muslim 
nor British. Being a non-native English speaker was an advantage in so far 
as I was equally alien to British Muslims and natives. Conducting these 
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interviews as a non-Muslim woman had both advantages and 
disadvantages. As a woman it was much easier to get in contact with 
Muslim women, especially of the first generation. Generally speaking, 
Muslim men did not respond to me any differently than British native men 
did. However, not being Muslim changed the precondition of the 
interviews considerably. The advantage was that Muslims seemed 
interested in conveying to a non-Muslim their perspective and to explain 
what Islam means to them. Muslims were prepared to sacrifice far more of 
their time for these interviews than British natives were and it seemed that 
they enjoyed speaking about themselves more than their native 
counterparts did. The disadvantages were that some Muslims may not have 
spoken to me as confidentially as to a Muslim and that some others felt 
obliged to attempt to convert me. The reduced confidentiality became most 
apparent as I was searching for someone to interview in the London Central 
Mosque and entered an office in which two men were having a 
conversation. One asked me what I had come for and as I explained that I 
wanted an interview with regard to Muslim organisations and the future of 
Islam in Britain, the other man exclaimed: 'Oh, sister do not worry about the 
future of Islam, we are working hard to get more Muslims into the country 
so that we have more influence. One day Britain will become Islamic! ' The 
other then asked me whether I was a Muslima (it was not obvious because I 
was wearing a head scarf) and as I declared that I was not, he informed me 
that he had nothing to say on this topic. 
In the same mosque on a different occasion I was sent to another official 
who, after he found out that I was not a Muslima but had studied Islam, was 
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aggressive and patronising towards me for not converting to 
Islam. No 
interview followed. Attempts to convert me by more subtle methods were 
made several times, particularly when interviewing private individuals. 
However, these attempts also provided a lot of insight into the religious 
identity of these interviewees and their responses produced interesting data. 
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2. British Identity 
This chapter will focus on the national identity and sense of belonging 
among the native British population. It seeks to investigate and to illustrate 
peoples' sense of Englishness, Welshness and Scottishness, as well as how 
these ethno-cultural identities impact British unity. The purpose of this 
investigation is to place Muslim integration and minority identity into a 
broader context. Clearly the socio-political situation of the Welsh and Scots 
cannot be directly compared to that of Commonwealth immigrants. 
However, it is important to consider what kind of a society, minorities are 
expected to integrate into. 
In order to determine under what constraints identity and British identity 
evolved and which identity anchors are available for immigrant minorities, 
aspects of English and British history are evaluated in depth. Most social 
theorists argue that identity of the modern subject is now fragmented. 
Therefore, the focus on history seeks to provide a contrast to the present and 
to establish, when and under what circumstances, identity became 
problematic. The evolution of multiculturalism, political and religious 
institutions are highlighted in order to determine their importance to 
modern British identity, as other aspects of British history are superfluous to 
this thesis. 
The historical studies provide a better understanding of the present and as 
the responses of Welsh, English and Scottish interviewees will show, the 
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past continues to exert subliminal influences on the present identification 
processes. An analysis of present English, Scottish, Welsh and British 
identity, based on interviews concludes this chapter. 
2.1. The Historic Development of British Identity 
To analyse British identity so far back in history may at first sight seem 
distracting. However, British history bears answers to many related 
questions. It is the story of brutality, feuds, war and suppression, but also of 
an intriguing ability to incorporate, unite, concede and strive for freedom 
and tolerance. It is the history of a people, who have shaped democratic 
awareness and have advanced economic as well as social development, far 
beyond their own borders, as a result of both an agricultural and an 
industrial revolution. British history elucidates the remarkable ability of a 
ruling minority to maintain continuity and stability while adapting to 
economic and social change. The capacity to change and simultaneously 
maintain stability are certainly based on a conglomerate of influences, of 
which one is the skilful manipulation of identity. Although identity only 
became an issue during modernity, identity as a phenomenon did exist, 
nevertheless. 
The investigation of British history not only allows for an analysis of British 
identity, but also reveals mechanisms of collective identity formation that 
can help identify strategies for coping with present social and economic 
changes. It is the aim of this chapter to review the most significant stages of 
British identity formation, in order to develop a better understanding of the 
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present, and to disclose the identity conflicts, which present youth, and 
especially Muslim youth, have to cope with as they seek to integrate into 
this society. 
Identity is a difficult concept to grasp, so it has to be kept in mind that British 
identity, as with most national identities, is constructed of selected historic 
events and social or political achievements, which led to national fame or 
notoriety. Therefore, by focusing on various historic contributions to 
British identity this chapter investigates what peoples constitute the British 
nation state and their relationships to society and the state. 
Identities are organised and defined by societies and therefore the attitudes 
towards central government, politics and legislation, as well as related 
changes, serve as indicators for what shapes British identity. It is the 
intention to highlight historic events such as the predominance of the 
Church of England, the maintenance of the monarchy and the reformation 
of Parliament, which contributed to identity formation and remained 
salient in present public discourse. 
However, using history as data to determine identity is problematic. There 
is a danger in interpreting historic events from the present perspective and 
therefore introducing a bias in the selection of historic material. It is not the 
aim to provide an overall objective account of British history; it is rather an 
attempt to select historic events that were instrumental in serving as 
identity anchors. Under these constraints, major political and historic 
developments shall be examined that have forged British, i. e. English, 
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Welsh and Scottish identity in the past and survived to the present day. 
Later chapters investigate whether these identity anchors are still of any 
value to present British multicultural society. 
2.2. The Psychology of Inhabiting an Island 
What are you proud of as an Englishman? 
The only thing I can think of is being an island. I think however much England is 
associated with Europe, however much, it is still slightly more separate than the 
others, because it is an island. I think there is a psychological thing about being an 
island. It has a very low subliminally affect on everybody! 
The psychology of inhabiting an island, and at the same time belonging to 
the cultural sphere of -Europe, has influenced British society in the past and 
still does so today in a unique way. British self-actualisation has to be 
understood in the context of a complex relationship with continental 
Europe. Since the landbridge to the European continent was severed 
between 6000 and 5000 Bc, the island has not ceased to experience 
immigration. Beakers (2300 BC), Celts (700 BC), Belgic Gauls (2nd century BC), 
Romans (55 BC), Angles, Saxons, Jutes (5th century AD), Vikings (9th century) and 
Normans (11th century) made Britain a multicultural society long before it 
became an empire. 
Britain, as an island, was only conquered twice in its history, once by the 
Romans in 55 BC and again by the Normans in 1066. Neither managed to 
conquer the entire British mainland. Britain's geographical separation from 
the continent made it difficult for invaders to intrude. Their successful 
arrival was dependent on the seasons and thus only relatively small 
numbers of them were able cross the sea at any one time. Eventually the 
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invaders became assimilated with the existing population and a mixed 
society emerged. 
Immediate expansion was as difficult as spontaneous invasion. 
Consequently, Britain's inhabitants quickly developed a sense of belonging. 
No one crosses Britain's borders unintentionally. To leave or to enter the 
country is a conscious act, based on 'will' and intent. The obvious 
geographical manifestation of Britain's borders prohibited successive 
settlement by neighbours who would eventually claim British territory as 
'legitimately' theirs. Britain always was a self-sufficient entity. Its 
geographic nature endowed Britain with an air of.. sovereignty, of, which, 
both Britons and neighbours seemed to be subconsciously aware (although 
the concept of a sovereign nation state was not coined until the 18th 
century). Therefore, invasion always was an apparent act of aggression and 
those who came did not obviously belong there. For those who did stay, 
settlement was concurrent with a geographical detachment from their 
native cultural roots and therefore a reduction of communication with the 
homeland. Consequently a need to integrate into the existing population 
became apparent. Encircled by sea the British were forced to become tolerant 
of each other's differences. Roy Strong described the impact of geographic 
isolation on British mentality as follows: 
The British by nature are in love with what they regard as the security of their island 
and the tranquillity of life which that engenders. It explains their innate 
conservatism, their ability to compromise, their pragmatism as well as their quite 
revolutionary voyages of the mind. Island claustrophobia must also account for the 
great geniuses of our history, a William Shakespeare or an Isaac Newton, for example, 
whose minds explode beyond island confines in search for universal truth. 
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Not only did their minds explore beyond island confines, the British also 
physically crossed the globe, driven by curiosity and in search for adventure, 
new land and wealth. Island claustrophobia and the circumstance that all 
those who settled in Britain must have been passionate and brave sailors 
may account for the innate urge to look beyond their own borders. This 
resulted in the building of one of the greatest European empires. 
Geographical isolation forced the British to look inwards and to resolve the 
strong internal divide between the Northern and Southern moieties. The 
Roman, Norman and English desire to unite various tribes inhabiting the 
island seems _to : be an obvious response to this geographical circumstance. 
However, the internal division between the Northern and Southern zones 
remained a salient issue up to the present day. The harsher climate in the 
north does not allow for such prosperous agriculture as in the South and 
the Midlands. Consequently more settlement took place in the South 
concentrating wealth and cultural exchange in that region. Wars with, and 
periodic domination over, the North produced an internal drama that 
determined the relationship between the Scots and the English as well as the 
national identity of the peoples. 
Isolated and surrounded by sea, native Celtic tribes were trapped in the 
North and South West as they retreated under Roman, Anglo-Saxon and 
Norman attack. The lack of opportunity to expand beyond the borders 
coerced conqueror and conquered into dialogue and eventually produced 
the Act of Union with Wales in 1536 and with Scotland in 1707. The 
unification of the Kingdoms was a necessary move to inhibit any alignment 
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between the native population and invaders. Cohabitation on limited 
territory forced the British to develop diplomatic instincts, the capacity to 
endure and the ability to protect ones identity. 
In spite of a shared history and acts of parliament to unite the peoples, ' the 
strong ethnic, regional and economic divide between the Welsh, the English 
and the Scots always re-emerged and saliently manifested itself as respective 
national identities. Thus a British identity was created, not to substitute 
regional identities, but to incorporate and to represent them. The creation 
of a British identity was a vain attempt to find a common denominator to 
overcome difference and to transplant the political union into the people's 
mind. This 'supra'-national identity proved to be binding, particularly in 
demarcation to anyone across the sea. Frequently this sense of separateness 
is expressed in discussion, when Britons refer to Europe as if they do not 
belong to this continent themselves. Repeatedly phrases such as: 'When I 
travel to Europe ..: , can 
be witnessed in conversation. Whenever inquiries 
are made about such forms of expression, the general response can be 
summed up in the statement that Britain and continental Europe are 
separate. 
Immigrants also readily adopt this sense of separateness and uniqueness, 
although modern technology minimised physical separation, both through 
increasingly efficient and cheap travel and through telecommunications. 
However, the mental sense of separation remained and is well reflected by 
British politics toward the European Union. 
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Although Britain produced a distinct and proud people, a coherent sense of 
British identity seems to be in decline. The British people are torn between 
the desire to maintain self-determination and to be an active participant in 
building a strong Europe. This coupled with the re-emergence of national 
sentiments on behalf of the Scots and the Welsh and the trend towards a 
multicultural society, forces Britons to rethink the concept of British identity 
and the criteria for a United Kingdom. 
2.3. British Identity Pre-Union 
'Among medieval society identity was unproblematic. An individual's 
identity was to a large extent predetermined by religious norms and a rigid 
social hierarchy. Only as a result of drastic measures such as expulsion from 
the community or excommunication, due to violations of rules and 
regulations, would identity become an issue on an emotional rather than 
cognitive level. Unfortunately, medieval society produced little 
biographical material, as the life history of an individual was insignificant. 
Biographies of saints rather sought to illustrate ideal examples of a pious life 
than to produce precise and detailed accounts. 
While little is known about the medieval individual, much can be said 
about the impact of the socio-economic and political developments of the 
time. Medieval politics laid the foundation for the British political culture 
of today. 
158 
2.3.1. The Thirteenth Century and the Development of a Political Culture 
Under Plantagenet rule England was linked in economic and cultural affairs 
with France. The continental territory of the Angevin Empire stretched to 
the foot of the Pyrenees. The loss and recovery of continental territory 
produced regular wars between British and French up until the 18`h century. 
Norman rule introduced a French speaking elite, which slowly replaced the 
Anglo-Saxon administration and the English church became more closely 
related to the state and tied with papal policy. Constant territorial conflict 
and the hereditary relationship between the French and English elite made 
France a favourite country of refuge for political opponents of English 
rulers. The feudal rule introduced by the Norman kings brought about 
conflict (social revolt and power struggles) and the means to settle conflict 
(contracts between king and subjects). The latter had substantial influence 
on legal awareness and perception of government among the British. 
Medieval man lived within a society that was rigidly structured and an 
individual's identity was formed by larger institutional structures. Identity 
was very much fixed by birth on the grounds of lineage, gender, home and 
social class. Personal struggle for identity, or simply the choice between 
various different identity components, was largely unknown to medieval 
man. Self-definition was predetermined, assigned by the environment. 
The role of most individuals towards self-determination was passive, 
altered only by specific transformations such as marriage, parenthood and 
further age-related transitions! 
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The fundamental difference between medieval and modern society is that 
medieval man was unaware of personal freedom and individuality. Every 
individual had a fixed place in society. It was inconceivable to move from 
one city to another, let alone to move upwards from one social class to 
another. 
The guild system regulated personal, economic and social life. It obliged 
guildsmen to share sources of raw materials while keeping technical 
knowledge secret from those who did not belong. Medieval individuals did 
not view themselves as individuals but defined themselves by means of 
their social roles. Life was regulated in every respect and although the 
medieval individual was not free, s/he was embedded in a social system 
that was defined by the perceived will of God 5 
It was accepted among feudal society that it was a God given right of the king 
to demand service from his subjects. At the same time he was considered 
responsible for his subjects and was expected to protect and to provide them 
with the minimum requirements to maintain their living standard. Thus 
exploitation took place within a system of mutual obligation that 
automatically set limits to the degree of exploitation possible. 6 The most 
famous settlement of such mutual rights and obligations is the Magna Carta. 
The Magna Carta was drawn up under King John's rule in the 13`' century. 
King John had lost all the French possessions by 1214. Attempts to recover 
Normandy failed and led to a rebellion among barons against the King. In 
opposition to the King, a Charter was drawn up on the basis of Henry I's 
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coronation charter, but reflecting the grievances of the time. At 
Runnymede on the Thames the barons met John on June the 15 `h, 1215 to 
draw up the Magna Carta. Although the Magna Carta is an undramatic 
document and largely untranslatable into modern language, its importance 
derives from the fact that it has the character of a contract representing an 
agreement between the King and the baronial parties. The concept of the 
community of the realm developed from this and provided the foundation 
for parliamentary government. The phrase 'community of the realm' then 
simply referred to the totality of the baronage. Eventually it acquired 
sophistication and the representative idea that it implies, became more 
significant. The Magna Carta became a part of permanent law after it. was 
reissued by John's son. The barons included a clause that called for a 
committee of four barons of the twenty five, to whom any grievances could 
be addressed and who were to enforce the charter, which paved the way for 
parliamentary government in the centuries to come. If the king refused to 
offer remedy after sufficient consultation, then the twenty five barons may 
distress the king until he complied. - 
Under Henry III (1216-72) and Edward I (1272-1307) the concept of parliament 
took shape. While the formulation of parliamentary powers under the 
reign of Henry III were designed to limit his power, Edward fostered the 
concept of the communitas regni himself. During Edward's reign forty five 
parliaments were called, of which seventeen were attended by 
representative knights and burgesses. The gathering that Edward I called in 
1295 became known as the 'Model Parliament', as it was representative of 
local communities and of the whole community of the realm. 
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The development of Parliament and its increasing power over the Crown's 
affairs are closely related to the king's financial dependence on taxation to 
subsidise war. Royal income was rarely sufficient to pay for the frequent 
military efforts against the Auld Alliance (France and Scotland) or to protect 
the throne against feuds and revolts. A large proportion of the country's 
wealth went to the Church, which over the centuries accumulated property 
inaccessible for worldly powers (The Church of England is currently one of 
the largest landowners in England). As a result English kings had to call 
upon Parliament to negotiate taxes in order to avoid baronial discontent and 
rebellion. If the kings of England had sufficient resources they could have 
ruled without calling upon Parliament. Therefore the constitutional 
authority that evolved out of the Crown's fiscal dependence on Parliament 
would not have developed during medieval times. 
Religion (Catholicism) and society (feudal system) primarily formed 
medieval identity. Britain developed its first secular legal norms, which 
made the king answerable not only to God but also to the law. Although the 
significance of the Magna Carta only became apparent over the centuries 
(John got the pope to declare it invalid as soon as it was agreed upon), this 
document represents baronial legal self-assertion against the king. By the 
reign of Edward I it was part of the political culture that the king would 
consult his noble subjects. This arrangement produced a change in 
conception of, and self-conception by, the king and the baronage. The king 
alone no longer had the power to decide on war and peace and the growing 
interdependency between the king and his noble subjects made the English 
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king a far more mortal being compared to his French, Spanish and Russian 
counterparts. 
Edward I conquered Wales in 1277 and unsuccessfully attempted to conquer 
Scotland in later years. During a Welsh rebellion five years later, Llywelen 
ap Gruffyd 'Prince of Wales' was killed and by 1295 the principality of Wales 
ceased to exist as English administration was introduced. The death of the 
'Prince of Wales' and the transferral of the title to the English crown prince 
still arouse anger among some patriotic Welsh. 7 
It is surprising that the attempt to extend Norman rule to the natural 
borders of the island was not made by William I, or any of his immediate 
successors. Thus for two centuries Scotland and Wales were able to develop 
a strong sense of individual identity and strengthen their political and 
cultural independence. While the Welsh were internally divided, the Scots 
had a far stronger sense of collective loyalty, which combined with Edward's 
financial plight led to the failure of his conquest of Scotland. ' 
The cultural identity of medieval agrarian society was shaped by a 
completely different social structure than early modern or industrial society, 
which facilitated the incorporation of newly conquered regions and 
culturally different communities. A small minority formed the literate 
ruling classes9, made up of the aristocracy, which in England was multi- 
lingual (Edward I spoke French, Latin and English)'O; the clergy (who more 
strongly identified with a united Christendom and Latin as the lingua 
franca)" and the military (the knights, who viewed themselves as the 
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defenders of Christendom and manifested this identity by going on crusades 
to liberate the Holy land from 'unbelievers'). 
The ruling classes then governed across culturally divided communities. 
During the thirteenth century the cultural division between the ruling 
classes and its subjects was enforced because the Anglo-Norman elite, which 
previous to Edward I were more strongly attached to the French mainland 
than to England, ruled over Anglo-Saxon subjects. Consequently, the 
relationship between ruler and subjects developed quite differently in 
England than it did in Wales and Scotland. 
In England the 'contract' between king and subjects was introduced, whilst 
in the relatively small inhabitable regions of Scotland and Wales, poverty 
and the clan structure of both societies led to stronger ties between the 
ruling classes and their subjects. The old clan structures produced a 
different administrative system, which was deeply rooted in Welsh and 
Scottish society. Thus in Wales and Scotland, loyalty and identification with 
the ruling elite, the clergy and the political system produced a strong 
resistance against English rule and administration. 
2.3.2. Social Transformation in the Sixteenth Century 
The 16'' century marked the end of the Middle Ages and brought about 
substantial economic, social and intellectual change. By the time Henry VII 
began 118 years of Tudor rule in 1485, the kingdom had recovered from the 
demographic catastrophe of the Black Death which led to labour shortages, 
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low rent and high wages and thus the agricultural depression came to a 
close. In response to that depression Landlords converted their fallow fields 
into sheep runs and increased their flocks to the point that these 
outnumbered humans three to one. The export of raw wool gave way to the 
export of woollen clothes manufactured at home. By the end of the 15' 
century the Association of London Wool Exporters, the Merchant 
Adventurers, controlled the London-Antwerp market. This increase in the 
export of wool and woollen clothes, combined with inflation due to a flood 
of gold and silver from the New World, produced a social and economic 
revolution. The centralised and coherent medieval social system slowly 
loosened up as individual economic initiative gained significance and a 
new wealthy class emerged. This growing individualism found expression 
in fashion, the arts, philosophy and theology. However, this newly found 
wealth, opportunities and the possibility of personal initiative also entailed 
a threat to the traditional way of life. For example, the medieval system of 
communal farming was destroyed as peasant farmers were evicted and the 
common land was divided up and fenced in. The consequences were labour 
surplus, land shortage, high rents and declining wages. This led to the 
transformation of farming techniques, an increasing gap between rich and 
poor and the replacement of old families by new on all levels of society. The 
new landed and merchant lasses sought political stability, strong 
government and the rule of law. There was no longer a desire to support 
baronial feuding as during medieval time and consequently social 
revolution and dynastic wars were total failures under Tudor rule. 
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Whilst political stability was sought to ensure economic progress, class 
solidarity disintegrated. Although the medieval guild system had excluded 
outsiders it provided relative security among the craftsmen who belonged to 
it. The guild system prevented competition, as it forced its members to co- 
operate with regard to setting prices, the supply of raw material and 
production techniques. By the end of the Middle Ages this solidarity was 
slowly undermined by increased competition, which brought about a loss of 
security and mistrust. 
As Capitalism began a new type of personality evolved. The individual's 
place in society was no longer secure. Monopoly of trade developed, which 
drove many craftsmen and small-scale tradesmen into poverty and many of 
the landed gentry experienced a decline in wealth. Insecurity, increased 
isolation and fear began to influence social relationships and human 
interaction. 12 
While the feudal system was based on co-operation and its regulations 
hampered competition, emerging Capitalism fostered an individualistic 
spirit of enterprise. The positive influence of this development was that it 
liberated the individual from the tutelage of the corporative system. The 
individual became in charge of their destiny. Risk, but also profit, allowed 
for economic independence and wealth, which eroded class boundaries and 
contributed to a transformation in personalities. Thus medieval man 
experienced the double-edged sword of freedom. The individual won the 
freedom of playing an active and independent role in the new social system, 
whilst that person was also free of all those attachments which have 
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provided security and a sense of belonging. The powerful forces of capital 
and market threaten the previously secure place in society. Former 
colleagues became competitors and life no longer took place in a predefined 
world. The feeling of oneness with the environment was replaced by a 
feeling of insignificance and helplessness. The new freedom must have 
produced a sense of insecurity and disorientation among medieval society. 13 
The decline of feudalism throughout Europe combined with a change in 
economy and rifts dissolved the political influence of Christendom. The 
teachings of Luther and Calvin met receptive audiences. Protestantism and 
Calvinism touched the middle classes, the poor and the farmers. The first 
symptoms of the social transformation to Capitalism, growing individuality, 
insecurity and disorientation were reflected in Luther's teachings. In 
reaction to the feelings of personal insignificance, doubt and fearfulness, 
Luther viewed the individual as a tool in the hands of God, who will only 
experience salvation in return for total subordination to and belief in the 
Creator. Luther liberated the individual from clerical authority, but 
simultaneously demanded total submission to God. For him belief was 
reflected in the acceptance of one's insignificance and in the readiness to 
surrender oneself to God. Psychologically the desire to subordinate and to 
perceive oneself as a tool in the hands of an all mighty power is an attempt 
to overcome doubt, helplessness and fear by becoming a part of a more 
powerful being and thus refusing responsibility 
for one's own fate. " 
In England the clerical neglect of the spiritual and the preoccupation with 
worldly affairs created discontent with the Church and prepared the grounds 
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for a break with Rome. Henry VIII (1509-47) inherited a secure throne, a full 
treasury and a united kingdom. These preconditions were the ideal grounds 
in order to advance beyond medievalism and to build a 'new monarchy'. 
The only residue of medieval times was the independent Catholic Church 
and its power over the king and the properties of the Church. The teachings 
of Martin Luther (1483-1546) and his equivalent Thomas Bilney, a 
Cambridge scholar, found a receptive audience also among upper-class 
individuals who were no longer satisfied with the corrupt and out-dated 
Church. 
In the 14`'' century John Wycliffe (died 1384), an Oxford scholar, had already 
proclaimed that dominium was not to be exercised mediately, through kings 
and popes, but immediately by anyone in God's grace. That is popes, kings 
and priests only receive God's grace and the power of possession, as well as 
of government, in return for service and not due to the hierarchical terms 
of feudalism. As a result Wycliffe espoused heresy in 1379 but the Lollard 
movement which he founded survived government attacks and continued 
to expand after his death. By the time of the Reformation Lollardy re- 
emerged once again. 
The break-up of the Catholic monopoly on religious truths destroyed the 
single (and for Western Europe universal) model of Christian life. The 
Protestant and Anglican schisms undermined the universal consensus 
about Christian belief and introduced a choice between differing guides for 
living one's life. The authority of the pope was questioned and the Catholic 
dogma came under attack. The causal relationship between the Creator, his 
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representative on earth and man's place in the universe was fragmented. 
Who now determines dogma and ritual, the Pope, a priest or the king? A 
Catholic identity was no longer the one and only option. Catholic identity 
was subjected to scrutiny and for the first time Catholics had to justify their 
Weltanschauung, which until then they had taken for granted. 
Henry VIII was never a Protestant and did not tolerate religious 
nonconformity, he was nevertheless dependent on the support of the 'zely 
people' (the Protestant zealots). They considered the political and 
constitutional steps by which his divorce from Catherine of Aragon was 
legalised as the prelude to reformation. 
In November 1529 Henry VIII called the Reformation Parliament which 
lasted for seven years and enacted 137 statutes. The Act of Restraint of 
Appeals severed the Church from Rome and in effect created the Church of 
England. Using this Act in 1533 Henry obtained his divorce and married 
Anne Boleyn in the hope that she will yield him a male heir. Henry VIII 
consolidated the break with Rome with the Acts of Supremacy and Treason. 
This Reformation was only possible with the support of the increasing 
number of wealthy landowners, who exerted their influence in the House of 
Commons. They consolidated their position of power and from that point 
on the land-owning classes set the political agenda until the reign of Queen 
Victoria. 
The English Church was no longer a separate entity with a divine law which 
supersedes human law, but was turned into a national Church with Henry 
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Tudor as its Supreme Head. As a consequence of the destruction of the 
Catholic Church, monasteries were dissolved and their property 
nationalised. To gain support against papal Catholicism nationalised land 
was sold to the gentry ensuring that they had interest in protecting their 
new property against Catholic opponents. Images of the Virgin and saints 
were destroyed and the multi-coloured wall paintings were covered with 
whitewash and replaced by biblical texts. Also the mystical aspects of 
Catholic rituals were eroded by replacing the traditional Latin mass with 
services held in English. '' 
Henry introduced the fall of papal supremacy over the English Crown and 
church and equipped Parliament with the power to regulate affairs which 
previously were in the ecclesiastical domain. With the Church of England 
Henry VIII not only emancipated the English Church from papal authority, 
but also initiated the development towards a synthesis between Catholicism 
and Protestantism that was unique to Britain. It was the birth of separate 
religious identities, which also set new criteria for the choice of future 
successors to the English throne. 
The liberation from papal authority and the expansion of government 
authority fostered self-confidence in determining society and one's own fate, 
supporting the capitalist need for individual innovation. Social 
organisation was no longer the mirror of God's will, but the product of man. 
This was certainly of advantage for the new merchant classes, although for 
the poorer segments of society this meant that God no longer determined 
their role in society, but the Parliament and the King. Henry established a 
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'new' church, but he never produced a consistent religious policy, therefore 
it is not surprising that on his death a region-based power struggle followed 
to fill this vacuum. 
The duke of Northumberland ruled on behalf of the teenage Edward VI 
(1547-53) and subjected the Church of England to a strong Protestant 
influence. Mary 1 (1553-58) sought to return England to the Catholic fold, 
her attempts were bloody and produced 300 martyrs during the last three 
years of her reign. Mary's efforts to re-establish old traditions and norms 
were a vain attempt to prevent the flow of change and maintain the 
reassuring causal relationship between God and society. 
Elizabeth 1 (1558-1603) was, by contrast to Mary I, the product of a fine 
Renaissance education. She re-established the royal supremacy, cemented 
her power as a 'King in Parliament' like her father did and re-severed ties 
with Rome. Requiring the support of the 'zely people' Elizabeth I moved 
her religious stance towards Protestantism. The philosophy of her reign was 
based upon the hierarchical assumptions of her time. Every element of 
creation had a divinely prescribed role to play. Although the Crown was 
divine and provided leadership it was a part of God's creation. Therefore 
the monarch decreed that the will of God was enshrined in acts of 
Parliament, which protected society against rebellion. However, the Queen 
viewed the parliament as an instrument with which to turn legislation 
designed by the Queen and the Privy Council into law. Thus control over 
the union of the Crown and parliament was possessed by the Queen. 
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Elizabeth I created a vigorous secular culture. Her approach to the state was 
that of benevolent paternalism and thus produced a deeply conservative 
and authoritarian society. The landed gentry were tied to the Crown by 
aiding them in achieving their social and financial aspirations in order to 
facilitate the shaping of public opinion. She attempted to control the 
threatening capitalists by hampering competition and simultaneously to 
assure a minimum standard of living for all, within a non-competitive 
society. The Statute of Apprentices of 1563 and the famous Elizabethan Poor 
Law of 1601 attempted to define and control all occupations in terms of their 
usefulness to society and divinely ordered social distinctions, as well as to 
counteract poverty and unemployment. At the time spiritual salvation had 
priority over material wellbeing, thus maintaining the hierarchical class 
structure. A stable society was more important than fostering economic 
freedom, with a mobile society that only posed a threat. 
During the reign of Elizabeth I the membership of the state soon became 
equated with that of the Church of England. Hence the conflicts between 
Mary, Queen of Scots and Elizabeth I reflect the manipulation of religious 
identity in their struggle for power. Spanish attempts to return England to 
the Catholic fold involved a rally for support among Catholics within 
Britain and abroad. The execution of Mary of Scotland aroused Scottish and 
Catholic sentiments. However, England and Protestant Europe saw 
Elizabeth l's great victory over the Spanish Armada in 1587 as God's 
judgement. Resisting the threat from Catholic Europe, Elizabeth I 
successfully created a united Protestant and patriotic England)' 
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Elizabeth I's financial difficulties, poor harvests, peasant unrest and high 
taxation put an end to her domination over the Parliament. The House of 
Commons increasingly became the instrument through which the growing 
politically conscious and economically dominant classes made their will 
heard. The spread of Puritanism among the gentry and merchant classes 
exposed the Queen to attack in the Commons. Demands for freedom of 
speech and permission to debate religious issues in Parliament pressurised 
the government to retreat from the paternalistic approach to issues 
regarding prerogative rights to regulate the economic life of the kingdom. 
The Protestant and Anglican schisms introduced a choice in orientation, 
although the price for the freedom to choose was high, as many paid with 
their lives during the power struggle between Catholicism and 
Protestantism. Religious plurality forced individuals to justify why they 
believe that they are better Christians than others. Religious identity had to 
be based on some "inner metacriteria"" and inner conviction. It was 
manifested as the way children were educated and occasionally by dress 
code. It was also a source of insecurity, as during conflict every party 
claimed to have God on their side. Those who lost did not only have to 
cope with the defeat but were also left with doubt and the question: 'why did 
God desert us? ' 
The choice in religious affiliation and the increasing influence of merchant 
and land-owning classes were the first steps toward the individualisation of 
society. The social expansion of the new lasses mirrored the economic 
swell. The English began to explore new markets for their wool trade. In 
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1588 the Muscovy Company was established to trade with Russia and 
around the same time the East Indian Company was founded for silk and 
spice trade with the Orient. Enterprise and the search for new markets were 
inspired by both the desires for wealth and to labour for the glory of God. 
The art and culture of this period reflected innovation and confidence in the 
future. Stately homes substituted fortresses and Shakespeare, Marlowe, 
Spenser and many others enriched the literary scene. Identity was no longer 
completely predetermined. A choice in belief and alternative options for 
male careers allowed more individuals to determine their lives. The socio- 
economic environment now allowed an individual to develop their 
identity. Therefore an individual's identity may become complex and 
problematic. 
2.3.3. The Seventeenth Century and the Consolidation of an English Identity 
The 17x' century witnessed the consolidation of English identity that 
developed on the basis of political and socio-economic transformations, 
which could no longer be resisted. The influence of the commercial society 
of financiers, manufacturers, merchants and tradesmen grew in the cities. 
In contrast the wealth of the landed nobility as well as their military power 
declined. Consequently vertical social mobility within towns and 
horizontal mobility between town and country produced a certain freedom 
of opportunity in English society. Social rank was no longer secured by 
lineage and even self-definition on the grounds of wealth did not guarantee 
stability, as families could rise and fall depending on the success of 
commercial business. " Social mobility and the increase in trade also led to 
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more frequent encounters between complete strangers. Thus the concept of 
sincerity was introduced as a new and important virtue in the sixteenth 
century. One's social environment was no longer constituted of well- 
acquainted individuals. The other person's self was uncertain therefore 
making "sincerity an important virtue reflected the new concern with 
inferring the hidden self from its acts and appearancesi79. Fluidity of society 
was unique to England during this period in history. Intermarriage between 
nobility and commoners became more acceptable during the seventeenth 
century and the trend towards commercial investment could also be 
observed among the nobility. It was a time when the professional classes 
comprised mainly of lawyers and clergy. The clergy now married and some 
even founded dynasties. 
From the sixteenth century onwards the emphasis on individuality 
increased. One essential shift toward the personal construction of identity, 
particularly for women, was the trend from an institutional to an 
individual criterion for the selection of spouses. Marriage consolidated 
family relations and sought to increase influence and wealth. The identity 
of a woman was primarily determined by the status of her father, then her 
husband and occasionally by the achievements of her sons. By playing an 
active role in the selection of her spouse, she not only had the possibility to 
determine her welfare but also her self-definition via her spouse. 2° Family 
descent became less important with respect to achievement. Hence, the use 
of language adapted to this change of consciousness and autobiographical 
writing became more popular. Words like 'self' began to appear in various 
compound words such as self-knowledge, self-confidence and self- 
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consciousness. 2' The old norms that previously structured society no longer 
applied, individuals had to find new criteria for orientation. The ability of 
the individual became more important than family lineage and 
consequently the focus on the self was the most reliable criterion for social 
success. 
In Stuart society social climbing for the gifted was possible, therefore the 
demand for education increased. The Protestants, and particularly the 
Puritans, fostered education because their religion was directed to the 
literate. In the world of business there was a greater need for literate 
employees. Wider access to education and a growing professional and 
merchant classes produced a broader interest in politics and the 
maintenance of peace in order for the economy to prosper. The increasing 
wealth of the merchant class made them more self-confident in their 
demands on the king, whose financial situation was usually critical. Thus 
the power and influence of the 'demos' became irrevocably stronger. 
The Thirty Year War on the continent produced a severe slump in the 
woollen-cloth trade in 1620. The reduction in export combined with bad 
harvest led to the worst depression of the first half of the century. War with 
Catholic Spain and France brought Charles I (1625-49) into financial 
difficulties. Parliament demonstrated its power by refusing to support the 
King in his military endeavour twice, due to which he resorted to the 
collection of forced loans and to billet troops under martial law in private 
homes. The imprisonment of five knights for refusing to pay forced loans 
and general discontent about the King's proceedings led Coke, Eliot and Sir 
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Thomas Wentworth to claim the precedent of Magna Carta in the 
Parliament of 1628. The Petition of Rights was established in which they 
demanded the consent of Parliament for the levy of taxes, no imprisonment 
of subjects without due cause being shown, to refrain from billeting soldiers 
in private homes and putting civilians under marital law. In return for the 
King's agreement he received financial support to fight Spain and France. 
Although the King quickly forgot the Petition of Rights at the time it, like 
the Magna Carta, came to be seen as one of the representative documents in 
the struggle for Human Rights. 
Parliamentary concern was not limited to the problems of finance. At the 
beginning of the seventeenth century the support for Arminianism grew 
within the Anglican Church. The Arminians opposed the Puritan concept 
of a few 'elect', but believed in the free will of an individual. The Puritans 
in Parliament vividly intervened against Arminianism whose supporters 
were mostly Anglo-Catholics and criticised the Crown, which led to their 
persecution in the mid-1630's. 
The strong Puritanical influence was indicative of a prevailing feeling of 
powerlessness and the need for clear orientation during the early modern 
period. Although the identification with a particular Christian schism 
could be problematic, God was still perceived as the undisputed Creator of 
the universe. Even scientists such as Isaac Newton considered their study of 
nature as a study of God's creation. 
l-ie is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite; He is not 
duration or space, but 
He endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and 
by 
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existing always and everywhere, He constitutes duration and space..... And thus much 
concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly 
belong to natural philosophy 
?2 
Protestantism and Puritanism provided the basis for an increasing self- 
consciousness and definitely determined not just British society but also 
European and American societies in terms of their individualisation and 
economic structure. The gradual emancipation from lineage and the well- 
defined Weltanschauung of the Catholic Church was concurrent with the 
enhancement of a private approach to religion. As Puritans believed in 
Calvin's notion of 'the Elect', a predetermined fate and the value of hard 
work their attention was directed towards their individual spiritual and 
material improvement. Their approach to the Bible was literal and allowed 
every individual direct access to both religion and God. Calvin had also 
indicated that it was possible to determine whether one was among 'the 
Elect' and that success in one's work was one of those signs. Thus Puritan 
ideology not only produced hard working and economically successful 
communities, but also a people concerned with self-knowledge and the 
dangers of self-deception. 3 
Identity crises among adolescents were first recorded in Puritan diaries. 
Puritan child-rearing practice was based on discipline and the conviction 
that the natural self was a danger to a virtuous soul. Preference for a 
nuclear family was to prevent bad influence from the wider family and to 
facilitate the complete subjugation of children to parents. Particularly young 
Puritan males may have given up on themselves as their 'sinful appetites'. 
grew. Occasionally they indulged these desires in an act of protest against 
community values. Disappointment, a bad consciousness or a religious 
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experience quickly led to the reassertion of an authoritarian personality and 
the re-submission to society's authoritarian ideals 24 
Authoritarianism is usually the response to the fear of freedom. The belief 
in predetermined fate relieves from responsibility and hard work as well as 
a disciplined pious way of life counter balances the anarchy and chaos that 
prevail among society. Puritan ideology made high demands on the 
individual. Luther and Calvin emphasised that man is innately bad and has 
no control over their destiny. Only those who do not doubt and truly 
believe may expect salvation. Thus Puritanism also took control over 
thought and motivation. The middle classes, which mainly adhered to 
Puritanism, felt strong resentments against the exploitation through the 
court. One way of expressing these resentments was by developing a sense 
of moral and religious superiority. Such feelings suited a pious man better 
than resentments. Hostility and resentment were based on economic 
insecurity and the fear of social decline. The lack of control over social 
developments was reflected in Puritan ideology: fate is predetermined and 
the individual simply has to accept destiny. This sense of powerlessness and 
helplessness can also result in resentments against individual weakness. 
Self-humiliation and total submission to God can be viewed as the only way 
to overcome fear and doubt. Thus Puritans expressed their self-hatred by 
emphasising the weakness and sinfulness of human nature, which is 
potentially also their own. Protestantism and Puritanism justified 
resentments against society and provided the following coping strategy: 
moral superiority for self-assurance, hard work as an escapism and 
acceptance of ones fate for the sake of inner peace. It was the response to the 
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need of uprooted and isolated people who sought nerv orientation and had 
to develop a new relationship to an environment, which became 
increasingly confusing? S 
To the increasing religious divide between Anglicans, Protestants and 
Arminians throughout the country Charles I responded with an obsessive 
aspiration to order and uniformity. Although James I (King James VI of 
Scotland prior to his succession to the English throne) proclaimed himself 
as King of Great Britain, trying to foster a sense of unity between England 
and Scotland, neither he nor his son Charles I ruled a united state. Ireland 
and Scotland were poor and neglected countries, deeply rooted in their 
traditions. This became most apparent as Charles I tried to extend legal and 
religious uniformity to his two other kingdoms. Whilst successful in 
Ireland, the Scots rebelled. The great Scottish reformer John Knox 
advocated a Protestantism strongly influenced by Calvinism. In Scotland 
the attempt to bring the Scottish Presbyterian Church into closer accord with 
the Anglican Church led to the Bishops' wars in 1639 and 1640. 
The effort to solve this discord by military means failed and forced Charles I 
to call upon Parliament. This Parliament met for thirteen years and is 
known as the Long Parliament. Its session resulted in the impeachment of 
two of the King's advisors and aimed to secure its own existence by 
stipulating that there should be no more than three years between 
Parliaments and that it could not be adjourned without its own consent. 
The constitutional revolution continued by demanding the exclusion of all 
clergymen from holding secular office and all bishops from sitting in the 
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House of Lords. The King was reluctant to sign the bill and as the 
Parliament passed a Militia Ordinance without Charles I signature, he 
decided on a military move against Parliament. In June 1642 Nineteen 
Propositions were issued in which the King was called to accept the Militia 
Ordinance and the Parliament's approval of the King's ministers, as well as 
of the education and marriage of his children. Charles I refused to accept 
these propositions and gathered military support, triggering Civil War on 
August 22,1642. Victory was that of Parliament and Charles Stuart was tried 
for high treason and executed (without being deposed beforehand) as a 
reigning king. Parliament had become so confident that they did not refrain 
from executing a king in power. The king was no longer perceived as a 
ruler with divine rights, but as responsible for his subjects and accountable 
for his deeds. 
In 1649, one hundred and forty years before the French Revolution, the 
office of monarchy and the House of Lords were abolished and the 
Commonwealth and Free State was proclaimed. The Council of State 
directed a republican form of government for four years before England's 
first constitution, the Instrument of Government (1653) was drawn up by 
Major General John Lambert, with Oliver Cromwell appointed as the Lord 
Protector. Cromwell recognised the victory over Royalist forces and the 
proclamation of the Free State as the divine judgement of God. Though 
how to continue the rule over Britain divided Parliament. Various 
religious groups such as the Baptists, Quakers, Fifth Monarchists and 
Ranters voiced their views on how to rule England in future. The most 
interesting demands made the Levellers, who called for a more fair 
181 
distribution of wealth and suggested extending the right to vote to everyone 
except servants and beggars. Hence, democratic ideas were discussed in the 
seventeenth century that were not to be realised until the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. "' 
Democratic visions, such as those forwarded by Levellers, are not to be 
understood in terms of present day concepts. The aim was to create Christ's 
kingdom on earth and radical Protestant sects awaited the Second Coming. 
Riots followed a bad harvest and commercial slump. This civic unrest and 
fear led to the emergence of religious sects and religious hysteria, which 
dislocated society all over the Free State. As a result this period witnessed 
one of the greatest waves of migration to the newly founded colonies in 
New England. Soon sects like the Levellers were suppressed and press 
censorship was re-introduced! 
That a lack of clear orientation during social change can defeat an attempt to 
establish a new social order is well illustrated by Cromwell's Republic. 
Under his reign Jews were allowed to return to England and religious 
tolerance was extended to Puritan groups such as the Independents, 
Presbyterians, Baptists (but not to Catholics, Anglicans and licentious 
people). This did not mask the brutality by which he defeated the Scots and 
ended Irish revolt in 1650 and 1651. On Scotland Cromwell imposed full 
parliamentary union with England in 1652 which was met with, hostility 
and generated royalist resistance in 1654. 
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Sympathy turned to Charles II, particularly after Cromwell had died in 
September 1658, and his son Richard Cromwell, who succeeded him as Lord 
Protector, proved too weak to maintain a permanent Puritan 
commonwealth. Richard Cromwell resigned as Protector, and people 
became tired of religious controversy and crippling taxation. In search for 
stability the return to monarchy seemed the safest choice to make and steps 
were initiated to restore it. In February 1660 General George Monck restored 
the Long Parliament that proceeded to implement Presbyterianism and to 
affirm peace with the Crown. The Long Parliament then voted to dissolve 
itself, as the law prescribed, in favour of the Convention Parliament that 
called for the return of the Stuarts, in the form of Charles II. 
The inability to cope with religious pluralism in the past and the confusion 
and chaos it produced, led Charles II to take a rather intolerant stance. 
Under his reign the new Act of Uniformity (1662), Conventicle Act (1664), 
Five Mile Act (1665) and Test Acts of the 1670's led to a systematic 
marginalisation of Dissenters, i. e. Puritans, and prevented their access to 
professional advancement within the church, politics and education. Only 
in business were Puritans able to expand without restrictions, which is also 
an explanation for the strong link between the Calvinist ethic of Puritan 
theology and business, a characteristic of the age of Industrial Revolution. 
The struggle for an undisputed state religion resulted in the exclusion of 
most other Christian sects or churches. Although religion as an institution 
no longer had any power over government, whichever 'ideology' prevailed 
and was incorporated into the Church of England, it had the power to define 
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social values and norms. Society at the time defined itself on religious 
terms, so that the religious struggle for predominance was the struggle for 
the power to define what people believed, which duties they accepted and 
how society should function. For the Roman Catholic Church the loss of 
this power of definition among the north-European countries led to its 
gradual decline. 
The origin of political parties within Parliament has its origin in the 
polarisation between the supporters and critics of the Duke of York. All 
civil or military officeholders at national level were required to take the 
Anglican holy sacrament and to denounce the Roman Catholic doctrine of 
transubstantiation, as stipulated by the Test Act of 1673. These regulations 
excluded all Catholics and Dissenters from civil and military office and 
resulted in the resignation of the Lord High Admiral, the Duke of York, 
Charles 11's brother who had declared himself a Catholic. The Popish Plot 
enforced the anti-Catholic atmosphere, which triggered the Exclusion 
Controversy. 
Those men, who supported the exclusion of the Duke of York from 
succeeding Charles II on the throne because he was a Catholic, were 
Dissenter critics of the royal prerogative and were referred to as Whigs. The 
supporters of the Duke of York and the royal prerogative were known as the 
Tories and were Anglicans. The Whigs failed to ensure the exclusion of 
James from the throne, as Charles II responded to every parliamentary effort 
of this concern with the dissolution of Parliament. The Exclusion 
Controversy was very much the birth of political parties in Parliament. 
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Following the Exclusion Controversy John Locke wrote Two Treatises of 
Govern nient, which he published in 1690. In this book Locke defended the 
idea that a government can be changed if it no longer represents the 
interests of the people. Locke's argument was used later to justify the 
overthrow of James II (1685-88). Although James II had promised to 
preserve the church and state, as it was when he succeeded his brother 
Charles II, he soon initiated first steps to re-establish the Catholic religion. 
His policies were met with hostility and only after three years of reign seven 
Whig and Tory peers invited William of Orange to assume the throne in 
England. 
A Convention Parliament offered the throne to William III (1689-1702) and 
Mary II (1689-94) under preconditions set forth in a Bill of Rights. Monarchy 
had now become subject to condition, as the hereditary succession was 
replaced by a parliamentary one. The Bill of Rights certified free speech, free 
elections and frequent meetings of Parliament. The consent of Parliament 
was prescribed for the levying of taxes and the keeping of a standing army. 
Although the Bill prevented the suspending and dispensing of power, 
sovereign power was not transferred from king to parliament. The 
settlement rather asserted, as the Magna Carta had done, that the king was 
under the law and guaranteed the rights of the nobility and the gentry 
against the Crown. Further legislation ensured Parliament's control over 
the army and permitted a freer press. By the eighteenth century it became 






regarded as an invented nation that was superimposed onto much older 
alignments and loyalties. " According to her thesis a common identity of 
Britishness among Scots, Welsh and English was forged by the continuing 
succession of wars between Britain and France. Around the eighteenth 
century they were at war between 1689 and 1697, and on a larger scale 
throughout the 18' century (1702-13,1743-48,1756-63,1778-83,1793-1802) 
culminating with the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. The fact that Britain never 
had to pay for its military glory with civilian casualties and large-scale 
domestic destruction, as was repeatedly experienced by continental 
European countries, made British responses to wars more unabashedly 
chauvinistic. She-argued that Britain's traditional Catholic enemy France, 
posed a long-term external threat and consequently united the mostly 
Protestant population within. The hostile 'other' encouraged Scots, Welsh 
and English to define themselves collectively against it 30 As a matter of fact 
France had posed an external threat throughout English history, but could 
not become such a unifying force until the Church of England adopted an 
unchallenged Protestant nature and the king of England was forced to 
assume an 'English identity'. Only from then on, both Crown and country 
would view France as a 'distinctly different' enemy. France posed a threat to 
both home country and national interests abroad, which encouraged the 
Britons to temporarily omit their differences in order to build a stronger 
whole to oppose this threat. 
In 1707 Scotland was linked to England and Wales, as the Parliament of 
Westminster passed the Act of Union, creating one United Kingdom by the 
name of Great Britain, with one Protestant ruler, one legislature and one 
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system of free trade. This Act of Union, like the earlier Act of Union 
between England and Wales in 1536, was more a union of policy than of 
affection 31 
At one level, then, Great Britain at the beginning of the eighteenth century was like 
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, both three and one, and altogether something of a 
mystery. 32 
Throughout their history and to the present day England, Scotland and 
Wales have maintained their ethnic, historic and linguistic differences. 
However, differences in Britain were not restricted to ethnicity. Scotland 
was divided in itself. While the Scottish Highlanders spoke Gaelic and 
thought of the English-speaking Scottish Lowlanders as being 
indistinguishable from the English, the Lowland Scots could not identify 
with their Highland countrymen either. 3 The English too, were not 
ethnically homogeneous. The north of England would be culturally closer 
to the Lowland Scots, as cross-border trade, marriage, and migration brought 
these people together. The same could be said of Shropshire and 
Herefordshire in relation to Wales. In 1707 Great Britain, as today, did not 
consist of three self-contained and self-conscious nations, but rather of a 
patchwork in which the loyalties and regional attachments were not 
identical with the borders of those three nations. The sense of Britishness, 
which emerged from these culturally diverse people, was not due to a high 
degree of cultural integration. It was rather a result of the British defining 
themselves as a unity in contrast to the French, their prime enemy. 
Consequently British identity was and remained to be only of secondary 
importance for many subjects. It grew stronger when Britain as a whole was 
threatened or when it seemed to be of advantage. Conversly, it lost 
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importance in times of peace or when local interests were in danger. 
Interaction with the 'other' (no matter whether this interaction took place 
on a one to one basis, or between groups or on a national level) makes it 
possible to recognise and to define the own distinct features more clearly 
and eventually becomes part of a self-definition, an identity. 
With the Act of Union, Britain was finally defined by its natural boundary - 
the sea. This geographical fact was a necessity, to ensure that Scotland will 
not opt for James Edward Stuart, Queen Anne's (1702-1714) exiled Roman 
Catholic half-brother, instead of agreeing on a new Protestant dynasty from 
Hanover 
_A 
Catholic and independent Scotland would be a potential ally 
for France, which could be regarded as an enemy within the- natural borders 
of Great Britain. An enemy, within a system or a geographically defined 
body, who cannot easily be physically identified, is generally perceived as a 
greater threat to a society. The knowledge of an enemy, who may live 
among society but cannot be recognised, can create collective insecurity and 
fear. Any fear, which cannot be attached to a specific object, underpins 
neurosis. 
The invasion by the exiled Charles Edward Stuart in 1745 shocked British 
society. He was able to recruit 2,500 Highlanders and penetrated England as 
far south as Derby, then supported by 5,000 men. He retreated into Scotland, 
where his army was cut apart at Culloden in April 1746. The potential 
success of this invasion created concern not only among the Hanovarian 
royalty, but also among the merchants and creditors, as the security of their 
investments and the possibility of recovering what was owed to them in the 
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event of a civil war was at stake. If Louis XV would have committed 
himself to a French invasion in additional support of Charles Edward 
Stuart, the Jacobite army could have been successful in restoring the Stuart 
dynasty 34 What followed the Battle of Culloden was an intense concern 
about Britain's internal divisions, national identities and moral corruption. 
As Britain's major enemies were either Catholic or not Christian at all, 
Protestantism was able to become one of the most important unifying 
factors. British national identity did not substitute Scottish, Welsh, English 
or any other regional identifications, but grew alongside of these and 
affected the way Britons interpreted their material life and how they viewed 
their politics 35 
The general perception that economic growth in society can only take place 
independently from religion did not apply to the eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth century Britain. The Protestant Weltanschauung helped 
individuals at the time to make sense of their lives and it gave comfort and 
dignity in the face of difficulty. It went together with Britain's economic 
experience in terms of agricultural productivity, the range and volume of its 
commerce, the geographical mobility of its people, the vibrancy of its towns 
and the ubiquity of print. 36 Protestantism became the frame of orientation, 
which allowed a collective to define itself and to differentiate itself from the 
'other'. A more precise self-definition and frame of orientation determines 
the selective process which in turn has an impact on the interpretation of 
history, on political decisions and on attempts to exclude those who do not 
fit in. With every definition borders are created which separate one from 
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the 'other'. Depending on the political, ideological and economic 
environment these borders may or may not be penetrable. 
The strong identification with Protestantism resulted in an antagonistic 
attitude towards the Catholic minority in Britain. From the late 
seventeenth century up until 1828 Catholics were openly discriminated 
against and viewed as potential traitors. 
British Catholics were not allowed to vote and were excluded from all state offices and 
from both houses of Parliament. For much of the eighteenth century they were subject to 
punitive taxation, forbidden to possess weapons and discriminated against in terms of 
access to education, property rights and freedom of worship. 7 
Law was much more lenient towards Protestant dissenters and Scottish 
Presbyterians, so that they were able to penetrate almost all levels of the 
political system, including Parliament. In times of insecurity and especially 
when at war with a Catholic country, British Catholics became scapegoats for 
enraged neighbours. The most commonly applied slang adjective for 
Catholics was 'outlandish' - foreigners. The collaboration against the 
Catholic minority served as a powerful bond between the English, Welsh 
and the Scots 38 The identification of a minority that served the majority as 
a scapegoat is the simplest method to confirm one's own- identity. The 
mechanism usually remains the same. Here the Catholic minority 
represented the foreign enemy. Prejudice, hatred and all aggressions that 
emerged from the fear of the Catholic enemy, was projected onto the British 
Catholic minority. Any feelings of weakness could then be transformed into 
a sense of power by attacking (usually defenceless) representatives of the 
feared enemy. 
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2.4.1. When Identity becomes Profitable 
Encouragement to adopt British identity was provided by commercial 
benefit. With the Act of Union in 1707, Scotland had access to all the British 
colonies, resulting in prosperity of most port towns that grew into large 
trade cities. By the 1770's not only in London, but also in Birmingham, 
Bristol, Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle, Norwich, Plymouth, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Paisley and many smaller towns, urban and economic 
growth became apparent. 39 Imperial employment provided jobs and 
opportunities for a better life abroad.. -Once participation 
in . imperial 
enterprise was possible, the desire to protect the colonies as well as the 
British homeland became part of the unifying factor. France was not only a 
threat to religious identity, but also the biggest imperial rival and 
consequently was a threat to security and livelihood. Being an active patriot 
also seemed to be an essential step forward to full citizenship, to participate 
in running the state by voting or other means. " Great Britain was forged in 
such a way that it reflected the interests and ambitions of its different classes 
and nations. " England had the advantage to be able to offer economic 
growth for a compromise on national identity. It was easier to consolidate 
an identity, when being British related to an improvement of lifestyle and 
influence. Collective identities provide security and the feeling of strength. 
England's imperial success was aspired to by the Scottish. To become part of 
a strong and successful 'body' is natural and is part of the concept of growth. 
Participating in the building of Empire, to contribute as well as to profit, 
fostered the self-definition of being an active part of the whole. As the Scots 
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were not passively profiting, but actively participating in Empire building, it 
was in their interest to preserve and defend the fruits of their efforts. 
Protestant perception that prosperity was a gift of God to the blessed, 
influenced their concept of freedom. The opportunity provided by the 
government to succeed, was viewed as one of the most important liberties. 
Thus Bourgeois patriots believed that individual prosperity went hand in 
hand with the country's good 42 The economic identification with Britain 
was also a reflection of political integration. As a result of the Act of Union, 
Scotland was represented in Parliament. Although Scotland, northern 
England and Wales were badly under-represented, every part of the island 
had a representative in the House of Commons and sometimes in the 
House of Lords, making another step towards integration. 
2.4.2. Loyalty as a Precondition for Acceptance 
The SevenYear War changed the British Empire. The pre-war Empire was 
predominantly Protestant and Anglophone (the thirteen American 
colonies). The post-war Empire included Quebec (with 70,000 French- 
Catholic inhabitants) as well as large stretches of Asia. Although the 
military component of the pre-war Empire was considerable, it was 
popularly perceived as a trading concern. Britain perceived itself as the 
beneficent creator of liberty-loving and commercial empire that was not 
raised on bloody conquest. To view every action, whether of political, social 
or military nature, as a blessing for the 'other' is a necessity to justify these 
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actions to oneself. The Seven Years War destroyed this illusion. The 
extended Empire demanded a redefinition of authority and responsibility. 43 
As it became clear by 1763 that in England and Wales, Jacobitism would no 
longer pose a threat because its support was marginalised. Scotland's union 
with the rest of Great Britain was secured and the British army was able to 
recruit men on a massive scale from the Scottish Highlands. What 
motivated these men to support the causes of Great Britain were 
inducements and promotions for their former chieftains. Consequently a 
new problem posed itself to the ruling English elite. There was no longer 
justification for the exclusion of Scotsmen- from opportunities. and. high _ 
orfice. The new and vast Empire abroad raised expectations, but also 
generated anxiety as demands for political change intensified. English 
patriots felt threatened by Scottish ambition of empire building and 
intention to participate in British politics. The new political environment 
made it necessary to reassess the meaning of Britishness and of the 
implications of empire. " 
The American War of Independence was a blow to British self-confidence. 
The British were at war with anglophone Protestants demanding 
independence. A large proportion of the American population were 
Scottish and Irish immigrants. As a result, old hostilities were revived to 
assure English nationalists that English primacy within the Union could not 
become eroded-'s This antipathy against Scots mirrored the fear of the 
increasing power and influence acquired by Scots within Great Britain. The 
desire to emphasise traditional values and national identities, such as 
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Englishness, always re-emerges in times of threat and insecurity. Under 
persistent pressure from English prejudice Scots tended to support and 
advance their own, especially in the world of letters and in other realms of 
activity. Due to increased opportunities and advantage that fellow 
countrymen were successful enough in politics and commerce to act as 
influential patrons, more Scots then moved south in search of employment. 
Some became alienated and returned disillusioned, while others became 
perpetual exiles, feeling themselves too Scottish to integrate, yet now being 
too English to return to their homeland. In turn some were able to 
compromise their Scottish identity with their English environment, 
regarding themselves as British, but maintaining their Scottish patriotism. 
One very profitable niche that provided Scots with enough opportunities to 
make a career and accumulate wealth, was the new colonies, especially 
India. "" 
The American War of Independence led the Scots, Welsh and Irish in 
Britain to openly declare their loyalty. Surprisingly enough many 
influential Scots supported the war with America to prove their political 
reliability to Westminster. It was an opportunity to impress the authorities 
in order to receive more sympathetic attention in the future. Their loyalty 
to Great Britain was also a blow to the Wilkite propaganda against the Scots. 
Nevertheless the American Declaration of Independence in July 1776 eroded 
the self-esteem and imperial identity of most Englishmen. The English 
radicals had difficulties in reconciling their patriotism with supporting the 
right of the Americans to establish themselves as an independent nation. 
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As Americans allied themselves with France in 1778, Spain in 1779 and 
Holland in 1780, their position became more difficult. 47 
Britain's preoccupation with war gave Ireland the opportunity to acquire 
parliamentary independence in 1782. America's alliance with the old 
enemies and rivals of Great Britain and the final defeat shattered the ruling 
elite but also linked Scotland more to the centre than ever before. 
Simultaneously, the spirit of the French revolution spread throughout 
Europe and nurtured alienation from authority in Britain. In the 1780's 
criticism of the government escalated. Accelerating industrialisation and 
urbanisation, growing class-consciousness and demands for reform-- as well 
as war in Europe enforced this crisis. Fortunately Britain escaped 
revolution. 
In the face of such criticism the British elite had to legitimise their authority 
and demonstrate that it is not a separate parasitic element in the State. Now 
they had to convince themselves, as well as others, that they owed their 
position to genuine distinction and devotion to duty, serving the public. 
Before the mid-eighteenth century it was common for young patrician 
males to receive their education at home by a private tutors and later to 
bypass university. Between the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth century it became increasingly popular for them to receive their 
education at public school. At the turn of the century more than 70 per cent 
of English peers had been educated either at Eton, Westminster, Winchester 
or Harrow. The institutionalisation of education for British patricians made 
it possible to convey unified set values and ideas. Increased contact with 
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social peers fostered group identity and cemented friendships (the 'old boys' 
network still operates today). Discipline and patriotic duty were stressed and 
the emphasis on Greek and Roman ancient history and classical literature 
nurtured a sense for empire, bravery, war and sacrifice. The aim was to raise 
a patriotic British elite. " 
The preoccupation with the American war brought about another trend 
among British patricians: the love of uniforms and a cult of heroism. The 
protracted warfare provided an occupation for the aristocracy, a purpose and 
the opportunity to prove that they were needed. Ideologically and physically 
they were trained and prepared for such an , event. Uniforms 
became the 
visible expression of heroism, courage and patriotism. They were elegant, 
revealed status and were modest compared to the French fashion worn 
prior to that. With the French Revolution more functional male dress 
became popular and gradually by the early 1880's understated London 
tailoring dictated etiquette. Warfare also nurtured a growing aristocratic 
class. Bravery and military achievements were usually rewarded with a 
new title. After peace was secured in 1815 new civil uniforms for all senior 
court and government officials, as well as for Lords Lieutenant of counties 
in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland were produced in order to 
maintain the impression of a distinguished and patriotic, yet modest elite. a9 
After 1793, panic about an imminent French invasion opened up the 
question whether mass arming could backlash and supply revolutionaries 
with weapons that may be turned against their rulers. The war with 
Revolutionary France lasted from 1793 to 1815 with unprecedented costs 
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accumulating after Britain had barely recovered financially from the 
American war. Britain was desperate to avoid defeat and therefore had to 
invest into victory. Everything was at stake for Britain and its nobility. 
Territorial autonomy and the survival of the ruling elite and aristocracy 
were threatened. The mobilisation of British working men at the time was 
unprecedented and not attempted again until the First World War. By 1814, 
a quarter of a million men were employed in the war effort. As Napoleon's 
Army, intent on invading Britain, encamped along the French coastline 
during the winter of 1797 the government was forced to recruit on a grander 
scale. The decision to arm such a mass of civil population was perceived as 
an act of trust by these men and as a sign. relaxation of the repressive attitude 
towards the population after the French Revolution. That this sense of trust 
was not abused is often seen as proof that a threat to British independence 
forged patriotism and a sense of unity that transcended the divisions across 
the social classes so 
War encouraged the development towards a meritocracy, which enriched 
the ruling elite with exceptional and talented men, who'helped preserve the 
existing order, although the majority of the peerage still owed their titles to 
their family heritage. Due to the disaster of the American war and an 
interest in the industrial development, more competent traditional 
aristocracy revealed flexibility in admitting landless talents to their ranks 
and were willing to adopt an ethos and lifestyle more appropriate to the 
spirit of the time. The final legitimisation of the reconstructed ruling elite 
was the victory at Waterloo in 1815. With the victory over France, Britain 
was able to increase the size of its Empire considerably. The triumph at 
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Waterloo over-shadowed the humiliating defeat in America and at the 
same time prevented any eruption of republicanism in its wake. And by 
creating new and honourable values, such as patriotism, military heroism 
and a sense of duty, the new British elite managed to reaffirm its right to 
rule during a time of revolutions' 
2.4.3. The Nineteenth Century: Enlightenment, Reform and Revolution 
Social preoccupation with economic growth and political emancipation left 
the decline of the Protestant Church of England and Scotland to go 
unnoticed. The first phase of religious and moral deterioration was between 
the Act of Tolerance (1689) and the emergence of Methodism in 1739. Those 
belonging to the Anglican Church seemed to perceive their religious duties 
more like a ritual, whilst the aristocracy, particularly at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, thought little of leading a disciplined religious life. The 
middle classes appeared indifferent to institutionalised religion and the 
working classes in the industrial areas were ignorant of any religious 
education. Also the Dissenters witnessed a religious deterioration, although 
not as drastic as that of the Church of England. It was pure conservatism 
rather than lively religiousness that prevented wider acceptance of deism 
among the clergy and intellectuals. The deists had a rational approach to 
religion and sought to find a rational replacement for Christianity. They 
rejected the divinely ordained ecclesiastical hierarchy, the divine inspiration 
of Scripture, miracles, incarnation and several other essential features of 
church Christianity. Yet beliefs in a first cause, an intelligent general 
providence, immortality and retribution in providence were regarded as 
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rationally defensible and therefore accepted. 52 The Christian revealed 
religion was nothing but a replication of the natural religion. The absolute 
perfection of the creation is in itself a revelation, which humans can 
comprehend by applying reason 53 
English theologians could not isolate themselves completely from the 
rationalist influences of the Enlightenment. As a result of the polemics 
against Hobbes and the Deists, the Latitudinarians, the liberal wing of the 
Church of England gained importance in the eighteenth century. The 
Latitudinarians, who were most influenced by the Cambridge Platonists, 
applied themselves to the natural theology. They tried to... investigate- 
whether the natural and the revealed religions could conform with and 
correlate with each other. Some Latitudians did not only want to 
demonstrate that the new sciences were compatible with the Christian 
belief, but that the new scientific insights made significant contributions to 
the comprehension of what Christians believed in. 54 Although they 
opposed deism, they had an open attitude towards the new sciences, which 
prevented a greater number of people turning towards deism. 
Advocates of the rationalist and humanist 'Enlightenment' of the 
eighteenth century were convinced that all problems could be solved and 
human society, and its individuals, could be perfected and understood by 
applying reason. Increasing scientific and technological achievements at the 
time were the foundation of their conviction. Irrational behaviour and 
traditional religion were considered to darken the spirit of enlightenment. 
The ideology of progress, one of the main pillars of bourgeois liberalism was 
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underpinned by the philosophical trends towards materialism and 
empiricism. The core of classical liberalism is a prevalent individualism. 
Each individual has the right to pursue their self-interest, which essentially 
maximises their satisfactions and minimises their dissatisfaction. 
Consequently social interaction is based on gaining advantages by entering 
'contracts' with individuals who share the same interests. The task of 
politics is to settle any interference. Therefore the aim of society is to allow 
for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals. " 
Despite the emergence of the Enlightenment and rationalism, religion was 
still the idiom of the people. As the. repercussions of the French revolution 
were felt across Europe, religion experienced a new revival. In Methodism 
and New Dissent people hoped to find salvation. The natural sciences 
divorced themselves from religion when Darwin offered an alternative 
solution for the creation of man. The age of Enlightenment had already 
introduced the emancipation of the individual, acknowledging its 
rationality and individuality. At this point it must be added that these 
intellectual accomplishments bypassed the mass of the people. For the 
majority scientific advancement had minimal impact on their religious 
convictions nor did the concept of the rational individual introduce more 
liberties in their everyday lives. The debate of these concepts was confined 
to the intellectual classes and was therefore not a shared notion among the 
collective conscious. Identities continued to be defined in terms of regional 
belonging and religious norms. 
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Up until the twentieth century religion has been certainly the source of 
values and orientation for the majority of people. It provided the terms in 
which the environment and the world around can be defined and 
interpreted. For many it was, and still is, a source of strength and hope in 
times of despair. The de-christianisation of males in the polite and educated 
classes had no impact on the peasantry. It was a privilege of the educated 
classes to question the existing hierarchy and to believe in the religious 
emancipation of man. For the lower classes the hierarchical world order 
remained stable. Subordination to God the almighty, the king and the state 
laws were part of life. People grew up within the boundaries of their social 
ranks and their figures of identification remained constant. Depending on., 
their social class, the individual sought to rise in status within their social 
boundaries. Figures of orientation and idealisation were also identified 
within these boundaries. For example, an apprentice may look up to the 
master craftsman as his figure of identification or a young lieutenant may 
hope to attain the quality of his captain in charge or one of his war heroes. 
These ideal goals were nevertheless attainable so that the relatively small 
discrepancy between the reality and the ideal goal did not jeopardise the 
harmonious development of the individuals character. 
The middle classes had access to the ideas of Enlightenment, but were very 
much dependent on the supernatural sanction of morality as discipline and 
support for their social and economic progress. In the period of the 
Industrial Revolution new industrial settlements emerged and cities grew 
rapidly. The established churches were unfamiliar with the urban masses 
and the problems of the new proletariat. Due to lack of understanding and 
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neglect these new communities and classes became fairly remote from, and 
indifferent to, organised religion. Consequently these masses were more 
easily captured by the labour movements of the nineteenth century. 56 
Industrialisation led to changes in the method of production and the 
working environment. Whilst in the eighteenth century the work process 
was to change and shape 'natural material' (such as wood or metal etc. ). The 
craftsman or workman became superior to Nature by mastering her. By 
creating something new, investing his skills and creativity, he developed 
his individuality and maybe his ability to co-operate with others. His work 
was the result of creative transformation of natural materials into 
something new, . utilising human intelligence and skills 
57 For a craftsman 
the daily tasks of work have a purpose, he was controlling the production of 
the product from the beginning to the end and enjoyed the satisfaction of 
seeing the results of his hard work in form of a final physically manifested 
product. Work and play as well as work and culture are strongly related 58 
The craftsman can identify with his product and his work, as it is an 
expression of his creativity and skill. Modern industrialised methods of 
production change the purpose of, and the idea behind, work. The 
industrial worker spends his whole day repeating a menial task in a passive 
manner. He fulfils therefore only one isolated step of a multi-step process 
towards a final product. He is not responsible for the final product, for its 
marketing and distribution. Excluded from the organisational process, the 
worker fulfils the same task at the same spot more or less throughout his 
lifetime. The machine did not substitute human workforce, but man 
substituted the machine. Fromm argued that the proletariat's work could be 
defined as the execution of tasks, which the machine cannot do by itself. 
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Work is no longer a purposeful activity, but has become a necessity to make 
a living. The workman cannot identify with the final product and he will 
feel increasingly alienated from his work. 
The desire to feel that there is a purpose in life is rooted in every individual. 
When the established churches fail to provide their followers with the 
necessary support, they will turn to those who provide for their needs. 
Those who show most care and understanding for the needs and problems 
of their followers in times of war and economic or social crisis are religious 
sects and radical political groups. 
As the established Catholic and Protestant Churches declined, sectarian 
Protestantism expanded. The increased secularisation went together with 
religious revivalism of a different form. During the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic decades systematic Protestant missionary activity became very 
popular. Missionary societies such as the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), 
the interdenominational London Missionary Society (1795), the evangelical 
Church Missionary Society (1799), and the British and Foreign Bible Society 
(1804) were founded and their activities became successful. In 1790 for 
example, the Wesleyan Methodists could only list 59,000 members in the 
UK, whilst by 1850 their number had increased to ten fold. These new sects 
were initially apolitical and strongly conservative, searching for personal 
salvation by turning away from the outside world. They were anti- 
revolutionary in their attitude and their political activity was focused on 
anti-slavery, temperance agitation and foreign missions. The new sects 
were most appealing to those who were about to rise into the middle classes 
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and those about to decline into the proletariat. Both of these cases represent 
moments of change. Transformation and change signifies instability. Those 
who ascended in the social system searched for supporting values, which 
gave them strength to prevail in their new environment to maintain their 
newly won status. While those descending in the social system were 
searching for moral support to bear their suffering and to find a metaphysic 
explanation for what they could not rationalise. Amongst the poor, forms 
of the millenarian predictions were very popular, as the economic crisis of 
the post-Napoleonic period appeared to forecast a dim future. Marx referred 
to such sectarianism as the 'the opium of the people', yet these sects gave 
-- expression both-to the discontent and the aspiration of the lower classes. By 
creating social, and sometimes educational and political, institutions these 
sects attempted to care for those, for whom the environment provided 
nothing. 59 Religion was a moral support for the middle classes and 
legitimised their expansion and the profits they made by providing a 
religious self-definition, rather than reducing their motivation to rational 
self-interest. No matter how immoral an action may be, man has 
nevertheless the desire to rationalise his action in such a way, to prove to 
himself and others that his motivations were based either on sound reason 
or common morals. 6° For the aristocracies, religion assured them of a 
degree of social stability, for pious and illiterate peoples were ready to accept 
their poverty if it was imposed as their destiny by God. The morality and 
order that religion supplies makes these people immune from the 
subversive effects of reason and therefore less susceptible to revolution. " 
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The unification of Britain, the Scientific Revolution, the evolution of a 
limited parliamentary monarchy and the tremendous colonial expansion 
during the eighteenth century turned Britain into the richest and most 
advanced Empire the world had ever known. After the resurgence of peace 
in 1815, the socio-economic and political problems that were suppressed by 
war, re-surfaced. The economy had been geared up for war, during which 
trade and agricultural productivity suffered and social unrest was intensified 
as three hundred thousand soldiers and sailors returned home seeking 
employment. Revolutionary voices called for parliamentary reform, 
universal male suffrage and lower taxation. Britain was at the brink of 
revolution from below. The depression during. the.. first quarter -of. 
thq 
nineteenth century, the falling money-wages, heavy technological 
unemployment, rapid urbanisation and impoverishment fostered 
discontent with, and criticism of, the liberal ideology and capitalism. 
Liberalism was considered to have failed, as capitalism allowed the rich to 
get richer and the poor to get poorer, instead of maximising happiness for 
the greatest number of individuals. Socialists revived the old perception of 
man as a communal being, consequently perceiving society as man's home. 
According to Hobsbawm classical liberals and early modern socialists based 
their argument of an inevitable evolution towards a better society on the 
rationalism of Enlightenment, directing their arguments towards the 
educated influential classes, whilst Marx based his theory on the historic 
inevitability of a proletarian revolution. 62 
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Britain's economic situation suddenly improved in 1820, although the 
government had been made aware of the fact that the parliamentary system 
no longer reflected the realities of a rapidly changing society. 63 
Discrimination against Catholics had also become obsolete. Ireland was 
incorporated into the United Kingdom by way of the Act of Union of 1800, 
out of fear of an impending French invasion. In order to reconcile Ireland 
to direct rule from Westminster, Britain had to grant the Irish population 
wider civil rights, although its population was predominantly Roman 
Catholic. If Irish Catholics were granted full citizenship then these rights 
-- - could no longer be refused to the Catholic minority within Britain itself. In 
1828 the Test and Corporation Acts, which. excluded Roman Catholics and 
Dissenters from holding office, were repealed and a year later, on the 
grounds of Catholic Emancipation, Catholics could be elected to the 
Commons and Catholic peers could once again sit in the Lords. Catholic 
emancipation was only the beginning of reform. 
The Industrial Revolution triggered rapid industrial urbanisation and 
produced a new social class - the working class. Rapid urbanisation tore 
individuals out of their 'natural' environment and produced an 
anonymous mass society. The urbanised masses became more receptive to 
new ideas as the established Churches lost their influence over them. Marx 
enjoyed a wide reception in a time of social-economic change and identity 
crisis. The standing political and social order were destabilised, the 
acknowledged roles and functions of the various classes were questioned 
and the anonymous mass became a political power. With the collective 
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awareness of class struggle, social identity experienced a polarisation. Marx 
provided a rootless and alienated working class with a powerful political 
identity. Bad working conditions and exploitation led to the formation of 
political unions and in 1831 a National Union of the Working Classes was 
founded. 
Whig policy encouraged parliamentary reform and despite difficulties a 
Reform Bill was finally passed in 1832. Although the Reform Act did not 
change the basis of government, it did concern the introduction of the 
middle classes to political participation. To achieve political status the 
middle classes made use of working class radicals.. 
English patriots looked at Parliament as a crucial component of British 
identity and British superiority. The Reform Act of 1832 changed the 
electoral landscape to such an extent that in Scotland the number of voters 
increased thirteenfold. Taking into consideration that Austria, Denmark, 
Greece and Russia had no popularly elected national legislative assemblies 
and that in Britain a larger proportion of men could vote than in Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands or Spain, this Reform Act was the source of a strong 
national pride. Nevertheless eighty per cent of adult males and all women 
had no right to vote. Despite the disappointment by those who remained 
excluded, Great Britain was in 1832, one of the most democratic nations in 
Europe. Part of British patriotic ideology was the perception that Britain was 
a pioneer in democracy. Yet by 1865 Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Portugal and Switzerland, as well as the Scandinavian countries, had 
implemented far more generous franchises than the United Kingdom. 
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Neither the Reform Act of 1867 nor of 1884 allowed for sufficient change for 
Britain to reach the democratic standards of eastern and western Europe up 
to the First World War " Votes for women and universal manhood 
suffrage had to wait until 1918 and the welfare state was only fully 
implemented after the Second World War. 
The Zeitgeist, which stood for progress and liberalisation, also extended to 
Britain's colonial subjects. Although Parliament had banned British 
involvement in slave trade in 1807, its sugar colonies in the West Indies 
still depended on slave labour. Anti-slavery became an emblem of national 
virtue.. Love of liberty was incorporated into British identity and faith. It 
was a subject that did not threaten British domestic affairs and involved 
people of every social and political background. By abolishing slavery in the 
West Indian colonies Britain tried to signal its moral integrity as an imperial 
power. By accepting economic loss it therefore gaining on the political and 
psychological level. The agreement of the House of Commons on 
abolishing the slave trade as an institution in the West Indies was preceded 
by mass-petitioning campaigns. To respond positively to public pressure on 
this subject was an opportunity to uphold the national values of both liberty 
and democracy and to simultaneously deflect public attention from 
demanding broader franchise and extensive social reforms in a time of 
economic crisis. 65 
In the mid-nineteenth century it became clear that democratisation was 
inevitable if social revolution was to be avoided. The short-lived 
Commune of Paris in 1871 and the first Russian Revolution accelerated 
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democratisation. The Victorian ruling classes were nevertheless reluctant 
to introduce universal male suffrage, but preferred to limit it. The Reform 
Act of 1867 and 1883 increased the electorate from 8 to 29 per cent of men 
over the age of twenty. In order to maintain the status quo the influence of 
the electorate was manipulated by limiting the political role of the 
assemblies elected by universal suffrage. Nevertheless, such manipulation 
could only postpone, but not prevent full democratisation. Consequently 
the need for political mass mobilisation emerged. Political tools such as the 
organisation of mass propaganda and mass parties were no longer only in 
the hands of the government, but also used in order to lobby the 
government. The increasing electorate and the.. _. 
development of-mass 
media, especially the press, forced the government to take on more 
responsibility towards the collective. 66 
At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century the 
British government had to cope with the emergence of nationalism at home 
and in its colonies. Constitutions and powers of self-government had been 
granted to the four Australian colonies (1850), New Zealand (1852), the Cape 
Colony (1853) and the dominion of Canada (1867) and they were formally 
recognised within the Empire as self-governing Dominions in 1907. The 
Empire was important for the British economy as it provided raw materials, 
markets, destinations for migrants and employment in various fields such 
as administration and trade. Although Imperial defence was expensive it 
served its purpose. At the end of the Edwardian period over 40 per cent of 
world merchant shipping was British-registered and over 60 per cent of the 
world's shipping tonnage was constructed in British shipyards. 
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Between 1900 and 1914 emigration to the British colonies increased. 
Although the average income per capita of British inhabitants exceeded that 
of any other European country in 1900, it was estimated that only 1 per cent 
of the population owned 65 per cent of the wealth. 7 
The military setbacks of the Boer War (1899-1902) made the government 
more aware of the ill health of its population, as one-third of the recruits 
had to be rejected as unfit for military service. It was considered as a 
national interest to improve health conditions in order to remain 
competitive in the world market. In 1906, the Education Act introduced 
compulsory supply of school meals and the Education Act of 1907 
introduced regular medical inspections. A further step towards national 
efficiency was the introduction of old age pensions in 1908, as well as the 
Children's Act of the same year that licensed personal health services for 
mothers and infants. 8 
All these steps towards state responsibility were at the same time an 
intrusion into the classic areas of Church and communal responsibilities. 
As the State took over responsibilities in the area of administration, 
education and social welfare, which traditionally rested with the Church, 
the Churches influence and ability to win people for its causes was gradually 
eroded and public life became increasingly secular. In the cultural field 
Darwinian ideas of the origin of species and both historical and moral 
criticism of the Bible added to the decline in influence of Christianity. 
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2.5. Islam in British India 
The first British expansion in the Americas, Africa and India began in the 
seventeenth century. At the time the Mughal Empire (1526-1761) made 
India one of the riches and most powerful countries in the world. India's 
wealth attracted various European nations such as Portugal, England, 
France and Holland, who were eager to share its wealth through commerce. 
With the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 the fear of France as an 
enemy was finally removed, but they remained in commercial competition. 
Britain asserted itself in India and the settlement of 1818. consolidated 
British supremacy. The British Empire in India now became the British 
Empire of India. 
British predominance was achieved on the grounds of a very old diplomatic 
strategy: divide et impera. The innate divisiveness of Hindu society, by 
political, ethnic and caste divisions, made India repeatedly vulnerable to 
unwelcome outsiders in the past. European powers were seen as a welcome 
assistance in order to defeat a rival. Thus the Marathas sought British 
support against the Mughals, the Nizam sought it against the Marathas and 
the Sikhs against the Muslims. Britain participated and on the grounds of 
diplomatic strategy and military superiority, took control. British attitude 
towards India reflected the industrial Zeitgeist; the colony was both market 
and provider of cheap raw material. By the 1830's Britain committed itself 
to promote the positive welfare of India by introducing Western knowledge 
and science, as well as by encouraging Indian participation in government, 
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this strategy was aimed to maintain long-term influence. By 1857 the 
British had established complete political control of the Indian 
subcontinent. Through direct rule and the help of subordinated Princes an 
authoritarian system of government was established. 
On May 10,1857 the Bengal army revolted at Meerut. The mutiny was 
triggered by Indian soldiers, who had refused to accept new cartridges that 
were greased with a mixture of beef and pork fat and could only be 
unwrapped with the aide of the teeth. - However, that this military mutiny 
turned into a popular revolt was a response to political, economic, social 
and cultural. 'Westernisation' Hostility and resistance by both the old 
governing classes and the wider population was triggered by a number of 
factors. English had replaced Persian as the official language in education, 
increased missionary activity and interventions in the realm of Hindu 
customs (e. g., the prohibition of suttee and the legalisation of remarriage of 
Hindu widows) stirred the masses. At the same time the old governing 
classes refused to accept political impotence and the British decision to end 
the Mughal imperial title on Bahadur Shah's death. 
The deposition of the Mughal emperor meant that Muslims were now a 
non-ruling minority, because the bulk of the population was Hindu. The 
relationship between the ruling Muslim elite and the Hindu population 
was unusual, as according to traditional Islamic doctrine polytheists must 
immediately convert to Islam once under Muslim rule. However, for ahl al 
kitab (people of the book such as Jews and Christians) traditional Islamic law 
makes an exception. They may retain their religion but do not have the 
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right to proselytise and have to pay extra taxes, as they are not permitted to 
fight in the army. For polytheists the only alternative to conversion is to 
accept death penalty. Thus with the conquest of India, Islam's establishment 
was forced to compromise on dogma because forced conversions of the 
massive Hindu population and the subsequent massacres would have 
undermined the power of the ruling Muslim minority. Therefore, Hindus 
were treated like ahl al kitab and the ruling elite remained a minority. 
With the deposition of the Mughal emperor Muslim identity in India 
changed drastically. Muslims lost not only their prominent status, they also 
had to cope with living in Hindu society as a minority. Muslims now had 
to develop strategies for living a pious Muslim life among polytheists under 
a non-Muslim ruler. While their contemporaries in the Middle East were 
also subordinated to colonial rule, the Islamic way of life was largely 
protected by the social pressure of the majority. In India the Hindu majority 
could now occupy public space for the practice of their religious rituals and 
released old resentments against those who slaughtered sacred cows (such as 
Muslim butchers). Gilles Kepel suggested that the strategies that Indian 
Muslims had developed during that period to cope with the new 
threatening situation, reappeared as Indian Muslims settled in Britain. He 
identified two strategies with which Muslims responded to the events of 
1857 and sought to protect community identity. The strategy to maintain 
religious identity was to encourage a radical separateness between the 
Muslim and non-Muslim society. This in turn was enforced by the political 
strategy of communalism 69 
214 
Communalism was promoted by the `modernist' movement founded by Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1989). In response to the deposition of the 
Mughal emperor the supporters of this group sought to participate in the 
political life of the British Empire, whilst maintaining Muslim identity. 
Contrary to the Islamic movements (to be discussed below) the endeavour 
of Ahmad Khan was to show that Islamic principles were not incompatible 
with Western modernity. For the modernists, religion was an expression of 
distinctiveness, although that was not a reason to reject Western influences. 
The first step to ensure political participation was to create an education 
system for an Anglophone elite to act as spokespeople of the Muslim 
community- As at the beginning of the twentieth century the British 
granted voting rights to 'natives' on the grounds of a tax qualification, these 
modernist elite negotiated for a separate electoral representation for 
Muslims. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan wanted to ensure that the Muslims in 
India were not marginalised. To this end Muslims were encouraged to take 
control of their destiny by acquiring the intellectual instruments of 
modernity. With the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which allowed for 
separate electoral colleges for Muslims and Hindus, the modernist 
movement was able to create the first political communalism in modern 
history. This secular elite acquired . political 
leadership and unified a 
heterogeneous population on the grounds of religious identity. In 1947 this 
7° political communalism transmuted into the creation of Pakistan. 
Not all Muslims shared the open, and maybe opportunistic, approach of the 
modernists. For many, Western modernity represented a threat to Muslim 
identity. Islam on the subcontinent had merged with Hindu traditions over 
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the centuries, which led some Muslim thinkers to consider re-Islamisation 
and isolation as the only way to revive Islam and to protect Muslim 
community identity. To purify Islamic practice (i. e. to remove what has 
been added) and to raise the sense of self-worth of the Muslim community, 
thinkers such as Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, Maulana Rashid 
Gangohi, Maulana Muhammad Muzhar Nanautawi and Maulana 
Muhammad Munir Nanautawi founded the Deoband movement. All of 
them had fought against the British in 1857, which also links them to the 
more militant Jihad movement of Sayyid Ahmad. However, with the 
defeat of 1857, the Jihad movement refrained from any further political 
activity. The founders of Deoband were also connected with the leader of 
the Delhi reformers Shah Muhammad Ishaq, grandson of Shah Wali-allah. 
In the light of Mughal decline during the eighteenth century, Shah Wali- 
allah (1702-1763) had already then sought to develop a coherent ideology to 
revive and protect Islamic identity. " 
Deoband dar al-Ulum was founded in 1867 with the aim of keeping the 
Muslim religious consciousness awake and providing the intellectual basis 
for a stronger Islamic identity. The Deobandi movement sought to build an 
non-Anglicised religious leadership of India's Muslims without state 
support. Pupils were usually from an artisan or commercial family 
background and they were trained to become well-educated ulema, who will 
be committed to reforming Islam and to guiding the Muslim community in 
solving the problems of daily life. Deoband schools spread quickly, 
although financially they were dependent on private donations. The 
Deobandis were also well received among Muslims who were not directly 
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involved in the educational system but wanted to be part of the movement. 
For the Muslim community the Deobandi ulema issued fatwas to clarify 
rules and regulations in accordance with the Shariah, so that believers had 
an orientation for how to conduct their lives among an 'ungodly' society 
subjected to 'ungodly' state laws. 'Z 
The deep conservatism of the Deobandis was soon combined with the belief 
that they alone conformed to the Sunna. They increasingly defined 
themselves in opposition to the ruling non-Muslims. 
In the face of British power, scientific knowledge and material mastery, the Deobandis 
asserted moral superiority. They urged their followers not to wear British dress or to 
buy British goods. Many of the fatwas encouraged this attitude of moral and spiritual 
self-confidence. The emphasis on correct religious practice provided a means for people 
to express their own value in a situation where they were powerless in other areas. 
There was satisfaction to be gleaned from identifying themselves as morally correct, 
and in separating themselves from others whom they judged to be wrong. 73 
Ron Geaves' analytical description revealed two basic mechanisms for 
enforcing group identity: drawing boundaries and providing orientation to 
counteract powerlessness. Drawing boundaries can be done by emphasising 
physical differences, such as by distinct dress and/or by advocating moral 
superiority, which also raises self-worth and encourages members of the in- 
group to withdraw from the environment. These mechanisms can also be 
observed among the first generation immigrants, who introduced the 
Deobandi movement to Britain. The autonomy of the Deobandis vis-a-vis 
the Indian state allowed them to adapt to the minority status in Britain. 
The nature of their socio-political environment had basically remained the 
same, as much as their strategies to maintain community identity have. 
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In opposition to the Deobandi reformers Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan (1856- 
1921) defended the Sufi strand of Islam and the traditions that evolved 
through contact with Hinduism. Riza Khan and his supporters are known 
as the Barelwis. Their movement is the only major one in the subcontinent 
whose teachings are independent of the ideas of Shah Wali-allah. The 
Barelwis emphasise the superhuman nature of the Prophet, he was believed 
to be the emanation of God's light and possessed a unique knowledge of all 
spiritual matters. The faithful believed that the Prophet could act as their 
advocate in front of God and the saints who were able to perceive the light 
of the Prophet were attributed with the power of patronage. The Barelwi 
movement appealed primarily to the rural population and their aim was to 
encourage Muslims to devote themselves to Islam. In Britain the Barelwi 
tradition is widely represented among first generation immigrants. As 
religion and cultural traditions are strongly inter-linked, religion was 
frequently used to reinforce ethnic identity. Consequently, attempts by the 
second generation to strip Islamic practice from these cultural traditions are 
not well received. Furthermore, due to the quasi-divinisation of the 
Prophet, the Barelwis perceive a lack of respect for the Prophet even more as 
an insult than Muslims in general would. For them the Satanic Verses was 
an attack on their identity. 74 
In the first half of the twentieth century two further Islamic movements 
evolved that eventually established themselves in Britain: The Tabligh-i 
Jama'at ('The Association for the Propagation of Islam') and the Jama'at-i 
Islami. In the late 1920's Muhammad Ilyas founded the Tabligh-i Jama'at to 
inspire religious renewal among the uneducated. and simple people. 
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Reforms amongst Muslims had priority over converting non-Muslims 
because only Muslims with a firm conviction and sincere intention are able 
to spread the message among others. 75 He did not feel that it was necessary 
to be a member of the professional ul ema in order to be active as a 
missionary, but believed in the responsibility of the individual to advocate 
Islam to others. He himself had studied at the Islamic University at 
Deoband and became a Deobandi 'al im (religious scholar). Ilyas had a very 
tolerant attitude towards Sufism, as he had been a Sheikh of the Sabiriyah 
branch of the Chishtiyah Sufi order. 76 
For Ilyas the identity of the community is given through strict religious 
observance to compensate the absence of an Islamic state. Although Ilyas 
considered the British to be the main opponents to Islam in India, he did 
not engage in political activity because he believed that religion and politics 
should be kept separate. Proselytism, primarily in terms of internal 
conversion among Muslims, cultural isolation from an 'ungodly' 
environment and strong pietism were considered to be more effective 
strategies to strengthen the Muslim community. These features facilitated 
migration and the adaptation to a new unislamic environment. 
Meanwhile the Tabligh-i transformed itself into a worldwide organisation. 
Its members currently preach in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the USA. 
This movement seeks to transcend cultural divides and to appeal to 
Muslim solidarity by fostering an identity with the Islamic Ummah. " 
Explicitly political objectives were represented by the re-Islamising 
movement Jama'at-i Islami. This organisation was founded by the Urdu- 
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speaking journalist Abul A'la Mawdudi in 1941. While the other Indian 
Islamic movement sought solutions for coping with the absence of an 
Islamic state, Mawdudi's approach implies the restoration of an Islamic state 
and the application of the Shariah. In 'Fundamentals of an Islamic 
Constitution' Mawdudi referred to the Qur'an to prove that "the authority 
of giving commands and the title to sovereignty is the sole prerogative of 
Allahi78. As God's law governs all of creation only an Islamic society 
submitted to the revealed law can ultimately reflect God's will. For 
Mawdudi and his followers Islam is a complete way of life and a total 
identity. 
Jama'at-i Islami was founded to train committed members so that they are 
equipped to work towards the foundation of an Islamic state in the 
subcontinent. Mawdudi believed that society could only be transformed 
with aid of political power. The domination of Western civilisation should 
be tackled by the creation of an Islamic state which serves as an example to 
both Western and other Muslim nations. With the partition of India in 
1947 Jama'at-i Islami was divided into two separate organisations. In India 
the Jama'at-i Islami Hind concentrated on educating the backward Muslim 
communities and on preserving their Islamic identity. They also engaged 
in dawah directed towards non-Muslims. The campaign to convert non- 
Muslims entailed two main areas of activity: in the field of education and by 
providing humanitarian relief in cases of natural disaster. 79 In Pakistan the 
primary objectives of the Jama'at-i Islami was to work towards a truly 
Islamic state. For this purpose Muslims had to be educated in Islam and 
protected from non-Islamic or false ideas. Members had to be found, who 
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had to be organised in order to spread the message of Islam and to work for 
a righteous human society. The organisation sought to train committed 
Muslims to bring about a complete change in society in accordance with the 
teachings of Islam. This encompassed a change in both intellectual and 
political leadership, for only a truly Islamic leadership can guide the State 
and society in agreement with the principles of Islam. However, the 
Jama'at-i Islami was neither able to win the support of the masses, nor of 
the ruling elite. It was members of the lower middle classes who were 
attracted to Mawdudi's attacks on the ruling elite, the clerics and the West 
8° 
"It gave them an ideology and an identity with which to fight for their place 
in their society. "81. 
2.6. The Prelude to Identity Crisis 
During the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), the age of reform, British 
society experienced an accumulation of developments that destabilised the 
traditional value-structure. The gradual emergence of the two party system, 
the growing self-awareness of the proletariat as a political power, the 
development of trade unions, the Darwinian theory of evolution and the 
appearance of feminists (or a more appropriate term for the time, 
suffragettes) collectively introduced a fragmentation of orientation among 
British society. 
In pre-Victorian decades ideological fragmentation was limited to religious 
schisms that could stimulate doubt in one's religious identity and 
Weltanschuung, although it eventually settled into a status quo. The 
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ideological fragmentation of the nineteenth century was not confined to 
matters of belief, but also affected both the private and public sphere of the 
majority of the population. What made the search for orientation more 
complex was that a clear categorisation of peoples' positions was not 
possible. Suffragettes for example, could be found among both 
Conservatives and Liberals, women affiliated to either party would unite 
regarding some issues while disagreeing on others. The affiliation to one of 
the parties and the support of the working classes or the suffragettes were 
not necessarily life-long commitments. The nineteenth century introduced 
a variety of values (frequently attached. to ideology) and orientations that 
_., 
forced individuals to take a stance on issues and to-make decisions. Society 
has become politicised and identity could suddenly become problematic. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the trade union movement 
began to form regional and national networks and their journals spread the 
ideas of radical political thinkers. In 1838 Francis Place drew up the People's 
Charter, which contained the following six demands: universal male 
suffrage, annual Parliaments, the abolition of the property qualification for 
MPs, the payment of MPs, electoral districts of equal size and a secret ballot. 
During the National Convention held a year later in London and 
Birmingham the Charter provoked riots, which were immediately 
suppressed by the army. The supporters of the Charter, the Chartists, also 
presented huge petitions to Parliament and in 1840 the National Charter 
Association was formed under the aegis of Feargus O'Connor. The 
demonstrations and strikes organised by the Chartists achieved little. While 
revolutions spread in 1848 in Europe, England experienced the beginning of 
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a decade of prosperity. That Britain was able to successfully cope with the 
revolutionary atmosphere originates in the historical experience of the civil 
war and the extended conflicts, from which the English political system 
evolved. 82 Internal divisions among the Chartists and improved efficiency 
in the police force with the new railway system prevented the successful 
organisation of bigger revolts. 3 
Radical thinkers such as Marx provided a coherent ideology for the 
emancipation of the proletariat. Attacks against the aristocracy and concepts 
for the abolition of classes posed a threat to the middle and upper classes. 
Entrepreneurs and investors, who had been praised by the establishment as 
the spearheads of progress and opportunity, now had to justify themselves 
for exploiting the working classes. The identity of the aristocracy and the 
middle classes came under attack and the need for their mere existence was 
questioned. The Protestant Weltanschauung, according to which God 
rewards all those with prosperity who are religious, law-abiding and hard 
working, had simply been opposed by Marx's materialist conception of 
history. 
Religious illusions allow people to escape from confrontation with self- 
alienation and the meaninglessness of life. Based on Hegel, Marx viewed 
human beings in modern society as alienated from themselves. This 
alienation occurred because the life-activity, particularly of the working 
classes, had taken an alien, inhuman form. Under capitalism the network 
of human co-operation that ideally should allow for the human powers of 
production to foster a self-conscious self-determination, was alienated by 
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dispossessing the majority of the producers and thus preventing collective 
self-determination. Contrary to Hegel, who sought self-fulfilment on the 
grounds of a new philosophical interpretation of life, Marx intended to 
change society rather than to reinterpret it. Therefore it was the mission of 
the working classes to establish a classless society in order to take rational 
control of the social form of production which will lead to the only true 
freedom: free self-activity 84 By declaring that modern society experiences 
self-alienation, Hegel and Marx insinuated a crisis of social and individual 
identity. Although the concept of identity did not exist at the time, the 
concept of self-alienation is the antithesis of the concept of identity. 
The Industrial Revolution tore the human being out of their traditional 
system of social co-operation. By subjecting the new form of social 
production to market mechanisms the industrial worker had no 
opportunity to identify with his activity and product as the craftsman or 
farmer could. Western philosophy created the foundation for the 
advancement of individualism in Western society. By the political and 
economic emancipation of the individual, educating them towards 
independent thinking and the liberation from suppressive authorities, the 
individual was supposed to experience his I' as the centre of his forces and 
activity. While only a minority were able to make this experience, 
individualism was nothing but a facade for all those who were unable to 
find their individual identity. Instead alternative identifications such as 
with the nation, religion, class or occupation were adopted. The most 
common identification would be with class 85 
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Even the escape into 'religious illusions', as Marx had formulated it, could 
no longer provide unquestioned orientation. The publication of Charles 
Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) undermined the whole metaphysical 
framework of Western European society. The theory of evolution forced 
society to see man's unique position in the universe in relative terms. 
Suddenly man was no longer perceived as a descendent of Adam and Eve, 
created in God's own image, but an ordinary animal that had evolved 
through the pressure of natural selection. Darwin's work affected religion, 
morality and politics and was quickly adopted by materialistic movements 
such as Communism. Roy Strong noted: "The fact that today we live largely 
in a world of agnostic materialism descends directly from the consequences . 
of his work. """ Although by the end of the century the doctrine on 
evolution was acceptable to some clergymen such as Frederick Temple 
Archbishop of Canterbury (1896), the conflict between science and religion 
was still widespread. However, most churchgoers accommodated 
intellectual doubt and scepticism, as religion had more of a moral and 
ethical value than an intellectual one 87 While the progress of science began 
to undermine religion, the Victorians responded to the loss of faith with a 
stronger dedication to morality. Gertrude Himmelfarb pointed out "... that 
morality became, in a sense, a surrogate for religion. i88 
In the nineteenth century identity could no longer be taken for. granted. 
Neither was the life history of an individual predetermined as during the 
Middle Ages, nor was orientation on the grounds of a coherent 
Weltanschauung necessarily God-given. Therefore it should not surprise 
that investigations of the human psyche began during this period of 
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transformation. Freud's discussion of the human drive and its repression 
was perceived as an attack on morality. Freud, Darwin and Marx all 
painfully unmasked the vain attempt of Victorians to maintain the illusion 
and appearance of a well-organised and virtuous society. They brought 
about a re-conceptualisation of human nature and an awareness* of the need 
for social and political reform. 
The need for reform was responded to in Britain before revolts turned into 
revolution. From the 1870's onwards more attention was directed to the 
channelling of the political impact of the working classes' discontent. In 
1871 the Trade Union Act finally provided the. unions with a clear status in 
law, though their power was limited to that of a pressure group. Inspired by 
the teachings of Karl Marx the Democratic Federation was formed in 1881, 
which merged with the Labour Emancipation League three years later to 
form the Social Democratic Federation. These intellectual groups, together 
with the Fabian Society (founded by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 1884) created 
the intellectual framework for the emergence of a new party in 1893: the 
Independent Labour Party. The Independent Labour Party did not seek 
revolution but social reform. 
The government adjusted to the need for reform. In 1857, judicial divorce 
became possible, the Married Women's Property Act gave women some 
power over their own property and by the 1880's women could go to 
university. In 1870, the government introduced the Education Act, which 
for the first time stipulated compulsory education for all children until the 
age of ten. Amongst the working classes (a term accepted by 1850) the 
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Education Act was not well received, as they stood to lose an additional 
source of income. Additionally, the government extended the franchise so 
that by 1885 two thirds of males could vote. The political system, that of the 
Crown and the Houses of Lords and Commons, which supported the rule of 
the elite, now had to appeal to a different kind of society. Therefore political 
parties had to develop political programmes to win a mass electorate 89 
The destabilisation of the traditional social structure and hierarchy as well 
as the introduction of secular ideology was counter balanced by three factors: 
political and social reforms (as described above), the success of the Empire 
and the adjustment of the monarchy to the rise of the middle classes. The 
political power of the Crown had turned into a passive one. However, 
Queen Victoria managed to turn the monarchy into a unifying symbol by 
representing both Imperial and domestic virtues. Under Prime Minister 
Benjamin Disraeli (1868 and 1874-80) a glamorous image of Empire and 
monarchy was encouraged and in 1876 Queen Victoria was proclaimed 
Empress of India. In 1890 she reigned over four hundred million people. 
The age of the superpower had arrived, nearly every European nation 
sought to establish a colonial empire and a strong identification with 
empire had developed. It was a deliberate move to build up pageantry and 
splendour of the Crown as an escapism from the grey world created by the 
Industrial Revolution. Victoria's Golden jubilee. in 1887 and her Diamond 
Jubilee in 1897 were celebrated with magnificent carriage processions 
through London. The mass circulation of newspapers enforced the 
popularity of such spectacles and the railways and trams enabled people to 
travel to London in order to participate at such events. 90 
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It was during the reign of Queen Victoria that the monarchy developed into 
a symbol of identification, representing supremacy and unity. The Empire 
offered opportunity, new markets and was a source for raw materials. The 
industrialisation of Britain and the Empire allowed Victorian society to 
believe in unlimited progress and virtues such as self-discipline, work, 
responsibility, perseverance and honesty; virtues that were reproduced by 
Margaret Thatcher in her election campaign of 1983.91 The belief in progress 
and the growth of the nation superseded intellectual doubt and social 
tension; it nurtured identity and patriotism. 
Patriotism and nationalism frequently serve as a source of individual and 
collective identity. With regard to Britain, nationalism is a difficult concept 
to discuss. Wales, Scotland and Ireland have maintained a strong sense of 
national identity, whilst the repeated British experience of conflict, 
especially war with Napoleonic France, developed a sense of unity amongst 
the inhabitants of the British Isles. The tradition of imperial expansion took 
place in a British framework blurring English identity. Therefore English 
patriotism is frequently expressed in British terms, while the Welsh and 
Scots continue to emphasise their ethnic and cultural identity. In contrast 
to the romantic nationalism of ethnically defined nations that erupted 
throughout Europe during the mid-nineteenth century, British identity was 
built on the preservation of political continuity and constructed around the 
institutions of the Crown, Parliament and the rule of law. 92 This concept 
has survived until the present day according to which Britishness serves as 
an umbrella identity for native and immigrant ethnic minorities. 
228 
Most Englishmen perceived Britain as predominantly English because the 
core of British polity, the symbols of Crown, Parliament and Empire were 
seen as English. England did not press for English definitions of identity. 
Assertion of English nationalism was unnecessary as English identity was 
based on the presumption of English superiority. Scotland and Wales were 
always aware of the English dominance within the British framework. Yet, 
Scottish nationalism is rather based on national character than on national 
history. Scotland has a clear national identity, but until 1914 there was no 
reason to regret the Act of Union. The Scots had pioneered the great 
industrial revolution and successfully participated in the empire-building. 
In comparison, Welsh nationalism is based on linguistic and intrinsically 
cultural distinctiveness. However, despite the fact that the Welsh also had 
their share in British Imperialism, Wales did not have the institutional 
basis for the separateness they sought. Therefore their nationalist 
movements did not seek the same degree of exclusion from the British 
political system as their Irish counter-parts did. 93 
British national identity was constructed around subjection to the Crown 
and Empire. The common cultural reference within the British framework 
was the English culture. Gellner noted that the industrialisation and 
urbanisation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries diluted cultural 
boundaries that made it easier to manufacture a national culture with the 
creation of the nation state. The national culture is characterised by cultural 
features of the ethnic groups that held sufficient power to define the 
national culture according to their heritage. While national culture, with 
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which citizens should identify, has to be specific enough to demarcate the 
population from 'others', it still has to be flexible enough to encompass the 
differences amongst the population that do exist. The emphasis is 
consequently on common historical experiences to enforce communality. 
With industrialisation a standardised education became a necessity to 
ensure a common system of communication. Thus education had to be 
centrally organised, enabling governments to convey the same values, 
understanding of history and sense of communality to the whole 
population. Gellner suggested that it is "nationalism which engenders 
nations, and not the other way roundi94. English nationalism therefore 
expresses itself in the standardisation, homogenisation and centralisation of 
culture, rather than in an exclusive ethnic oriented nationalism. The 
standardisation of culture and education is an attempt to overcome ethnic 
differences, to consolidate society and to promote the efficiency of the 
national economy, which consequently facilitates the legitimisation of 
politics. In other words British national identity has been centrally 
constructed since the Act of Union. Empire, the Crown and Parliament 
have become salient 'objects of identification' and promoted as national 
heritage. 
Gellner identified the 'will' to form a nation and 'culture' as the main 
factors for the social cohesion of nations. Industrial society is anonymous 
and impersonal, making it even more vulnerable to disintegration. Its 
members are held together by historical values and elements of culture that 
were abstracted to form symbols and to enforce a sense of communal 
belonging. 
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Centrally organised and standardised education becomes necessary to 
reproduce fully socialised and intellectually flexible individuals, with a 
universal education, able to adapt to the changing occupational structure in 
order to perpetuate economic growth. This system of education itself 
becomes part of the division of labour. 'Work, in the main, is no longer the 
manipulation of things, but of meanings. i95 Therefore it was in the interest 
of Britain to make school attendance compulsory in 1880 and to provide free 
elementary education in 1891. Gellner argued that it was not nationalism 
that imposed homogeneity, but rather industrial society's desire for 
homogeneity to secure progress and growth, which produced nationalism. 
2.6.1. The Twentieth Century: Identity at Stake 
By the twentieth century British society has become varied and volatile. 
The daily social interaction has become more anonymous in a rapidly 
urbanising environment. The great Depression between 1873-96 posed a 
threat to the sense of optimism that prevailed among Victorian society. 
Although British exports continued to rise, other countries such as the USA 
and Germany followed the British example of industrialisation and began to 
overtake the level of British production. Consequently the newly 
industrialised nations wanted their own empire for resources and as a 
market. These long-standing imperialist rivalries of the great powers 
eventually culminated in the First World War. 
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Nationalism spread in both Ireland and throughout the British Empire. 
Although a series of Home Rule Bills were introduced into the British 
Parliament beginning in 1886, Ireland's demand for self-government was 
not realised until after the First World War. Territories that were largely 
settled by UK emigrants, were formally recognised as self-governing 
Dominions within the Empire in 1907. Such were the four Australian 
colonies, New Zealand, the Cape Colony and the dominion of Canada. 
However, Britain itself was not spared from a revival of national 
consciousness. In response to an increasing wave of immigration, in 
particular of East European Jews, the . 
Aliens Act of 1905 restricted the 
number of foreigners able to settle in the country. Between 1880 and 1914 
over 120,000 Jews settled in Britain, primarily in London, Leeds, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Birmingham. Roughly the same 
number settled temporally on their way to the United States. 96 However, 
the largest group of immigrants at the turn of the century were Irish. 
Strictly speaking the Irish were not immigrants within the framework of 
the Union. Nevertheless, their settlement in industrial and urbanised areas 
such as Lancashire, London, Glasgow, York and Cardiff caused social 
tensions, although migration of Irish was in decline since the 1860's. In 
1901, there were 426,565 Irish immigrants in England and Wales and 205,064 
in Scotland. 97 The Irish offered cheap labour, which generated hostility 
towards them among the communities. 
Patriotism and national consciousness also expressed themselves in a 
constructive way. As much as the military setbacks of the Boer War (1899- 
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1902) were a blow to British identity and pride, it made the government 
aware of the poor physical health of the urban masses. The government not 
only had to show concern about military efficiency, but also had to focus on 
whether the nation was fit for its imperial task. It was a Quaker pacifist, 
Seebohm Rowntree, who pointed in 1901 to the high poverty in urban areas 
and the resulting physical deterioration. He appealed to the national self- 
interest as he called for political action. In 1904, the government responded 
to such concern with the appointment of the Inter-departmental Committee 
on Physical Deterioration. On the basis of its report the government 
recognised the need for school meals and regular medical inspections in the 
Education Acts of 1906 and 1907 respectively. To provide relief for the 
temporarily unemployed and old age pensions, the National Insurance Act 
(1911) introduced compulsory Health Insurance and the provision of 
payment during unemployment. 98 
The years following the Boer War also witnessed the establishment of a 
number of patriotic leagues. The National Service League, the Tariff 
Reform League, the British Brothers League, the Union Defence League and 
the Anti-Socialist League, only to name a few, all sought to contribute to the 
'national cause'. This entailed reviving Britain's economic and military 
supremacy abroad, as well as fostering social unity and a sense of patriotic 
duty at home. 
Based on the same motives new youth movements such as the Boys 
Brigade, the Boy Scouts, the Church Lads Brigade and the British Girl's 
Patriotic League were created. These movements actively nurture 
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patriotism and a sense of national identity among children. The virtues 
propagated by such youth movements is best illustrated by a quote from the 
manual 'Scouting for Boys' written by the founder of the Boy Scouts, Baden 
Powell: 
Remember, whether rich or poor, from castle or from slum, you are all Britons first, and 
you've got to keep Britain up against outside enemies, you have to stand shoulder to 
shoulder to do it. If you are doing harm to yourselves you are doing harm to your 
country. You must sink your differences 
99 
Due to colonial rivalries Britain anticipated conflict. Patriotism and 
national identity were encouraged to ensure popular and broad support in 
defence of the Empire. As Britain engaged in what was to become the First 
World War in August 1914, popular opinion held that war would be over 
by Christmas. The Britons revealed an astonishing idealism and a 
remarkable sense of national unity as the government called them to arms. 
Only few people could comprehend the scale that this war was to assume. 
The First World War traumatised a whole generation. Britain counted 
nearly two-and-a-half million casualties, including over 700,000 killed. At 
the Armistice in November 1918 Britain had to re-integrate over five 
million servicemen into civilian life. "' 
Although Britain emerged from the First World War triumphant, the 
atrocious reality of the war made it impossible to romanticise it in the 
traditional manner. Air bombardment on British civilians produced a 
considerable psychological shock and discredited the common belief that the 
British Isles were invulnerable to direct attack. After the British desire for 
justice was satisfied in the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the desire for peace 
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manifested itself in the foundation of the League of Nations and the 
support of disarmament across the whole British political spectrum. 
The inter-war period was marked by unemployment, heightened industrial 
unrest and economic decline that had followed from the initial post-war 
boom. Indicative for British identity was that it was the only significant 
country in Europe that was not consumed by totalitarianism during any 
stage of the inter-war period despite economic crisis. Why? For the 
explanation three general factors can be isolated: economic, political and 
social. Firstly, the depression in Britain was relatively mild compared to 
other industrialised European nations. As the world's largest importer of . 
food and raw materials, Britain did not experience a financial collapse. 
Unlike other industrial countries Britain did not respond to the fall of 
import prices with an immediate increase in tariffs. Therefore as the prices 
of imported food (and raw materials) fell and the real income of consumers 
rose as a consequence, the purchasing power was not hampered by tariffs, 
which helped investments. The depression primarily affected the 
unemployed and the rich entrepreneurs (due to a sharp decline in 
profits). ')' 
Secondly, the greatest political phenomenon during the inter-war period 
was the meteoric rise of the Labour Party. In the general elections of 1922, 
Labour became the official opposition party, in what was a Conservative 
victory, and in 1924 King George V called on James Ramsay MacDonald 
(leader of the Labour Party) to form a government. He only held office for 
ten months but returned to power in 1929. The most important aspect of 
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Labour's party policy was to distance itself from Bolshevist extremism, 
which prevented political marginalisation. The newly born Independent 
Labour Party (1893) was strongly linked to armchair visionaries such as the. 
Fabians. Embedded in a deeply rooted tradition of a democratic political 
culture, the party was driven by ideology and sought to bring about social 
change, within the framework of a democratic culture and not revolution. 
Thirdly, British society has come to identify with relative political 
continuity. The presence of three distinct political parties allowed the 
population to express its discontent and desire for political change in 
democratic terms. Compared to Germany's short lived Weimar Republic 
(1919-33), the long history of democratic culture and the slow successive 
introduction of a wider electorate, raised democratic awareness and 
prevented mass experimentation with newly won rights. A politically 
mature Labour Party and a patriotic Conservative Party provided democratic 
alternatives. 
The inter-war period was also marked by the desire to escape from the social 
reality of economic depression by engaging in leisure activity and 
consumerism. One positive consequence was the introduction of paid 
holiday in the early 1920's. The formation of the British Broadcasting 
Company (BBC) in 1922 and the expansion of the cinema industry provided 
for such escapism. Adverts targeted primarily women. Domestic electric 
appliances designed to alleviate the housework, as well as cars, were mass- 
produced for those who could afford it - for the middle classes. But women 
also received new opportunities as a result of their indispensable 
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participation in industry during the war. By 1928 women gained the full 
voting rights after the Franchise Act (1918) had only granted the vote to 
women over twenty-eight, and the Acts in 1919 and 1923 equipped women 
with equal rights with men in cases of divorce. The ideal image of women 
changed to that of an emancipated career girl with an element of 
classlessness. 102 However, the optimism that prevailed among British 
society after the economy finally recovered by the mid-30's, was shattered as 
the policy of appeasement could not prevent the Second World War. 
The Second World War changed both the international political climate and 
Western societies as such. Security was a collective desire. _. 
The Charter of 
the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco and came 
into force on 24 October 1945. In Britain it had become increasingly difficult 
to justify the idea of Empire even though it had been re-labelled 
Commonwealth. Granting former colonies independence was not only a 
moral gesture on behalf of Britain, but was also an economic necessity. The 
disintegration of Empire represented the decline of an international pre- 
dominance that had evolved since the sixteenth century. 
Britain proved great diplomatic skill in the course of dissolving the Empire. 
National humiliation was avoided by handing over power in a pompous 
ritual to a pro British 'democratic system', which had been set up. Britain 
compensated the loss of direct power over her former colonies by casting 
herself on the level of a major power with Russia and the USA. As the 
world became polarised in the Cold War, Britain actively participated in the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in 1949. In her struggle to 
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maintain her international status as a major power Britain sought to 
nurture political ties with the USA and to assert her economic relationship 
with the Commonwealth. 
With the loss of its colonies Great Britain also lost its predominant 
economic position. From the beginning of the twentieth century Britain 
had to cope with a continuous economic decline. On the macro-economic 
level the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fell behind 
France, Germany, Japan and the USA. Although the US and UK economies 
cannot really be compared due to different conditions for the access to and 
endowment of economic -resources, the 
UK. may be set against other 
European countries with comparable resource endowments and natural 
constraints on growth. Even in the 1950's and 1960's, as unemployment was 
only at the level of 1-2 per cent and Britain achieved its highest ever rate of 
recorded economic growth, its growth of GDP per capita was only 2.5 per 
cent compared to France, Germany, and Japan with a growth of GDP of 4.0, 
4.9,8.0 per cent per annum respectively. By 1989 Britain not only lagged 
behind France and Germany, but also Switzerland and several Scandinavian 
countries. 103 
Nevertheless, Britain refused to participate in the formation of a United 
Europe. Too strong was the identification with its global role and a too 
difficult a concept to swallow were the political and economic restrictions 
involved in joining the European project (in which Britain would have just 
been another middle-ranked European state). For Britain it was 
unacceptable to adopt a single uniform tariff against all non-EEC imports 
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(based on the Treaty of Rome, 1957) including all members of the 
Commonwealth from where Britain obtained cheap goods. Therefore Paris 
and Bonn became the focus of the new Europe. Britain's physical division 
from the mainland reflected in her distanced stance towards the European 
Community. Although Britain eventually did join the EC in 1973, a sense 
of true commitment and belonging has been lacking up to the present day. 
English people tend to be quite isolationist, they seem sort of separate from the rest of 
Europe although we are supposedly now a part of Europe, but there is still the feeling 
that we are different from everybody else. There is still a very strong feeling that that 
should be protected ... against an 'invasion'. And a single currency, if it went to a 
referendum, that would not be a popular move because there is still a strong sense of 
nationalism here 104 
As if the loss of the Empire and the self-imposed marginalisation within the 
European Community had not put enough strain on national pride, the 
revival of ancient historic identities within Britain also threatened to 
fragment the nation. '05 In 1967, the Scottish National Party won a seat in 
the House of Commons and during the same period Plaid Cymru gained 
grounds in Wales. In the years to follow more MP's of these two parties 
were elected who encouraged the introduction of devolution bills during 
the late 1970's to establish regional assemblies. The referendum in 1979 did 
not reveal mass support for this notion. 106 It was not until 1998 that 
Scotland re-established a Parliament and Wales formed a National 
Assembly. Linda Colley's argument that British identity was forged by 
Empire, Protestantism and French threat, seemed to be confirmed by the 
gradual national fragmentation after the Second World War. It does not 
seem like a coincidence that regional national identities have re-emerged as 
soon as both Empire was on decline and immediate continental enemies 
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could no longer threaten Britain. Protestantism had also lost its influence 
over the people. Although the Church of Scotland could register a more 
continuous commitment until the 1960's, the Church of England witnessed 
a'continuous decline of its members from 1900 onwards (except during the 
inter-war period). "' 
Economically Britain experienced a decade of rapid growth after the Second 
World War. After an initial period of austerity, the Labour government 
battled the repayment of the war debts. The economic situation demanded 
price controls and the assurance that industry worked in the interest of the 
country. After 1947 the. Labour government. pursued its agenda on the 
nationalisation of industry. The industries concerned were in the utilities 
and fuel sector. In 1949, the pound was devalued by 30 per cent. The Korean 
War put further restraints on the British economy and hampered its 
normalisation. It was claimed that the costs of maintaining the parity of the 
sterling and excessive investments to support Britain's interests overseas 
posed a drain on the economy. The economic boom was finally to come in 
the 1950's: high growth, low unemployment, and low inflation allowed 
Britain to prosper. The GDP grew at a rate of 2.8 per cent per annum 
between 1951 and 1973 and the living standards of the population improved 
significantly. 108 By 1951 the Labour government had successfully 
implemented the 'welfare state'. 
In 1979, Mrs Thatcher won the general elections and had the advantage of a 
working parliamentary majority that was bolstered in the following 
elections of 1983 and 1987. Margaret Thatcher came to epitomise an era. She 
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became internationally and nationally renowned for her 'iron' policy of a 
radical free-market economy: privatisation of a wide range of nationalised 
industries, cutbacks in industrial subsidies, the sale of council houses to 
their tenants and limiting the trade union's legal immunities. As the 
Conservatives came to power at the end of the 1970's, they refrained from 
clamping down on the welfare system, but rather chose to change its nature 
by transforming the 'welfare state' into an 'opportunity state', by 
encouraging and rewarding initiative with tax relief. The final attack came 
after their third election in 1987. The 'dependency culture' was eroded by 
transforming Supplementary Benefits into Income Support and 'additional 
payments' for exceptional needs into Social Funds, yet 70 per cent of their 
grants had to be repaid by the claimants. Powers of the local governments 
were transferred to smaller accountable bodies in order to erode local 
democracy and to increase the power of central government both as a 
regulator and a paymaster. By 1985,2.5 million people lived below, and 7 
million people, on the poverty line. The State dismantled the welfare 
system in a time when there is nothing to take its place. Focusing on the 
control of inflation, macro-economic objectives were neglected. After a 
short boom during the 1980's, the worst post-war slump followed in 1990 
and 1991, with more than three million unemployed and a negative GDP 
growth. 109 
Unity among British society. Not really, I think it is quite fragmented. I think that is 
probably part of what New Labour is theoretically about. It is trying to bring back 
some sort of feeling of social identity. During the Thatcher years it was very much 
individualistic and everybody was fighting for themselves, so I think that fragmented 
a lot of the structures that have been in place ... and made people really 
just out to get 
what they could and a big gap opened up between the rich and the poor. And I also 
think that over the past twenty, twenty-five years a lot more mobility within the 
country (job wise) tended to fragment families. I mean I originally come from Sheffield 
where everybody ... all the relations were there, everybody lived within a small area, 
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but I went to university and moved away. A lot of people that I know around here are 
in a similar position. They have lived away from their families and you have to form 
new networks of friends to replace that family structure. 
11° 
In less than a decade Britain declined from the most powerful Empire in the 
World to a middle-ranked European nation. Those generations that grew 
up with the self-concept of being world's most powerful political and 
economic nation, could probably never part from this idea completely. 
Although a sense of superiority may remain, the Empire can only nurture 
identity as a memory. 
It still makes people feel that they are superior, particularly if they are abroad. That 
reflects in the fact that we are not particularly good at learning foreign languages. So 
that when we go abroad we tend to expect people to speak English rather than making 
the effort to learn the language. That has to do with having gone out and colonised 
places like India and expected everyone to speak English 11' 
Today society is-- also composed of generations that did not consciously -- 
witness the glory of Empire and its subsequent decline. Everyone born after 
1945 grew up in a historic period of peace, stability, and unprecedented 
general wealth. Also religion was marginalised in the public consciousness, 
ousted by the desire to improve the living standard. Consequently it is of 
interest what British identity is composed of today and whether the classic 
objects of identification (Empire and Protestantism) and external threat to 
promote social cohesion are still of any significance to the population. 
David Miller has expressed doubt whether traditional aspects of British 
identity are still relevant today. The post-war experience destroyed the self- 
perception of Great Britain both on the geographical and economic level. - 
Today Britain primarily advertises what David Miller referred to as 'cultural 
Englishness' such as drinking tea, etc. ' 12 
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2.7. Do the English have a National Identity? 
Bernard Crick observed that in contrast to the Scots, Irish and Welsh, the 
English did not develop a specific English identity. He suggested that 
English nationalism and self-consciousness were deliberately suppressed to 
safeguard the unity of Britain. Particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century nationalism would have been counter-productive because it would 
have antagonised and frustrated reconciliation with Scotland. "' Thus what 
is Englishness associated with today? Which values are equated with 
. 
Englishness and Britishness? 
The Scottish, the Welsh and the Irish probably have an even greater sense of national 
identity and pride, whereas the English, it's more that they don't want to mix with 
outsiders but there isn't the same sort of central cohesion within English people. There 
is a lot of division within the North-South divide. Southern English people see 
themselves as quite different from Northern English, whereas the Scots and the Welsh 
probably see themselves as Welsh primarily, belonging to a particular area"` 
It has been observed that the English interviewees found it difficult to 
produce spontaneous associations with Englishness. Some interviewees 
asserted: 'We are very proud" 15. But what they were proud of or which 
values to equate with their nation was a far more difficult question to 
answer. 
I don't really know, you are bom English aren't you. What are you proud of? My 
country most of all I suppose. At one time I would have said the Royal Family but I'm a 
bit anti-Royal family now. Well, I suppose the Royal Family is part of our heritage 
and we have a lot of foreigners who come mainly to see them. "" 
Frequently aspects of identity have been mentioned which are not unique to 
the English but apply to the whole of Britain. 
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The only thing I can think of is being an Island. I think however much England is 
associated with Europe, however much, it is still slightly more separate than the 
others because it is an island. I think there is a psychological thing about being an 
island. It has a very low subliminally affect on everybody. "' 
To escape an answer an interviewee attributed Englishness to those English 
living in the country and therefore detached herself from being a 'real 
English' based on the argument that London is a cosmopolitan area. This 
would imply that Englishness is rather equated to the English countryside 
than to cosmopolitan London. 
This is a very cosmopolitan area of. London, if you want to find real English you need to 
go to perhaps Devon; or Yorkshire, or Cornwall, or out of London. ... I think we are a bit 
stand-offish sometimes. As a race we are a bit private, sometimes, and reserved if that 
is a value. "' 
The older generation still seems to identify more strongly with Empire. 
While a 40 year old woman stated that the Empire doesn't really have an 
impact today. Her mother interrupted: "I'm proud of it. The upbringing I 
had, my mother was very old fashioned and I'm proud of it and I have 
brought up my children the same. i1' 
Other interviewees have also mentioned 'upbringing'. The nature of their 
upbringing is reflected by their answers, particularly if identity is 
investigated via the individual's value-structure. It is what Freud called the 
super-ego that was nurtured with a basic value-system during childhood 
and adolescence by parents and will guide an individual in his or her 
decision-making process. The elderly generation was subjected to a far more 
authoritarian up bringing. The way the following interviewee referred to 
his associations reflects both upbringing and a strong identification. 
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Our heredity, our Parliament and our Royalty. And freedom of speech and freedom of 
expression, loyalty and gentlemanly conduct. .... Basically we've started 
freedom of 
speech, our monarchy, our equal opportunity system, ... we 
have got poor people but 
there is no one starving to death like they are in some of the other countries. No doubt 
we have our poor but we see our way out, there are poor but nobody should starve to 
death. 12° 
The fact that we have the Royal Family and history. I think it is the heritage we are 
proud of. I think each nation of Great Britain is proud of its heritage. ... It is respect 
and respect for the elderly or this society. When we were young, we had a lot more 
respect for our elderly than most youngster got. 'Z' 
By contrast, some youth find it difficult to identify particularly with their 
historic past. Judged from the contemporary perspective, Empire has 
received a negative connotation. 
What are you proud of as an English? Well that's really hard. Like almost 
impossible. Well, especially at SOAS people aren't really proud of being English it's 
kind of a minority thing, you get a complex. People are like, uhh, you've ruined the 
world. What is it? Colonisation, yea. I don't know what I'm proud of ... 
English 
humour, that amuses me. Pub culture, you don't get that anywhere else'2 
Quite a few interviewees referred to tradition and their upbringing, but 
have remained vague about what it entailed, as this 35 year old woman has. 
It basically is all tradition isn't it. It is the way you are brought up, it goes back for 
centuries: the English attitude, stiff upper lip. I really don't know what to make it. 
About values, I think they are probably the same as everybody else's. In some way the 
English people are very reserved'2' 
Among the younger generation aspects of traditional values related to 
conduct have never been mentioned with reference to themselves. Only 
one interviewee has attributed some to 'a minority' among the English. 
They are perceived to be very polite, very chivalrous I suppose, all stiff upper-lip, 
unemotional and detached. I'm not a 100% sure if they're all like that, it is only ever a 
small population. Those that go to Eton 124 
Sarcasm, queuing, I'm not aware of it I don't know" 
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I think in reality there is no such thing as Englishness. 126 
Englishness is a dragon, because of St George's dragon, and Britishness - pride. Not 
where I come from, but for other people it's pride. ... There you have to look at regions. 
Ideally now it should be multiculturalism, I mean that is what should be happening, 
whether that is a value I still doubt it. I think values change according to what 
political system your in. ... Perhaps liberalism is a value. ... 
England is much more 
central, the way government works England gets a lot more focus on it. ... Centralisation 
is a huge thing! 
How salient upbringing and class-consciousness can be, is best illustrated by 
an interview with a young aristocrat. 
Basically English society, ... I would say English society is still extremely class fragmented probably more than any other society in Europe. Maybe not any other 
society in Europe but it's because we had our revolution in the 17th century and a 
revival ... the British class structure stayed in tact with a far greater sense of 
continuity than it has in any other European country certainly that I've been to or lived 
it. And I think that's probably one of the defining features of British society. I think 
that probably is the defining feature of British society. It's the class system, which 
everyone rambles on about so-much. British identity itself is very clearly defined, not 
to say that French, German, or Italian isn't, and I think that is probably because we are 
an island. And I think there is an island mentality, notice the same with the Japanese, 
I mean Japanese history. And islands tend to have very strong senses of cultural 
identity, although our society is as diverse or comes from as many diverse racial groups 
as any other in Europe. It's because we are cut off by a very easily definable boundary 
from the rest of Europe, I think British people do see themselves as being something 
other than European and that's ... 
I think is probably the defining aspect of the 
British, certainly the English. I'm English so although I say British because we are a 
part of the British Isles, but technically I'm English. 
Also this interviewee found it difficult to separate British attributes from 
the English ones. Although emotionally he emphasises his Englishness he 
expresses his national identifications in British terms. 
(English values) There is a great difference between what they actually are, and I 
don't think that I can tell you what they actually are, and what we would like them to 
be, we as the British would like them to be. I suspect that you could do a lot worse than 
to look back to say, the 1930's in India, the Indian colonial regime. I think the British 
regard themselves as superior. I think every nation regards herself superior, whatever. 
The British just do it with such confidence that they annoy everybody else so much. I 
mean you go to America and you get people. saying gosh you British are so fucking 
arrogant. And it's true. I think we would like them to be honour, duty. I tell you what I 
think is the most significant English trait is: absolute abhorable stupidity in the face 
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of all logical reasoning. That is the thing that crops up more than anything else in... . 
The British have this element of admiring people who do something utterly stupid and 
often they do something so utterly stupid that they actually succeed because no-one 
expects them to be so ridiculously insane. I think that is probably the most continuous 
trend in British history, is this absolute trait of controlled insanity. I think that is the 
most significant British value, ... would 
be: never do anything the simple way if you 
can do it arse backwards'28 
In order to establish a more detailed picture of what Englishness is all about, 
the interviewees have been asked to explain how the English differ from the 
Scots and the Welsh. It was found that the majority of the interviewees did 
not recognise any major differences. 
I don't think they are different. Again, it is a different cultural background, the 
Scottish have a long history as the English have obviously in the past. And the Welsh 
are probably more English than the Scottish are. " 
Well, I don't think there is a big difference. Probably one, we are not so nationalistic. 
I think the Welsh are more, and the Scots, tend to be more nationalistic. They are 
proud to be Scottish. The English are probably much more lower key about it. If you 
take the English, and the Scottish, and the Welsh you get an enormous mix, you get a 
lot of Welsh living in England and a lot of Scotsmen living in England more than the 
other way round. So you don't think of a Scotsman being any different and there is 
normally a sense of humour, they are a bit jokey about sport and their national teams, 
but I think normally they all get on very wel1130 
I think a lot of people like the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish, with regard to the 
English, they've a bit of a chip on their shoulders if I'm quite honest. You just have to 
watch international football or rugby and they raise their game just because they play 
against England. By us it is a bit different because when we play Wales or Scotland, it 
doesn't really matter. We get more up-set playing Geordies, rather than... . We can 
understand that some of them get up-set because let's say a hundred years ago we've 
conquered them and now control them, their Parliament, their government from London, 
so I suppose there is some historical ... 
devolution 
... that's why. 
"' 
I don't think so, we don't drink as much as the Scottish. I would think we are all alike. 
It's a different religion, they tend to separate people but on the whole we are alike. 12 
However, there were also interviewees who thought differently. 
Nevertheless, they primarily stated the difference but could not explain 
what the actual difference is. The only additional English traits that could be 
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filtered from these interviews were: a different way of life, English arrogance 
and superiority. 
A tricky question. I think the English are ... the 
English see themselves as different, 
almost as different form the Scots and the Welsh as we do from the French or Germans 
even though we speak the same language, which is quite a continuity. And a lot of 
English people can claim Scottish, Welsh, Irish decent. I think English people see 
themselves as different to Welsh or Scottish people but it is a difficult question. It is 
difficult to define a cultural identity for the English. Within the section of society I 
grew up in, was born into, they are very ... they tend to 
be very arrogant, very class 
possessed'33 
We are superior. Lawfully we are all one nation, we are all individuals but we like to 
think that we are all one nation. Yes, there is a unity at this stage, but as you know we 
are currently debating about devolution. The Scottish and the Welsh are debating 
devolution. We've got Northern Ireland, which is a bit of a problem also, but in the 
main we are all the same. There are some peculiar laws with these which is different 
to our legal system and our bill system'3' 
The Scottish people, I think are very nationalistic and proud of being Scottish and 
Welsh, especially in view of the English. If they compare themselves they are always 
very derogatory about the English. Whenever I've been to Scotland it seems a lot more 
laid back but that's because I've always been in the country. I don't know it just seems to 
be a totally different way of life. ' 
To check whether the general perception of a lack of difference between the 
Scots and the English was consistent, it was asked whether the interviewees 
feel that there is a unity among British society. In the light of Labour's 
promise to consider Scottish and Welsh demand for devolution. 
Yes, I think so, on the whole. Based on a number of things. Unitedly the majority of 
the people stand together. I always find that people stick together during big 
tragedies, they all unite together. "' 
I do think there is a unity among British society, but I think that probably ... 
I 
wouldn't know why. Yes, I think there's a unity but people see themselves as British 
but there's also a very significant move towards ... the 
Scottish now have their own 
nation effectively, and I'm sure that the Welsh will soon. I think it won't be long until 
Britain becomes a federal state rather than a single political unit. Because I think. the 
Scottish see themselves as different form the English and so do the Welsh. The 
Northern Irish I think cling to England or to Britain simply as a way to get away from 
the Southern Irish. 137 
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I don't, I mean I know I'm British but I don't feel any sense of pride towards it or any 
kind of affinity for it. But I can see, just read the publications of the Sun, that there is 
definitely a British unity among certain sections of the population. But there is a lot, I 
think, ... a fringe kind of areas where people don't 
feel it, where they don't affiliate to 
it. The kind of nationalistic jingoistic bollocks that goes on there doesn't apply 
anymore to the majority of the population, at least not to my circle of friends. If you 
take Diana's funeral, that tells it all, enormous nationalism"' 
Not really. Well, no, it depends if you ask people whether ... you can tell whether 
they say I'm English or whether they say I'm British. You see, I would say I was 
English because ... I don't know. I know nice Scotsmen, I know nice Welshmen, 
I know 
nice Irishmen, I have got nothing against them... you know just because they are Welsh 
or Scots. I've got no affinity for their country because it's not my country. ... I would say I 
was English more than I was British. "' 
Well, I think really we are united but there is obviously a percentage who like to back 
things which you get in any society but I think when the chips are down then we a 11 
pull together. Whether in the future all the different groups will do that, I don't 
know. In fact devolution could spoil everything., ' 
The majority of all interviewees were in favour of devolution and some 
would even accept Scottish independence. 
I think they should. As long as they all agree, we just don't want the same problem as in 
Northern Ireland-"' 
I think they should have some independence. I mean they already have a different 
education system and a slightly different legal system. And I can understand their 
feeling that they want more control over what they are doing "" 
2.7.1. The Monarchy 
It was a surprise that only a few interviewees have immediately mentioned 
the monarchy or the Royal Family (despite Diana's recent death) as an aspect 
of English identity. Nevertheless, once the topic was brought up responses 
did become emotional from time to time. 
I think other countries are jealous of our monarchy. " 
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It is what we base our freedom on, because at the end of the day, although she would 
never agree, she could over rule the Parliament. The powers are there but it wouldn't be 
used. She is also, how would you say, a great tourist attraction. The monarchy will 
change and that is basically because of the problems we've had with Diana and the 
change is for the better. Whether the monarchy will continue in the future years no one 
knows. '" 
That is loads of crap, but good for tourism, that's about it. It's a bit antiquated. " 
We got to have it, I mean they can fiddle with it a bit and adjust it if they want to, but 
I think, again it is a part of our system and our governmental system. It has evolved 
over a long period and I think it works. I think they could fine-tune it perhaps if they 
want to be proper. "" 
I personally think they should get rid of it, I think it's outdated, it shouldn't be here"' 
A complete waste of time and money frankly, that is all that needs to be said. OK, let 
her keep her palace if you reckon that she is like heritage, but heritage isn't heritage 
unless people get to see it. There is no point of having heritage if it only belongs to one 
person, then it is their house. "" 
I'm a big fan of the monarchy. It is something, which sets us apart from other countries, 
really. It is brilliant. She has done an awful lot of good work, especially the queen. 
1'm a big fan of the queen, I just wish her children were a bit more.... I just hope that the 
next generation William and Harry turn out to be ... a bit more spine. 
"" 
Monarchy, it is very expensive and I object to a lot of the money that the sort of minor 
Royal get. I can see that we probably benefit tourist-wise from having a clean 
Buckingham Palace, but I think there are a lot of hangers-on, who do very well out of 
the monarchy without actually putting any effort in. I would restrict it to a very few at 
the top and every body else would have to pay their way. 150 
2.7.2. The House of Lords 
Also rarely Parliament was mentioned. As the new Labour government has 
proposed the reformation of the House of Lords it was of interest how the 
English respond to this intention. The majority of the interviewees 
supported reforms but emphasised that a second chamber must be 
maintained. Only a few were content with the House of Lords the way is 
presently organised. 
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Personally I'm all for it (the monarchy). I think it is a good idea. I believe in the 
monarchy and I believe in the House of Lords, which is possibly a more important 
point. Because the House of Lords is ... partly 
because I get to sit in it one day, if I'm 
lucky and they don't abolish it, and personally I want my 30 Pounds a day to sit in there 
and do nothing. Secondly because it is a very good idea to have a legislative..., it's the 
highest law court in the country, and it also legislates, and it is a very good idea to 
have a legislative body which is not bound to answer to a electorate. You can't accuse 
the Law Lords to, or the Lords in general of trying to pander to public opinion by 
amending or rejecting a law. I do believe in the veto. The Commons have veto over the 
Lords and can push the bill through if necessary. I believe in that but I do think it's a 
good idea not to go for the American system, where every Senator in the States is 
covertly looking towards his next election and covertly worrying about whether his 
action concerning a certain law or bill will affect his chances of re-election. I mean it 
has enormous disadvantages in the respect that the Lords are entrenched, ... are a group 
of people entrenched in privilege and money. Not so much as they were, but certainly 
still and will cling to some ideas that people consider to be out-dated and out-moded, 
but I think that that also in some respect is a good thing because the Commons is drawn 
predominantly from population centres which means cities. Fair enough, there are 
members for the counties as well, ... the Lords are almost entirely drawn from country 
seats. The fact that the Lords are drawn from the country and the Commons from the 
Towns is to a certain extent a good idea's' 
Why change it when it isn't broke. I think that the British parliamentary system has 
worked quite well for a lot of years. Everyone needs an older House to quieten down the 
younger House to make them think again. I don't think that necessarily it has to be 
elective. I mean, if it is as it is, senior churchmen ... 
it should be a mix, it should be part 
heredity, part life peer, part... .I mean 
I don't think it does any harm. I don't feel 
strongly that we should change it. You get senior judges ... when they 
have completed 
their careers, they end up, lets say many of them, in the House of Lords and it is exactly 
what we want, we want them to temper the younger House. That is what it is for, to 
make them think twice sometimes. "' 
The idea that people who just happened to have been born into a certain family can 
make decisions, which affect everybody isn't representative the way it should be. I 
think there should be a second house so that there is some check on ... particularly 
if 
you get a situation like we've got at the moment with a large Labour Party with a large 
majority, so that they can't do what ever they want to. But I think there should be ... 
I 
don't know, I have never really thought about how it should be organised. There 
should be a way of making them all representative and not just by right of birth's3 
Hereditary peers shouldn't exist, life peers isn't such a bad idea but they should be 
voted for. '-' 
They are just realising that they are coming into the twentieth century. 'ss 
I'm not a 100% happy about the great, great, great, great, great grand son bloke who 
basically bought his title having a say in how the country is run. OK, may be life 
peers, well people who have been knighted in their life and just for their life time sure 
they might have some say but equally Elton John who has just been made a peer, why 
should I value his opinion on legislation. So it is probably nice to have a House of Lords 
but I'm not a 100% sure I want it to do the job it's doing. " 
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It seems silly because the whole point of the Parliament, they are elected to run the 
country so I don't see why you have to have a second chamber checking on them. They 
should get it right the first time. These people are in there and aren't really 
accountable to anybody. " 
2.7.3. Beneath the Threshold of Consciousness 
Generally speaking the responses demonstrated that English national 
identity is not salient, which confirms Crick's observation. However, this 
does not imply that it does not exist. On the contrary it has only evolved in 
a different form. As a matter of fact English identity emerges in disguise as a 
strong British identity. - Britain seems to be perceived as 'Great England' 
because of the awareness that Scotland is 'ruled' from, and that British 
politics are determined in, Westminster. The majority of the interviewees 
found it difficult to describe Englishness and there was commonly an 
interchange between the terms English and British. 
Among the older generations a sense of superiority was either expressed 
blatantly, or in a more subliminal way. This was less obvious when the 
interviewees spoke about England, but it became most apparent when issues 
such as minority integration and the Salman Rushdie affair were raised. 
Particularly in response to the Salman Rushdie affair interviewees 
remembered that it was freedom of speech and the freedom society provides 
for the individual which they are proud of. 
Basically living in England and being English is about having freedom of expression, to 
be yourself. I love living in England, I travelled and lived in many countries but I like 
living here. I would not want to live anywhere else. ... We don't want to be taken over by anybody ..., but it's freedom of expression. In other countries you're so restricted that 
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it makes you private, you know, .. you're pushed into a hole and I don't agree with that, 
I'm terribly English in that way. '`8 
A central component of English identity seems to be 'the way of life' as such. 
This entails freedoms and social rituals, as well as the way the political 
system is organised. That monarchy and Parliament were not mentioned as 
frequently as expected, has much to do with the fact that it is taken for 
granted. As soon as these issues were raised it became apparent that there is 
a strong desire to maintain these traditional institutions, possibly modified 
and adapted to a twentieth century society. 
The English way of life was also central to the younger generations. Among 
these interviewees, pubs, beer, as well as fish and chips were the first 
components of English lifestyle that were raised. This is very much a 
reflection of their preoccupation, but not so much of their national identity. 
Youth tends to learn from mistakes, rather than self-analysis. Therefore it is 
rare that individuals (in their twenties) have thought about national or 
cultural identity unless they grew up in social or political tension which has 
forced such an awareness upon them. 
It was found that many students, who had more contact with members of a 
minority or foreign students, felt a sense of shame or guilt with regard to the 
impact of Britain's imperial past. Among those who did not reveal an 
insight into to the consequences of colonisation (which were the majority) a 
sense of pride and superiority became evident. 
Fish and chips, lager and getting drunk, pubs, history, people being scared of the 
English. Patriotism ... I suppose it's because we are, like, an island, sort of separate 
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from the rest of Europe ... we are definitely superior. We've 
invented football, we have 
better beer than the rest of the world, ... democracy, .. we are 
the birth place of 
democracy. We are still quite individual, we've got our own lives, our own 
personalities. It's a different sense of humour to everybody else. ... We are a very 
musical kind of nation, like, British music tends to sort of dominates the rest of the 
Western world19° 
To be proud of one's nation is one way to raises one's self-worth because one 
is a part of that nation. It does not make a difference whether one's nation 
dominates the world on the grounds of politics, football or music. Instead it 
is far more important to be a part of something grander, which is also 
recognised by others as such. Especially adolescents and young adults like to 
feel embedded in a strong nation particularly as long as acknowledgement 
through personal achievements has not yet substituted acknowledgement 
on the grounds of descent and family. 
Among the -English aristocracy a strong - class-consciousness has not been 
eroded. No evidence was found which could support the 'decline of class' 
thesis or help identify 'post-industrial' and 'post-capitalist' features in British 
class structure. Britain is still largely a class-divided society, as also recent 
research by Marshall et al. revealed. 16o 
It was observed however, that English identity is primarily equated with 
mentality, way of life and government. This entails English humour, an air 
of self-containment frequently referred to as 'stiff upper lip', as well as 
freedom of speech and the safe-guarded freedom of the individual that are 
based on democracy and the way the government is organised. A strong 
sense of tradition prevailed among the interviewees, although quite a few 
could not immediately associate any particular objects of identification with 
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it. At the core of all the identifications named above is the subliminally 
awareness of 'being' an island. Britain is an island that has dominated the 
world and despite its size, has maintained its powerful position in 
international politics. This awareness nurtures pride and a sense of 
superiority, frequently expressed in terms of British identity that 
nevertheless has been shaped by the predominance of English government. 
English nationalism may have been suppressed to safeguard the union of 
the United Kingdom, but beneath the threshold of consciousness. 
2.8. How Strong is Scottish National Identity? 
Many English interviewees pointed to the fact that the Scots and Welsh are 
more nationalistic than the English. On the grounds of the political trend 
towards devolution it can be assumed that a Scottish national identity is 
more salient than perhaps the English. Therefore it was of interest to 
rationalise what Scottish identity is based on and whether different 
generations define Scottishness from different perspectives. 
Are there any distinct Scottish values? No, not anymore. You know, they have all been 
eroded. Which values have been eroded? The Protestant work morality. In the South 
of Europe it is all more andiamo, but in the North we work harder. The Scots used to be 
very hard working, got up at four, work, work, work, for little pay. But now that is a 11 
over. Now it is like anywhere else. We used to have a lot of famous inventors. A lot 
has been invented by Scots, but that's all over too. We don't even have a good 
engineering department at Glasgow University. But we do have good doctors, health 
and so, yes. Is there anything cultural which distinguishes the Scots from the rest of 
British? No, not when they are here, but when they go to Canada or America, then 
they pull out their bag-pipes and kilts and drink their whisky. And then they start 
crying when they hear their bag-pipes. Then they remember the history, you know, 
when the Scots got slaughtered, slaughtered by the English. Yea, the Scots had a hard 
time. But the Scots here don't care about all that. You don't see anybody wearing a kilt 
here. 
Where do you live? With a friend. Is she Scottish? No, she is ... ... 
don't say English! 
(He spat at the seat next to him) No, French. Ah, vive la France! I know, ha. 61 
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Pride in national achievements was only expressed once (with regard to 
inventions). Otherwise an air of melancholy accompanied the interviews as 
the Scots thought and spoke about their nation. During all interviews the 
historic plight of the Scots was brought up at some point or another. 
Particularly the older generation, even when they claimed not to care for 'all 
that', as the taxi-driver quoted above, became resentful towards the English. 
With regard to associations, descriptions of Scottish mentality immediately 
followed the obvious: the kilt. 
We've got our heritage, we're more laid back, we're more passionate, we've got our 
passion. We're wearing a kilt and are no Anglo-Saxons. We are very generous, we are 
more welcome to strangers like yourself, we are more like the Irish, being Celts as we 
say. I think that's what makes us different. We're all open to people coming up, other 
races. 162 
The Scots define themselves primarily in demarcation to the English and 
via their resentments against English domination. 
Very much like the Irish, of subservient background. We used to be the underdogs, I 
suppose, in Britain. So we'll fight, the same as the Irish. The English have been like, 
their Empire and all this rubbish. " 
A strong sense of distinction was also observed among those interviewees 
who were in their early thirties. Yet these responses were not as aggressive. 
What has been emphasised was the difference in mentality, particularly on 
friendliness. 
Apart from just the language itself, what about tartan as a national dress. The politics 
is different in Scotland too. It's all about left wing political values. ... We like to 
socialise more than others I think, particularly in the pub we like a drink. ... There is a 
very marked distinction between Scots and English, no question. We've got our own 
culture, it's a different culture. I don't know how to explain that. We've got our own 
sense of humour which is quite different to the English sense of humour, Scottish 
characters, particularly in the cities, you know, which you would probably not find 
anywhere else. The people particularly in Glasgow and in some of the big cities tend to 
be very friendly. If you were to ask somebody where or how to get from one place to 
256 
another, they'll walk with you for half a mile to show you how to get there rather 
than to try to explain it. '" 
To quite a few respondents it was of importance how others think of 
Scotland and the Scots. Many answers revealed a subliminally inferiority 
complex which automatically coerced the interviewees to take a defensive 
stance. The desire to be acknowledged and accepted as well as the need for 
self-respect becomes most obvious in some of the answers. 
I was watching a television program and they were saying that Glasgow is seen now as 
one of the most fashionable cities in the world. And people are seen to have their own 
character, their own fashion, their own style, and it is becoming a very trendy thing 
now as well, it's not just ... It is one of the first times that Scotland is feeling sort of a 
superiority thing. I do really think that when you go abroad and you say that you are 
Scottish, you get quite a good reception. 'Oh, you're Scottish, -brilliant', rather 
thaij 
when you say your English they say 'ah, all right another tourist''65 
To be perceived as backward and not being treated as equals seems to be a 
salient issue for quite a few Scots. 
When Scotland and England came together with the Union in 1707, most people 
thought that, you know, that was a really bad thing but actual fact, as far as the 
Scottish economy was concerned, it was the best thing that happened in Scotland. It 
opened up huge areas to Scotland. But, you know that aspect has been lost and when 
people start to think about how well they might do and soon they are going to do better 
with their own parliament. But well, that is not necessarily the case. ... 
It is part of 
the United Kingdom but it's different. People think of themselves as being Scottish as 
opposed to being British. That's because we are being suppressed and people think that 
they are being dominated. If you interview people down south, I mean a lot of people 
down south they don't actually see Scotland as being a place they would necessarily 
want to come to. Most of them, you know, have this idea that we are running around 
with wooden clubs in our hand, we don't have TV or central heating, that we're really 
roughing it. It's just ... they've actually established Glasgow as being a kind of trendy 
cultural place now. " 
The religious difference between the Scots and the English was not top of 
the agenda. Only a few interviewees referred to it. 
Religion is different in Scotland as well, ... in England the Church of England has got Bishops and so on, they've got a hierarchy, in Scotland there is more equality. 167 
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How deeply rooted resentments against the English really are, became 
apparent as the interviewees were questioned about ethnic minorities in 
Scotland. An overwhelming majority not only passively accepted the 
situation but also welcomed the idea of a multicultural society in Scotland. 
The general trend was that ethnic minorities from abroad were more 
welcome than the English. 
There is an irony, just because of the history of Scotland and England and the pitch 
battles and everything that went on before, people you know, from further afield 
almost going to be accepted quicker than an English person. I mean it has been in the 
news just recently that someone was beaten to death in Edinburgh, that was an English 
person... Just because of this Scottish-English thing. Maybe that's an exaggeration if 
you're an-Indian, you came, you'd be-accepted fully, but there's no question that Scots 
have always had this thing about the English, they are always suspicious of them. 
You've only got to be at a Scotland-England football match to appreciate how intense 
that feeling is, it really is 1" 
The Scottish experience of marginalisation seems to have an impact on the 
way attitude is shaped and foreigners are viewed. 
That's good. We are from a different culture, we are the Celts, our families go back to 
when Ireland has split, the potato famine, a lot of immigrants came from Ireland and 
that's where we're from, our background. The Catholic community in Scotland has been 
looked down on for years and years and years, so it's better when it's more multi `9 
Among the younger generation none of the interviewees seemed to have 
any aggressions against the English as such, but the issues such as history, 
political neglect and lack of respect was also brought up by the majority of 
these respondents. 
They are more aware of their history and where they come from. Yea, because Scotland 
is a smaller country ... but it has more of an identity than the English do. The 
Scottish 
accent, that is what Scottishness means to me 170 
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I think Scotland itself has a much better sense of community and a much friendlier 
atmosphere. I think people know more about their neighbours"' 
It's because Scotland is so much smaller but yet we still compete on the same scale. Like 
at sports, in events for the start, I mean how much respect does Scotland get, especially 
for their rugby teams and football teams so we just shout that little bit louder to try and 
get more recognised. 172 
I think as well that Scotland hasn't any political representation in Britain, its only got 
the London government. And I think that's why a lot of people resent... . 
I do feel that we are shoved into the background. The government focuses on England 
much more than it focuses of Scotland. We don't have control over what we want. 
Which is why people stand up for Scotland more than they stand up for England, 
because there is more to stand up for. "` 
2.8.1. A Parliament as an Identity Anchor 
It was surprising to hear that although the majority of the interviewees 
wanted a Scottish parliament they were not sure what advantages it would 
actually bring. The interviewees gave the impression that a Scottish 
parliament represented national self-respect rather than an institution that 
will bring self-determination. It seems that the Scottish parliament 
symbolises the end of English 'imperialism', no matter whether things will 
come to the better or worse. 
I mean, I think the Scots love to be able to blame everything on the English and once we 
get a parliament, if things ... we can't blame anybody anymore. I mean Scotland does have security by being part of Britain but maybe the parliament will work for 
Scotland's people, maybe Scotland will be better off, but I don't really know until we 
get going. " 
I think it's good because we've been wanting it for so long. I don't know how it is going to' 
be in reality, but it is an improvement. 1' 
It has been inevitable for quite some time, but not necessarily for reasons of national 
sentiment. It's simply in response to practical needs because the Scottish office, just one 
of the London Ministries, administered all the money spent in Scotland and it was 
unaccountable to the popular sentiment in Scotland because there is no legislative body 
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to scrutinise this kind of thing. And there is certainly not enough time for it to be 
scrutinised effectively in the Westminster Parliament. And so it was simply a 
recognition of the need to have something which was necessary, which we didn't have 
before. " 
2.8.2. No Monarchy for Scotland 
The interviewees made it rather obvious that the monarchy does not enjoy 
a lot of support in Scotland. The circumstance that Scotland does not 
directly profit from the monarchy may contribute to its general rejection. 
That Scotland supplied King James VI of Scotland (James I) and that the 
House of Stuart ruled Britain for more than a hundred years was only 
mentioned by a historian. 
We're anti monarchy, anti monarchy, it's a waste of money. "' 
They have no biding in my life whatsoever. 1' 
I'm not really bothered about it. People will argue that it is bringing a lot of money into 
the country and that they are doing a lot of good but, you know, to Scotland I'm not 
sure180 
I don't think they do a lot for their country, the government runs the country. I don't see 
the point18' 
I mean I don't give a shit about the 182 
2.8.3. History can Hurt 
It was observed that Scottish national identity is primarily based on the 
memory of historic humiliation and the rejection of English domination. 
For the majority Scottish participation in Empire building was of no 
significance. Only three interviewees referred to the Act of Union and the 
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subsequent economic advantages and therefore only spoke of the Empire 
indirectly. One Scotsman associated it directly with the English and thus 
devalued. it immediately. From this it can be concluded that Empire could 
only temporarily weaken but not obliterate Scottish nationalism. The 
majority of the interviewees would primarily refer to themselves as Scottish 
rather than as British and not a single one of them ever confused 
Scottishness with Britishness. 
The Scots still perceive themselves as Celts as opposed to Anglo-Saxons and 
value their friendly and helpful mentality. Although the Scots insist on a 
stronger national identity they are aware of the regional differences within 
Scotland; it was frequently mentioned that the Scots in Edinburgh are more 
anglicised than they are in Glasgow. The Scottish accent and dialect is of 
particular significance. It marks identity and signifies distinctiveness 
although the Scots and English speak the same language. 
The desire for self-respect and acknowledgement has manifested itself in the 
demand for a Parliament and some self-determination. However, complete 
national independence was not an appealing perspective for the majority. 
The Scots are aware that English and Scottish society has grown together to a 
certain extent. 
I mean there are so many English in Scotland and so many Scots in England and same in 
Wales, that I think there is some kind of unity. ' 
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External threat definitely seems to be a binding element. A sense of 
solidarity in the case of external threat has not been eroded by the aspiration 
of devolution. 
If there was a war, if Scotland, England, and Wales, if they all had separate 
parliaments, they would come to some agreement to come together. ... I would 
definitely 
say I was Scottish before I would say I was British'' 
When identity is bruised by humiliation it seeks healing. Everyone wants 
to feel proud of who or what s/he is. Therefore pride (not arrogance) and 
identity are intertwined. If a nation is dominated in such a way that it loses 
self-respect, aggression and conflict becomes inevitable. Past national 
humiliations are deeply ingrained in Scottish minds. The establishment . of 
a Scottish parliament and more self-determination would finally allow the 
Scots to identify less with the past and to build their identity on their own 
achievements. 
2.9. Welsh Identity 
Welsh identity is frequently described as primarily cultural compared to 
Scottish national identity. 
Leeks and dragons, rugby and the countryside, that's it. The Welsh culture, the 
language, our literature's 
Among the Welsh interviewees national pride was more frequently 
referred to as an aspect of national identity than by the Scots. 
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Heritage, history, national pride. I think because it's such a small country ... insular is 
the wrong word, but.... " 
Those interviewees who, from a political perspective, looked beyond Welsh 
and even British borders found it more difficult to describe Welsh identity. 
They rather referred to what 'home' means to them. 
Language, 
... that's a 
difficult one, countryside, the coast-line, the culture basically I 
think, music, sport, it's industrial past, that's about it. I think it attempts to have a 
national identity, I don't know whether it actually succeeds in having a national 
identity though. There is a big divide between south and north Wales, there tends to 
be a big divide between north and south Wales. I don't think, to be honest, I don't think 
its actually got an identity which is different or as much as say Scotland has or Ireland 
has, although it sort of attempts to regain one with the national assembly here. 
Nationally we are not that different although we like to think that we are different. 
We're "not that different. " 
Others associated community values such as friendship and loyalty with 
Welsh identity. A strong solidarity with the Scots and Irish particularly in 
disassociation from the English was also observed. 
Rugby, singing and sheep. Loyalty, honesty and friendship. The rest of Britain hates 
the English. We are very friendly people, accommodating people. ... We're not 
Welsh 
nationalists' 
Quite a few Welsh have associated Welshness with working class, industry 
or coal-mining and some of them declared the English responsible for 
closing the mines. Historic injustice and economic 'discrimination' seem to 
be the most important issues for those interviewees who claim to be 
nationalists. 
Leeks and daffodils, rugby, and working class, nice people. Not the usual stuff, aI1 
coal-miners singing everywhere ... they are 
friendly people, down to earth. 
... 
Nationalistic very, based on heritage. Proud of what we are and who we are, we are 
proud of our rugby team although they are not very good at the moment. We are also 
anti-English. ... 
No disrespect, but the Welsh will always be the Welsh and there will 
be nothing that will ever change it because of the fact that we are proud of who we are 
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and where we come from.... There is a divide because of a language difference. 
People 
who are Welsh speaking, don't think of people who are English speaking, who can't 
speak Welsh, who are Welsh, I don't know if they think of us as less Welsh ... or 
English. 
... Another analogy, it was an 
Englishman who killed our last dragon. It is an 
analogy, but if you think about it, it's pretty true to what happened. It was an 
Englishman who's killed our last dragon, St. George, he's the patron saint of England189 
I've learnt history and I know how the English shit on us basically, in years gone by. 
1536, I know that stuff. A lot of Welsh think that they are looked down upon. I mean a 
lot of Welsh people think that the English look down on us. They do. We're ruled by 
outsiders, we're left out. For the time being. Independence? Totally. ... (In America half 
of the people who signed the Treaty of Independence were Welsh or of Welsh ancestry. 
Abraham Lincoln his parents were Welsh, Hillary Clinton's grandfather is Welsh, 
Elvis' grandfather, Welsh. ... So they migrated 
because the pbs were taken away, 
there was nothing here, so they migrated to America. )"' 
The Scots are very much the same. The Scots and the Welsh people get on very well. 
They all hate the English. You will never see a Welsh person carrying the Union Jack. 
At a football match, Welsh people carry the Welsh flag, the English take the Union 
Jack never the English flag with the plane white and the red cross, the English always 
take the Union Jack, they see that as English. We don't, we take the Welsh flag19' 
The majority of the interviewees however, indicated at one point or 
another that they were not nationalists. Mostly women but also men 
related Welshness with communal feelings and the country as well as the 
countryside. 
Family atmosphere, friendliness between people in villages, especially in villages. 
Family and friends will look after you, no matter what goes wrong. Welsh people have 
a communal feeling, if something goes wrong then they all come running. It's called 
hewrieth, you can't explain it in English, it's a Welsh word. It's the same feeling for 
what I feel for my nationality. It means longing, but it's more like belonging, you can't 
translate it into English. You know where you belong, language, ways of dealing with 
people, spirit" 
As the interviewees were asked whether they think that there is unity 
among British society, the Welsh came up with the most 'categorical no' 
replies. None of the Scottish interviewees responded to this question with 
such determination as some of the Welsh have. 
No, no chance, not at all193 
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No, well as a whole country? No. Well, the Celts yes, Wales, Scotland, Ireland. The 
Celts have a lot of history and we've always been oppressed by the English. But we're 
better than them, so it doesn't matter' 
There is definitely a divide between the English and the rest. "' 
The Celts there is a unity there. I mean the English look at it: we don't care about the 
Welsh we don't care about the Scots. But we care, we care for us, we are treated 
differently. It makes a difference to us. There is a massive unity there. The largest 
part is England, that's why we have a problem, that's where the problem is'% 
Those interviewees who were generally satisfied with the political situation 
believe in the silent majority who feel that there is also a social unity with 
England. 
Oh yea, I think so, generally. There is a silent majority. And there is a loud minority, 
all stirred up this sort of nationalism sometimes. But there is still this feeling of pride 
in the Welsh, in being Welsh. ' 
Personally -1 would look to the region, basically becäüse I think our future is within 
Europe. Things are basically down to the fact that we'd like to see ourselves as like: 
the Scottish are different, the Welsh are different, the Irish are different, the English 
are different. You know, because when I go abroad, if somebody says: oh you are from 
England. You say: no from Wales. I probably think of myself as Welsh first, British, 
then European. But if somebody accuses me of being English it's like: Aaaar. 198 
2.9.1. The Monarchy 
Generally speaking the Welsh thought about the monarchy in a similar way 
as the English did. The interviewees supported the idea of maintaining the 
monarchy but thought that some reform is necessary. 
Too many hangers-on. As long as they pay their way, I'm happy with it. I'm not an 
anti-monarchist and I'm not particularly pro. 199 
Yea, okay, I'm quite fine quite happy with that. They're good for the economy of the 
country. 20° 
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I'm pro monarchy. It makes us very different from the rest of Europe. I think they 
contribute a awful lot towards the UK, in a lot of ways 201 
However, those who think in more nationalistic terms were rather aroused 
by the memory of how the crown prince received the title 'Prince of Wales'. 
Waste of time, we've got a Prince of Wales who is not Welsh, who's got nothing to do 
with Wales. The whole thing came about by taking our real Prince of Wales and 
making the Queen's son Prince of Wales. It doesn't relate to us at all. There should be a 
head of state but not the Royal Family. There should be a President not a monarchy. ' 
2.9.2. The Non-Assimilative Welsh 
. To claim that 
Welsh identity was primarily based on culture would distort 
the picture. Certainly the demand for independence is not as loud among 
the Welsh as compared with the Scots. The majority of the interviewees did 
not support Welsh independence, but at the same time they based their 
stance on the argument that it was economically not feasible. However, this 
does not mean that the Welsh are less nationalistic than the Scots. The 
Welsh emphasise cultural differences and support the re-introduction of the 
Welsh language because it is the only way to maintain Welsh identity. 
National independence is impossible because of economic dependency. 
Compared to the Scots, the Welsh were more aware of their cultural 
heritage and compared to the English they never exchanged Britishness 
with Welshness, without making a clear distinction between the two. 
British values are classified from outside as English values. British values are 
decided by the English. If you went to London, they would say the Union Jack, the 
flag 203 
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Although the Welsh still seem to reject cultural and national incorporation 
by the English, their historic destiny did not erode their national self- 
confidence in the same way as that of the Scots. Possibly, this can be related 
to the fact that the Welsh were conquered nearly two hundred years before 
the Scots entered the Union and have therefore experienced less military 
friction during that period. 
Welsh identity seems to be country-bound and is strongly influenced by 
community feelings, in the sense that the interviewees expressed their 
attachment to the area of Wales where they grew up. The Welsh language 
has both a cohesive, as well as divisive impact on the Welsh population. It 
provides identity and a sense of unity particularly among those who speak 
it. However, a few interviewees mentioned that Welsh speakers consider 
Welsh non-Welsh speakers as anglicised. These interviewees gave the 
impression that they felt hurt by this categorisation. 
The Welsh, like the Scots were very aware of their Celtic heritage and 
shared the sense of unity with the Scots and Irish. They also referred to 
friendliness and community oriented helpfulness as an important Welsh 
trait. An awareness of the industrial past and references to Wales as a poor 
area were unique among the Welsh. The former Empire was no topic at all. 
It was observed that those interviewees who have established themselves 
on an economic level are less nationalistic. However, all interviewees 
expressed pride in being Welsh; pride in who they are, what they are and 
where they come from. 
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2.10. British Identity 
British identity was constructed, as Colley suggested with the Act of Union 
(1707), as an 'umbrella identity' which was intended to unify the kingdom. 
It was never designed to replace regional or national identities, but to serve 
as a unifying factor between the English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish. Now, 
nearly three hundred years after the Act of Union, devolution is loosening 
the legal ties between the contractors. Empire, Protestantism and the 
Catholic threat have been forgotten. What remained are a political and 
economic dissatisfaction among the Celts and an internalised British 
identity among the English. it has become clear that neither the Scots, nor 
the Welsh, have absorbed the idea of a British identity in the same way as 
the English have done. Nevertheless both Scots and Welsh do not seem to 
support total national independence. There is a strong indication that once 
the Scots and Welsh have more say in their own affairs a British identity 
will become more appealing as it is no longer equated with English 
'suppression', but with partnership. 
Contrary to Scottish expectations the majority of the English interviewees 
thought of the Scottish as equals and were very much in favour of 
devolution. The English were not completely oblivious to Scottish 
resentments and did indicate an understanding for the disadvantaged Scots. 
A few thought that in future Britain will be transformed into a federation. 
The awareness of inhabiting an island and to provide mutual support 
during times of hardship signifies the core of British identity. Although 
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Scottish and Welsh nationalists may demand more acknowledgements 
for 
who they are, this psychological bond cannot be broken. 
From a historic perspective British identity was determined by English 
values as well as governmental and administrative structures. Patriotism, 
loyalty and law and order were based on the Crown and Empire (both 
originally English). Britain and its Empire were governed from London, 
which had turned into the centre of all political attention. Thus the 
observation made by one Welsh interviewee, who rejected British values as 
English ones, was correct. Collective identity is based on a selective process, 
on the choice, interpretation and advocacy of historical material. The 
question of ethnic and national identity has become especially important 
with the creation of nation states. Generally, no nation state is ethnically 
and culturally homogeneous. The national identity that was created 
together with the nation state is dominated by the cultural identity of the 
dominant ethnic group at the time of its creation204. Accordingly, historic 
events will be emphasised which reflect the victory and success of this 
particular ethnic group, in the case of Britain, that of the English. 
Since the 1950's Britain developed into a multicultural society. Immigration 
from the Commonwealth introduced Afro-Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis, 
Bangladeshis and Chinese to British society. In this context British identity 
is bound to change its meaning to a restructured society. Tony Benn MP 
believes that British national identity is based on ethnic and cultural 
diversity: 
269 
Britain is already a melting pot of Celts, Romans, French, Saxon, Danish + Irish. 05 
The future development of British identity has to be based on 
Diversity + self-confidence + pride in tradition .. 
2 06 
... which are important to us all. Among the British population the idea of a 
multicultural society is already widely accepted. The majority of 
interviewees ascertained that British society is multicultural and always 
was. It is seen as a continuation of a social development just in a different 
form. Lord Tebbit CH stated that justice is the most important British value 
on the grounds of which a coherent society can flourish. 
Above all, they have to be shared values by everybody within this society. So you can 
have a decent and coherent society in any part of the world, with almost any set of 
values, Hindu, Christian, Muslim, whatever you like, as long as they are shared by 
everybody. In our particular case I think those values have to be based on Judaic- 
Christian ethics. Because all the assumptions of law, family, are on that basis, and it 
seems to have worked pretty well. Then if you add to that the concept of justice, I think 
you have most of what is necessary for a society to function. ... A specific British value? 
Well, I think certainly that of justice. 207 
Although Tony Benn MP and Lord Tebbit represent completely different 
political perspectives, both have indirectly touched the most phenomenal 
aspect of British identity: the (perceived) continuity of British history. 
Whilst Tony Benn MP referred to the continuity of multiculturalism 
throughout British history, Lord Tebbit emphasised the continuity of the 
Judaic-Christian ethics and justice. 
To what degree there was or was not continuity in British history is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, it can be argued that history and political 
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actions have always been presented in the framework of political tradition. 
Therefore it depends on which historic period is highlighted to create a 
sense of continuity. For example, the majority of British interviewees were 
aware of both multiculturalism and justice (particularly with regard to the 
protection of individual freedom) as British features. Based on their 
political predominance, the English were prepared to provide more political 
and legal justice for the Scots and Welsh, the latter were more focused on 
receiving it. 
Natural geographical borders determine British identity. It is based on 
'being an island'. The English are more attached to this 'umbrella identity' 
than the Welsh and the Scots. The former, equate their political institutions 
and expansion with it, whilst for the Celts it represents a geographical and 
political definition, yet all of them are aware of the multicultural nature of 
British society. Although devolution is on the political agenda, a 
subliminally sense of unity based on geographic constraints does exist 
nevertheless. The Empire may no longer be a salient factor for political 
cohesion and national pride, nevertheless it still shapes British identity in a 
subliminal way. The circumstance that Australia, Canada and the United 
States are English speaking opens up a huge market for English literature 
and allows Britons to migrate for jobs without major adaptation problems. 
English has become the international language because of colonisation, 
which enables Britons to travel the world without ever learning a foreign 
language. The whole world economy has grown from Western Imperial 
commerce and present British multiculturalism is part of its colonial 
heritage. 
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2.10.1. Is British Society in Crisis? 
The question of 'fragmentation' or 'crisis' of identity is being vigorously 
debated in social theory. Therefore it is of interest to explore whether this 
phenomenon can be observed among British society. On the political level 
it became clear that devolution will bring about substantial change in terms 
of what Britishness will mean to the Scots, the English and the Welsh. 
Although devolution seems to be an indication for the political 
fragmentation of Britain, the interviews demonstrated that national 
independence is not an appealing option. Therefore devolution may 
possibly entail the opportunity for an intensification of Welsh and Scottish 
identification with Britishness in the future, as they will then participate in 
the union as an equal party. 
On the social level the condition of a society can be analysed by exploring a 
number of factors: divorce rate, unemployment, crime rate, church 
attendance, etc.. However, the interpretations of such quantitative research 
results are controversial. For example, statistics on rates of divorce have 
shown that the proportion of children born to single or unmarried parents 
has risen sharply since the early 1970's. Whilst some deplore this fact as 
harmful to child development others argue that there is no evidence that 
children are being neglected more or less today than at the beginning of the 
century. Some speak in favour of smaller families, as fewer children receive 
more attention. 208 
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Another indicator for social problems is the crime rate. The number of 
offences reported to the police has risen inexorably since the beginning of 
the century. This phenomenon is explained by a rising propensity to report 
crimes, more people owning valuable possessions and more opportunity to 
commit crime. 209 Youth delinquency and the circumstance that juvenile 
and young adult males commit most of the crimes are not new phenomena 
either. During times of recession crimes due to unemployment have always 
increased. In the past century attempts to counteract such juvenile 
waywardness and delinquency were made by establishing youth 
organisations such as the Boy Scouts. "' 
An actual crisis of identity cannot be determined from the interviews on 
British identity. With regard to the decline of religious observance it was 
suggested that although less than one-fifth of the population are practising 
Christians, "personal attachment to Christian moral teaching remains high, 
particularly as expressed in the moral commandments of the Decalogue"Z". 
An interviewee from Birmingham has also supported this position: 
I think Christianity is perceived as a safety net. I'd like to think that, if you look at 
church attendance Christianity is in a pretty dull state really. ... 
They believe in some 
sort of God and if they have to relate it, then they would relate it to the Christian 
God. Our culture is completely, our political culture our socio-economic culture is 
dominated by Christianity in that ... the way that we talk, in very religious terms, .. like Blair has done in the Labour Party he speaks in very messianic terms. The whole 
of our political system is based on those kind of things. I think it has become a little 
less inherent than it has been. I think acceptance has become a value in this society 
now, not as much as I would like it to be but it is. 212 
If the effects of such isolated social facts on society are so difficult to 
determine, either a more focused study would be necessary to highlight 






from Birmingham spoke about their family values than Londoners did. To 
what degree the size, or the nature of a city, is proportional to social 
cohesion remains open. But generally speaking in big cities people are not 
integrated into communal life in the same way as in smaller towns and 
villages, where social cohesion, communal spirit and peer pressure 
encourage and nurtures cultural traditions as well as religious practice. The 
urban environment rather fosters individualisation and isolation. Social 
mobility separates the family and high competition on the job market leaves 
little time to maintain ties with wider family. The artificial rhythm of office 
work, or monotone and alienating factory work, also discourages the 
-maintenance of 
traditions, and religious life, which in turn entail social 
rituals to foster community cohesion. 
Industrial mass society also developed an unprecedented variety of leisure 
accessible to the masses. The cinema, radio, television, professional sport 
and motor vehicles led to a preoccupation with escapism to the exclusion of 
spiritual and communal concerns. Industrial society has been organised 
towards maximising economic profit. The family structure has adjusted to 
the needs of a mobile society. Fewer children receive more education and 
material support to prevail in a society, which is more focused on the 
manipulation of information, rather than on the manipulation of objects. 
Even leisure has been directed towards consumerism to profit the economy. 
Within this socio-economic framework the pace of life is constantly 
increased, so that time for oneself, for family, friends and community 
becomes scarce. 
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To optimise efficiency the State has participated in `division of labour', for 
example by taking control of education. Gellner observed that a highly 
industrialised society has to standardise the education system to maximise 
efficiency213 Such standardisation ensures basic common knowledge and a 
sense of social cohesion on the grounds of cultural reproduction. The 
institutionalised education of children was paralleled by an increasing 
tendency of parents to neglect their duty to convey behavioural and moral 
patterns. This phenomenon was enforced by the promotion of anti- 
authoritarian education in the light of emancipation. A. S. Neill, founder of 
Summerhill, promoted the idea that children should grow-up free of fear 
and physical violence in order to develop a healthy ego and a sense of self- _ 
worth. They should learn by understanding the purpose and reason for 
their individual limits instead of facing unexplained prohibition. Children 
should explore their own abilities and enjoy education rather than perceive 
it as an obligation. Like this they are able to explore their own abilities and 
will thus find their niche in society? 'a 
Unfortunately the concepts of anti-authoritarian education were 
misunderstood or applied incorrectly by many parents due to ignorance. 
Parents simply eliminated authoritarian measures and failed to apply 
alternative educational strategies. Instead of investing more time into 
explaining to their children why certain behaviour is inappropriate for a 
successful integration into society, to substitute for authoritarian measures, 
children were left to themselves and they no longer learned to accept limits 
and how to deal with authority. Yet it is part of the learning process and the 
role-play of childhood to try and test limits. Children want to know how far 
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they can go and where they will face resistance. In the course of this process 
children are taught behavioural norms and moral as well as ethic values. 
It has been observed that the phase of childhood has shortened while the 
phase of adolescence has been prolonged. Partly due to the mass media, 
children are burdened with the facts of life too soon. They lose their 
innocent view of the world and have to process information that their great 
grand parents were ignorant of throughout a lifetime. Once adolescents, 
these youngsters try to suppress their powerlessness via the dilemmas of 
this world and escape into a world of excessive entertainment that 
sometimes is accompanied by an air of infantility. The prolonged. phase of _ 
education, during which the individual does not have to take on any 
responsibilities, is an additional factor for a prolonged adolescence. 
The younger generations (born during the 1970's and after) have received 
only limited orientation from the Church, parents and school. However, 
the dilemma is that humans seek to act and feel according to adopted 
values. In a modern secular and industrial society, with a democratic 
political system, a variety of values are offered. A multitude of churches, 
religious sects, non-governmental organisations, societies and movements 
offer ideals and orientations. Therefore problems are not related to lack of 
values but to the difficult task of choosing the right ones. Ideally a young 
individual should have been equipped during their educational years with a 
frame of orientation based on a value system. 
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The increasing violence and destructiveness within British society are a 
result of hopelessness and lack of orientation. An insufficiently developed 
identity, due to parental neglect and a missing value system, makes the 
search for a suitable orientation more difficult for an individual. Identity is 
an important aspect of human nature both on the individual and collective 
level. The confidence in ones identity is based on the confidence in one's 'I', 
which is the belief in one's 'self' and in the core of one's personality. If there 
is no belief in the continuity of the 'self', then the feeling of identity is 
jeopardised. In order to maintain the feeling of identity, a dependency on 
the acknowledgement of others develops. The belief in one's 'self' s the 
precondition for the ability to make a promise. 15 
Unemployed youth, who feel that society has no need for their productivity, 
will slowly lose their faith in their potential and their future. They will 
search for security and support from groups or gangs that will give them a 
new feeling of powerfulness and integration. The decline of conviction in 
one's own reason and strength will lead to the irrational belief that 
submitting to a power perceived as overpowering, strong, all knowing and 
almighty can substitute for one's own insecurities and weaknesses. Rational 
belief is based on the observation of one's potential and productivity. The 
belief in an existing, all-controlling power is identical with the disbelief in 
the possibility to realise one's potentials, which are not yet actualised. 216 
Self-actualisation is best achieved by overcoming one's passive existence by 
being creative. By giving expression to his creativity man can transcend his 
passive existence and become 'creator'. The need to transcend is the basis for 
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love, artistic endeavours, religion and material productivity. The 
requirements for creative productivity are activity and care for what is done. 
Yet there is still another way to experience transcendence. If an individual 
cannot create life, s/he can nevertheless destroy it. Also by destroying life 
the individual can experience a sense of 'transcendence', because s/he then 
places himself above life. When driven by the desire to transcend, the 
individual has the choice between creating or destroying. The will to 
destroy usually emerges when the will to create cannot be experienced with 
satisfaction. 21 The degree of destructiveness seems to be proportional to the 
degree to which the expansion of emotional, physical and. intellectual 
abilities cannot be spontaneously expressed and their realisation. - 
is 
_ 
hampered. If the individual's natural tendency to expand and to live is 
suppressed, then these suppressed energies will be transformed into 
destructive ones. Destructiveness is the result of suppressed life energy. 218 
Present day youth especially have to cope with high competition and a 
materialist society in which creative liveliness was substituted with rational 
functionalism. Youth entertainment no longer consists of sports and the 
enjoyment of self-made or self-renovated toys, bicycles or motorcycles 
(depending on age), but of playing computer games, watching television and 
drinking in pubs. Consumerism has become the main focus of youth. 
Objects are bought in response to set trends and gotten rid of with the next 
trend. Quality is no longer a criteria for choice, only what is trendy is 
desirable. The Enlightenment created the foundation for the advancement 
of individualism in Western society. By the political and economic 
emancipation of the individual, by the education towards independent 
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thinking and the liberation from suppressive authorities, the individual 
was supposed to experience their 'I' as the centre of their forces and activity. 
Instead society has subjugated itself to the dictate of the free market 
economy? i9 
Excessive escapism, whether in the form of entertainment or consumerism, 
is generally speaking the result of lack of stability and orientation. Usually 
the family, the community, the Church or government provide orientation. 
If such orientation was not provided, the individual is exposed to the 
manipulation of mass media within the urbanised mass marketing-oriented 
society that seeks to create new demands in. order to keep the economy 
going. The diversity and the multiplicity of 'objects of identification' 
available in a democratic-industrial society presupposes that individuals are 
able to make the right choices for themselves. Thus the individual should 
have a stable value structure that provides sufficient orientation. According 
to Fromm, industrial society influences modern man in two essential ways: 
the individual becomes more independent, can relay on his own judgement 
and critical observations, whilst becoming more isolated, lonely and 
fearful. 22° The system does not impose a rigid structure on the individual 
and a supply of pre-defined values for orientation. Although democracies 
are based on some generally accepted principal values in order to allow for 
the system to function, individuals have to rely on themselves to make 
sense of their lives and to search for an appropriate niche in society. For 
adolescents this lack of orientation presents greater complexity in their 
search for a more stable identity. Provided that a system of values and a 
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frame of orientation are not home nurtured, society will offer little support 
for the adolescent. 
In politics subliminally manipulation is also taking place. Political 
passiveness is the result of the feeling that one's political will cannot be 
enforced. With the introduction of universal suffrage, the Chartists 
expected social change brought about by the will of responsible and 
independent individuals. Their ideals remained a utopia. Although 
political participation is no longer limited by restricted franchise, the way it 
is practised, does not give expression to the actual will of the people. People 
cannot express 'their' will if they don't have one. In an alienated society 
people express their will jr. the same way as they decide on a purchase. Very 
much dependent on external influences, they decide according to repetitive 
and suggestive advertisement. The democratic process is nothing but the 
manipulation of public opinion (or will) to come to the same conclusion 
that politicians had already reached. As far as most political issues are 
concerned, the majority of the people feel indifferent as long as their private 
and economic interests are not affected. Any connected dangers are 
considered removed and maybe not as threatening as they may initially 
seem. This attitude reveals signs of a limited sense of reality. A limited 
sense or awareness of reality reduces the individual's responsibility and has 
an impact on the individual's ability to enforce their will. The will is the 
psychological counterpart of a well-targeted responsible action. The average 
citizen does not have any influence on economic or international affairs. 
The individual has no task to fulfil and therefore no opportunity to enforce 
his will. As the individual has no power over this decision-making process, 
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they will not feel responsible. This also explains why many people have 
only limited knowledge concerning political issues? 2i 
Insecure individuals with no orientation will tend to support strong 
leadership. The desire to overcome one's own powerlessness with regard to 
the social and political complexity, of which the individual does not seem to 
be able to make any sense, can express itself in a radical counteraction - to 
seek control. 222 The individual will avoid admitting their weakness to 
themself and direct anger outwards, in other words, project resentments and 
exasperation onto the establishment and society. 
In the light of these developments that are the consequences of the 
industrialisation of society, the 'electronic revolution' is demanding new 
social sacrifices. With the technological advancement the process of 
globalisation that has been initiated by colonialism was unbound. It 
penetrates cultural and national boundaries and exposes the individual to 
the world, with all the consequences this entails. Every part of the world 
becomes accessible to a relatively large number of people. The mass media 
and the internet provide an unprecedented access to world-wide 
information, leaving the selection process to the individual. This process 
will open new areas of employment as much as it will sacrifice traditional 
jobs. Careers will depend even more on the luxury of a highly specialised 
education and social isolation could provoke neurosis among society. 
During the past two hundred years Britain has been at the forefront of social 
revolution. Its society has constantly adjusted to the demands of economic 
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progress. British society is based on progress that brings about structural 
changes. During the Industrial Revolution the pace of change has increased 
tremendously. It appears that the need for further change has become a 
coping strategy in itself, to veil the fact that society has not yet developed any 
serious long-term solutions for the negative consequences of its 
industrialisation, which are mass urbanisation and unemployment. 
Certainly the National Health Service, housing schemes and 
unemployment aim to help, but they do not provide solutions for the 
psychological damage. 
The consequences of industrialisation have culturally and socially up-rooted 
the majority of modern society. Psychologically, humans seek continuity in 
their life history to develop and maintain a coherent sense of identity. Yet 
modern society demands flexibility so that people can adjust to economic 
changes. Adjustment to change such as engaging in retraining programmes, 
unemployment or social mobility complicates the maintenance of a 
coherent identity. Additional personal problems such as serious accidents, 
unexpected pregnancies or divorce can amplify such an inconsistency. 
Consequently, individuals adhere to selecting events from their life-story to 
produce a coherent picture of their self. For the younger generations, for 
which the environment has provided only little orientation, the search for a 
coherent identity becomes even more problematic. 
Since the Industrial Revolution only one ideological concept has been 
developed to cope with the subsequent social crisis: communism. However, 
communism was defeated by one of the most fundamental human traits, 
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that of innate individualism. Once basic human needs such as housing, 
clothing and food have been satisfied, the desire to strive for something 
higher and to emphasise one's uniqueness,. suddenly emerges. If this 
motivating energy is suppressed the individual will become passive. 
Consequently the tremendous enthusiasm among communists soon 
withered away. 
Radical ideology cannot offer long term solutions to an increasingly 
complex society. As a matter of fact, the 'electronic revolution' now 
provides the basis for the solution to the social problems that the Industrial 
Revolution created, because it reduces the need .. 
for social mobility. 
Depending on how the process is channelled it may become possible that 
'work will come to the employee' rather than the employee having to 'go to 
work'. Like this a trend towards communal, family and rural life would be 
possible again. 
2.11. Preliminary Conclusions 
Historically British identity was formed from multicultural influences on 
both a political level (Roman, French, and Hanovarian Rulers) and on the 
popular level (immigration, settlement and invasion). To ensure that the 
foreign kings ruled in the interest of their English subjects the idea of a 
contract between the king and the 'community of the realm' was released 
with the Magna Carta. The circumstance that the Crown was always in 
financial difficulties made the kings dependent on their aristocratic subjects 
and therefore more co-operative. The heightened awareness for a just 
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government may have derived from the constant tension between the 
foreign kings and English subjects. 
The limitation of the Crown's power was a slow process but nevertheless 
made the monarchy an integral part of a check-and-balance government. By 
the time William of Orange was invited to assume the throne, Parliament 
had established its power and made the monarchy subject to condition on 
the grounds of the Bill of Rights. Thus today's Parliament and 
constitutional monarchy are deeply rooted in the English political tradition 
and still constitute a central component of English national identity. 
Henry VIII's religious emancipation from Rome protected England from 
foreign influence, but also provoked an external Catholic threat. The 
internal Catholic and Protestant power struggle for control over the 
Anglican Church led to unresolved Catholic discrimination right to the 
present day, as can still be observed in Northern Ireland and to a lesser 
extent in Scotland. 
With the Act of Union (1707) Scots, Welsh and the English constructed a 
British identity based on Protestantism, imperial interests and the defence of 
realm against primarily Catholic and non-Christian enemies. Scottish, 
Welsh and English elite merged, leading the way to unity and to co- 
operation in policy-making. With the emergence of revolutionary ideology 
and war with Napoleonic France, the British ruling elite allowed for just 
sufficient political change to appease the population. Their propagation of 
patriotism and conversion to modesty saved them from social upheavals. 
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The continuity of monarchy also meant security and a stronger faith in the 
ruling elite. Adopting a British identity was related to career opportunities 
in the British colonies. The construction of a British identity was successful. 
Protestantism provided all three nations with a common frame of 
orientation and united the English, Welsh and Scots against their enemies. 
Although the established churches eventually lost their influence, 
Protestant dissenters and sects replaced them. The industrialisation 
alienated many members of the working classes from religion and thus 
became more susceptible for socialist ideas. The physical deterioration of the 
population and the socialist pressure. groups forced -the government .. to 
introduce health care and pension schemes and thereby accepted 
responsibilities that were previously taken on by the church and the 
communities. The consequences of industrialisation were not only physical 
deterioration, but also spiritual impoverishment and social isolation. The 
inner emptiness was compensated by consumerism. 
Protestantism, warfare and empire-building were the cement of British 
identity in eighteenth century. In the twentieth century the Empire was 
lost, Protestantism is in decline and since the Second World War Britain 
was no longer engaged in seriously threatening warfare. All three pillars of 
British identity have been eroded. What is there to substitute them? 
Today, due to the dispute over the full membership of the European 
Community Britain can no longer afford to perceive any of the continental 
European states as a threat to British interests. Apart from that more and 
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more Scottish and Welsh voices call for devolution. Protestantism as 
Christianity itself, is no longer as influential on British culture as it used to 
be. With the loss of the Empire, both the commercial supremacy and 
imperial hegemony have ended. Britons no longer feel the same 
compulsion to remain united as they did before, as neither economic profit 
nor external threat provides motivation for union. For Scotland, 
independence and membership of a federal Europe could be a profitable 
alternative to the United Kingdom. During recent years the profit of British 
identity was forgotten by many Scots because of regional neglect, particularly 
during the Thatcher years. However, the Empire created a strong enough 
bond for Scots to prefer to maintain the union, but under different terms. In 
times of transformation it is more difficult to build 'an umbrella of 
solidarity by a symbolic construction of similarity' for large collectives. 
Nevertheless the successful repatriation of the Falkland Islands is a recent 
example of conflict which consolidated society. British identity will 
certainly continue to evolve the way it was intended to. British identity will 
continue to represent an 'umbrella identity' for the Scots, Welsh and Irish, 
but also for the Chinese, Pakistanis, Afro-Caribbeans and many other ethnic 
minorities who have settled in Britain. This identity has been and will be 
perceived as a multicultural one, providing orientation for how the 
juridical, social and political system is organised. 
Crick's observation that the English did not develop such a specific English 
national identity as the Scots, Irish and Welsh can only be given partial 
support. English national identity may not be as specific as that of the Celtic 
nations, but it is certainly equally strong. Evidence suggests that English 
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self-consciousness is even stronger because English identity is very much 
equated with British identity. In contrast English nationalism is certainly 
less developed because the English nation is neither threatened, nor 
suppressed. With the emergence of imperialism the English dominated 
and economically exploited large parts of the world. In the past there was 
no need to boost the ethnic consciousness with national ideology. This, 
however, may change rapidly as devolution proceeds and England may 
have to make more concessions to the European Union. Assuming a new 
identity in the realm of a new Europe is still being vigorously rejected. It 
remains an open question how English identity will develop in the future 
particularly in the light of an increasing. settlement of ethnic minorities. , 
Western industrial society is transforming into a globally accessible 
technological society. Any transformation and change creates instability and 
anxiety, due to the insecurity and unpredictability that it generates. The 
social crisis, as a result of globalisation, is enforced by the fact that the social 
consequences of the transformation from the agrarian society to the 
industrial society have not yet been successfully coped with. 
The Industrial Revolution was preceded by the intellectual revolution of 
the Enlightenment, which emancipated man from the rigid and 
overpowering religious institution - the individual became the centre of 
intellectual attention. This ideological revolution however, developed out 
of an ideological stability with regard to a set value system and a rigid class 
structure. As religious values lost importance, the human intellect became 
the standard for all criteria. Economic progress, technological advancement 
288 
and the liberalisation of society became the main focus of modern time. 
Individualism also facilitated the creation of a mobile society, which 
allowed for unlimited economic growth. 
After the Second World War the hope for a better future was unchallenged. 
It could hardly get worse and the flourishing British economy in the 1950's 
allowed for optimism. Never before, in the history of mankind, had such 
general wealth among whole of Western society been observed as during 
the period between the 1950's and mid 1980's. The increasing focus on 
materialism and social status pushed aside most of the religious values. 
-- Thus many forget that values are preserved in different forms. The. social 
welfare state for example is one expression of taking responsibility for the 
well being of other members of society. 
Western society as a whole has not yet come to terms with the effects of 
modernity as both the First and the Second World War have successfully 
veiled social crisis with destructive means, but not obliterated its cause. The 
first two decades of the post-war era were marked by the reconstruction of 
Europe, leaving little time to reflect on the wider historical and social 
correlations. The post-war era was and still is marked by another essential 
aspect: the focus on materialism. Materialism based on the economic 
principle of capitalism, unaccompanied by 'moral' and political ideology, is a 
result of industrialisation paralleled by the moral insecurities after the 
experience with the atrocious impact of fascist ideology. In Germany for 
example, a detailed public debate on the past was avoided immediately after 
the war, as extensive accusations could have triggered a collective 
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depression and hindered the reconstruction of the country. The 
introduction of ethics, based on traditional values that paved the way for 
such collective megalomania, would have been met with distrust. In East 
Germany (DDR) the dialectic materialism, Marxism-Leninism, was 
introduced from Moscow and in West Germany (BRD) the 'capitalist' 
materialism established itself. In the DDR the population oriented itself 
according to the theoretical, and in the BRD according to real, materialism. 
The question may now arise why the societies of the Allied Nations have 
not developed a substantial social value system either. Well, as far as 
Britain and France were concerned both nations were preoccupied with the 
normalisation of their economies after the war and the management of the 
disintegration of their Empires. It became essential to secure markets and 
the supply of raw material. Socially both societies had to overcome the loss 
of prestige with the loss of their Empires and to redefine their national pride 
in terms of economic growth. During the 1950's and 60's existentialism 
emerged in France which was rather confined to the intellectual and artisan 
classes. During the end of the 60's the Flower Power Movement emerged in 
Britain and developed out of protest against the predominant materialism 
and the establishment. Yet the political programmes out lined by the young 
Flower Power Generation were met with hostility by the ruling elite. 
The Cold War facilitated the definition of good and bad, right. and wrong. 
The USSR was depicted as a barbaric and authoritarian regime, which 
threatened all Western values. In contrast the West, headed by the United 
States, defined itself as the defender of freedom and Human Rights. 
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Righteousness, prosperity and peace marked Western identity. The concept 
of individual freedom received more significance within the conflict with 
communist Russia. The Cold War seemed to unite Western society, in 
defence of freedom and capitalism and to provide this society with a 
positive identity. Yet such an identity is too vague to supply a moral and 
ethical code to provide orientation for everyday life. Prosperity and freedom 
produced a self-satisfied, supersaturated society, in which the lack of 
orientation resurfaced. The two World Wars, the Cold War and the 
tremendous effort to provide for the economic growth on which this society 
is based, has veiled the symptoms of social crisis which industrialisation had 
triggered for decades. The growing demand for a mobile work force was the 
first step towards impairment of family ties and of the perpetuation of 
regional cultural heritage. The modernisation of society (which entails 
individualisation, technological progress and the creation of the welfare 
state) fostered a trend towards fewer children, who receive more trained for 
skilled and professional work. 
British society is facing substantial transformation both on a social and 
political level. On the social level densely populated cities create 
anonymity. This condition isolates individuals and creates loneliness. 
Therefore people began to compensate these deficits. Some transform 
themselves into workaholics to counter their emptiness by increasing their 
activities, whereas others indulge in consumerism and a materialistic 
lifestyle. Yet no one seems to be really satisfied. 
291 
The search for spirituality and the reassertion of rigid religious identities 
seem to be a consequence of the late modernisation process of Western 
societies. -After the Second World War the desire to improve the economic 
situation prevailed among Western societies. Religious affiliations and a 
sense of spirituality gave way to the pursuit of progress and success. 
However, the desire to add spirituality and a purpose to one's otherwise 
rather empty and materialistic lifestyle seems to remain a significant 
component, which contributes to the equilibrium of the human psyche. 
Thus an increasing number of Christians, dissatisfied with the established 
churches convert to Buddhism, Sects, New Age movements and Islam. 
The present social, political and economic system of this society does little to 
support individual identity development, leading to many unstable and 
disorientated individuals, primarily motivated to function in society in 
order to acquire wealth and status. They lack the feeling of responsibility 
towards society, as they seek to exclusively promote their own progress. A 
society with no sense of solidarity and compassion is in danger of gradually 
disintegrate as a whole. This crisis is not an exclusively British 
phenomenon, but can be observed among most Western societies. 
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3. Muslims in Britain 
This chapter aims to examine Muslim identity in Britain. It begins with a 
short overview of Muslim settlement in Britain and a case study in Cardiff, 
where the Yemeni community has a long history of settlement in Britain. 
British women who married Yemeni seafarers before the Second World 
War provide an insight into the way of life in Butetown earlier this century. 
The younger interviewees belong to the second or third generation who 
already had to struggle for opportunities and can serve as examples of what 
the second and third generations of South Asians may have to cope with in 
the course of integration. 
The Cardiff case study is followed by a detailed study of the South Asian 
community in Britain. The identity of the first generation of Muslim 
immigrants is discussed in order to illustrate the type of environment the 
second generation is growing up in and to create an understanding of the 
conflicts and tensions these young people have to address. The responses in 
London, Birmingham and Glasgow have not revealed significant 
differences to necessitate a separate analysis. Therefore the interviews of 
South Asian Muslims will not be discussed with reference to the region in 
which they have been made, i. e. Scotland or England. Originally interviews 
were conducted in London, Birmingham, Cardiff and Glasgow in order to 
determine any regional differences in identity development, which possibly 
concur with native identifications. However, only the well-established 
Yemeni community revealed significant differences in identification, largely 
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based on their Yemeni origin and seafarer heritage. The South 
Asian 
communities did not indicate any strong regional identifications other than 
that the second generation considered their place of residence to be their 
home. 
The chapter will conclude with an analysis of how young Muslims cope 
with the inner tensions and conflicts created by the sometimes mutually 
exclusive expectations of family and the wider social environment. 
3.1. The Geography of Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain 
The main document for demographic data is the 1991 Census, which also 
serves as the primary source for this analysis. Demographic characteristics 
of ethnic minorities other than 'Muslims' will also be taken into 
consideration. This should put the presence of South Asians and other 
Muslim minorities into context of wider society. 
According to the 1991 Census ethnic minority groups constitute 5.5 per cent 
of the British population (3,015,051 people). South Asians represent half of 
the ethnic minority population of which Indians are the largest single 
ethnic minority group, with 840,255 people (2.7 per cent of the population). 
In comparison, Black ethnic groups form 1.5 per cent of the population. 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis constitute 0.9 and 0.3 per cent of the population 
respectively. 
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The 'Other-Asian' category largely comprises Asian people (144,800) who do 
not form a substantial minority group (e. g. Vietnamese or Filipino people). 
Also 45,300 people, with ethnic origins in the Indian subcontinent, such as 
Sri Lankan, Indo-Caribbean and East African Asian people, who do not 
identify with the three main groups, fall into that category. It must be 
considered that people of such ethnic origins may also have attributed 
themselves to the categories Black-Caribbean or Indian. 
The 'Other-Other' category contains 290,000 people (0.5 per cent of the 
population). This category is comprised of ethnic groups such as North 
Africans, Arabs and Iranians and is more significant in. localities containing. 
higher education establishments. The census data has severe limitations for 
the detailed study of the ethnic mix in cities such as Cardiff and Liverpool, 
where ethnic minority communities have long been established and have 
intermarried with members of the local population. 
Locally significant groups, such as Greeks, Cypriots and Turks (total of 36,858 
people) are allocated to the White ethnic group. However, the census also 
asks for the country of birth, which allows for the identification of these 
groups. 
The 1991 Census has shown that the majority of ethnic minority groups 
settled in the most populous areas of England. Compared to White ethnic 
groups, ethnic minorities are also more concentrated within these regions. 
In Table 1 (see appendix VIII), the 1991 population of each ethnic group is 
expressed as a percentage of the Great Britain total for each region and 
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metropolitan county. The region's share of the total national population 
can be compared to the regional population share for each ethnic group. 
Whilst less than a third of those from the White ethnic group live in the 
South East standard region, more than half of all people from ethnic 
minority groups populate the area. Greater London alone contains 44.8 per 
cent of all people from ethnic minority groups in Britain compared to 10.3 
per cent of the White ethnic population. 
The West Midlands accounts for more than 14 per cent of the minority 
population -compared to 9 per cent of-the White ethnic-group. The next 
relatively high concentration of people from ethnic minority groups was 
found in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester. In comparison Wales, 
Scotland and the more peripheral regions of England are least populated by 
members of ethnic minority groups. 
The 1991 Census revealed marked differences in settlement patterns 
between the South Asian ethnic groups: Indians, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis. Table 2 (see appendix IX) highlights the relative 
concentrations of ethnic minorities in each region. 
In 1991 more than half of all Bangladeshis, two fifths of Indians and one 
fifth of Pakistanis lived in Greater London. The major concentrations of 
Pakistanis are in the West Midlands, the North West and West Yorkshire. 
In West Yorkshire Pakistanis constitute the largest ethnic minority group (4 
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per cent of all ethnic minorities). In Greater Manchester Pakistanis and 
Indians form the )sargest minority group. 
The main concentrations of Pakistanis within the South East standard 
region are in North East London, West London, Slough, Buckinghamshire 
and Luton. In the Midlands their representation is highest in Birmingham, 
Stafford and Peterborough. However, most notable is their presence in 
'textile towns' stretching through south Lancashire into Greater Manchester 
and West Yorkshire. Local concentrations of Pakistanis also occurr in 
Middlesbrough, Newcastle, Lanarkshire, Newport. and Cardiff. 
Bangladeshis are strongly represented in North Central London (notably 
Tower Hamlets), Luton and Oldham. Concentrations of Bangladeshis also 
occurr in the West Midlands Metropolitan County, areas to the north and 
west of London, Newcastle, Scunthorpe, some Pennine mill towns and in 
the major cities of South Wales. ' 
3.2. Historic Overview of Muslim Settlement in Britain 
Muslim residence in England can be traced back to the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, but the number of Muslim settlers was small. During 
the late nineteenth century various Arab immigrants arrived in Britain. In 
the 1860's Lebanese traders travelled to North and South America, 
Australia, West Africa and Europe. Only a small number eventually settled 
in Britain, one such a community is resident in Manchester. Later on, the 
1975 civil war in Lebanon added to this number. 
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Around the 1890's thousands of Yemenis, primarily from the north, were 
recruited at Aden by merchant ships such as the East Indian Company. They 
were searching for work on ships and in foreign countries. Gradually some 
of them came to Britain. 
Mosques were already established in the nineteenth century, such as the 
mosque in Woking built in 1889. In such early days most of the Muslim 
mission was organised by British converts. For example, Liverpool solicitor, 
W. H. Quilliam, who embraced Islam in 1887, produced a weekly called 'The 
Crescent' between-1893-1903. Lord Headley 
_and Khwaja 
Kamal-ud-Din had 
close ties with the mosque in Woking, of which the latter came to England 
to challenge misconceptions of Islam. Islamic apologist, Syed Ameer Ali (d. 
1928) and Qur'an translator Marmaduke Pickthall (d. 1936) were members of 
the Muslim Literary Society which was sponsored by the mosque in 
Woking. Further Islamic centres were in Liverpool and London prior to 
1914. Woking is the oldest mosque, but the Central Mosque in Regents Park 
is the most prestigious. It was opened in 1977; its trustees drawn from 
ambassadors and high commissioners of thirteen Muslim countries, who 
had collected donations for its erection. The Islamic Cultural Centre was 
inaugurated by King George VI in November 1944. 
The major influx of Muslim immigrants occurred with the labour shortage 
after the Second World War. Due to the rapid economic expansion during 
the late 1940's and early 1950's Britain had a high demand for cheap labour 
in order to fuel its economy. Both the Polish Resettlement Programme and 
304 
the European Volunteer Workers scheme did not supply enough 
manpower to compensate Britain's labour shortage. Consequently 
additional labour immigrants from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, as well 
as from Africa and the West Indies were welcomed. 
Britain struggled with the integration of Jews, Poles and Ukrainians, who 
had immigrated between the end of the last century and the Second World 
War. With the arrival of immigrants from the New Commonwealth in the 
1950's and 1960's, ethnic minorities became more visible and changed the 
colour of life in Britain. Britain has become irrevocably multi-racial and can 
no longer be regarded a purely 'white society' .5 
Further immigration to Britain occurred due to upheavals in the Indian 
subcontinent, the Arab world and other regions such as Cyprus and Africa. 
The revolution in Egypt in 1952 and in Iraq in 1958 forced political refugees 
to find a new home in Britain and other parts of the world. The Iranian 
community in Britain increased due to the Iranian revolution. Those who 
came to Britain settled primarily in and around London. Some continued 
their political activities with respect to their home countries from the 
British capital. 6 With the oil boom of the 1970's a large number of Arab 
entrepreneurs established their companies as well as a second residence in 
Britain. It was calculated that by the end of the 1980's up to half a million 
Arabs lived most or part of the year in Britain. Their main country of 
residence and work remained in the Middle East; therefore they did not 
constitute immigrant status. 
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A number of North Africans from Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria 
were also among the labour migrants. They came to Britain during the early 
1970's to work in the service sector in and around London. Most of them 
stayed only for short periods. Substantial communities of Moroccans and 
Egyptians were present in Britain by the mid-1980's, although the majority 
of the North African migrants settled in France. Due to political 
circumstances a small number of Palestinians settled in Britain. It should be 
noted that Arab Christians and Jews exist within these Arab communities. 
3.3. Cardiff: A Case Study 
While most Arab immigrants settled in and around London, Yemenis Aid 
not. 7 There is only a small Yemeni settlement in London. The majority of 
the early Yemeni settlements were at the ports of Cardiff, Liverpool, South 
Shields and Hull. From the 1880's onwards, foreign sailors from West India, 
West Africa, China and Yemen began to settle by the main trading ports in 
Britain. With the low wages they had earned as seafarers many were left 
discharged in British ports, waiting to join new ships. Unemployed, some 
looked for new jobs at the dockyards or newly founded peripheral 
industries. During the First World War the demand for seafarers and land- 
based workforce increased. New jobs were also available in the war 
industries. These closed down with the end of the war and many seamen 
were discharged again; Consequently unemployment forced these ex-sailors 
to search for new occupations. By 1919 there were an estimated twelve 
hundred unemployed 'coloured' sailors in Cardiff. ' 
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The first sailors who arrived lived in lodging houses for men, run by former 
sailors of the same nationality. Some sailors who repeatedly returned to 
Cardiff eventually got jobs, in the docks. It was common for several men to 
joined together to buy cheap houses. Some also married Welsh women. 
From these mixed marriages a generation of part Welsh and part Yemeni or 
West Indian emerged .9 In 1942 it was estimated that approximately 1500 
Yemenis and 1000 Somalis lived in Cardiff. 
In the course of research in Cardiff, Mrs. Ali, eighty-four years old, and Mrs. 
Mohammad, seventy-six years old described the atmosphere of Butetown 
when they married their Yemeni husbands as young girls. Mrs. _ Ali's 
marriage to an Yemeni seafarer was unproblematic with regard to parental 
response. She met her husband in the house of her mother's second 
husband, who was also an Yemeni seaman. Mrs Ali's mother had 
converted to Islam. Her mother regularly cooked for her husband's friends, 
who were unmarried lodgers. Friends often came to visit and it was normal 
to help each other in every way possible. 
In contrast Mrs. Mohammad's parents were hostile towards their daughter's 
spouse. The family was of religious Methodist background. They were 
convinced that Muslims did not believe in God. The community priest 
responded with disgust to her conversion to Islam and her father threatened 
to disown her. However, after the death of her father, her mother took a 
positive stance towards this unusual alliance. Mrs. Muhammad and her 
husband ran an Arab boarding house in the docks. Most seafarers could not 
speak English; therefore the people who ran the boarding houses would 
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look after them when they were sick and acted as translators when 
necessary. At that time the Welsh thought that the docks were a dangerous 
place. Mrs. Mohammad emphasises that she only got to know wonderful 
people and that she lived a happy life with her Yemeni husband. Her 
husband was a trained cook, who not only ran the boarding house but also 
opened a Muslim school and a small mosque. Their ten children were all 
raised as Muslims but only one of the girls married one. 
Community life was close knit. Although money was scarce, mutual 
support provided comfort and security. Nobody in that community 
possessed. much but people managed the best. they could. Mrs. Ali married 
her Yemeni husband in a registry office but did not convert to Islam. Her 
husband always respected her beliefs, yet sometimes his friends tried to 
pressure him to divorce his wife if she refused to convert. Nevertheless her 
husband stood by her. However, Mrs. Ali lived very much like a Muslim 
woman with regard to the duties she fulfilled, how she cooked and behaved 
to the other Yemeni men. Out of respect for her husband she only went to 
Church for Christmas mass once a year. Other Welsh wives did convert to 
Islam, some in response to pressure and others out of conviction. When 
children married, and two of the daughters chose to marry Welsh men, 
their Yemeni father did not object to a Roman Catholic wedding. He 
considered it his duty as a father to present his daughter to her husband to 
be and insisted on walking her down the aisle. When one of the daughters 
died, all Yemeni friends attended the funeral at Church to pay their last 
respect. 
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Mrs. Ali feels that she has lived between two religions but the tolerance and 
mutual respect among the community made this possible. Not all Yemeni 
seamen who lived with Welsh women married them. Yemeni community 
leaders were not in favour of cross-cultural marriages. It occasionally did 
happen that seamen left their Welsh women as they returned to their home 
countries. However, soon new seafarers arrived who were happy to take 
care of these deserted young women. Others continued to live together 
without ever marrying. 
The men were usually at sea for months. When. the men did return they 
were very caring. During their absence however, Yemeni friends and their 
wives (usually -English or Welsh) were supportive, particularly when a child 
was born or when someone in the family was ill. The children received 
religious education and Arabic lessons from the Yemeni seamen after 
school. At that time Children did not have the opportunity to travel to 
Saudi Arabia to receive proper religious education. When Islamic feasts 
were due the children were allowed to take time off school for the 
celebrations. Sheep were still slaughtered in the streets and all the Yemenis 
gathered together to celebrate. 
To build a mosque the Yemeni seamen regularly contributed financially to 
the purchase of a row of houses. Others bought a shop and started a 
business. When one of the Yemenis died in Cardiff, relatives or friends 
would bury him. The men washed him and ordered a plain coffin. A group 
of men would then pray for the deceased all night. 
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Both Mrs. Ali and Mrs. Mohammad confirmed that it was not problematic 
to live an Islamic way of life in the midst of British society. In their time 
Muslims have integrated well into Welsh society. The city council was 
always prepared to provide Muslim schools with equipment. The social 
cohesion went beyond ethnic boundaries despite ignorance towards Islam 
among wider society. Mrs. Mohammad's husband always referred to 
himself as a 'Welsh Arab'. While amongst wider society ignorance and 
prejudice did exist, the atmosphere in Butetown seemed to have been 
tolerant. Neither Mrs. Mohammad nor Mrs. Ali could recall explicitly racist 
events. The area was multi-racial and everyone respected eachother. 
We lived as if we were an ordinary English family, as if there was no colour or 
anything in it. But nobody took no notice, nobody bothered us, you know. We didn't face 
racism or anything like that. No, I've never faced it in my life, never. Nor my 
children. If they've faced it in school they didn't tell me. But then, the school days 
were entirely different to now. It's like you are talking about another world. 10 
The son of Mrs. Ali attested that the community spirit in Butetown was 
similar to that of communities in Yemen. 
Wales is my homeland, I was born there, I believe it is my home. Also my father is from 
Arabia, so I tend to favour Yemen as well as my homeland. I've spent a few years there 
when I was younger. And the lifestyle in Yemen is very similar to the lifestyle in 
Wales. Just the language differences ... 
" 
He neither feels torn between two cultures nor does he consider integration 
to be a problem for Muslims in Cardiff. The multi-racial nature of the dock 
area prevented the development of a minority - majority relationship. 
Everyone was different and therefore everyone shared the same sense of 
tolerance and respect. 
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So you didn't have the feeling that you grew up between two cultures? No. I was 
always ... we were 
brought up in the docks area of Cardiff and that area was multi- 
racial and multi-religious. But we grew up with people of other religions and other 
races, everybody accepted one another, there were no problems as far as religion or race 
was concerned. 2 
From the perspective of the elderly generation, those who came to settle in 
Cardiff after the Second World War seem to have had a different attitude. 
The 'old' Arabs were polite and helpful, whereas the new generations keep 
themselves to themselves. The community spirit has died. The new 
generations are no longer respectful in their conduct and no longer content 
with what they have. From the perspective of the elderly, the atmosphere 
of Butetown and the docks has changed substantially. Before the war there 
was more solidarity among the community and people were more open to 
each other. Today the members of the community are more isolated and 
less co-operative. Before social security was introduced, priests and nuns 
collected for the needy: Muslims also donated for that purpose, they were 
more integrated. People had less but were more generous. At present, even 
among the Muslims, cohesion is not as strong any more. One explanation 
for this development is that the community has expanded and many have 
moved to other areas of Cardiff. 
Do you have the feeling that Muslims have successfully integrated into Welsh society? 
The older ones integrated a lot better than these new refugee-type Somalis that are 
coming now. Because they ... to be honest I've never seen anything like this ... they don't conform to anything, they have no values. The older Somalis were a different 
race of people, they conformed and integrated. But there seems to be a problem with 
the younger generation. 
Why is that? A lot of them, I think, that come over here as refugees from Somalia, ... and the freedom that they've got here and access to money .... and ... you cannot even talk to them, reason with them. 
So what kind of problems do they make? They make all sorts of problems; they've got 
problems with crime, problems with neighbours. They don't want to conform with this 
society here; they only do things the way they want to do them. " 
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The generation difference in integration observed by Mrs. Mohammad's son 
is related to the change in immigration patterns. Until the late 1960's the 
majority of Muslim labour immigrants arrived without their families and 
passively adapted to the social reality of the host community. The personal 
approach to the experience of the cross-cultural passage was simple: these 
men lived a modest and quiet life, only relying on self-sufficiency and hard 
work to maintain their families. 
They seem to breed apart from what I was brought up with. All ours wanted to do was 
work, look after their families and their praying. Should I tell you something? When 
the war was over lots more came in. And you know what our men called them? Fish and 
Chips. As a breed apart from them. Even they themselves felt that they were 
different. There was something different" 
The generation of immigrants who arrived before the Second World War 
encountered a host society not that different from their homeland in terms 
of family values and concepts of personal virtues. Although the new 
environment was culturally different, the lives and the social status of these 
labour immigrants were determined by the employment they received in 
the docks. They did not seek entry into the social and economic circles 
beyond the dock community, therefore rejection or discrimination was not 
part of their spectrum of experiences. As these men arrived they relied on 
the opportunities which the host community made available. Family 
networks neither served as support nor represent a burden during the 
process of integration. Consequently many Muslim men married Welsh 
women and built their lives on a cultural compromise. It became apparent 
from the interviews that non of the Yemeni immigrants assimilated to their 
environment, but practised their cultural and religious values in privacy. 
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Mutual tolerance was the foundation for a constructive cohabitation among 
this multi-ethnic and religious community. 
However, such harmonious cohabitation as described by Mrs. Ali and Mrs. 
Mohammad (as well as by other elderly inhabitants of Butetown) was made 
possible by the relative social isolation of this area. Harbours have always 
been perceived as areas with a 'status ex patria' among wider society. The 
development of multi-ethnic communities was accepted as part of the socio- 
economic process in such areas. Conventional society regarded dock areas as 
dangerous and immoral places from which children and young women 
were kept away. Therefore assimilation was not really expected of seafarers 
that passed through. In turn, the children in these areas who were born 
from mixed marriages, felt part of both cultures and grew up within an 
environment where such multi-ethnic marriages were more common than 
elsewhere in the country. 
This situation changed as the port of Cardiff could no longer provide 
enough employment for its inhabitants. After 1945, less immigrants came 
to this region. In the 1970's the Merchant Navy recruited more seamen 
from India and Pakistan rather than from the Yemen, so that in general the 
Yemeni influx decreased. Over the past four decades governmental policies 
have restricted immigration to such an extent that most immigrants now 
enter the country on the grounds of family reunion or political asylum. 
Consequently single male labour immigrants no longer arrive in Britain. 
Instead family units and community networks were established. The 
dynamics of the integration process is thus bound to change. In many cases 
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children arrived with their mothers or have been born into an ethnically 
homogeneous family. Their mother tongue is neither English, nor are the 
early ego ideals conveyed to them partially British. 
It's a different generation; the younger generation is different. Like I believe that the 
best Muslims was in my time, when I was younger. The Yemeni, the young ones are not 
like the older ones, its because the times have changed" 
Since 1945 Western societies have experienced tremendous social change, 
which emphasised the difference between values/virtues of the host and 
that of the immigrant community. The greater the difference between the 
new community and that of origin, the more must an immigrant 
temporarily give up part of his/her individuality in order to integrate into 
the new community. "' The cross-cultural passage involves the search for a 
new identity for both the individual and for the ethnic group to which 
she/he belongs. 17 The psychological predisposition to integrate into a host 
society is determined by a number of factors. 18 
The dynamics of cross-cultural passage differs according to whether 
immigration is temporary or permanent. Labour immigrants did not 
originally intend to settle in the new land, whilst refugees have little control 
over their departure and return. Therefore reasons for leaving one's 
country are essential in determining the process of adaptation to the new 
environment. Migration always involves a loss of past certainties and an 
insecure future. Depending on the emotions with which the host culture 
receives the migrant, the feeling of loss is either intensified or eased. If a 
migrant is able to find a niche in the new community then his/her search 
for a new place in this society has been successful. The individual is then 
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more inclined to adapt to that environment and to adopt new ego 
identifications. 
The process of cross-cultural transformation is different for single labour 
immigrants than for children and family units. Whilst single labour 
migrants are under greater pressure to adapt to the new environment in 
order to succeed, they consider any identity changes as a temporary sacrifice, 
whereas family units are less flexible. When families migrate they intend to 
settle in the new environment for a longer period of time. Parents face 
more responsibility during the process of cross-cultural passage and are thus 
inclined to adopt more conservative behaviour. because they have. now. 
become representative for their culture of origin. Within family units and 
minority communities the culture of origin is perpetuated in daily life. In 
contrast to the parents, children have no choice whether they want to 
migrate or not. Depending on the individual's age and stage of identity 
development the cultural relocation generates substantial changes in 
internalised structures as a result of new group interactions. 19 As young 
children find it more difficult to rationalise reasons for migration, the loss 
of the old environment and possible rejection in the new one are therefore 
more threatening to the emotional world of the individual. 
Several Yemeni interviewees complained about Somali reluctance to 
integrate. The Somalis they referred to are refugees who arrived with their 
families. Some of these refugees left their homeland under pressure. Many 
of them experienced physical and/or psychological violence or at least the 
threat of it. Political activists or intellectuals usually continue their 
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activities in their country of refuge; this provides them with a purpose in 
life and facilitates integration as they interact with, and seek support from, 
British organisations and the media. All those refugees of poor background 
who were driven out of their countries because of their race or religious 
affiliation are once more confronted with marginalisation. The loss of 
home and the lack of perspectives in the new society can lead to isolation 
and the attempt to build one's world on communal self- sufficiency. For 
refugees there is no immediate possibility to return to their countries of 
origin, therefore their strategy to cope with the relocation can express itself 
in a devaluation of the country of refuge and an idealisation of their country 
of origin. - The new- environment can therefore become the catalyst for the 
frustration about personal plight. When unemployment and lack of 
perspectives threaten an individuals self-worth, the individual will search 
for personal or specific community traits that compensate for the feeling of 
devaluation. It is thus common among minorities to emphasise moral 
superiority towards the majority. As a consequence parents seek to prevent 
their children from developing close ties with children of wider society in 
order to maintain their strongest pillar of identity - that of moral 
superiority. 
Readiness to adapt to the new environment also depends on the 
expectations immigrants have of their future in the host society. The older 
generation of immigrants were more modest with regard to the socio- 
economic development they could expect within their new environment. 
Modesty and self-restraint were virtues also highly regarded among British 
society at the time. At the beginning of this century people did not 
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anticipate major social climbing throughout their lifetime. The majority 
had to struggle to make a decent living. The living standard among the 
broad population was modest and mutual support was the most reliable 
safety net. 
The so-called post-war generations had the benefit of growing into a socially 
mobile and wealthy society. The advertisement of luxuries and the building 
of a society with equal opportunities for everybody created discontent 
amongst those who were unable to improve their socio-economic position. 
The struggle for a place among the middle classes has become more 
competitive. However, not everyone can succeed. To live a life of 
deprivation in a society which advertises wealth for everyone, is a more 
difficult burden to bear than if deprivation is a collective destiny. This is 
particularly so when deprivation is the result of racism and xenophobia. 
British society has also changed in terms of how children are raised. When 
Mrs. Ali and Mrs. Mohammad were young the values and virtues among 
British society were similar to that of the Muslim communities. Thus 
modesty and self-restraint determined the mode of human interaction in 
the past. Dependency on communal support as well as responsibility 
towards the community was usual. However, within a mobile society 
individualism and independence have become necessary personality traits 
in order for individuals to adapt to the mechanisms of this society. Two 
young Somali women described how this development has influenced the 
relationship between the sexes among Muslim immigrants. 
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The only problem I would say with Islam or Muslim religion is like, ... you can, like, ... 
man and wife, they live together, like, Western people, and then they decide to get 
married. With Somalis, a person can be all nice and everything, like my ex-husband 
was all nice to me and everything, but like, as soon as I went to live with him I realised 
it was a mistake. When you go to live with that person, that real person comes out and 
everything. Saying that really, our parents had arranged marriages, I mean years and 
years ago in the Muslim world ... and that worked. 
° 
Things were more stricter then so the men, you know, the men were more religious and 
the women were more concerned with religion. And women, if the man would be angry, 
she wouldn't, you know, go crazy, or,... you know. But with us now, we won't take 
anything. We're a lot different to our parents; it's just changed. Is it the same in 
Somalia? In Somalia things change from our parents' days. In Somalia itself women 
are starting to change. 1 
Self-representation in a new environment where ideals differ from those of 
the country of origin is a difficult task for both males and females. The 
increasing pressure on men to provide for a better living standard in the 
light of unemployment can cause stress and friction in the family. The 
traditional hierarchical gender divisions have to be reaffirmed and justified 
anew in an environment that no longer-shares the same concepts of such 
family patterns. For women, relocation into an alien environment 
frequently results in a greater dependency on the nuclear family, as other 
female siblings are no longer around. Anxiety and isolation increase the 
pressure on family life. In order to compensate ego losses immigrants seek 
to restore familiar ego support by symbolic restitution of the homeland. 2 
Some older Somali interviewees (both men and women) were not able to 
describe how they viewed the Welsh people because they have no contact 
with them. Their social interaction is restricted to the Somali community 
and it was necessary to employ a translator in order to conduct the 
interviews. Their priorities are to maintain family cohesion and to practice 
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Islam. Their sense of British identity is very limited, as not even basic 
communication is possible due to language barriers. 
The majority of Somalis who were interviewed in Butetown were 
unemployed. Most of these unemployed Somalis had difficulties with the 
English language. They also lacked appropriate training for basic 
employment. Both of these factors decrease the opportunity to improve 
their immediate outlook on life and perspectives for the future. The lack of 
opportunities, whether on the grounds of racism or due to shortcomings in 
education or training, produces a sense of powerlessness because the 
individual does not have the ability to change these factors. Aggressions 
that build up can be either directed against the self or against the 
'discriminating' or 'careless' environment. The most common and 
preferable option is the latter. It is part of a natural self-protecting 
mechanism to project hatred and aggression onto an external object of desire 
(usually unattainable) to deflect potential damage to the self. Only in a 
serious psychological crisis does an individual resort to self-destructive 
actions as a cry for help or as the last possible solution for crisis 
management. Therefore isolation from, and hostility towards, a rejecting 
society are the first signals which indicate that attempts to integrate have 
failed. 
Those elderly Somalis are content with the isolation they live. All necessary 
facilities are available to live self-sufficiently among the Somali community 
and the identification with the country of origin is too strong for elderly 
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people to let go of deeply rooted ego ideals or to change identity 
components. 
There are still people here who like Somalia, from their memories when they were 
young. It is difficult here these days, you know. It's hard to learn English and .... It's different in Somalia; you don't have bills and so on. 
Do you have the feeling that you can maintain your culture here? Now I can, yea. 
When Somalis come from Somalia they bring the culture back to us, if they wouldn't 
come them our culture wouldn't be as strong as it is now. Before they have come I used to 
hang around with a lot of Welsh girls and I used to like their culture. Whereas when 
my cousins come they got me interested in our culture and slowly I got to know my 
culture. I used to hate Somali music; I hate Somali videotapes. Somali music, I used to 
take it out and I used to try to hide the tapes. And now I really love it, I do. ' 
As mentioned above, integration entails the sacrifice of ego ideals (at least 
those that interfere with a complete identification process). The process of 
giving up ego ideals and therefore identity components makes an 
individual vulnerable. It creates disorientation and anxiety. If the 
individual does not experience positive affirmation from the new 
environment during this phase of identity development then self- 
protectionism will lead to a revival of former identifications and ego ideals. 
The process of developing a coherent identity, in which identifications of 
both native and new culture provide a framework for self-acceptance, can be 
long and painful. The individual can move between the extremes of total 
assimilation to absolute rejection several times before the most suitable ego 
ideals have been found. 
Unlike the Somali community the Yemeni community can provide 
examples of third and fourth generations. Two sisters, whose mother was 
the daughter of a first generation labour immigrant from Yemen and a 
'Geordie' mother from South Shields, were prepared to talk about the 
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problems they had as they sought to adapt their Muslim background to the 
British way of life. 
It is really hard to follow this religion in a Western country, very hard. Your not 
supposed to drink, take any drugs, your supposed to cover the arms and the ankles. 
You're supposed to cover the head, you know, and it's difficult to keep that up at in this 
country at least when you were born here anyway. You know, you find that the people 
who really do stick to it are people who either come from the Yemen or from an Arab 
country. You know, because that's the way they were brought up so they just carry en 
living the same way. But, ahm, I feel like I'm a Muslim within, as long as you don't 
mention my name, I drink you see. Don't mention my name, I drink and what I did, ehm, 
I was very bad about two years ago and before that I had started to settle in to get back 
into my religion and not drink and everything, when I was really young, and then I've 
never gone back to it, you know. Right now it's Ramadan, but usually during the month 
of Ramadan I never drink alcohol or anything, you know I stick to it in that way. But 
this year because it fell over new year I went off drinking so now I have the feeling I 
haven't stuck to it this year. But it's all about charity - Islam, you know. Nobody is 
saying it's a good religion because I feel it's a true religion anyway and it all comes from 
the heart when you're charitable and kind, you know, and not wishing any bad on 
anybody. So although I do drink, I'm a Muslim. A lot of people are saying, well you're 
not a practising Muslim then, are you. I try to take it light-heartedly, but I do believe 
in my religion. It's just I find it really hard to follow the religion properly because of 
the way we live 24 
Lila lived in the Yemen for a year when her father married her off at the age 
of fourteen. When her father asked her whether she wanted to get married, 
she said no. Nevertheless he insisted, saying that she would if she loved 
him. After one year she came back to Cardiff and did not return to the 
Yemen. She would like to marry a Muslim man again but she would like 
him to be Westernised. 
A few years after Lila returned to Cardiff her mother died and her father left 
Cardiff to return to his first wife. As Lila was the oldest daughter she had to 
take care of her sisters. She had to work hard to maintain the rest of the 
family and felt that in the course of her fight for survival she eventually has 
succumbed to the Western way of life. 
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Do you think that your cultural and religious values are compatible with the Western 
way of life? No. So how do you accommodate that? Well, I'm more Westernised. So 
you really should be asking that someone who has not succumb to the Western society. 
If you talk to somebody, say now, who prays every day and goes to the mosque, they 
would tell you straight no, no. Because it's to do with religion. Although I can say 
that, you know how I am, so my views shouldn't really count there, I feel like a 
hypocrite. 
... 
I don't really agree with the Western way of living though. Although I 
drink, you know, I think that, when I speak to my own people, that the way the Arabs 
are running their lives is a lot better than the Westerners, because like, the Westerners 
don't seem to have any values at all, you know. If you look at like ... maybe not so much 
Cardiff but like say London or places like that, you know, their freedom, their parties, 
and I don't agree with that at all. The way they live is they don't care about anybody 
and when they should be caring about themselves, they don't. It's just another way of 
living and looking at life and I don't like it, to be honest. But I can't change it, can I, by 
myself. And this is a Western country, if we don't like it, we should leave 
05 
For Muslim women the integration process is more difficult than for their 
male counterparts. Whilst Islam does not prohibit marriages with women 
from the 'Ahl al Kitab' for men, Muslim women are only supposed to marry 
Muslim men. The access to the public sphere is limited for women or 
subject to conditions (such as dress code, etc. ) and the ego ideals are more 
precisely delineated than for men. Therefore -women are more in danger to 
offend against Islamic regulations in the course of integration than men are. 
Since it is easier to detect whether women offend against Islamic 
regulations, they are more conscious of their behaviour. 
Most of the female Muslim interviewees wanted to marry a Muslim man. 
The ideals varied between English converts to Westernised Muslim men of 
the same ethnic origin. Nevertheless these women have to take care of 
their reputation according to Islamic criteria and when they fail to do so, 
perhaps during an attempt to adapt to wider society, the consequences are 
often guilt feelings and a loss of self-respect. The result is ambivalent 
feelings toward British society. Whilst the individual lives an assimilated 
lifestyle, resentments for this way of life and a yearning for the culture of 
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origin accompany him/her when the individual's dreams and life plans 
were not realised. In comparison the men of the third generation of 
Muslims in Cardiff did not feel that practising Islam in this society was a 
problem. Even those interviewees who also neglected their religious 
obligations did not share any feelings of guilt. 
Hala, also a third generation Yemeni, was born in South Shields before her 
mother moved to Cardiff to live with her second husband, a Yemeni 
seafarer. Before Hala and John (half-Welsh, half-Yemeni) married, they 
both went to Clubs and enjoyed their drinks, as any Western/British citizen 
would. It was not until their son was born that they decided to practice their 
religion and gradually gave up clubbing and drinking. Hala and John do not 
feel that they are a part of Welsh society because they feel that they are 
different. In comparison to other Yemenis, they did detect hostility amongst 
the Welsh population during the Gulf War. 
The fact that John is half Welsh does not have an impact on his increasingly 
strong identification with his Islamic and Arab background. John interprets 
his Western lifestyle in the past as disoriented. When he was younger he 
had difficulties with respect for authorities. That he now adheres to Islam, 
which demands discipline and respect for authorities, is not perceived as a 
contradiction. The guidance and orientation that Islam now offers John, 
provides him with the security and self-certainty which he was always 
seeking. 
What does Islam mean to you personally? Well, for me..., it's given me spiritual 
guidance, I'm at ease with myself now, whereas before I wasn't, I was a bit turbulent. 
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I'm more of a calm person now. I was never in trouble with the police, you know like 
stupid things, you know drinking, like I said I was drinking at the time, I stopped now. 
Not because .... It was the right time for me to stop, you know, not because I thought I'm 
going with religion now, blah, blab, blah, and stop like that (he snapped his fingers). 
It didn't work that. It was the right time for me to do it and that's the way I've done 
it. Like I said don't go to deep into it, it'll make you nuts, you go crazy. 26 % 
That's what I've done. 
Such guys become fanatics. 
Was that after your mother died? No it was ... I was ... I went to Arab school, 
I was 
learning, you know, I felt in my heart that I wanted to become a proper Arab, you know. 
What I did, was I went to school, I dressed the same, I wore a head thing, I wore the 
right clothes, everything. I used to go to the mosque and I used to do my prayers five 
times a day in the mosque and ... Then I found myself sometimes, if I wanted to gp 
somewhere or other, I'd find the mosque and sit there on my own ... and I started 
thinking, everyday things, oh, that's wrong, and it wasn't, that's wrong and I can't do 
this and I can't do that ... and my mind was taken. So I went to my uncle and I said look 
this is what's happening to me. And he said to me: Allah doesn't expect you to eat, 
sleep and drink Islam all the time. That's what I found myself doing. I wasn't carin 
about nothing; all my mind was focused on was Islam, all the time through the day,... 
Hala's relatives noticed the change in her personality as she desperately 
sought to adhere to Islam. Her aunt complained that the change was not for 
the better. Hala noticed that her character was changing for the worse. She 
neglected her friendships, particularly with non-Muslims, and became 
increasingly isolated. The reason why she forced herself into such 
compulsive religious observance was because she felt that she did not have 
enough opportunity to grow into the religion as a young girl. 
I was starved of Islam, as I was growing up, and I wanted to take it all in as fast as I 
could, but that wasn't the right way to do it. And like my uncle said, you take it day by 
day, by day. I couldn't even ... how should I explain, be the way I wanted to be and 
then I just broke down. 28 
Hala had to fight a long battle with her 'self' until she found the right 
balance between adjusting to Western society and adhering to Islam. She 
experienced both extremes during her search for a coherent identity. Both 
Hala and her husband consider themselves to be observant Muslims whilst 
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maintaining their friendships and contacts with non-Muslims. For their 
son they want to be a good example of how to integrate both cultures. 
3.4. The South Asian Community in Britain 
The increasing immigration from India began with the partition of the 
Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947. The exchange of the 
Muslim, Hindu and Sikh populations of East and West Punjab and the 
additional exchange of population between East (now Bangladesh) and West 
Bengal caused mass migration. The resettlement forced hundreds of 
thousands of families to search for new homes. Many men chose to migrate 
to Britain to earn a better living for their families. Those who were already 
resident in Britain became anxious about their relatives and sent for their 
kinsmen and friends. In the early 1960's the construction of the Mangla 
Dam displaced approximately 100,000 people, primarily from Mirpur 29 The 
admission of labour immigrants into Britain was arranged at Government 
level 30 
A large proportion of migration from the Caribbean occurred during the 
1950's. Within ten years that population had grown eleven times. This and 
the Notting Hill riots of 1958, motivated the British government to 
introduce immigration control . 
3' As the news reached Pakistan that the 
British government was planning to introduce the first Commonwealth 
Immigration Act, a major rush to enter Britain began. On the 1st of July 
1962 the Immigration Act came into effect, which the Conservative 
government had passed about eighteen months before. Since the 
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is equally difficult to determine. Anwar estimates their number at 
approximately 45,000. After estimating the number of Muslims among the 
Indian population . 
Anwar made to the following conclusions: 
Table 3 
Country/Region of Origin Numbers (000s) 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi/Indian 770 
Other Asians 80 
'Other Others' 29 
Turkish Cypriots 45 
Other Muslim Countries 367 
African Muslims 115 
(New Commonwealth) 
Total 1406 
(Source: Muhammad Anwar, 'Muslims-in Britain: 1991 Census and other Statistical Sources', 
Europe, CSIC Papers, No. 9, September 1993. ) 
It has to be taken into consideration that these numbers do not include 
Muslims from non-Muslim countries such as the Caribbean, Singapore, 
Philippines or Indonesia. Nor are white Muslims and converts considered 
in these calculations. It was not possible to avoid including Christian 
minorities from the above mentioned Muslim countries. Their numbers 
are very small though and should not influence the overall estimations. 
According to Anwar the Muslim population in Britain in 1993 could be 
estimated at 1.5 million 3a 
An important demographic aspect of the Muslim population in Britain is 
the age distribution. Among ethnic minorities in general and among 
Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in particular, the population age structure is 
much younger than among the rest of the population. In 1991 just under 
half of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani group were under the age of 16 and 
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around three-quarters were under 35. Consequently Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis have one of the highest child dependency ratio (in proportion 
to the number of people of working age) 35 The fact that the majority of the 
population is young has political implications with regard to education, 
employment and service facilities for ethnic minorities. In contrast to the 
rest of the population, males outnumber females among the South Asian 
group. This fact together with the younger age structure is rooted in the 
migration history described above. Nevertheless the gender ratio is expected 
to converge in coming generations. 
The Labour Force Survey of Spring 1995 shows that according to the social 
class division, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are most concentrated in the 
skilled manual and partly skilled classes, and women are also found in the 
partly skilled class 36 
The Black and Ethnic Minority Health and Lifestyle Survey from 1992 asked 
questions related to languages spoken and read by minority groups. These 
questions were primarily directed towards the South Asian minority 
because English is generally one of the main languages of the 'Black' groups 
in Britain. The table below shows that people of Indian origin are more 
likely than Bangladeshis to be literate in English. A very high percentage of 
youngsters, who were most probably educated in Britain, speak English, 
while the older generations are less inclined to master the language. Fewer 
old women than men are literate in the English language due to less 
exposure to their British environment. 
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Table 4 English literacy among Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis37 
England Percentages 
Males Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi 
16-29 96 95 92 
30-49 93 94 72 
50-74 86 66 51 
All males aged 16 - 74 92 88 74 
Females 
16-29 89 78 68 
30-49 80 42 21 
50-74 47 15 10 
All females aged 16 - 74 77 54 42 
All aged 16-74 85 72 59 
(Source: Black and Ethnic Minority -Health and Lifestyle Survey, Health Education 
Authority, Question asked: "Which languages do you speak including English". ) 
Similar results were found when asked about their ability to read English. 
While three quarters of the Indian group said they could read English, only 
little over half of the Bangladeshi group claimed the same. Again there. was 
a decline in literacy in English with age, and women of the immigrant 
generation would be less acquainted with the English language 38 
The survey of English Housing of 1994 shows that 63 per cent of Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi live in Council estates and in low income areas, and 68 per 
cent of Pakistanis live in private houses. Around forty per cent of the 
Bangladeshi and twenty per cent of the Pakistani households said they are 
partly, or very, dissatisfied with their. accommodation 39 According to the 
1991 Census Bangladeshi and Pakistani have the largest households. The 
average Bangladeshi household would consist of more than five people and 
that of Pakistanis between four to five people 4° 
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The Labour Force Survey shows that unemployment affects the Black group 
the hardest as well as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. From all males aged 16 
to 64,21 per cent of the Black group are unemployed, 22 per cent are 
'economically inactive', and 8 per cent have part time work. Among the 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi group 18 per cent are unemployed 33 per cent are 
inactive, and 8 per cent have part time work. Consequently only two thirds 
of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were economically active at the time of 
the survey. In comparison the Indian group has 10 per cent unemployment, 
with 18 per cent of its members being inactive and the White group has the 
lowest unemployment rate at 8-per cent with 15 per cent- of its members 
being inactive. " The same survey shows that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
have the highest number of self-employment, which is around 22 per cent, 
compared to 12 per cent of the White group, 13 per cent of the Indian group 
and 8 per cent of the Black group. 42 
3.4.2. The First Generation and their Identity 
The majority of immigrants from the Indian Subcontinent were illiterate. 
They were usually offered badly paid jobs and consequently were associated 
with the lower working class. In comparison the first generation of Arab 
immigrants from Iraq or Lebanon interviewed for this study, arrived as 
students. As they grew into the British professional classes and experienced 
professional respect in their work, these individuals were able to support 
themselves. Therefore they were less inclined to isolate themselves from 
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wider society. Most of the educated Arab minority settled in London, 
although a few have moved to other big cities in the Midlands and Scotland. 
Most South Asians settled around industrial areas, where they worked 
predominantly in newly established industries and textiles. As the first 
immigrants were men who had left their families behind, they accepted 
shift work and permanent night-shift work. Usually several men joined 
together to share the purchase of a house. The areas which Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis moved to were usually poor and therefore inexpensive to 
obtain. Initially the orientation of the pioneer immigrants was home 
rooted. They came to work here tolmprove the socio-economic situation of 
their families back home. Both the host society and the Muslim immigrants 
themselves considered their residence in Britain to be temporary. 
Consequently neither made a substantial effort to create facilities for 
extended cultural and religious links between the communities. 
With the family reunion process during the 1960's and 1970's this situation 
changed drastically. As the immigrants decided to settle in Britain, and to 
bring their families into the country, the new communities began to 
establish facilities to accommodate their social, cultural and religious needs. 
Nielson described this process in 1984 in the following way: 
The focus of economic activity and social and cultural identity gradually moves from 
the villages of the Punjab and Sylhet to the inner city of London, Birmingham and 
Bradford. With the family moves also the focus of religious identity. We see the 
appearance of Muslim worship and action relating to the context of Britain 43 
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With the arrival of the families the immigrants were confronted with the 
need to pass on cultural and religious values to the next generation. To a 
large extent women fulfil this function in their role as mothers. 
Nevertheless, to preserve and transmit these values an appropriate 
environment had to be created. No longer did a small number of men have 
to cope with a temporary situation of living in an alien environment. The 
settlement of the family demanded appropriate conditions and living space 
in order to accommodate basic cultural needs. Religious education, mother- 
tongue classes, and an appropriate halal diet are only examples of the needs 
of resident Muslim communities. Traditional patriarchal family structures 
were re-established and a social. network created for support. A family is a. 
responsibility.. Apart from the provision of economic security, the head of a 
family is obliged to secure the safety and morality of the family. 
While grandparents and older generations were absent in the immigrant 
community, adults along the 'horizontal line' were numerous. South 
Asian households are, due to the family structure, larger than those of 
British society. 
For the first generation the settlement into British society was particularly 
difficult. While in the traditional Islamic world there is a division of the 
public sphere, dominated by men and the private sphere, dominated by 
women, the Western public sphere is accessible for both sexes. The 
institution that enforces the segregation of the sexes outside the family in 
Pakistan is called purdah. As South Asian families are extensive and society 
is structured according to the codes of purdah, women have their own space 
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in which they can move freely amongst each other and in which the burden 
of complex codes of dress and behaviour is alleviated. This rather isolating 
but certainly sphere for women does not exist in Western societies. 
Consequently the concept of purdah became a burden for women in Britain. 
Separated from the majority of their family, many are isolated in small 
British homes. The environment outside is even more of a threat, as it is 
alien and even basic communication with the outside world is impossible 
because most women are likely to be illiterate °4 
The older Pakistani generation appreciate that their children receive a much 
better education in -Britain, 
have the opportunity to go to university, and 
have a better chance of receiving a well-paid job. One forty-year-old 
Pakistani woman declared that she is happier back home because her friends 
and extended family are there. When the husband leaves for work and the 
children for school there are neither other women to talk to, nor parents, 
brothers or sisters to provide support or to help in the household. Like 
most Pakistani and Bangladeshi women of that age group, she never 
received an education back home. The emphasis on, and withdrawal into, 
ones own cultural and religious life is a logical consequence of such 
isolation. The fulfilment of religious obligations becomes a 'Lebensinhalt"'. 
Family ties become more important than ever, to serve as support and to 
provide 'Geborgenheit"". The interviewee admitted that the reason for her 
loneliness in Glasgow is that she does not speak English. Nevertheless she 
spoke very fondly of Britain and emphasised the high quality of the 
childcare that her daughter received when she gave birth to her twenty years 
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ago. The facilities ranging from transport and health care to education are 
appreciated by the first generation. 47 
Of interest was one complaint that was mentioned by second-generation 
interviewees. She stated that she would like to see more Asians in the 
media, particularly in the adverts. What was expressed, was the obvious 
desire to become socially accepted by visual representation in the media. It 
is also the innate craving for acknowledgement by being addressed directly 
on one's own terms. To find one's ethnic and cultural traits reflected in the 
mass media of a society, not only conveys acceptance but also supports the 
individual's identity. Everybody needs objects of identification. It is easier 
to identify with images of the same ethnic and cultural background than 
with foreign faces. Since the media and particularly the advertising industry 
seek to stimulate consumerism, ethnic minorities want to feel directly 
addressed as any other potential consumer. Now that Asians shape the 
image of British society, they feel marginalised and under-represented in the 
media, which is still dominated by white society. 
The first generation is still predominantly home oriented. All the 
interviewees of that generation have maintained their extended families in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Some managed to build beautiful houses in their 
villages of origin and are proud to show pictures and videos of their homes. 
And when they see my house back home they could not believe it. They say what the 
hell you're doing in Scotland when you have a place like that? Well, if I was not here 
I most probably would not have that place. You know they don't realise that. So I 
make life very comfortable for my children, so up to them what they make for their 
children. 48 
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One of the biggest ego-satisfactions among this generation is their economic 
achievement. To improve the living standard of their family back home 
and in Britain demanded a lot of discipline and personal sacrifice. The 
rewards are the satisfaction of having successfully provided for their 
families and the respect they receive from their family members in return. 
Women express their respect by obeying the head of the family. The male 
family members aim to improve the family status. The honour of the 
family is a well-protected value. First generation Muslim identity is thus 
based on their well-situated and honourable family. 
3.4.2.1. Kinship and Biraderi 
Kinship is a set of ties socially recognised as existing between persons because of their 
genealogical connections. It includes affinal relations created by marriage as well as 
those of descent. 49 
Kinship determines the co-operation between kin in business and family 
maintenance. The structure is patriarchal and the whole family respects the 
authority of the male head of the household. Strong ties with the family in 
Pakistan are maintained and parental authority, even when the father 
remained in Pakistan, will extend to Britain. Every member of the family 
has responsibilities and obligations towards the rest of the family. 
The obligations to relatives and non-relatives are regulated by the 
institution of Biraderi (Biradar - brother) in Pakistani society. Biraderi 
provides mutual support in times of hardship and is maintained by the 
exchange of gifts. The exchange of gifts, also known as Vartan Bhanji 
(dealing with sweets) is also used to establish relationships with people 
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outside the Biraderi. This. term is also applied to relationships in which 
every party can feel free to ask favours of each other 50 Based on this kin 
network newcomers from Pakistan can rely on their kin to help them settle 
in Britain. 
Close ties with kin and friends alleviate the struggle of every day life. Early 
immigrants obtained houses close to each other, renting spare rooms to 
friends and kin at nominal rent. As family members started to arrive they 
joined their siblings, fathers, or husbands. When the accommodation 
became too crowded new houses were bought near by, for which money was 
usually borrowed from kin. Soon the lifestyle became similar to that of a- 
Pakistani village. This environment provided the possibility for mutual aid 
and physical and emotional support when needed. The fact that most 
immigrants were not fluent in English, made them more dependent on 
each other. 
The kin network served another important purpose. The majority of South 
Asian immigrants came from underdeveloped areas of India and Pakistan. 
With their arrival in the United Kingdom they faced a culture shock. They 
had to cope with the sudden confrontation with Western City life and 
people of a different race, with a different mentality, speaking a different 
language. So not only did they have to adjust to the city 'mentality', but also 
to the Western 'mentality' and way of life. In such an alien environment 
the first immigrant pioneers could only rely on each other for support. 
Consequently they moved together, supported each other and their kin 
which followed on later, to establish a well functioning social network. 
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Those who arrived later were able to integrate quickly into this communal 
life and to build their future on already well established social networks s' 
Shops, other ethnic facilities, and services became meeting points where 
information and news was exchanged. Shopkeepers usually spoke English 
and could also be drawn upon as interpreters. The English language as well 
as contacts within and outside of the community gave entrepreneurs an 
advantage over the rest of the community and enabled them to act as 
community leaders. In response to new problems and challenges such 
community leaders quickly realised that they could only expect support 
from local governmental institutions if they speak and act in the name of an 
institution. Soon numerous organisations, led by one or two men, were 
created with the intention to make wider society aware of, and to 
accommodate, the Muslim communities' needs. Pnina Werbner pointed 
out that 
... increasingly, much Pakistani voluntary activity has as its aim the achievement of 
greater and more elaborate 'institutional completeness' J2 
3.4.2.2. Cultural, Sectarian and Class Divisions 
As has become evident above, the Muslim community in Britain is far from 
homogeneous. Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Arabs, North Africans, Iranians, 
Turks, Malaysians, Africans, etc., all have their own communal life. Their 
different cultural background has to be distinguished from Islamic culture 
itself. Most of these ethnic groups have formed their own ethnic 
organisations. These ethnic divisions are as such un-Islamic. The first 
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generation of immigrants does not differ much between Islam and cultural 
traditions. Instead religion is frequently employed to legitimise cultural 
traditions. Therefore a threat to cultural values is often perceived as a threat 
to Islam. 
Both in the Muslim world and in Britain many of these ethnic 
communities are again subdivided into `sectarian groupings'. Examples of 
such groups include the Barelvis, the Deobandis, the Tablighi Jamaat (centre 
in Dewsbury), the Ahl-e-Hadith, the Pervaizi, the Modernists, the 
Revivalists, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Shi' ite Muslims. The majority of 
Muslims in Britain are Barelvis. However,, until today these. divisions have 
made it virtually impossible for the Muslim minorities to create a unity 
among the Islamic community. The strong interdependency within the 
communities makes it very difficult, especially for the first generation, to 
penetrate sectarian boundaries. The competitive spirit between the sectarian 
groups hampers the formation of a community. 
Apart from cultural and sectarian divisions the Muslim community is also 
divided according to the class structure. The British social class stratification 
according to occupation (professional, intermediate, skilled non-manual, 
skilled manual, partly skilled and unskilled), differs completely from the 
Asian class structure, which is determined by income (wealth-business elite, 
professional status-elite) and religious family background (familial pedigree 
relating them to the Prophet's family or a family of religious elite). The 
British class system has upset the traditional Asian structures. The religious 
elite no longer receives the respect it did in its home country and those 
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Asians who have acquired wealth are still not accepted as equals among 
British society. Those Asians (and Arabs) who managed to acquire wealth 
were able to do so because they adjusted to the British society. They limited 
their religious practice to the private sphere and their ties to the rest of the 
community have weakened. The poor members of the community 
maintained strong adherence to their religion. Mohammad Raza attributed 
the lack of motivation among British Muslims to donate money to Islamic 
institutions, to the absence of community spirit, which was never able to 
evolve due to the national/ethnic/class and status divisions. He further 
argued that this is the reason why Muslim organisations accept donations 
-from 
Middle Eastern countries and are --subsequently exposed to their 
influence 53 
3.4.2.3. The Islamic Identity of the First Generation 
The sectarian influences on the first generation of Asian immigrants 
fostered the establishment of community networks in Britain. 
Nevertheless, it has now become a source of conflict between the 
generations. As illustrated in part two, most South Asian Islamic 
movements have developed in response to British influence in India and as 
a self-protecting mechanism for a Muslim minority among a Hindu 
majority. That is to say, the first generation of South Asian Muslims was 
well prepared for their minority status in Britain. This circumstance 
contributed to the rapid establishment. of religious institutions in Britain 
and to a reliable self-sufficiency in this context. 
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As this generation settled in Britain they drew upon their experiences with 
British India. Withdrawn from wider society, these Muslims built on 
family support and also brought their imams from their region of origin for 
support and spiritual guidance. The imams were imported from the 
country of origin, mostly the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and often from the 
villages and biraderies. These imams continued to preach and teach Islam 
the way they always did at home. By transplanting these imams to Britain, 
South Asian Muslims have institutionalised their traditional, culturally 
blemished religious practices. 
_ 
For most of the members of the first generation, migration from--rural to 
urban areas caused social disruption in traditional life. Having been 
transplanted into an environment where it has become an intellectual 
pleasure to question all existing orders, to face all traditional orthodoxy with 
scepticism and to look for multiple interpretations of all phenomena 
including religion, and where the loss of faith and the celebration of 
pluralism have become the norm, most Muslim immigrants try to counter 
their feeling of powerlessness (Ohnmacht) by retreating into their cultural 
and religious traditions. Lacking sufficient knowledge of the English 
language and preoccupied with the battle of economic survival, holding 
onto that which provides most reassurance is the easiest coping strategy. 
Since Islam always has been the frame of orientation for these Muslims in 
their home countries, it should not surprise that Islam has become the focal 
point and primary source of orientation in the West. 
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The majority of South Asian Muslims in Britain belong to the Barelwis, 
who adhere to the "custom-laden style of Sufism and closely allied 
themselves to the teachings of the medieval pirsi51. Nevertheless it is 
difficult to quantify the Barelwis in numbers because not all Muslims who 
adhere to this approach to Islam would necessarily define themselves as 
such. This kind of Islam is primarily practiced by people who have their 
origin in the rural areas of the subcontinent. It follows that there are also 
regional differences among the Barelwis, as each community perpetuates its 
own local customs by oral tradition. In Britain, these regional differences 
were maintained due to chain migration and the pattern of settlement. 
Since South Asian immigrants usually settled close to family members and 
friends, and as the imams were recruited from the same villages or districts, 
the disruption of religious practice was only temporarily. Usually not well 
acquainted with the English language, these imams perpetuate local rituals 
and customs 55 For the first generation, which is home oriented, these 
traditional imams provide spiritual shelter from an alien environment. 
Thus the personal nature of the small mosques allow these Muslims to 
retreat into a symbolic reconstruction of home, where kinship and ethnic 
ties are reinforced and where their problems and concerns are understood. 
In their mosques, which were established to serve only a small 
congregation, the congregation reasserts characteristic communal customs. 
The identification with the particularities of every communal mosque is 
very strong. Mosques serve the religious needs of the community as much 
as they serve as meeting points for the older generation, in particular men. 
Members of other mosques are usually not well received. Religious 
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observance and attendance at the mosque does not only serve the purpose of 
religious observance, but also reinforces a very particular custom-laden 
ritualisation of life. It is an isolated environment where individuals who 
share the same belief and cultural background assemble and are able to 
escape the alien reality outside. The sectarian and ethnic divisions among 
the mosques reinforce this feeling of belonging to a particular group and 
strengthen the bond within it. These sectarian and cultural differences have 
made it difficult to combat the fragmentation of the Muslim community. 
Since the sixties an increasing number of mosques were registered. In 1966, 
18 mosques were registered, whilst the number had risen from -136 in: -1977, 
to 338 in 1985 and to 487 in 1993 (in the same year the Multi-Faith Directory 
lists 650 mosques in the UK) and at present it is estimated that there are 
approximately 950 mosques in Britain. 
These numbers do not include unofficial prayer houses. The ethnic and 
religious divisions among Muslims and the fact that mosques should be 
established close to residence or the working place of Muslims have lead to 
an explosive increase in mosques over the past thirty to forty years. 
Although the Pakistani community has built the majority of the mosques 
and the subcontinental Muslims dominate religious life, it contributes little 
to a sense of unity among the community. 
Other Islamic movements from the subcontinent which have also 
contributed to the diversity of religious institutions, are primarily 
reformation movements. In Britain reform groups such as the Deobandis, 
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Ahl-Hadith and Tabligh-i Jamaat, could build on already tight-knit 
organisations back home. The reformation movements were committed to 
dawah activity among Muslims in the subcontinent and the rest of the 
world. In Britain they quickly responded to the 'new community's' 
dilemma of lacking religious institutional organisation. 
The Deobandi together with the Barelwis have the widest support among 
the South Asian Muslim community 56 Frequently conflicts have arisen 
over the control of mosques between the two movements. The Deobandi 
supporters tend to be of urban background and more educated members of 
the ccmmunity. In response--to-their minority situation under colonial rule 
in India, the Deobandis always stressed correct ritual and practice as an 
important criterion for Muslim life. Their approach also appealed to 
Barelwis in Britain. The Deobandi ulema quickly responded to the need for 
effective religious guidance. By 1967, they had founded the Majilis Ulema 
UK in order to increase the efficiency of their activities. The ulema issue 
fatwas to ensure correct practice of Islam in Britain; they establish the correct 
time for prayers and the beginning and end of Ramadan. They also organise 
the supply of halal food and campaign for separate Muslim schools for girls 
as well as the acceptance of Muslim family law by Parliaments' 
Although the programme of the Deobandi movement intends to promote 
the orthodoxy of universal Islam and seeks to unite the Ummah they are 
not free from ethnic and class influences. Maulana Muhammad Raza, a 
theologian of Barelwi background and head of the Muslim Shariah Council, 
believes that although leaders will always emerge who seek to unite the 
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Muslims and who will preach the universality of Islam, such divisions 
among Muslims will always continue to exist. 
I know many, many Muslims who are advocating the global main of Islam in the West. 
They are concerned about this sectarian image of the Muslim community in this country. 
But personally I do not subscribe to their approach at all. It may be an idealistic 
approach of those leaders who are advocating a global Islam in this country, but if you 
have a realistic approach then we have to admit that these divisions are going to 
remain in this community and these divisions have been in this community for the last 
thirteen hundred years. So always there have been leaders who have been advocating 
the universal character of Islam and unity and global major of Islam, but ... everybody 
who knows the history of Islam and the history of the Muslim community from the last 
thirteen hundred years, knows that we had so many great politicians, leaders, kings, 
and Sufis, and scholars, but despite of their best efforts it had not been possible for any 
of the rulers or politicians or philosophers or Muslim scholars to get Muslims together 
and eliminate these sectarian trends or currents of the Muslim community at all. So 
what is the realistic solution of this problem for me: let us recognise all of them, let us 
allow all of them to flourish and to access their own capacity according to their own 
resources; and at the same time accept the challenge and try to formulate a minimum 
formula or a minimum programme of bringing all of them together on certain oDmmon 
issues. That is the realistic approach that may be successful in the future 58 
A young imam from the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK admits that the divisions 
among the Muslim community have caused a lot of problems in the past. 
However, the second generation tend to search for the universal elements 
of the teachings, rather than to focus on the divisions. 
In the 80's I can remember, when I used to go to school here, at that time it was very 
difficult among the Muslims, or in the sects. Like they were saying that these are so 
and so group, that belongs to so and so group, we shouldn't talk to each other or we 
shouldn't listen to those people. We had with that a lot of problems, but hamdu-1 
allah, the things are going better now. ... The younger generation plus the older people 
now they thought that it's time to give up. We shouldn't fight now and we shouldn't 
attack each other, we shouldn't do these things. The young generation and the new 
Muslims or the new comers into Islam, they realised that these sect fights are ... that 
that's all nonsense. We should base on Qur'an and Sunna 59 
In the past the Ahl-i Hadith propagated a policy of separation from non- 
Muslim society. 6° This policy is slowly changing as British converts change 
the ethnic reality of the Muslim communities in Britain. Despite the fact 
that the members of the Ahl-i Hadith seek to maintain their strict 
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observance of Islam concurrent with the Qur'an and Sunna, the young 
imam, who arrived in Britain at the age of ten, reassured that the imams of 
his generation have a less rigid approach to their pupils and congregation. 
Children ask a lot of questions and I think that's a great thing to do. The Qur'an itself 
says that the Qur'an is not just to read, Qur'an is to read and understand. Islam itself 
says that we should read and understand, not to just read, and here the young children 
or young peoples, before they do anything they ask, and. that's brilliant, I think. 
That's one of the best things I've learned from here, from this country. Even if they ask 
you awkward questions. ... Did 
You find that some imams of the old tradition ... Well, 
as I told you earlier, the imams we had while I went to school and the mosque back in 
Sheffield, that's where I'm from, those imams they couldn't speak English, they 
couldn't answer questions. We had lots of problems, yes. They used to say to us keep 
quiet, and do this, this. Well, I could speak our language, but the majority of most 
pupils, in those days even, they couldn't. So we didn't know what the imam was 
saying. We were just reading Qur'an and that's it, not understanding it. 61 
Younger imams have partly received their religious education in Saudi 
Arabia. Although they may not be born in Britain, they have spent most of 
their youth in this country. They have received much of their general 
education in Britain and are acquainted with the less authoritarian teaching 
methods. Nevertheless, the older imams still have an influence on their 
congregation and continue to hold on to the old traditions. "' 
A factor which has motivated organisations like the UK Islamic Mission to 
refrain from emphasising its affiliation to the Jamaat-i Islami seems to be 
the struggle for support and the competition among the South Asian 
Islamic movements. The Jamaat-i Islami propagates Maulana Mawdudi's 
ideas and thus seeks to lead the Ummah back to its original purity of faith 
and political greatness. As Mawdudi's concept of an Islamic state is less 
relevant in an environment where Muslims are a minority, the 
sympathisers of Jamaat-i Islami focus on dawah instead. Although the 
Jamaat-i Islami has not established itself in Britain as an official 
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organisation, it does exist as a movement. The UK Islamic Mission, Young 
Muslims UK, The Islamic Foundation and The Muslim Educational Trust 
were identified by Jorgen Nielsen as Jamaat related. 3 All these 
organisations employ the ideas of Mawdudi but work in different areas 
concurrent with the perceived needs of the community. Nevertheless, they 
all claim to be independent from the Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent 
and of each other. This trend was encouraged by the second generation that 
seeks to strip their religious adherence from ethnic and cultural bonds and 
emphasise their loyalty to the Ummah and the 'Islamic Movement' rather 
than to the Islamic movements of the subcontinent. 
- Representatives of the South Asian movements all share in common that 
they have responded to the individual needs of their congregations. They 
provide the Muslim communities with guidance and religious orientation 
concurrent with the traditions of their regions of origin. Since the main 
Islamic sources, the Qur'an and the Hadith, do not elaborate on regulations 
for Muslims living outside of dar al-Islam, Muslims in Britain frequently 
search for reassurance from their imams. Fatwas give advice on how to live 
and behave in a non-Muslim environment to ensure Muslims do not err 
from their religious course. The obsession with the details of religious 
observance is characteristic for South Asian Muslims who traditionally 
countered the threat of deviation among a non-Muslim majority in this 
way. The isolationism, most commonly applied by Deobandis, is a self- 
protecting mechanism that complicates the process of integration. 
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One can observe a slow change in approach to sectarian divisions, which 
cannot be directly categorised into the first and second generation of 
immigrants. The younger generation of imams, who belong to the first 
generation of immigrants but have arrived at a younger age in Britain, are 
the first to generate a change in approach. The education they have received 
in Saudi Arabia enable them to identify cultural rituals that were added to 
the religion by their South Asian ancestors. In spite of the tendency toward 
'scripturalism' among these younger imams they still adhere to the various 
movements they belong to. Among the reformation movements 
particularly the idea of reforming and purifying religious practice among the 
Muslim community in Britain remains. the highest goal, which they follow 
according to the teachings of their subcontinental theologians. To ensure 
the perpetuation of their movements, the Deobandi's, for example, founded 
their own colleges, the Dar al-Ulums, for the religious education of new 
generations of imams. An example of the difficulties involved in 
establishing an Islamic institution for education, independent of sectarian 
and political influences, is best illustrated by the founding history of the 
Muslim College. 
3.4.2.4. The Muslim College: An Example 
The Muslim College was established in order to provide a better training for 
the new generation of imams and to teach them how to convey Islam in a 
Western environment. The founding history of the Muslim College is 
exemplar for the struggle involved in establishing new institutions for the 
Muslim community. Dr. Zaki Badawi, the founder of the Muslim College 
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was previously director of the Islamic Centre of Regents Park. During the 
course of his work he developed contacts with many mosques and their 
imams in Britain. The standard of qualification of these imams was 
inadequate. Not only did these imams lack sufficient knowledge of Islam 
they were also ignorant of the English culture and language. Consequently 
Dr. Badawi suggested to the Council of the Regent's Park Mosque 
(constituted of the ambassadors of twenty-eight Muslim countries) to 
establish a college for the education of imams in Britain. The proposition 
was poorly received. A shortage of money and disputes over the location of 
such a college caused tension. As Dr. Badawi finished his contract at the end 
of 1981 he founded a company called the Muslim College Limited.. --He sent 
his plans to the various governments that could afford to fund the college. 
My vision was quite simple. First it'll have to be independent; that is to say you have 
a fund to be always there. If a coup happens in the country or the ruler changes his 
mind the fund remains. This is one condition. And the fund will be invested and the 
associates would meet the essential needs of the college. The second is that the college 
should remain completely outside politics. They have nothing to do with politics, 
particularly with politics amongst the Muslim states. Third, the college should 
remain outside fractions, you know sectarian divide. It should be open to all the sects. 
And finally the college should not discriminate against women that women are 
discriminated against. These were my conditions. And clearly the insistence that the 
academic freedom of the college be maintained, totally and without reserve, was 
something some of the donors were not very happy about. The people from the 
ambassador of Saudi Arabia spoke to me, but he said at the time, he said that his 
people would not agree with the independence of the college, they would like to have 
it follow the Saudi Arabian line. 64 
Other countries were showing little interest because Dr. Badawi demanded a 
minimum investment of five million pounds. Dr. Badawi wanted to 
establish a Muslim college in Britain because he believed that only outside 
of the Muslim world such a college could be free of sectarian and political 
culture. He rejected generous financial contributions from Saudi Arabia, 
which twice exceeded the Libyan support offered in order to insure the 
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independence of the college. His aim was to prepare a new generation of 
imams for their work in Britain. Consequently this could best be achieved if 
they are educated in a Western country. The project also had to be realised 
quickly. Apart from the fact that the religious qualification of most imams 
was insufficient, they too were unable to communicate with wider society 
and the authorities. Therefore the Muslim communities remained in 
isolation which was frequently encouraged by the ideology of the 
movements some of the imams adhered to. The first generation of Muslim 
immigrants respected their imams as the most educated in the community. 
In Britain however, their education was too limited to accommodate all the 
needs of the community. Particularly,.. the second generation quickly 
recognised the inadequacy of these imams and were reluctant to go to the 
mosque. ' 
The education of the new generation of imams should therefore reach 
beyond sectarianism and inner communal power struggles. The students 
are made aware of the perspectives of the various Islamic movements, the 
world religions, the values and mechanisms of Western and other societies 
in the course of their studies. The aim of this education is to prevent 
intolerance toward other societies and their religions. One precaution 
which should prevent the future young imams from becoming dependent 
and thus corruptible, is that students are expected to apply to the Muslim 
College after their first degree so that they are also able to maintain 
themselves by working in different professions. 
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In this spirit Dr. Badawi also re-established the Shariah Council under the 
imams and Mosques Council in order to provide religious guidance for the 
community. 
According to the Shariah, if a Muslim community exists outside of the Land of Islam 
they should refer their problems to the most knowledgeable person or persons within 
their community. So we happened to be the most knowledgeable and therefore we do 
that. So we started the Shariah Council.... And one characteristic of the Shariah 
Council, it does not exist anywhere else, is that it combines all the schools of thought, 
so we have the Sunni, the Shi'a, and everybody. Later on every community now has its 
own Shariah council 66 
Particularly the Saudi government tends to finance institutions that parallel 
organisations whose founders refused to follow the Saudi line. 
3.4.3. Muslim Organisations and the Institutionalisation of Islam 
Dr. Raza identified four types of Muslim organisations: agent, sectarian, 
service, and independent. Divisions and competition between Muslim 
organisations complicate effective organisation and make them vulnerable 
to external influences and manipulation. They also become ineffective in 
countering the increasing 'Islamophobia' in Western countries. 
Most Muslim organisations in Britain were originally established to 
organise the provision of praying facilities and religious education for 
Muslim children. They also sought to accommodate other needs such as 
halal food and to lobby for girls' schools and the introduction of Islamic 
holidays. 
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The organisations' effectiveness depends on the external support received, 
because divisions among the community prevent an effective distribution 
of donations. Those organisations, which could build on the facilities of 
sister organisations on the subcontinent or those that received funding from 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, grew very quickly. Other organisations were 
founded on the grounds of private initiative of educated members of the 
community and in many cases the lack of funds has made it very difficult to 
achieve the set aims. Due to the reactionary nature of some of the South 
Asian movements and the ineffectiveness of many organisations, the 
Muslim community experienced a swamp of 'leaders'. The traditional 
leaders have received - competition from. the professional classes, which 
have taken the initiative to accommodate the needs of the community. 
According to Dr. Raza, Saudi Arabia funds over 800 organisations and many 
imams are directly funded by the Saudi embassy. An estimated 50 million 
pounds were invested in Britain over the past decade. The Islamic 
revolution in Iran proved that a revolution could be initiated from abroad. 
Therefore the investment in Muslim communities all over the world is 
intended to win sympathy for the Wahabi school of law and to propagate it 
as the 'official and universal' Islam. A broad acceptance by Muslims all over 
the world should protect the 'Westernised elite' from major criticism and 
attacks by Islamists abroad and in the Middle East. 
The Jamaat-i Islami for example, is said to receive financial support from 
Saudi Arabia for their political activity in Pakistan. Dr. Badawi assumes that 
the Jamaat-i Islami related organisations in Britain use their bases in this 
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country to influence the political situation in Pakistan. Although they 
represent only two percent of the Muslim community in Britain, they 
receive approximately eighty percent of the Saudi money. "' 
Dr. Sidiqqi from the Islamic Foundation rejected direct association with the 
Jamaat-i Islami. He explained that the founder of the Islamic Foundation 
adhered to the Jamaat-i Islami, as most first generation immigrants adhere 
to one of the South Asian movements. However, the Islamic Foundation 
as it is now, has developed in its own right and is purely financed by the sale 
of publications and community donations. Nevertheless, Dr. Sidiqqi 
admitted that individual Saudi citizens who do not intend to influence the 
organisation have funded some projects. He also declared that the foreign 
policy of other countries does not have any effect on the institution. The 
focus of the organisation is directed on research, publication and training for 
the younger generations. The training is primarily concerned with religious 
education, Arabic classes and preparation for a life in a plural society. "' 
The UK Islamic Mission also focuses on education of children, charity and 
the arrangements of marriages. All their activities evolve around their aim 
to establish an Islamic social order in the United Kingdom. 
The Mission seeks to observe and establish Islam fully in its original purity, based an 
the teachings of the Holy Qur'an. ... We are also doing dawah, the invitation to Islam 
... last year there were four hundred and forty, who converted to Islam. They were a1I 
British people 69 
The Islamic Mission organises training sessions for their activists and also 
for the police, nursing staff and social services, lectures at Islamic schools, 
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colleges and universities, encourages meetings with other organisations and 
distributes Islamic literature. 70 The nature of these activities is similar to 
those of the Islamic Foundation. Although the members of the UK Islamic 
Mission insisted that they are not related to the Jamaat-i Islami, the 
literature they distribute most, are translated publications from Maulana 
Mawdudi. The funding for all these projects is raised by organising charities 
and from contributions from the six thousand members of the Islamic 
Mission. The branches of the UK Islamic Mission have to finance 
themselves so that the communities concerned support the projects in their 
own region. " 
The UK Islamic Mission is very traditional in its approach to the Muslim 
community. Headed by traditional religious leadership, the organisation 
perpetuates a very pious and community centred life in Britain. Although 
S. T. H. Shah emphasised that the UK Islamic Mission encourages its 
members and supporters to participate as active members of British society 
and to avoid isolation, there is a strong indication that this participation 
should not lead to major social adaptation. 
The leadership's primary focus on religion led to the promotion of an 
exclusively Islamic identity among the community. Due to the nature of 
South Asian Islamic movements one of the primary strategies to win 
support for the Islamic cause in the West is by dawah, the invitation to 
Islam. 
We should only find an Islamic identity, only, we should call ourselves the Muslims, 
but we can't keep your cultural way at all, that's a part of it. At the same time if we 
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just keep our culture and follow the Qur'an, then ... 
Do you see some Western values as a 
threat to Islamic identity? I do only on one topic and that is the Holy War. That the 
Westerns, they try to block the Muslims, those who are fighting for Islam in the 
Muslim countries. ... 
How do you see the future of Islam in Great Britain? Well, the 
future of Islam in Great Britain I think looks bright, yes, and from my less experience, 
I've got friends, brothers here in the UK, the future of Islam is very, very bright, and 
you know, lots of people coming to Islam. And Islam is growing faster but it's not as it's 
supposed to be. ... 
Do you think that Islamic life in Western society will change? Yes, 
it definitely will. In which way? Well, not Islamic life, but Western life will change 
into Islamic. 72 
The sectarian organisations predominantly focus on the Muslim 
community. They lack sufficient knowledge of the social and political 
mechanisms of the society they live in. In order to compensate for this 
deficit, the professional members of the Muslim community have 
established umbrella organisations which seek to unite all the organisations 
and leaders of mosques to work as pressure groups and to lobby. The leaders 
of such organisations are usually well acquainted with the mechanisms of 
British society as they have established themselves within their professions 
as journalists, doctors, barristers, businessmen, etc. 
3.4.3.1. Muslim Umbrella Organisations and their Political Aims 
The Muslim leadership in Britain was pre-occupied with internal 
differences among the leadership. The strong strive for individualism 
hampered the dynamics of developing a strong representative body for the 
Muslim community in Britain. The attempts to exert influence on British 
public politics have lacked impact due to the divisions and differences 
among the Muslim leadership. A consolidation of forces is nevertheless 
slowly evolving. Political participation at national level is necessary to 
promote interests of the community, but at present the Muslim community 
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is still struggling from isolation that arose through the controversy over the 
Rushdie Affair. 
At the moment Muslim leaders are trying to convince the British 
government to grant Muslims the status of a religious minority opposed to 
that of ethnic minorities. The Race Relations Act of 1976 only refers to the 
rights of ethnic minorities but does not consider issues such as incitement to 
religious hatred. Therefore leaders like Dr. Pasha from the Union of 
Muslim Organisations (UMO) lobby the government to acknowledge the 
. need 
for legal religious protection. Such a law, whether in the form of a 
separate- law or as an extension- of the Race. Relations Act, should cover 
issues such as blasphemy and discrimination of Muslims by their employers 
with regard to religious holidays and dress code. Also state funded Muslims 
schools were the subject of political initiative. Here Muslim pressure 
groups were successful. The new Labour Government responded to their 
large Muslim electorate by accepting the application of two Muslim schools 
in Birmingham for state support in 1998. Although this has only been a 
small step forward, Muslim organisations have proven that their initiative 
and persistence do lead to improvements. In order for the Muslim 
community to fully manifest its Islamic identity Dr. Pasha also campaigns 
for the implementation of Muslim family law. 
Anyhow, one intention is that there is a special law for religion for the Scottish people 
and the laws are different for the English people, so if it is possible to have two laws 
for religion for two separate British citizens, so certainly it is possible to have a law 
for religion for the Muslim people. The government says, well look these are on the 
geographical lines not on the religious lines. That is not really a sound proposition. So 
on the whole we are lobbying the Members of Parliament. And some political parties 
are trying to seriously talk about what we are proposing - the Labour Party. The 
Conservatives are very much against, 1-don't know why. Although they are the people 
who we are expecting very much support. You see they are conservatives, we are 
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conservatives. In a sense we are trying to conserve our value system. So we talk to the 
Conservatives and the Home Secretary but they are less supporting. But still we are 
putting pressure, we have begged the Home Secretary several times, not only this Home 
Secretary, all his predecessors, we had delegations wearing them ... and we've put forward all these proposals and we said: look we are law abiding citizens, we are 
peaceful citizens, we are asking are asking for certain rights within the framework of 
your constitution, although it's an unwritten constitution, but we are accepting freedom 
of religion, we are asking for certain facilities for us to practice our religious values, our 
religious tenures and laws. Without disturbing the general law here. We are asking for 
example, for separate criminal law for us, law of property. Constitutional law, there 
are so many, the whole range of laws they are so huge, but we are just asking one 
speciality, personal laws: married, divorce, and not adoption because we don't have 
legal adoption, maintenance, wills, gifts, you see, so limited scope. So we are still 
putting pressure,. we went to the Chancellors office, we had a meeting with some 
officials, and the latest situation is, we are trying to harmonise the law to recognise 
the Muslim law of marriage. Although it is performed under the Islamic law they are 
willing to accept to give it equal status along with the marriage performed in civil law 
here. But just by name, by implication there is not much consequence. 
Especially, what happens when somebody wants to marry four women or two women? 
Yea, that's what I'm saying, they are rejecting this. They are just accepting one 
marriage. 3 
The UMO was the only umbrella organisation for over fifteen years. The 
fact that little has been achieved in that time has encouraged other leading 
members of the community to establish organisations which should fulfil 
such a role. The Muslim parliament for example, works as an umbrella 
organisation and a pressure group. Also Mr. Iqbal Sacranie head of the UK 
Action Committee on Islamic Affairs has founded a new umbrella 
organisation to increase the effectiveness of Muslim organisation. He 
believes that it is the duty of every Muslim to contribute to the community. 
By encouraging the sense of unity, the Muslim community in Britain will 
be able to draw from enormous resources. The diversity of the new 
generation born in Britain represents a capacity that must be co-ordinated so 
that the whole of the community can benefit. To help the next generation 
succeed in their profession, while at the same time creating an environment 
in which they can maintain their identity and accommodate their cultural 
and social needs, is an important task ahead. 
356 
Mr. Iqbal Sacranie considers Muslim response to the Rushdie Affair to be 
one of the most important experiences the community has made. As the 
founder and head of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, which he 
established to take more effective measures against the Satanic Verses, Mr. 
Sacranie experienced first hand the unity of, and the consensus among, the 
Muslim community. The Rushdie Affair has taught the community how to 
overcome the divisions between the movements and classes and to work 
together for a common aim. He believes that the unity Muslims have 
demonstrated in response to this issue has brought respect from the whole 
Ummah for the efforts British Muslims have made to protect Islam. 74 
To found an organisation that will unite all British Muslims and create 
consensus on important issues concerning Muslims is "an expression of 
maturity and identity, bearing in mind the progress, which has been taking 
place over the yearsi75. 
So the claim of being an umbrella organisation by several organisations is quite 
apparent. I think that the judgement will be given only by the community. Leadership 
is not claimed it is earned. So whether it will be Sacrani or any other body, the 
community is going to judge it only within the next five years. The opportunity is for 
everybody who is going to do something, who wishes to do something, equal 
opportunity is there but if somebody does something for the community it will be 
them 76 
Dr. Raza confirmed that the majority of Muslims and leaders of mosques or 
organisations recognise the need of a platform that will function in a similar 
way to the Jewish Boards of Deputies. However, even Dr. Kalim Siddiqui's 
(Muslim Parliament) attempt to create such a platform has lost support over 
the years. At first the Muslim Institute was very successful and over three 
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hundred leaders and speakers of the community attended their meetings, 
whereas at present not more that fifty attend. " 
Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, the founder of the Muslim Institute was a journalist by 
profession. He was well acquainted with the British media and knew how 
to draw attention to the needs of the Muslim community. He employed all 
means available in a democratic Western country. Opposed to simply 
searching for dialogue with British politicians, the Muslim Parliament 
employs pressure. 
When it comes to the methods to achieve your aims, you have said they vary from 
fundraising to sort of media work... 
It is fundraising, media work and campaigning, I mean for example, recently on 
Lebanon, we wrote a letter, I could get you a copy of it, to every single member of these 
two thousand, and we asked them to do a number of things or one of the number of 
things: 
1. to help fundraising for emergency relief; 
2. to put pressure on the government, by writing to their MP's, writing to the Prime 
Minister, we even put the phone number of the Prime Minister, Downing Street 
number 10, and we said dial this number and ask them why is it that our 
government is supporting a terrorist state and terrorism. And you know ... 
3. and we asked them to contact every media, local or national and put them under 
pressure. 
Now that to us, that is more effective than sending 2000 people in the street ... 
shouting, 2000 people calling 10 Downing Street, you know, it is much more effective 
than 2000 people going in the street and holding placards. 
And especially it doesn't give you a bad media ... Yes, with the telephone, you phone and put the ... and you know, the idea is that jam 
the phone lines of 10 Downing Street, jam the phone lines of BBC, ITV, you know, when 
they do something, make life difficult for them. And this is a better way of 
campaigning, and this is the sort of thing we prefer to do. And also we do press releases 
into media, we put ... there is not a .. if there are days that goes without us being 
involved with some work with media, there is not a week that goes by without three or 
four involvements of different aspect of media, and these all range from our own projects 
or helping the media to reflect better what the needs of our community are, and what 
perspective of different things are. 8 
Their activities are not restricted to the representation of the Muslim 
community in Britain, but are extended to the Ummah. The Human Rights 
committee raises funds for the Muslim struggle against oppression in 
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Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya and for the families and orphans whose kin 
died in course of this struggle. 
The Muslim Parliament, we were talking about the Human Rights committee. The 
Muslim Parliament has been involved in a number of things, for example, we have just 
done a major thing on the Home Office strategy regarding Muslims, I don't know if you 
have received that, now that probably came out after your last visit, that is quite a 
major document which is how we see that Islam and Muslims are being dealt with by 
not just the British government but also European government, how they are trying to 
manipulate the Muslim organisations, and so forth. It is quite a major work that has 
been done. And also we do have the tutorial colleges which is going ahead, we do have 
the war crime watch, this sort of project, we do have the Bosnian orphans and how we 
are going to expand it to elsewhere. We have set up a project which is supporting the 
families of those who have died in the cause of Islam, right across the board, Algeria, 
Bosnia, Chechnya, we have got this project, we are going to extend it to Lebanon and to 
Palestine. This, you know, is our major work, we match up families, so one family here 
supports another family over there, and ... so they become more closer to one another, 
and this is a way of actually linking our community together and also making people 
here feel responsible for people there, this is quite important. 9 
The Muslim Parliament seeks to maintain links with the global Islamic 
Movement and aims to foster a strong Islamic identity in Britain and other 
EU countries. The Muslim Parliament perceives Muslim identity to be 
under threat in Europe. Dr. Kalim Siddiqui stated in The Muslim Manifesto 
-a strategy for survival: 
Of all the major religions of the world, Islam is the most 'pliticized'. At its inception 
Islam created a political platform from which Muslims were to launch themselves on a 
global role as founders of great States, empires and a world civilization and culture. 
Political and cultural subservience goes against their grain. Yet in Britain today 
Muslims are being asked to accept subservience and the total disintegration of their 
identity, culture and religion, as the only real options open to them 80 
To counter this threat to Muslim identity Dr. Siddiqui called on the Muslim 
community to resist integration or assimilation and to secure itself an 
honourable place in British society. Muslims can resist subservience and. 
the disintegration of their identity, culture and religion, despite being a 
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minority by creating institutions and mobilising resources to pursue their 
goals that are concurrent with the goals of the global Ummah. 81 
I generally want to know, and you can talk about your personal ideas now, how would 
you describe Muslim identity at present in Britain? 
Well, Muslim identity has been, there is an attempt always to dilute Muslim identity 
and this is being done under the umbrella of integration. I don't think someone needs to, 
you know, you would never ask a Black person to become a white because to be 
integrated into the community. You equally don 1 ask a Communist to become a 
Capitalist to integrate into the community. You don't ask a Muslim to, sort of, give up 
their belief so they will become integrated, what you do, you actually say that this 
society is for all of us, and this society ... each one of us 
have got a contribution to make, 
even if some of our ideology is a conflicting one. That in itself is not something one 
should destroy, cleans the other group. And Muslim identity is very important because 
we are considering ourselves living in a society which is a multicultural, multi- 
religious ... 
for us to sort of be able to get the benefit of all the ... our efforts, our taxes, 
etc., etc., we've got to have our identity recognised before our need could be addressed. 
If I am looked upon as Asian then, you know, what is Asian, there is no such thing as 
Asian culture, Asian need, you know, there is no such thing. It is a whole thing, what, 
where is Asia, China is in Asia, Central Asia is in Asia, you know. So you really need 
to address the identity of people as they see their own identity. I see that I have got 
more in common with a black or white or even an oriental Muslim than I have with 
another person who happened to be from the same race as myself, but from a different 
religion. And I see my need, be it a place of worship, be it the diet that I eat, be it the, 
sort of social need, or be it a cultural need. Even things like my fun time will be more 
identifiable with another Muslim than another non-Muslim. So all these things 
actually makes me and my identity what it is. And if that is not recognised then I am 
being oppressed in this society. My children at the school won't get their needs 
addressed or in the hospital, or in social services, etc., etc., so that is very important. I 
see my identity as Muslim and I think on this that identity for all of us Muslims is being 
recognised officially and addressed, we are basically oppressed community. 
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Part of the justification for the call to resist integration is based on a deep 
mistrust toward British and Western societies. It is based on the belief that 
no matter whether Muslims will integrate or assimilate, British society will 
remain hostile, and the reward could even be persecution. The examples 
Muslims refer to are: Jewish persecution during the Second World War and 
the plight of the Bosnian Muslims in Ex-Yugoslavia. 
How do you see the problems of the second generation? Do they sit between two chairs? 
Well they are ... I feel sorry 
for an overwhelming majority of people who have come 
here or have been born in this society. And their families still consider themselves on 
an ethnic-nationalistic, sort of basis. They, the children don't see themselves on those 
basis, because they have never seen so called back home, you know what it is. They are 
not ... 
in some ways they might not even be able to identify and go or live in ... 
if they go 
down, lets say Pakistan or Middle East or anywhere, they will be looked upon more as a 
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tourist than somebody from there. So they will not be accepted on that sort of basis, and 
also that society here does not accept them. They become... they end up having some 
sort of identity crisis and that is a very harmful and damaging thing for a teenager to 
go through, on the top of everything else a teenager goes through. You see the youth are 
going through that dilemma and they will, you see, they get to a point where they 
recognise that they would never be accepted by society at large. This is a very old 
fashioned thing in this society that people say that you should become integrated. 
This is something that we are always told that you should become integrated. You 
know, no matter how much you become integrated the fact of the matter is that this 
society is very xenophobic and will never accept anything other than that, that is the 
bottom line. What we have to change is the attitude of that society rather than 
changing the colour of our hair and the... going back to Michael Jackson, having a cream 
tan making it lighter, wearing contact lenses and this sort of thing. That is not the way 
to do it. The way to do it is actually change this society and also to equipped yourself 
with sort of confidence that you could withstand this sort of society which is far from 
perfect. And we have to live in it, you know. 
Do you think that the Muslim identity of the second and third generation is under 
threat through Western influences? 
Actually I don't think so, I actually think that ... yes there are bound to be some 
casualties of people loosing themselves completely and I feel sorry for those people 
because I look at what happened in Bosnia. And I see that no matter how integrated 
you become eventually you are going to be ... you are not going to be accepted in any case, 
and this is a lesson that ... a very harsh lesson and unfortunately a lot of us have to learn. ' 
Dr. Ghaissuden explained that the ultimate aim of the Muslim Parliament 
is to achieve long term political representation of Muslims in Britain. He 
admitted that the Muslim community is too young to expect political 
participation to develop quickly 84 Such political participation is not 
automatically fulfilled by the election of a Muslim MP. The experiences of 
the Afro-Caribbean community has shown that MP's like Bernie Grant are 
not necessarily able to defend the interests of the community, but become a 
tool of the system themselves. Therefore Dr. Ghaissuden believes that the 
work of pressure groups toward receiving rights and protection as a 
religious minority is more effective at present. The political parties are 
aware of the impact of Muslim votes at local and national level. To resolve 
conflicts with local authorities on the issues of burial, slaughter, worship, 
education, voluntary schools and planning permissions, Muslims have to 
mobilise manpower to act as pressure groups. Until Muslims grow into the 
British political system, the Muslim Parliament is lobbying for state funded 
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Muslim schools to protect the Muslim identity of children. In response to 
the question whether Muslim schools will lead to the segregation of 
Muslim youth and a development toward isolation of the Muslim 
community, Dr. Ghaissuden clarified that such schools are intended to 
strengthen the Muslim identity of children and prevent them from drifting 
away from the community. Then when they move on to higher education 
or enter the British job market, the young generation will have received a 
strong enough religious and cultural foundation, not to lose touch with 
their roots. For the same reason the Muslim Parliament also provides 
student loans and training for teachers. In order to foster Muslim 
- representation in the media, scholarships for media studies are provided 
The British government repeatedly confirms that the Muslim community is 
an integral part of British society and that the government is committed to 
ensure that Muslims maintain their own identity. However, leaders of 
pressure groups like Iqbal Sacranie have critically observed that the 
government is reluctant to turn these promises into practice. The 
reluctance of the British government to grant Muslims the same rights as 
the Jewish and Catholic communities is perceived as unjust. 
Dr. Ghaissuden believes that due to the colonial past, Muslims suffer from 
low self-esteem in Britain. Muslim organisations like the Muslim 
Parliament fostered political awareness and generated more confidence 
among the Muslim community. The first generation among the Muslim 
community lacks the political experience and education. One of the 
consequences of such inexperience was the response Muslims generated by 
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burning the Satanic Verses in Public. The immediate association with 
fascism in Germany backlashed on the activists. The Muslim community 
has learned that it has to fight for its rights but that it also has to adjust to 
the British political culture. Therefore the community invests a lot of hope 
in the younger generations which were raised in Britain. Their education 
and experience with this society should help the community to flourish. 
3.4.3.2. Identity and Politics 
Political orientation is. subjected to many stimuli, which makes assumptions 
about their origin and de-velopment difficult. Nevertheless, some 
assumptions about political attitudes of the Muslim minority can be made. 
In general, assimilative Muslims spoke favourable of the British political 
system. Observant Muslims perceived democracy as too weak, which 
became apparent in the way social liberties and crime control were 
discussed. The social-Darwinist attitude that the stronger one survives, 
which is functional for the dynamics of modern industrial society, prevails 
among many Muslims. As most Muslims had to succeed in British society 
without social or state support, self-reliance and self-sufficiency are a source 
of pride. Another element is the devaluation of other minorities. This 
hostility towards other minority groups is partly based on economic 
competition and partly on Asian culture. Hostility and racism is a common 
experience for most members of ethnic minorities. 
The survey on 'Attitudes towards Race' undertaken by the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (IPPR) in February 199786, revealed that the young, 
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educated generation, especially of different ethnic background, constitute the 
majority of the 'young optimists' (a category created by the researchers, 
labelling individuals with a positive and optimistic attitude towards race- 
relations). Their responses indicated that they are weary of racism. They try 
to reflect on the topic and to find constructive solutions to the problem. The 
subjects suggested that education and parental tolerance can erode racism in 
society. 
Among the native British population the well-educated professionals are 
strongly ant-racist. Their group was categorised as the 'comfortable liberals'. 
_, -They argued that with increasing education individuals become . more 
liberal, as it is possible to understand the complexity of race-relations and to 
see through the fallacy of racist arguments. 
In contrast to the two positive groups, this survey also identified the 'I'm 
Not Racist Buts... ' and the 'die hard' groups. The latter group belonged to 
the lower strata of the social class system and they openly expressed their 
resentments and racism. Frustration about their situation, their economic 
fear and their feeling of powerlessness are the main causes for their 
attitudes. More complex is the 'I'm not racist but... ' group, which denied 
racism. This group tried to rationalise these feelings by employing one- 
sided facts to support their arguments and to present their reactions as 
common sense. Their experience with other ethnic groups was limited and 
they tend to belong to the working or middle classes. Among this group are 
a lot of white females but also first generation Asians. 
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Many of the Muslim interviewees held strong views on the limitation of 
freedoms. Their criticism was directed against the moral and social freedom 
of native British individuals and against the limitation of freedom for 
Muslims to practice Islam publicly. 
... When I was in school, at 
least people would have a degree of shame, from what I can 
see because now, since I've become practicing and observing my own religion, as one of 
the key characteristics I have recognise in non-Muslim people, not just English people, 
just non-Muslim people, that they are very, very promiscuous, and it's OK. And the 
other thing is that, when I,... since I, I was always brought up with this idea and the 
people that I was around, while I was young, I was brought up with this idea that the 
reason why a person works is so they can live, OK. And now, in this society, because I do 
work now, and my colleges and the people that I see, their concept it seems is so obvious 
from their behaviour and attitude, that they live to work. And I find that very 
disturbing, that someone can base their whole world, their whole life around their 
work. For example, they'll go to work and they'll earn their money, they'll associate 
with the people at work, after work they'll mix with them, after that they will try to 
have some sort of relationship with them. Then after that, from the money they. earn 
from that work they are doing their best to spend that money on themselves, (I'm just 
talking primarily about women because those are people I'm having contact with and 
those are people that I see) with that money that they have, they go and spend it so 
that they can look beautiful and blah, blah, blah and everything, so that they can ga 
back to work and present themselves. It's like really the most vicious circle, that you 
earn your money to spend it on yourself so you can prepare for work, rather than spend it 
on yourself so you can prepare yourself for the other things you want to do in life. 
I've got to say something here, when I was little OK, I used to do Thatcherism when I 
was doing my A-levels, but Thatcherism isn't so bad, she had her own political thing, 
she was OK. ' 
Principally, Muslims hold very conservative views and are proud of being a 
law-abiding community. Although they can best identify with the values 
represented by the Conservative Party, New Labour offers political 
participation, and has a more tolerant approach to the demands made by 
Muslims for their community. With regard to voting preference Muslims 
reveal the same degree of inconsistency as the rest of society. Political 
orientation does not always correspond to voting preferences, as the latter is 
made dependent on temporary advantages. As New Labour won most the 
Muslim community's votes, it can be assumed that opportunity had priority 
over compatibility of values. 
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As Muslims were asked about their views on Labour's suggestion to 
introduce parliamentary reforms, the majority declared that they were 
happy with the way it was. Some respondents explicitly declared that this 
was a matter on which the native British should decide themselves. Those 
Muslims, who also apply Islamic criteria to British politics, prefer a passive 
stance all together. 
I can't really answer that question because it firmly contradicts with my beliefs. The 
whole parliamentary system contradicts my belief entirely so I can't... But if you had 
to vote..? I wouldn't vote, I don't vote. 88 
Occasionally some extraordinary suggestions were made as well. 
You see, you are asking me as a Muslim person being in a non-Muslim country, so I have 
to look at the question within that context. First of all as you know, I obviously would 
prefer this country to be a Muslim county. Besides that, I am a minority here, and my 
views on that is that at the moment it's quite democratic and I prefer first past the post 
rather than the other, you know was it proportional representation. Because at least 
first past the post means that minority groups, very big minority groups cannot... For 
example, lets take the XXX, you can't say that all the XXX, who constitute about one 
Million of the population, if they would have equal representation in Parliament then 
they get about five people. Now I could just say well, that could be the same for a 
Muslim person, but that is not the point really because Islamically all the Muslims, see 
we are economic migrants, when we came to this country we came here not seeking 
religion, we came here seeking economic prosperity. If we were to seek some sort of 
representation in this Parliament, what we would have to do is form our own Muslim 
community in an area, which would be represented of us. Because being scattered a 11 
over the country it's going to be much more harder. For example, even if we did have 
proportional representation and we had a few Muslim MPs, for them to be directly 
answerable to us would be difficult because we'd be all over the country. Rather than if 
we were in an area OK, and that area we could by first past the post, nominate someone 
who is Muslim, understood Islamic terms and stuff, could apply what ever he did in 
Parliament to us 89 
3.4.4. The Identity of the Second Generation 
The identity development of the second generation of Muslim immigrants 
has to be understood in the context of British society. As British history has 
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revealed, most of the English and British alliances (whether imposed or 
willingly contracted) were established to protect Britain and to aid economic 
growth. Compared to France, Britain did not impose British culture on its 
imperial subjects but sought to organise these societies in order to maximise 
economic efficiency to the benefit of the Empire. The union with Scotland 
was based on mutual advantages and political concessions were usually 
made in response to social and economic pressure. 
The first generation of labour immigrants arrived on the basis of a mutual 
economic advantage. The second generation, born as British citizens, had 
not been a part of this calculation. This generation has to struggle to find its 
own place in British society. The main conflict these youngsters have to 
resolve, derive from the fact that they were raised according to South Asian 
traditions, but have to succeed in Western British society. At school they 
were confronted with the English language and British native children for 
the first time. Most South Asian children could not expect much academic 
support from their parents. Most children of ethnic minorities do not do 
well at compulsory education because of their poor social background and 
the fact that their parents do not have the same educational background 
themselves. 
3.4.4.1. Education 
The Youth Cohort Study of Spring 1994 investigated the number of pupils 
achieving five or more GCSE grades A to C at the end of compulsory 
education. Only black pupils were academically less successful than 
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Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Twenty-one per cent of the black pupils and 23 
per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis gained five or more GCSEs at grades 
A to C, compared to 51 percent of Other Asians (including Chinese) and 
around 45 percent of the Indian and White groups. Nevertheless, there is a 
trend for pupils of ethnic minorities to stay on for further education. In 
August 1993,95 per cent of the Indian group, 89 per cent of Other Asians, 86 
per cent of the Black group, 80 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and 
71 per cent of the White group continued their education at the age of 
sixteen. The study has shown that in the years from 1993 to 1995,31 percent 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, 40 per cent Blacks, 43 per cent Whites, 49 per. 
cent Other -Asians and 
61. per cent of Indians, had two GCE A levels or 
equivalent among the 21 to 23 year olds. ý Nearly 30 per cent of the Indian 
group were studying for a degree in spring 1995 compared to approximately 
15 per cent of the White and Pakistani/ Bangladeshi groups. 90 
The middle classes of the South Asian Muslims understand how important 
the education of their children is and therefore support and encourage 
them. Some parents even preferred to send their children to Roman 
Catholic schools to ensure that their children will receive a good education 
within a pious environment. 
We went to Roman Catholic school because our parents thought we need a better 
education. Because in those days, when my Dad came over, Roman Catholic schools 
had a good reputation. " 
Whereas the middle classes are aware of how the education system in 
Britain works, the working classes fail to provide additional support at 
home, partly because they feel helpless towards the system. Within working 
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class families children are not encouraged to speak English at home or to 
read to improve their language skills. Therefore these children also lack 
confidence at school. Academic ability has to be combined with confidence 
in order to improve academic achievements in school. Teachers who work 
in schools located in poor South Asian dominated areas of Birmingham, 
have observed that the social and academic deprivation of the parents 
reflects on the academic achievements of the children 92 
Muslims have not only become concerned with the low educational 
standards of their children but also with the lack of Islamic education at state 
schools. At present Muslim children receive their Islamic education in 
mosques and madrasahs established by the Muslim communities. This is 
an additional burden on the children as their education continues after 
school or during weekends. The Muslim community is also concerned 
about other important areas such as the dress code for girls uniforms at 
school, the separation of gender at puberty, the sex education of Muslim 
children in state schools, religious holidays, and prayer facilities. 
In the late seventies associations were established which informed parents 
of their rights and how to pursue them. The 1944 Education Act, made 
religious education and a collective act of worship compulsory. 
Modifications, such as the invitation of an imam to lead morning prayers 
twice a week, are possible. Such decisions to modify are left to the 
individual schools as local authorities and head teachers have enough 
powers for this purpose. 93 In many cases concessions were made concerning 
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the school uniforms as long as school colours are respected. Some schools 
permitted long skirts, headscarves and national dress. 
In 1983 for example, Muslim associations established the Muslim Liaison 
Committee (MLC) which directly approached the Birmingham LEA with its 
requests. Together they formulated Guidelines for national schools 
concerning the needs of Muslim children. The 1944 Education Act also 
allowed for 'occasional holidays' which could be used to make the two 
festivals of Id a religious holiday for schools with a high percentage of 
Muslim students. Several schools in Birmingham make use of this 
possibility until the 1988 Education Act made such agreements impossible. 94 
Requests for separate showers and changing rooms for Muslim children, as 
they are not allowed to undress in front of others and the need for separate 
swimming classes with female instructors proved to be most problematic. 
Schools in Birmingham, Bradford and other regions with a high percentage 
of Muslim students try to accommodate these demands as far as is 
financially viable. 95 
Other requests such as separate classes for drama, dance and music could not 
be accommodated. Whilst some Muslims believe that these subjects are 
forbidden by Islam altogether, others have a more moderate approach to this 
topic. Certainly sex education in the school curriculum is an offence to most 
Muslim parents who believe that this is entirely a parental responsibility. 
The Guidelines of the 'Birmingham Working Party' have suggested 
including sex education into the subjects of Biology and Ethics. 
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A major concern of Muslims is the provision of halal food for their children 
at school. Schools try to meet this request by offering a balanced vegetarian 
diet. The possible provision of halal meat is more difficult as the provision 
of meals is centrally organised and therefore the responsibility of the City 
Councils 96 
Although compromises are possible in some of the areas of demand, British 
national schools cannot satisfy substantial religious needs. Only Islamic 
schools, as far as many Muslims are concerned, can incorporate Islamic Din 
into the whole school curriculum. Some Muslims feel that the secular 
school environment itself is in conflict with the values of Islam. They fear 
that the lack of Islamic education also with respect to the Islamic code of life 
will estrange the youngsters from their faith in God. 97 The fear of de- 
Islamisation of Muslim children in state schools is also related to their 
exposure to peer group pressure. Efforts were made by the Muslim 
community to establish private Muslim schools, yet these have to struggle 
with fund-raising. It follows that the demand for state funded schools is a 
logical consequence. Although such requests were granted to the Jewish and 
Catholic communities, the British government was reluctant to accept such 
applications from Muslim schools for a long time. 
Khurram Murad pointed out in his work Muslim Youth in the West, 
Towards a New Education Strategy, that "obviously, we are not prepared to 
be assimilated and become 'lost"'98. This remark is representative of what 
the majority of interviewees mentioned in the course of this fieldwork. It 






Islamic identity. Only if Islamic rules are incorporated into the everyday life 
from early youth onwards, an Islamic identity can be maintained. 
Information may evaporate, and dies evaporate, but living by Islamic rules, day in and 
day out, will engrave Islamic identity indelibly on consciousness-' 01 
The struggle for state funded Muslim schools is the struggle for Muslim 
identity. Attempts to compensate for the lack of religious education 
revealed to be problematic because the children had to cope with an 
additional workload. As mentioned before, the knowledge of the imams, 
who are responsible for religious education of the children is limited to the 
sectarian parameters of the sect they belong. to. They neither., speak English 
nor are they acquainted with socio-political context of the dominating 
British culture. Therefore they are unable to offer to the young, constructive 
solutions to their problems in Britain. Whilst British education encourages 
children to think independently, these imams are unable to adopt these 
teaching methods. imams with a dogmatic attitude and literal 
understanding of their faith also fail to promote an interest in Islam. 
Therefore it is no surprise that these imams are not highly regarded among 
the second generation. 
K: Another thing that is most probably worth adding as well is that they, on the 
whole, have a very poor opinion of the imams. Because the imam's position within 
Asian society is that he is the village idiot who is not able to do anything else, so he 
was made imam. 
What? 
F: Yes that is the heritage within Asian society, that the village idiot became imam. 
K: This is not always the case. 
In Pakistan? 
F: In Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in India... 
K: This is no joke, this is serious. This is not all the cases, I mean, surely, you can have 
some Asian imams who are very knowledgeable and very wise, but this is the joke, 
and this is the cultural ideas that they have been brought up with. In the village, 
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the person who is not going to achieve anything he will become the imam. You know, 
you can teach him a few lines from the Qur'an, teach him Arabic ... F: ... teach him how to lead the prayer... K: ... and off he goes. That is the way it is. F: Trust me, I know from personal experience. When I was taught Arabic as a young 
person, the imam that came to our house to teach, told us that drinking Coke was' 
haram because it was from America and America is a Godless country. And we should 
drink Muslim drinks like water, milk and wasla, is a Pakistani drink, which is made 
from roses. 
Rosewater? 
F. Rosewater and drinks like that. Can you imagine, this is the low level of 
intellectual discussion that Islam in Asia has come to. I mean any child who has a bit 
of brains is going to think, well this religion is a bit stupid, I am not going to follow 
this. 1O' 
3.4.4.2. The Second Generation and their Social Identity 
Second generation youths may feel different to the white community but at 
---the same time their 
feel that they fit into and belong to both societies. - 
None 
of them wanted to return permanently to their home countries. They 
considered Britain as their 'home'. 
Many of them had achieved a healthy level of adjustment without a loss of their 
ethnic identity ... and achieved a creative synthesis of the two, sometimes very disparate, cultures103 
The second generation does not want to be identified with the immigrant 
status of their parents; they were born and bred in Britain. They mingle and 
interact with English, Welsh and Scottish youth at school, university and 
work. Many have a higher proportion of white to Asian friends, however 
most of them feel that their Asian friends are closer to them. Rarely do 
Asian boys and girls join their native counter parts when these plan their 
leisure activities for the evening. The majority of the native British 
interviewees complained that the Asians 'keep themselves to themselves' 
and do not encourage closer contact with the rest of the social environment. 
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The culture clash between South Asians and the British becomes most 
apparent with regard to the choice of leisure activities. The majority of all 
Muslim interviewees deplore the British drinking culture. Also the free 
interaction between males and females makes it difficult for young Muslims 
to implement the segregation between the sexes and to maintain their idea 
of morality. From the perspective of young Muslims, the fact that they do 
not join their British friends in the Pub does not indicate refusal to 
integrate. For them this is a cultural matter in which they differ from the 
rest of the British. All the Muslim interviewees of the second generation 
have emphasised that they feel a part of this society and that they appreciate 
their friendships with their British counterparts... Many of them 
substantiated their line of reasoning with religious arguments. 
There are pockets of people who are trying to, you know,... because as we are supposed to in 
Islam, we are supposed to carry on our daily lives, we are supposed to live a full life, 
you're not supposed to hide yourself away. ... You go out there living your life. You're 
supposed to lead by example and how on earth are you going to do that if you're not living 
so that others can see you, and take part, and ask you, and talk to you. So I think there are 
people out there in the country who are trying to do that. But there are great many a 
people who are culturally bound, socially bound, who cannot seem to get onto that next step 
in their thought, so they are going back there, you know. They haven't seen that. The 
first seed of doubt is fundamentalism, in a way. They are so scared of loosing what they do 
have, that they can't move on104 
This attitude dominated among the educated members of the second 
generation. The criticism of the 'culturally and socially bound' is primarily 
directed to the first generation and those British born Muslims who did not 
strip off the ethnic chauvinism and caste system that is so deeply rooted in 
South Asian culture. 
Nevertheless, the closest relationships continue to be established among 
South Asians themselves, also among the second generation. One of the 
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most significant reasons is that they were raised to prefer an Asian 
environment. Collective or group identity is influenced by the experiences 
made with the social environment. There was only little contact with 
native British children after school to intensify relationships and at home 
Asian kin dominated the social world of these children. In the course of 
personal development children quickly learn what social behaviour is 
appreciated and accepted by parents. Parental sanctions are the first source of 
orientation for children. Friendships with children who belong to the wider 
family or family friends are least problematic. Interaction within this close- 
knit social environment, determines the role-play and self-experience of the 
individual. The interaction and role-play perpetuates cultural symbols, 
common convictions, beliefs, criteria for classification and value attribution, 
which determines the gradual process of self-definition and group identity. 
Acceptance and acknowledgement by the family as well as the group gives 
the individual a feeling of security, which in turn strengthens the feeling of 
uniqueness. 
We are a minority without a doubt, but we are not that much of a minority because we 
have quite a lot of Asian friends. There are so many of us, so many Asian families. 
There were Asians and Asians at every sight, but we loved it because when you're 
younger and growing up, you don't care. " 
Not only are South Asian friends acceptable for the family they also 
understand the culture related problems. Shared concerns about the future 
and perceptions of the environment foster the preference for their own 
kind. 
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You see here we are treated as aliens just because we are Asians, right, but then when 
we go to Pakistan, right, we are treated like aliens there too, because we're not from 
there either106 
The second generation of South Asians and native British youth have little 
in common. Once the next generations develop more interest-related 
identifications with members of wider society and native British convert to 
Islam, the ties between the communities will become stronger. 
3.4.4.3. The Islamic Identity of the Second Generation 
I don't think there is patriotism in our part of the community. I'm just like, yea I'm born 
Scottish, but me personally, I think there is a lot of religion more than anything. If 
someone would ask me for my day to day identity I would not say I'm British, I'm 
Scottish, I would say I'm Muslim. Scottishness to ne is a lot of drinking, kilts, the 
Highlands. You see I don't drink, I don't wear kilts, I don't go to the Highlands. That's 
what I mean, I don't really think that we are very patriotic. I know I'm Scottish, I was 
born in Glasgow, I was raised here, but that's what Scottishness is to me. It's not us, it's 
not me, it's not my identity. "' 
Religious identity is based on a set system of beliefs and hierarchy of values, 
which determine personal behaviour and socialisation. Identity is expressed 
by the way people think and on what their perceptions of the world as well 
as their social constructions are based. If man only consisted of intellect 
without a body then a comprehensive system to rationalise the 
environment would be totally sufficient. The dichotomy of mind and body, 
forces man to respond to his environment on an emotional as well as on a 
rational level. Therefore a satisfactory system of orientation must 
encompass not only an intellectual but also an emotional element, in the 
form of an object of devotion. After the satisfaction of the basic human 
drives and needs, man desires to be in relation with others, seeks 
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transcendence, rootedness, an experience of identity and a frame of 
orientation. 108 
Compared to youngsters of the host community, there is a greater danger for 
identity diffusions and crisis to occur among adolescents of immigrant 
communities. They face a continued struggle by trying to gain 
acknowledgement of both communities. Seeking acceptance by British 
society and at the same time accommodating the culturally and socially 
different demands of the family is difficult. Everyone desires completeness 
by experiencing security as part of a collective but at the same time to unique 
-. _. as an individual- Personal identity is the product of personal experiences 
and expectations of the future. The inability to believe in one's future 
(whether due to insufficient education or marginalisation) is cause for 
anxiety and identity crisis. The assumption of identity crisis as a result of 
culture conflict is based on the observation that young people of different 
ethnic backgrounds are more in danger of having to cope with a shattered 
future because of racism, cultural tension and social deprivation. 
3.4.4.4. Cultural verses Religious Identifications 
When studying relevant questions to identification and self-identification, it 
is important to look at questions such as 'why it is worth living' and 'what is 
valuable to the individual'. Part of the value orientation is transmitted by 
the way the individual is raised. During this phase of education the 
individual develops a sense of cultural self-evidence, which when under 
attack can lead to a crisis of identity. This process of cultural identity 
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development starts in the family and will continue to develop during 
interaction with the environment. 109 Cultural identity among minority 
groups is both a source of comfort when the individual is among the in- 
group, as well as a source of conflict when the individual is among wider 
society. 
Cultural identity is the basis for national identity and it is inter-linked with 
religious identity. Both national and religious identities are essential tools 
for the mobilisation of emotions and feelings of belonging. Cultural 
differences also occur within nation states and can serve as indicators for 
communal differences. 
Early literature suggested that the second generation may face identity- 
diffusion due to culture conflict. However, the result of more recent studies 
undertaken by Hutnik (1991) on the identity of minority youth in Britain 
and by Heitmeyer et al. (1997) on youth identity and potential radicalisation 
among Turkish adolescents in Germany, supported the conclusions of Boos- 
Nünning/Nieke (1982)110 which postulated that the identity and orientation 
problems of second generation minority youth are not nearly as serious as 
the hypotheses of culture-conflict and identity-diffusion suggest. 
The study of Heitmeyer et al. has shown that Turkish youths develop 
strategies to achieve a balance between the different norms, values as well as 
regulations of behaviour, and create their own freedom within the 
traditional and authoritarian sphere of influence of their fathers. They 
develop patterns of interpretation with which they can make their objective 
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difficulties, sometimes caused by socially scandalous situations, subjectively 
bearable. "' 
An indication of a healthy identity is the development of constructive 
coping techniques designed for the individual's subjective situation. 
Contentment (Lebensgefühl) is expressed in the degree of satisfaction with 
one's situation. Satisfaction with one's private life, culture/ religion and 
school/job are three such essential areas. 112 The degree of contentment is 
dependent on the individual's sense of self-worth. Tesser (1988) focused on 
the process of social comparison and its effect on the sense of self-worth. He 
__based his theory on the assumption that there is a motive to maintain and 
expand one's feeling of self-worth. Thus when an individual compares all 
his or her areas of life with that of others, including contentment, this 
process will influence the persons feeling of self-worth and comfort. The 
tendency related to this process of comparison is to compare oneself with 
those who are worse off. This is why it is possible to achieve a positive 
sense of contentment although objectively the individual may face a 
difficult situation such as discrimination. To maintain a positive sense of 
self-worth is essential for a positive identity and psychological equilibrium. 
In general enthusiastic participation in competition, a positive approach to 
challenges and high aspiration are expressions of a healthy identity and 
positive sense of self-worth. High aspirations in the area of education and 
employment reveals readiness to face the challenges of Western society and 
a higher degree of integration. Low aspirations in that field reveals 
difficulties in integration, as the challenges of wider society may be 
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considered as unmanageable and the individual has too little faith in 
his/her own abilities. This deficiency is usually compensated by a higher 
degree of contentment with culture and religion, as contentment with, and 
over-integration into, the cultural community is independent from 
accomplishments at work. 13 
Much literature suggested that youth with low educational and occupational 
aspirations develop stronger identifications with Islam than educated young 
Muslims. However, the results of this study revealed that individuals with 
high aspirations in education and employment, with a high degree of 
integration indicate a low degree of contentment with culture. but a strong 
identification with their religion. It was found that the majority of educated 
young people turn against the cultural values of their parents, whilst 
searching for a personal approach to Islam. 
I suppose because a lot of the culture I feel quite negative about. I've always found it 
easy to talk about what I dislike rather than what I like. "` 
The second generation has found its own way of defusing the tension 
created by parental expectations and the pressure to assimilate. Identity 
entails a rational choice within the limits of one's value system. An 
individual can choose to emphasise certain values and neglect others 
without risking a crisis of identity. As the majority of young South Asians 
have grown up in a tight-knit and caring family network, these young 
people are aware of the fact that if they chose to assimilate to Western 
culture thus abandoning their South Asian traditions as well as their 
religion, they would become subject to attack from their own community. 
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When subjected to racist attack from wider society the community would no 
long provide shelter and refuge. Total assimilation is the most risky form of 
integration and there is no guarantee that wider society will accept the 
young people fully. Therefore it has to be acknowledged that the priority of 
young Muslims is not to lose the support of their family and community. 
At the same time these young people have come to realise that many 
components of parental culture are restrictive and unjustifiable even by a 
respected 'authority' such as Islam. Whilst the first generation focused on 
social comparison with their native society rather than with British society 
the=second generation does engage in social comparison with wider society. 
For their parents it was preferable to derive their feeling of self-worth from 
being the maintainers of their family back home, than to reflect on the 
working class and minority status in Britain. The second generation no 
longer has this dual national identity but a dual communal one. In order to 
participate in British society they have to move forward and build their 
feeling of self-worth on both communal and societal achievements. 
They can't see that they would only gain by giving, by going forward, and going back is 
cultural, you know, it's not a religious thing, it's they are clinging onto their culture. ... The boys in my school were asking me: are you Muslim? I said yes. So where are you 
from? I'm like Birmingham. What they really meant was what town do I come from in 
India or Pakistan, where do I come from, where are my roots, which is the Hindu cast 
system if you like. I was like, what are you talking about, this is not relevant, this is 
not an issue. But it is, in their world, in their eyes, it's the values they have. It's so 
sad. And you try to talk to them about it, but it's all they've ever heard. ... 
But I hope 
they will see otherwise. "' 
Parental cultural values are increasingly perceived as regressive and 
isolating. The cultural values are associated with the oppressive 
components of South Asian social life. It is not the dress, food or language 
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which is subjected to criticism, but the way parents are trying to determine 
their children's lives, according to the criteria of social status and family 
pride. As the second generation engages in social comparison, they find that 
(from their perspective) total freedom is coupled with immorality. They are 
now searching for a way to determine their lives themselves, very much 
like their British counterparts, but within the framework of their own value 
system. 
Asian families do not usually work with immediate pressure but with 
emotional blackmail and the pressure of community expectation. During a 
dinner given by one of the Pakistani interviewees in Glasgow, the head of 
the family showed the video of his daughter's wedding in Pakistan. It 
became apparent that the bride looked very sad and also the way the girl 
watched the video of her wedding did not reveal a change of mood. Despite 
the presence of her father it did not seem inappropriate to ask her whether 
she wanted to marry at the time. The body language expressed more than 
words could ever say. The father exclaimed with euphoria, conveying 
happiness and pride, that he had asked his daughter beforehand whether 
she wanted to marry her cousin and she agreed. Simultaneously the girl 
shrugged her shoulders and whispered with a sad face: I knew it was 
expected of me. Obedience toward anticipated expectations of parents is the 
most common response of South Asian youth. This behaviour can be 
observed among the first and second generation as well as the professional 
and working classes. 
There was, not necessarily pressure, but certainly, ... no one would pressure them into that situation. And this is widespread, this is, you know ... I have heard this story in 
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different ways many times. No one pressured them, it was family obligation, not 
pressure, you know. It was what they felt obliged to do, as opposed to someone saying 
you must do this, this would help, you know. So there is a difference. "` 
The feeling of obligation derives from the respect for parents, gratefulness 
for their care and fear that they will withdraw their love and support. 
Additional pressure comes from the community, which reinforces the 
child's consciousness. By insinuating that disobedience is equated with 
ungratefulness, that it is perceived as disgraceful and that the young person 
cannot expect support unless s/he conforms, the community exerts 
enormous pressure on the second generation. 
Having grown up in a society where adolescents can choose their lifestyle, 
can leave and return home whenever they want, and do not have to fear 
disgrace when they change their partners, young Muslims also want to 
determine their lives without risking expulsion from their family and 
community. The second generation of Muslims has converted the 
community's tool of oppression into their tool with which to achieve 
personal liberty. Many young - Muslims have rediscovered Islam for 
themselves. 
And so living in the culture that I was brought up in, my culture I suppose is an Asian 
culture. India, although there are a lot of Muslims, there is ... it is hard to 
find any 
real Muslims here. So my interest was lets not upset the community, you know, lets not 
rock the boat. Lets marry someone who is from the continent, with whom I have much 
more in common and where there is more to look. But what I found was that they do not 
have any real interest in their religion. One thing within the Asian community is that 
do as you are told. You know, it is very much like the Buddhists, and like the Hindu 
religion, which focus very much on the worship of the elders. Even to the extent that 
when the husband is older than his wife is, the wife has to worship her husband like a 
God. This was bound to have an influence on the Asian Muslim culture. And the 
children which were bom here, their parents were brought up in this way. So this 
generation which was brought up in the West, where you have your own freedom, 
where you are your own person, they started to question what their parents were 
brought up with. Because it is only a cultural, a cultural icon, you know, you do this 
because it is a cultural icon and so a lot of them chose to throw all this out of the 
384 
window. So the other section of the second generation would say, ok, well although 
this is all wrong, religion as such is right, so what does religion really say. They have 
come to go the opposite way. I have kind of gone that way, but before I could not really 
make up my mind which way to go. I could not really feel comfortable with my religion 
being secular, then again I was not that comfortable with the way my religion was. It 
did not quite fit with my ideas of... 
What was...? 
Things like listen to your parents, do this if you do not you will be punished, and 
everything is about punishment. It has nothing to do with the love of God, more to do 
with the fear of God, more to do with the fear of authority. It is a very, .. still a feudal 
system. It is still a cast system within India, within the Hindu society. If someone is 
older than you, earns more money than you, if someone has a better background than 
you, these things make them a better person. And fortunately within the Muslim 
society that sort of thing does not exist. "' 
The second generation is observing the first, and there is little mercy in their 
criticism. Those young Muslims learn Arabic and study the original sources 
rather than adopting the interpretations of their parents. For many the 
confusion was great because a lot of religious practices, which they have 
associated with Islam have proved incorrect: They find that their parents 
are practising traditions as religious ones, which are actually cultural and 
additions although this is explicitly forbidden by Islam. Parental religious 
practice has come under scrutiny. 
... They want to keep religion where it suits them. If it suits them to be a certain way, 
it suits their community to be a certain way, they will stick to community rules. If the 
community norm is to do something wrong, they will do that wrong, rather than follow 
their religion. The community norm is to have 'bravhani'. 'Bravhani' is something 
that is developed within the Asians for some strange reasons. It is an invention, it is 
something that has been invented within the religion. It is what happens if someone 
dies, and all the people come round into a place and they start reading the Qur'an. 
Now that is an invention. It is called Bivrat. It is something that you are not supposed 
to do. You are not supposed to innovate your religion. You are not supposed to bring 
things into it that never existed. That is wrong. It can lead to very, very bad things, 
and they know this. Their children say: listen this is bidda, this is wrong. And the 
children who have become practising Muslims have a huge problem with it. If they see 
something wrong happening within their own household, there is nothing they can do 
about it. 18 
Particularly among the more educated and wealthy elite, parents are 
criticised for their inconsistent religious observance. Not in all households 
do children dare to criticise their parents, but occasionally it does happen. 
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So they get angry with their parents, they are like, ... you know, they 
lose respect for 
their parents. And so the parents see: Ahh, this boy or this girl goes to the Islamic 
Society, mixes with Muslims, they come back, and they are rude to us and they lose 
respect for us. Stop them going. This boy, this girl, wants to marry a black person, 
wants to marry someone who is a non Asian, they have met these people at some 
society, they have met them at the mosque, they have met them ... stop them going. And this will not happen. You know, this is what parents said, you know, my mother 
said this, just came back from ... People sitting down and saying: we should stop our 
children going to the mosque. We should stop them going to Islamic Society meetings, 
because they come back with new ideas and then these ideas are problems for us 19 
The problems parents have to struggle with in such cases is not how to 
prevent their children from adopting a purely Western way of life, but how 
to maintain parental authority over the definition of values. The 
multicultural environment in Britain enables young South Asians to meet 
Muslims of different cultural backgrounds. Multi-ethnicity among the 
Muslim community is a new phenomenon for South Asians. Although 
South Asian Muslims are acquainted with the minority situation, their 
ethnic environment has usually been of their own kind. In Britain Arab, 
African, Asian, South Asian and European Muslims all constitute the 
Muslim community. Young Muslims passionately attack the chauvinistic 
trait of South Asian culture, which partly stems from the Hindu caste 
system. 
That is right, within Asian culture, everyone is not equal, they still look down on a lot 
of people, on the whole, you know. They will go on and glorify, saying: Hattu ul- 
Alaah, the first guy to give the Alzah, you know, companion of the Prophet, blah, 
blah, blah. The second black guy to walk through the house and say, 'hey can I marry 
your daughter', would be thrown out. So it is a dichotomy, it is not, it is not, it is 
hypocrisy, and I could not stand that. I did not like that. I did not want to marry 
anyone who believes in that. So of course I started looking outside of my culture. 120 
The contact with Arab Muslims makes young South Asians aware of the 
cultural mores, which have been woven into the traditions of religious 
practice. In many cases the young South Asians not only had to learn what 
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Islam is really about, but also had to 'unlearn' everything that was added. In 
a way those young Muslims who have rediscovered Islam for themselves 
can be described as 'converts of the special kind'. Although they are born 
and raised Muslims, they reconfirmed their faith and have to struggle to 
acquire their knowledge of Islam. They approach their religion with the 
same compassion converts are known to do. In the multi-ethnic Islamic 
Societies, they are made aware of their role within the global Ummah, 
which puts their relationship with the South Asian community on relative 
terms. The relationships or biradieries their parents and generations before 
them have established are of little importance to young British Muslims. So 
although South Asian parents have not lost their children to Western 
society, they have difficulties to integrate them into their native social 
structures. It has become clear that on many occasions parents have used 
religion as. means of control. Some parents may find it less problematic to 
turn a blind eye to occasional alcohol consumption as long as the rest of the 
community is not aware of it, than to know that their children will refuse to 
perpetuate their cultural values. 
If I can just correct something, you said that their parents would rather want them to be 
seculars. I do not think, that is actually what their parents intention was. Their 
parents would rather that their kids were Asian. 
Obedient? 
Obedient. Follow their idea of what Islam was, rather than this ... 
121 
Whilst the first generation perceived their culture as a natural supplement 
of their religious traditions, the second generation begins to divide these 
two identity components apart. Being an observant Muslim can no longer 
be directly equated with being an obedient South Asian child. The second 
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generation of South Asian Muslims are in the process of redefining Asian 
culture within British society by means of reviving Islam. 
3.4.4.5. Islam as the Source of Orientation 
You can know a lot more about religion but we are more real about religion because we 
are different. We have realised that we are different and we want to know why. 
What used to happen in our parent's days was that parents would set up a box with 
jewels in it, and hand it to their kids and say look after this, and they would take it 
inside of them but not know what it is. But what we've been taught now-a-days from 
our parents is, because they realise that we ask a lot more, because we're living here, 
we're different, we see we're different, it's so evident, so we're always gonna ask more. 
Whereas people in Pakistan they accept it. We're not doing this, taking this jewellery 
box or what ever, and putting it away. We're saying OK, what is it? Why am I 
different from that Christian over here. So we open it and of course because we're 
opening it we get to see the jewels, we get to see the gold, pearls and everything'22 
Most of the respondents among the second generation were in the stage of 
transition between adolescence and young adulthood. It is the stage during 
which a young person re-evaluates earlier identifications. The individual 
has to reflect on social demands by the environment and define his or her 
future. During this phase of development, young people search for an 
appropriate environment, partnership, ideological and political orientation. 
It is the stage of personal development, in which a young person should 
develop an identity that will equip him/her with enough self-worth to 
participate within society as a responsible adult. This situation can create 
instability and lead to a crisis of identity. The Muslim respondents have 
found in Islam what they were looking for. 
Jessica Jacobson stipulated in Islam in Transition that not only does the 
religion provide universal rules and regulations, it also "acts as a resource 
which can be openly called upon on efforts to resolve conflicts which arise 
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as a result of the differing demands of family and wider society"23. By 
searching for orientation in Islam young South Asians do not move 
contrary to what their parents adhere to. Indeed they reaffirm parental 
rejection of the faults of British society. Nevertheless, they study Islam with 
enthusiasm to find justification for breaking through community 
boundaries. 
The Asian community is perceived as both a place of refuge and a burden. 
The way a Muslim girl described her community in the East End of London 
is representative of what was said by interviewees about Muslim 
communities in Birmingham, Glasgow, and other areas of London. 
A really tight community, that you can belong to. ... 
There is so much picking and 
bitchiness, if you go round the corner with a white man the whole community will find 
out sooner or later. 124 
During adolescence it is common for young people to resist authority and all 
those who represent traditional values. Moral, religious and political 
values, which the child has adopted unquestioningly are then re-evaluated 
and sometimes abandoned. Some South Asian Muslims have coped with 
their threatened identity by focusing their resistance exclusively against 
parental cultural values. Parents have to face criticism for not practising 
Islam properly and public scandals are created by inviting parents and their 
friends to prayer, rather than by returning home drunk. 
That situation is false, it is a false situation. And within the next generation you will 
be finding that with my generation of kinds they are making a choice. Either they are 
finding out what is real and are practicing wholeheartedly or they are finding out 
what is false ... or not bothering to find out, not believing what their parents say, and just going off and drinking and having affairs and stuff ... and so forth. There is a definite, within this generation, a split ... we, in fact, ... the majority of the parents 
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prefer it, to be of the second, seculars, because then we do not think properly, we do not 
question their deeds. It is the ones that decide to be more religious, the ones that decide 
to follow Islam as a religion, that really humble the parents. To the extent that they 
have stopped their kids going to Islamic meetings, stopped them mixing with other 
Muslims, you know,... 
Is this true? 
It is true, it is in Birmingham. 
Do you know anybody of ...? Yes, yes, we. do. 
Sorry, have you ever talked to the parents who do not allow their kids to go ... Yes. 
And what have they said? 
They should be concentrating on their studies, you know, ... that they spend too much time studying Islam, where are they going to go with their studies. Where is their 
studies leading to? They way I see, you know,... all they do is come back and be rude to 
their parents. They gp there and they say so and so, and they come back and they 
accuse us of being this and that and the other, and ... What this, that, and the other? 
You are not praying five times ä day, their kids have a problem with this, you know. 
If you are a Muslim, why are you not praying five times a day. If you are a Muslim, 
why do you not behave in a certain way? If you are a Muslim, why are you doing when 
you know this is wrong? You know that kind of stuff. 
And those kind of parents are religious though, according to ... 
... According to their kind of culture, yes. According to their society that they live in, 
yes. 125 
Power struggles and self-actualisation can take place in Islamic terms. For 
that purpose even parental concern about education can be exploited. In the 
case of the interviewee above, the mother had to agree to wear a scarf and 
the father to engage in regular prayers in order to receive the reassurance 
that their child will finish her university studies. 
Young adults also search for recognition by the environment. 
There are certain people, I've been surprised by this, I mean despite being bom and 
raised in Britain they are very Islamic and they follow everything. They pray five 
times a day, observe all the rules of Islam and despite living in a British Western 
society they are more Islamic than someone who could be else where, which is like a 
contradiction. And that is probably, in my opinion, that's a reaction to living in the 
West. To the other extreme you will have people, probably like myself, who like, we 
do have that Muslim, Islamic identity at the same time we do claim that we are 
British as well. Like you know, we are born here and you know, we are probably gonna 
be living here, you know settle down and what ever. At the end of that spectrum you 
see that people are never gonna accept you for what you are. You might you know just go 
to the mosque once a week, or you might just believe in the basics but due to that fact you 
are persecuted, like having a Muslim name or observing some festivals. It does go on. '26 
390 
Within Islamic Societies these young people can interact with others, who 
share the same convictions and aims. The position acquired within this 
environment becomes part of the individual's self-definition. These 
societies also welcome native British converts and Muslims of different 
ethnic background. In this environment young South Asian Muslims can 
overcome their community boundaries without breaching the ethic code of 
the community. It serves as an additional security net, when the native 
British environment threatens the new Islamic identity. One of the 
respondents admitted that she felt insecure about conveying her belief to 
non-Muslims. She was scared that she would immediately be associated 
with fanatic fundamentalists. 
__,, 
Perhaps not have the confidence in what they believe. I mean that was a fact with me, 
I think. I mean, I knew what I believed, what was right and what was wrong. But I 
didn't believe that any body else would want to hear about it. I was scared to get down 
peoples throats, not wanting to be seen as a fundamentalist. Well, that is how Islam is 
viewed in the minds of people because of how it's been in Islamic society. That is how 
it is viewed and they immediately say ehhhh, these mad people, nutters. A lot of 
people do have that reaction and I didn't want to perpetuate that and make them 
think that I was one of them. So instead I was talking about that in a rational manner, 
to show them the other side of it, which was wrong. 127 
Islamic societies provide the environment where shared convictions can be 
discussed and where young Muslims are at least temporarily sheltered from 
criticism and attack. For those young people whose parents have no 
understanding for their religious enthusiasm, such societies are the only 
places where they can find moral support. 
By trying to guide their parents along the religious path, young Muslims are 
trying to convey to their parents that they have found their own coping 
strategy other than communal isolation. They are fighting for respect and 
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authority in their chosen field. It is one way to develop a positive sense of 
self-worth, respect and independence. The results of this study concur with 
the findings of Jacobson that in particular, girls turn to the teachings of 
Islam to support their quest for personal liberation. 
The battle against chauvinism among Asian society can be interpreted as 
compensatory for the powerlessness via racism among wider society. The 
feeling of powerlessness regarding racism among wider society is overcome 
by fighting chauvinism within their community. The issue most frequently 
referred to by young Muslims, in order to illustrate the tolerance of. Islam, 
was. the concept of the global Um mah. They repeatedly emphasised that 
racism and nationalism does not exist in Islam and that Muslims wherever 
they live and whatever ethnic background they have, belong to the 
Ummah. 
There is no racism in Islam, because we are the descendants of .. 
'" 
The threat to ethnic identity is countered with a strong religious identity, 
which promises a society free of racism. It is the aim to set an example for 
wider society and to show that Islam is not as Western media portrays it. 
When questioned about ethnic and religious intolerance in Islamic societies, 
the Muslim interviewees explained that the injustice occurring there 
originated from people who are not real Muslims. 
Marginalisation in British society poses a threat to two identity components. 
First, to the ethnic self-identification and second, to a positive sense of 
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personal achievement. On many occasions young Muslims criticise the 
economic system in Britain. The fact that British society is preoccupied with 
economic growth and subsequently abandoned religion from the public 
sphere, is subject of major concern. Particularly, that the lives of British 
people can evolve primarily around their work is not only perceived as an 
empty way of life but also as a threat. Very much like their British 
counterparts, young Muslims fear that if they cannot compete within this 
system they will find themselves in the bottom strata of British society. The 
awareness and experience of racism amplifies this fear of competition. By 
rejecting the socio-economic (and sometimes also the political) system, the 
individual pre-empts the rejection s/he anticipates. Among the -Islamic 
community it is reaffirmed that spiritual values are' more important than 
material ones, which reassures the individual that competition is not a 
necessary option. 
However, the pressure to compete for a career does not always come from 
the British environment. Some young South Asians are put under pressure 
to achieve a professional career by their parents and the community. 
K: I don't know, this may be interesting because you are not only dealing with 
Birmingham society which is very Asian. But you are also dealing with this 
community, the Muslim Doctor and Dentist Association, OK. So they are mostly 
professional, they are mostly educated. Their kids go to the private schools, they 
have generally ... 
F: ... a huge over achievement level, I mean, everyone goes to medical school, everyone 
tries on Cambridge and Oxford, you know, it gets ridiculous... 
K: ... it gets ridiculous, the kids are under a lot of pressure. F: You know, you get a kid who is not so bright, it is very tough on them. They have to 
compete on that level. Immense over-achievement129 
Depending on the personality of the individual such pressure can be 
perceived as an unbearable burden. A lot of the young people from this 
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very successful community in Birmingham have turned to their religion. It 
is possible that their search for deeper religious values was triggered by the 
desire to escape from this pressure to achieve. By adopting spiritual values 
they chose a completely different criteria according to which a person is 
judged. No longer is the university a young person attends of any 
importance, neither the grades s/he gets, nor the amount of money earned. 
On the contrary, modesty and a pious lifestyle are highly regarded and 
Yuppies are looked upon as disoriented and misguided. 
Religion provides justification for rejecting participation in competition but 
at the same time bears new options. It can be described as a moratorium that 
allows the young person to make up his/her mind. Religious values are 
employed to argue against parents who exert pressure. In particular girls 
choose to marry and have children rather than to start a career. The 
founding of a family is thus perceived as a refuge and a way to escape the 
pressure to achieve. The mothers of these young women cannot 
understand why their daughters refuse to choose the careers they 
themselves always dreamt of. The mothers identify strongly with their 
daughters and express their love by trying to give their children the 
opportunity they never had. The misunderstanding between the two 
generations is that both seek self-actualisation by searching for the ultimate 
form of happiness. The mothers associate self-actualisation with a 
professional career, for which they never had the opportunity. The 
daughters by contrast have all the opportunities but want to live in 
happiness without the pressure of a professional career. 
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This phenomenon of escaping parental pressure to follow up a career can 
also be observed among wider society and is not restricted to ethnic or 
religious minorities. The only difference is the way young people cope with 
their subjective situation. Whilst young Westerners try to move away from 
parental influence, break with family tradition or at the worst abuse drugs, 
young Muslims turn to their religion to justify their choice. 
Nevertheless, the successful Birmingham community is not representative 
for the fate of young Muslims in Britain. The majority do not have the 
financial backing of their parents to access private schools and Oxbridge. 
Their success within wider society -is not only. 
dependent on their- own 
ability but also on whether their environment accepts them. A young 
Muslim respondent from London has indicated that she reduces interaction 
with members of British society to the minimum. Her comment revealed 
that she assumes that she is not accepted by society. However, with the 
same token she believes that there is a unity among British society and that 
Muslims feel part of it. 
Do you think there's unity among British society? 
I think there is. Let me tell you why. You see when it comes to the European question, 
whether we should join the European Community or not. I think a lot of British 
Muslims would prefer not to join the European Community, and there are a lot of... why? 
That is a nationalistic thing, not because they are looking at the economic factors but 
because they are British nationals and they don't want to be called European nationals. 
And I think they are quite nationalistic, British nationalistic, if you know what I 
mean. I mean I know I was, I am telling you from my own... because I do, even if British 
people don't see me as one of their own, cause I live here I still sort of feel the need to be 
independent. 130 
The ambivalence over the sense of belonging seems to be a problematic 
issue for quite a few young Muslims. The insecurity and discomfort created 
by the feeling of not belonging to wider society, in which they are expected to 
395 
integrate to make a living, is countered by the search for clear orientation 
and the sense of belonging to an even greater community, the Ummah. It 
was found that the majority of the young interviewees strongly identified 
with the plight of Muslims in the rest of the world. The solidarity of 
Muslims across the world suddenly places Muslim identity into a different 
light. The young Muslims no longer belong to a minority in Britain, but to 
a large Ummah, which is constantly growing to the size of the Christian 
world community. Young South Asians who feel neither accepted by 
British nor by South Asian society bridge the lack of belonging by identifying 
with a larger and anonymous Ummah. Like this, it is possible to criticise 
the country of origin.. without betraying one's beliefs and the group of 
identification. 
See, what really annoys us, I think is that in Pakistan, a Muslim country, that those in 
government destroy the basis that it's made on. It doesn't work right because Islam says 
give charity, help the poor. What really annoys us the whole purpose of Pakistan was 
for us Muslims, but what have we done to it. It quite annoys us because they are 
representing ours and people are looking at them. I think Pakistan is the second 
corruptest nation in the whole world. It just annoys us that they think they're 
Muslims 131 
3.4.4.6. Self-Actualisation and Islam 
In the course of debate, which was stimulated by the conviction and 
sentencing of British Muslims in Yemen, it was suggested that the second 
and third generations of Muslims in Britain have become 'fundamentalistic' 
in response to 'Islamophobia' among wider society. This assumption, 
although partly true, turns a blind eye to the most natural phenomenon: 
youths always were the most radical idealists, seeking to change the world 
for the better. Young people seek ideals, which they can adopt and fight. for, 
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thus revolutions were always dependent on the fanatic idealism of young 
people. Israel was built by young Jews, who adopted Hertzel's ideas, the 
Cultural Revolution in China was carried through by young enthusiasts and 
the Cuban revolution (Fidel Castro and Che Guevara) won the sympathy of 
a whole generation of young people in Europe and the USA. Terrorist 
organisations such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) (Andreas Baader and 
Ulrike Meinhof) in Germany also depend on the fanaticism of young 
people. 
Western society does not fail to be astonished by the fact that some Muslims 
seek to express themselves in Islamic terms. Until the Age of 
Enlightenment Western society fought wars with the help of God and 
scientists sought to discover God's laws of nature. The Quakers in Britain 
and the USA still express themselves in religious terms. 
It is now common for observant Muslims to travel to the Middle East to 
learn Arabic and to study their religion. 132 It can be expected that some 
young Muslims aim for self-actualisation in Islamic terms and also want to 
change the world according to Islamic ideals. The fact that Western societies 
meet Muslims with distrust and scepticism also invites young Muslims to 
employ fanatic behaviour to provoke wider society. Members of radical 
groups like the Hizb ut-Tahrir usually take such actions. It is the aim of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir to re-establish the Caliphate and to lead Muslims back to past 
glory. During research there were several occasions during which members 
of this organisation behaved in a very patronising and aggressive manner. 
However, such extreme expressions of Islamic identity are rare and do not 
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represent the second generation of young Muslims. The strong convictions 
of some young Muslims can sometimes also become a burden for those 
among them who want to go further in their integration process. One 
respondent indicated that he is frequently criticised by other Muslims for his 
assimilative behaviour. The criticism that he received was particularly 
severe during the second Gulf War and the Rushdie affair. 
I would be viewed as liberal, to the extent that other Muslims will say: hold on, your 
confused, you don't know... At the same time I do know because I've lived six years in 
Pakistan, I've studied, like, Islamic Studies and Religious Studies, so I do know. And 
that's the thing, it's difficult, you can never talk for everyone. 33 
3.4.4.7. An Islamic Solution to Social Problems 
Most organisation and community leaders try to avoid public discussion of 
social problems of the Muslim communities. In particular the elderly 
generation does not see or does not want to see that the Muslim 
communities have not been spared from violence, drugs and prostitution. 
The Young Muslim Organisation UK has accepted this challenge. The 
organisation shares the ideas of the global Islamic Movement and is open to 
Muslims of every ethnic. background. Originally the Young Muslim 
Organisation was a South Asian institution but adjusted to the ethnic 
change within the Muslim community. The mother organisation is the 
Islamic Forum, Europe. The Young Muslim Organisation co-operates with 
the central mosque in Regents Park, regional mosques, The UK Islamic 
Mission, the Islamic Foundation, Dawatul Islam, and various educational 
organisations. The organisation claims to have about three hundred active 
members nation-wide who participate in the local organisation of seminars, 
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training and summer camps, as well as educational, social, cultural and 
sports programmes. Active members receive training as social workers to 
improve their leadership skills. Active members elect executive members 
as representatives of the organisation. They have to be observant Muslims, 
exhibit problem solving skills and be innovative. The organisation is 
focusing on social work to address violence and drug abuse among young 
Muslims. 
We are not obsessed with recruitment. What we are concerned about are the problems 
of the community. For example, I don't know how much you know about this, but the 
drugs, the use of drugs concern us so much. Young Muslims are taking drugs these days, 
violence, crime. We are more focused on resolving these issues than recruitment. So we 
have people, who go on the streets, many of whom are youth workers, working with 
the community, set up youth clubs. And what happens is that they work with the 
youth and try to keep them away from drugs, crimes, and violence; and give them an 
alternative. This is what we do mainly. If after that these youth think, you know, 
that they want to be a part of that group, or do something similar like social or 
community work, then they got to become members. So we do not force them, 'you have 
to become a member', no! This is from their own consciousness that they say 'yes, we 
want to work for the community'. So that is our main focus when-we are talking about 
work with youth. Same in schools and colleges, we just provide a service. 134 
It is the aim of the organisation to provide an alternative for those young 
Muslims who have gone astray. Leading them back to their religion should 
give them new perspectives in life. On a local level social workers try to 
control crime and drug abuse by approaching drug dealers and gang leaders. 
By inviting these young Muslims to Islam and to complimentary youth 
activities the gangs lose support. The social workers consider it to be their 
duty as Muslims to help their brothers and sisters. Also non-Muslims can 
turn to these social workers for help. 
The Young Muslim Organisation was able to reduce some of the violence 
and drug trade in parts of their environment. Some of the former gang 
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members who understand the dynamics of street crime participate in the 
social work of the organisation. 
Drugs used to be quite a big problem in this area. Brick Lane is just around the corner and 
there used to be big fights between the areas. So some time ago I could not walk to Brick 
Lane, they would have picked me up. ... Whereas now people 
from this organisation 
can walk around in this area, so that is no problem, people respect us. So now, because of 
our work, that has gone away now more or less. They can respect each other and they 
can talk to each other, and many of them come to the mosque praying, and they have 
become community workers themselves. So they go to the community, they have 
influence, and they change youth away from drugs and these sort of things" 
Some of the former gang members who have not joined the organisation, 
returned to education or found a job and contribute to the organisation 
financially. 
The kind of strategy applied by the Young Muslim Organisation contains 
every element- necessary to combat street crime. First, the youth are 
approached in their natural environment. The initiation of change is not 
left to the youngster in the street. Initial rejection is not accepted but by- 
passed so that the individual has to reflect on the new options presented to 
him. Second, the youth on the street is offered a change in environment 
and associates. They are physically and mentally confronted with a different 
way of life and are drawn away from the sphere of criminal influence. 
Third, a different value system is offered to them so that they reappraise 
their past lifestyle. By conveying to these young people the values of Islam, 
they are offered community spirit and clear orientation to determine right 
from wrong, how to behave and how to structure their day. In an 
environment where competition and opportunity are essential for personal 
success but where clear orientation is not given, Islam provides a certain 
degree of authoritarian regulation, which serves as reliable guidance for. 
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young people who have strayed. Islam responds to the search for a purpose 
in life, which is fundamental to the maturing process and the acceptance of 
responsibility. Finally the organisation also offers training. and therefore 
hope and perspectives for the future. 
3.4.4.8. The Second Generation and the Dilemma of Integration 
Seidel-Pielen pointed out that in a multi-ethnic nation 'nobody is an island', 
every change in self-perception among a social and ethnic collective has an 
impact on the whole community. 136 The question of integration is of 
concern to both wider society and the Muslim -community. - 
Among the 
native British respondents one third declared that they knew too little about 
Islam and the Muslim community to comment on the issue of Muslim 
integration. In contrast seven respondents from Birmingham have made 
clear 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do'. One of these interviewees, a 
woman indicated that she feels that Islam is being imposed on this society 
and that the Muslims in Birmingham refuse to integrate. 
Do you think that the Muslim community is integrating into British society? 
No. I don't think they ever will. No they won't they are on their own and probably if 
anything I feel they would like to take over137 
The rest of the interviewees thought that the first generation has not 
integrated but that the second generation speak English well and will 
eventually integrate. However, most of them added that South Asians tend 
to isolate and do not mix with the rest of society. 
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Although the first generation hardly make an effort to establish contact with 
members of wider society, they themselves feel integrated into British 
society. They are so entrenched in their daily routine and concerned with 
family issues that they do not feel isolated. Many respondents expressed 
their appreciation for what British society offers and some respondents of 
the second generation have confirmed this. 
I think, it is to a certain extent, I think for example I can speak because it's my parents, 
they believe that they owe a great deal to British society because they came here and 
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they got housing, and what ever. So in that sense yea... But I think our generation.. 
Among. the English respondents there seemed to be some concern - that 
'parallel- societies' could evolve. One being a de-traditionalised, secular, 
functionally differentiated majority, and the other being re-traditionalised, 
religious-politically oriented minority groups. Thus a dispute could arise 
over 'cultural capital"". Some interviewees suggested that there is a 
subliminal struggle for the definition of values. With reference to the 
Salman Rushdie affair one woman declared: 
London in the apex, everybody comes here whose been somewhere else, they come back 
and we can clean their eyes out, their ideas and we can siff them through and take 
ideas from them. And we don't want to be taken over by anybody, but... and they absorb 
our ideas too. And I think that's what's interesting. But it's freedom of expression, like 
our press is not... of course it has some restrictions, but mainly we can say anything, you 
can write articles in any newspaper, you can go on television, and I agree with that, 
freedom of expression, I really do"° 
In contrast, many young Muslims believe that British society has to change 
before Muslims can fully integrate. (It must be emphasised here that the 
term 'integration' was not defined for the interviewees. ) The natural 
response was that full integration was directly associated with assimilation. 
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Do you think that the Muslim community is integrating into British society? 
I think that is a danger, if it does then I think it's a danger. '41 
All the young respondents mentioned that their generation integrated to a 
certain extent in that they speak fluent English, have attended British 
schools and work among wider society, which could best be circumscribed by 
partial acculturation. Seven interviewees could be described as assimilative. 
They seek interaction with their British counterparts but reveal a preference 
for their own ethnic group as close friends. 
The stereotypes, the images people come form. It's hard, women as soon as they realise 
we're Muslims they're like, oh shit. They are there on guard. And it is a two way 
process but I myself, I probably make a bigger effort to integrate. I wanna probably 
work for the government finally. 142 
Some people just don't accept other religions, they just don't accept them. And they just 
say, you know, you'll go to hell. And that's not what it says in the Qur'an at all. - The 
most important thing is that you are a good person, isn't it? And as far as living in the 
West, if you want to be accepted you will be, but if you start, you know, looking, sort of 
criticising or rejecting Western society, then you won't be. That is natural. You know, 
it's hard, just like if a Westerner went to the Islamic World or anywhere in the East or 
Africa. Your are gonna have to adapt, you can't criticise what they eat, or how they 
behave, or what they wear, you have to fit in if you want to live there, otherwise you 
shouldn't go there in the first place. You know a lot of people who are here because, I 
don't know, they have to be and they seem to reject it a lot. But my opinion about 
people like that is if they don't like it, they shouldn't be here. " 
Ten respondents in turn expressed a strong desire to observe their religion 
but do not feel that the interaction with wider society is problematic. 
Although the majority feel that Islamic values are not compatible with the 
British way of life, they hope that their values will also be adopted by wider 
society one day. 
Do you think Islamic values are compatible with the English way of life? No! I think 
they could be if Western society changed. In which way? Well, they've got to change 
... if they did take on board some Islamic value, you know, ... such as ... such as, the women, the role of women, you know, I cannot believe that women are happy in the role 
that they have today in society, you know. ... Their heart is broken, it's bleeding, they are aching. Everybody wants something, their soles, they are crying out for something 
and they turn to all these different Gods, if you like, to worship. It's so sad. The 
children my God, the children, if there was just more respect and more realisation of 
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what we are as human beings and what we have been given, you know, our limitations 
and understanding of God.... Then this society could heal itself, be more constructive, 
and use guidance. '" 
Another girl explained the problem of integration for Muslims: 
You see as society changes, and you define society as changing norms, of course it's a 
dangerous thing because it contradicts with Islam, it's a way of life not a... Islam is 
society how can Islam change to British society. I rather if British society was an 
Islamic society, then hey we're coming, ha, ha! ' 
The basic characteristics of Western modernity are pluralism of value- 
orientations and lifestyles, secularity of the State and liberal attitudes on 
democratic regulations of social cohabitation. Rapid social change as a result 
of constant . progress, the extension of 
individual spheres of freedom and 
access to knowledge are part of the foundation of cultural modernity. A 
general feature of development of these foundations is the 'de- 
traditionalisation' of all spheres of life14', which becomes visible in the 
disintegration of religious views, the abandonment of predetermined paths 
of life and in the liberation of the individual from the collective. 
Consequently the individual is more dependent on his own ability to work 
on the question of his raison d'etre, to search for orientation and to optimise 
his career within unequal structures. This is why part of the process of 
growing up is to master disorientation and to be successful in education in 
order to achieve material security and social status. '47 
The price that individuals pay for the liberty of modernity appears as 
manifold ambivalence. De-traditionalisation was accepted to release society 
from ties that hinder its progress. The disintegration of traditions is 
associated with insecurity, anarchy, rootlessness, despair and the challenge 
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of an increasingly complex environment. This can lead to anxiety, 
disintegration and disorientation. In times of insecurity individuals search 
for undifferentiated and clear orientations. Muslims in particular observed 
that Christian norms were bent towards society rather than the other way 
round and that this adjustment has not prevented its decline. Therefore 
Muslims fear that Islam would have to face the same destiny if Muslims 
tolerate the relaxation of religious observance. 
For example, a lot of the time people will say, well we don't agree with technological 
change and we cannot adapt to modem society. That's not true, that's not true at all, 
because this isn't an innovation in religion. We are fundamentally opposed to any 
innovation in religion because that means that you're going astray. And anything that 
goes astray, we believe leads into the hell fire. So in order to maintain the basic 
concepts that we were used to then, we have to, like sort of, you know, we have to sort of 
maintain them. And we cannot therefore adjust to these values because they are 
constantly subjected to change. 1 
The demand for 're-traditionalisation' can be interpreted as a reaction to 'de- 
traditionalised' modernity in order to maintain orientation and direction in 
life. Islam promises integration into a group of equal minded people within 
a foreign nation. Therefore the 
" rejection of Western lifestyle, 
" criticism of the extent of individual liberties, 
" rejection of coeducation, 
" and a sense of moral superiority 
can be interpreted as a consequence of modern developments. 
S. Ahmed pointed out that Muslims respond to post-modernity by 
reasserting ethnic or Islamic identity. Muslims reject modernity as a past 
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era, which has failed. Postmodernism is perceived as a phase of cultural 
schizophrenia, and an apocalyptic moment in history. 149 Muslims all over 
the world, have lost their faith in modernity and prefer to hold onto their 
intrinsic certainty - Islam. As postmodernism is associated with the 
rejection of the view of the world as a universal totality, the questioning 
and multiple interpretation of religion, and scepticism toward all traditional 
orthodoxy, Muslims respond with hostility. Ahmed described 
fundamentalism as "the attempt to resolve how to live in a world of radical 
doubt""'. Muslims now have to resolve: 
... how to participate in the global civilisation without their identity being 
obliterated. It is an apocalyptic test, the most severe examination. Muslims stand at 
the crossroad's' 
Although authors such as- Ahmed occasionally suggest that Islam and 
modernity are in a state of competition, exactly the opposite is true, at least 
" for Muslims in Britain. The second generation of Muslims adopt modernity 
and integrate it into their view of the world, but reject the subsequent ill 
developments. The reassertion of religious identity has to be perceived as a 
coping strategy in the course of integration. 
However, it would be a mistake to immediately equate integration with 
assimilation. K. 0. Hondrich suggested that it is impossible to circumvent 
origin-related attachments. His theory stipulated that the more future 
oriented attachments an individual develops, the more important origin- 
related attachments become. He therefore contradicted the assumption that 
highly educated and progress-oriented individuals- will automatically 
substitute origin-related attachments with chosen ones. The reason being 
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that origin-related attachments will always serve as refuge when chosen 
attachments lead to disappointment. "' This reassertion of origin-related 
attachments, be it ethnic and/or religious, will, always accompany the 
process of integration. 
The findings of this study seem to confirm the observation made by 
previous researchers that the second generation adopted the framework of 
British identity. Beneath it Muslims can mobilise different collective 
identifications depending on desirability and external stimulation. 153 The 
religious identity promises more opportunity for integration than the racial 
one because its communal boundaries are more permeable. It encompasses 
identifications with Muslims of different ethnic background, British 
converts and it provides a basis for a positive relationship with Christians 
and Jews (Ahl al-Kitab). It thus keeps a door open for all those 'Westerners' 
who share the same or similar ethical and moral values. 
That assimilation is not always an option is based on the fact that South 
Asian Muslims have to cope with discrimination on the grounds of both 
race and religion. '5' The process of integration moves along the line of 
gradual acculturation. The second generation is partially acculturated due to 
the fact that they were raised within the British school system and are 
acquainted with the structures of British society. The degree of acculturation 
will be related to the opportunity and personal acknowledgement Muslims 
find in British society. 
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3.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The first generation of Muslims arrived in Britain in order to improve the 
economic situation of their families. In an alien and sometimes hostile 
environment, minority groups became more aware of those features, which 
mark their difference from the rest of society. Whilst Hinduism and 
Buddhism became subject to romanticism and idealisation with the Hippie 
generation, the Western population remained relatively ignorant of Islam. 
Consequently immigrants of Buddhist or Hindu faith are perceived as exotic 
and interesting rather than as a threat. Much of Buddhist belief was 
integrated into New Age philosophies, which became very popular in the 
Western World. In contrast to the popularity of Buddhism, Islam is 
associated with violence and perceived as a threat, not least because of its 
political instrumentalisation in the Arab World. This hostile attitude 
towards Islam is deeply rooted in European history. Such hostility towards 
Muslims has an impact on the identity development of Muslims in Britain. 
In an environment where all established norms are under attack and where 
Islam has become object of suspicion, Muslims rebuilt their communal 
structures in Britain and sought guidance as well as stability by reasserting 
their religious-cultural heritage. For the first generation of Muslim 
immigrants religious observance is deeply rooted in their cultural heritage. 
Cultural identity comprises language, dress, norms for social behaviour, 
concept of time and truth as well as social obligations and rights. Islam's 
contribution to identity formation includes their system of belief, the 
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ritualisation of life, strategies to cope with every-day life, and the authority 
to sanction. 
The observation that one of the main effects of modern liberalism on 
Western societies is a general ethno-religious revivalism, has puzzled many 
scholars in recent years. The spirit of modernity produced a lot of freedom 
for individuals unprecedented in human history. Nevertheless it provides 
only limited orientation and guidance, because it belongs to the 
conceptionalisation of freedom to choose one's own frame of orientation. 
The trend towards reviving ethno-religious identities represents the return 
to the most obvious and basic identifications. People. search for orientation 
and shelter among those who reveal most similarities. These people may be 
of the same race, of the same cultural background or share the same beliefs. 
As this trend towards ethno-religious identification occurs within Western 
societies, there is also a tendency to emphasise difference and to exclude 
others. 
Young Muslims were not prepared for the discrimination they could face 
when seeking acknowledgement as employees from wider society, neither 
within the British school system nor the close-knit structures of minority 
communities. 155 The community, entrenched in its cultural heritage, aims 
to maintain the communal security based on mutual loyalty. The fear to 
lose their children to Western society is great. 
Whilst the first generation of immigrants derive their self-esteem from 
their economic achievement and the acknowledgement based on 
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hierarchical family structures, the second generation has to fight for 
acceptance from both its own community and wider society. Being torn 
between two sides is an indication of being 'dependent', because there is an 
increased danger of giving in to either, temporarily more influential side, 
on which the individual will depend for guidance and orientation. If this 
way of dealing with tension is interpreted as pragmatic, then another 
problem arises according to the theory of identity. It is the choice of values 
and norms according to 'desirability' and according to the utilitarian 
calculation of situational advantage. 156 To develop a uniform identity there 
is a need for consistency of orientation, in order to avoid dependencies on 
interchanging -orientations that .. will 
leave the individual in a state of 
instability. 
Identity entails a choice in emphasising identifications according to 
situational advantage and personal comfort. Since being a Muslim in 
Britain is one of the factors for social discrimination, it has consequently 
also become a salient aspect of self-definition. To avoid the dependency 
created by the tension of growing up between two cultures, young Muslims 
discovered the fundamental values of Islam for themselves. How Islamic 
identity is expressed depends on the subjective situation of the individual. 
J. S. Nielsen developed a six-point typology157 of different options. 
1. The random retaliation option can be observed among Asian youth 
gangs, who sometimes mobilise Islamic symbols. The level of such gang 
activity appears to be proportional to the level of local racist activity. 
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2. The option of collective isolation is an expression of quiet retrenchment 
within the community networks in order to survive the unemployment 
rates of 35% or more. For the security derived from communal support 
the individual repays the community with loyalty to the collective 
norms. 
3. Young people who have been successful in education and business 
frequently opt for limited participation. They actively participate in the 
wider economy but remain highly integrated in their community. 
4. High profile separation is an option chosen by young Muslims, who 
became increasingly involved in organisational work since the Rushdie 
affair. They have little interest in wider society and actively campaign at , 
local and national level for social and political space. 
5. High profile integration is the way forward for a small but growing 
number of young Muslims. The majority of these young people are well 
educated and attempt to find ways of constructive participation in wider 
society, whilst maintaining their Islamic system of values. 
6. Aggressive action is taken only by a small minority who adopted the 
programme of radical Islamic political movements. 
Among the respondents of this study none could be attributed to the first or 
sixth option. Five girls and three males can be attributed to the collective 
isolation option, five girls and four males to the high profile integration 
option, three girls and one male to the high profile separation option and 
nineteen respondents to the limited participation option. Although the 
numbers are not representative, it is interesting to see, as the findings of this 
study have shown, that the majority of respondents, despite their different 
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attribution to the options above, have employed Islam to cope with their 
subjective situation. 
The interviewees have made it apparent that their search for the 
fundamental values of Islam helps them to cope with the demands of both 
ethnic community and wider society. The study of Islam enabled many 
young people to modify the strict rules and obligations of their communities 
to subjectively bearable ones, without breaking from their families. Young 
people especially those well educated, emphasise the Islamic value of a non- 
racist society. Their belief encompasses the hope for a better future. The 
struggle against racism and chauvinism among the South Asian 
community can be interpreted as a compensation for the powerlessness they 
feel via racism among wider society. The majority of - interviewees are 
already identifying with their first chosen and non origin-related 
attachments, be it their studies at university or their employment. Their 
belief nurtures self-esteem and their sense of belonging to their community, 
as well as the sense of security and solidarity provided from belonging to the 
global Ummah. Their Islamic identity provides enough security to bear 
disappointment and offers enough flexibility to seek integration. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen how, in the course of history, both individual and collective 
identity has been subjected to change in Britain. With the Act of Union 
(1707), British identity was constructed to form an "umbrella of solidarity"'. 
Britishness was associated with opportunity and economic expansion. 
Protestantism, which used to serve as the emotional and cognitive tool to 
create consensus, was eventually substituted by a capitalist ideology. Ever 
since, multicultural Britishness, as an identity anchor, is offered to everyone 
who wishes to become a citizen of the United Kingdom. Labour immigrants 
have moved to Britain due to the economic opportunities available at the 
time and adopted a sense of Britishness as part of their self-definition. 
British history revealed that social cohesion was strongest either during 
times of external threat or when all ethno-cultural groups were encouraged 
to participate in the building of a successful society. In times of socio- 
economic and political crisis the British elite had pre-empted an escalation 
of conflict by introducing small steps towards political liberalisation. Today 
devolution is an expression of both the political crisis management of 
Westminster as well as the lack of social cohesion due to the absence of 
opportunity and external threat. It is also an expression of how Welsh and 
Scottish national identities have survived over time. 
Maintaining communal unity depends on the 'symbolic construction' of 
similarity'. It has been observed that the less people have in common with 
each other, the more problematic social cohesion becomes. In times of 
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transformation and social insecurity the need for social cohesion, 
predictability, a feeling of belonging to and being protected by a collective 
becomes increasingly important. 
Many social theorists have concluded that identity development has become 
problematic in modern societies, more so for ethnic minorities. Modernity 
has questioned and sometimes destroyed certainties and initiated a trend 
towards 'de-traditionalisation'. An increasing pace of change, culminating 
in the unpredictability of globalisation, produces anxiety and disorientation 
in many people. 
This observation has led to a dispute over the validity of 'essentialising' 
notions of identity among social theorists. It is argued that identity is no 
longer unified and stable, but is becoming fragmented and composed of 
sometimes contradictory identities. ` The findings of this study have shown 
that the Scots, Welsh and Muslims are overcoming this dilemma of 
contradictory identities by mobilising origin-oriented identifications, which 
in turn helps to maintain coherence and stability. The majority of 
identifications are chosen and sometimes imposed. When these fail or lead 
to disappointment an individual will fall back on origin-oriented 
identifications in order to cope with critical situations. It was also observed 
that whenever individuals hold on to, objectively seen, contradictory 
identifications while also tolerating ambiguity, they created a subjective 
synthesis based on progress- and future-oriented identifications. 
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The methodology of this study does not allow for conclusions on changes of 
identity or phases of identity development on an individual 
level. 
However, the manner in which individuals who had contradictory 
experiences, interpreted their personal history in order to maintain a sense 
of continuity, confirms the 'Eriksonian' theory of assimilation and 
accommodation processes. Additionally some of Weinreich's findings can 
be confirmed. In the course of this study it was found that young Muslims 
search among their own group for their significant other, who reflect their 
current beliefs: this nurtures self-esteem and a sense of security in the event 
of potential discrimination. Many young Muslims have exhibited salient 
conflicting identifications with people of their own ethnicity. To. -resolve 
such conflicts these young people search for ways to redefine ethnicity. 
The majority of Muslim interviewees of the second generation also 
confirmed at least one of the three strategies of maintaining a positive sense 
of social identity, as stipulated by Tajfel. Not only do numerous Muslim 
organisations aim to change the values in the social system by acting as 
pressure groups, but young Muslims too seek to set examples by exhibiting a 
pious lifestyle in the hope to impact on society. By stripping their Islamic 
practice from cultural traditions and by reviving the fundamentals of their 
religion, they hope to change the image of Islam in Western society. This 
observation also confirms Modood's finding that Islam provides symbolic 
solidarity with other Muslims. In contrast, other young Muslims choose to 
distance themselves from their ethnic groups and try to assimilate as much 
as possible, 
419 
When discussing the culture laden religious perception of their peers some 
of the Muslim interviewees of the second generation exhibited what 
Goffman referred to as identity ambivalence. Identity ambivalence occurs 
when an individual adopts some of the perceptions of wider society and 
consequently feels repelled when observing members of his or her group 
behaving in the stereotyped manner, but cannot detach him or herself from 
their group. One of the 'assimilative' interviewees explicitly described 
experiences in which being a Muslim was a stigma. 
The findings of this study can to some extent support the identity model of 
Breakwell. Those interviewees who reflected on their experiences produced 
stories of subjective continuity. Breakwell stated that. the accommodation- 
assimilation process can be described as a memory system, which is 
susceptible to biases in information recall. Thus continuity is rather a result 
of how past experiences are interpreted and remembered. Identity is under 
threat when such continuity cannot be created. One of Breakwell's 
suggested coping strategies was repeatedly observed among second 
generation Muslim interviewees: the rearrangement of salience. 
Freud's first psychosocial reference to the 'inner identity', which he based on 
deep feelings of communality and common mental as well as inner 
constructions, was vague. However, the Scots and Welsh revealed that 
their sense of Scottishness or Welshness is primarily based on the sense of 
belonging. The respondents found it difficult to define their identities, but 
emphasised communal feelings and their difference in mentalities. Historic 
experiences of oppression were salient. The interviews suggested that in 
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comparison to the English, the self-esteem of the Welsh and Scots is 
strongly erroded. The reassertion of national identity and pride is an 
attempt to gain acknowledgement for communal individuality, to 
strengthen self-esteem and to create a socio-economic basis for communal 
security and stability. A sense of Britishness has remained, not least because 
the Union was the best option in the absence of viable alternatives. 
Muslim response to socio-economic insecurity differs according to the 
generation. Whilst the first generation sought refuge in their rebuilt social 
structures and culturally homogenous communities, the second generation 
is trying to find a way to create a synthesis between the two -contradictory 
identities. For the majority of the first generation there was little need to 
develop a relationship to wider society in order to maintain their families. 
At the time of their arrival the British economy was in need of cheap 
labour, which they offered. The economic relationship was based on a 
symbiosis in which both parties received what they sought. The labour 
immigrants derived their self-esteem from their personal achievement, the 
gratefulness of their families and economic improvement. The community 
network provided security and a sense of belonging. 
The second generation was raised within both the tight-knit communities 
and the British school system. They learnt how important and valuable the 
support of their community is and they are well acquainted with the. 
mechanisms of British society. Parental and communal concern that their 
children could go astray puts much pressure on these young people. Young 
Muslims have partially acculturated by speaking fluent English and 
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participating in the British schools system. Conversely, they were raised 
with a subliminal rejection of the very society they are growing up in. 
However, in order to succeed within British society and build careers they 
have to create a synthesis between the two, sometimes even contradicting 
normative value systems. On the grounds of their education and 
willingness to work hard, a growing number of South Asians are striving 
for the middle classes, a socio-economic status that British natives are 
becoming increasingly defensive about in times of recession. 
Many young Muslims have turned to Islam for guidance in order to cope 
- with the tension created by the need to. conform to wider society, to remain 
loyal to the community and to protect themselves from rejection. By 
rediscovering the fundamentals of their religion they can strip off some of 
the repressive elements of their culture without opposing their family and 
community. Young Muslims have chosen to emphasise their Islamic value 
system as opposed to their cultural one: this confirms the third hypothesis. 
Initially this may seem exclusive and antagonising for Western societies. 
However, these young people have chosen the more inclusive option from 
the identity components available to them. These young Muslims 
emphasise the tolerance, peace and rejection of racism, which their religion 
entails. As such Islam respects the AN al-Kitab. Although most Muslims 
point to the lack of faith among Western societies, there is a common basis 
for mutual understanding. 
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In multi-ethnic Britain, South Asian Muslims are also confronted with 
Muslims of Arab, European and African background as well as converts. 
Islamic societies allow these young South Asians to break through their 
community boundaries without breaking from the basic value system of 
their parents. Hence, even those young people who dissociate themselves 
from wider society have opened up a new spectrum of associations by 
developing a sense of belonging to the global Ummah. 
For a small but growing number of young Muslims Islam has become the 
essential tool to facilitate the process of acculturation. It links the 
community with British society in the sense that an Islamic . 
identity has. 
permeable boundaries opposed to an ethnic one and it provides the 
unambiguous orientation which cannot be found elsewhere. It nurtures 
self-esteem and makes alternative criteria available to the Western success- 
oriented evaluation system, by which human qualities can be judged. Islam 
has become the tool for personal liberation within an acceptable value 
system. It allows young people to make sense of their lives and provides 
ideals for a better world and future. The strong system of belief bolsters 
confidence to cope with potential rejection and racism in the course of 
acculturation. 
Dr. Badawi explained that societies have similar problems all over the 
world, only the strategies chosen to resolve them differ. Many young 
Muslims have chosen Islam as their frame of orientation, they act according 
to Islamic regulations and express their anxieties and ideal concepts of 
society in that context. 
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In the course of research it became obvious that the friction which emerges 
as Muslims integrate into wider society, derives from the fear of conflict 
over the definition of values between a de-traditionalised, secular, 
functionally differentiated majority and a re-traditionalised, religious- 
politically oriented minority. Both parties feel that their cultural capital is 
not respected. This finding concurs with the second hypothesis. 
It was also possible to illustrate that some native respondents mistrust 
Muslim demands for more religious freedom and protection because they 
feel that it limits the -socio-political freedoms (such as freedom of speech) 
which this society took so long to develop. Muslims in turn argue that 
immorality among society threatens their spiritual well-being. It therefore 
can be argued that polemics over the issue of freedom impinge on the most 
fragile Western identity components; this illustrates the first hypothesis. 
The process of mutual rejection is enforced in times of economic hardship. 
The escalation of ethno-cultural conflicts can be reduced, as long as disputes 
take place in form of cross-cutting-conflicts. This presupposes that members 
of the conflicting groups are integrated in most of the different levels of 
socio-economic status and their interests overlap. If the different ethnic 
groups do not share mutual interests, then there is a danger that ethnic 
minorities will withdraw to their in-group communities and focus on an 
identity (i. e. Muslim identity) which can bear no more violation -5 
424 
Identity allows individuals to emphasise different identity components 
without threatening continuity or stability. However, individuals usually 
face this choice when identity becomes an issue, that is in times of crisis. 
Both wider society and Muslim minorities hold rich recourses of valuable 
identity anchors. It remains a matter of 'will', which identifications both 
parties mobilise, to work towards a coherent society. 
'R. Jenkins, Social Identity, London, 1996, p. 105. 
2A. P. Cohen (eds), Symbolising Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures, 
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Modernity and its Futures, 1992, pp. 276-7. 
5 W. Heitmeyer et al., Verlockender Fundamentalismus, 1997, p. 190. 
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Appendix I 
Source: E. Erikson, The Life Cucle Comvleted, London, 1985, pp. 32-3 
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LIST OF ORGANISATIONS 
Association of Muslim Youth 
and Community Workers 
Mr Shams-uddeen Hassan 
81 Melbourne Road 
Spinney Hill North 
Leicester LE2 0GW 
Council of Mosques (UK&Eire) 
46 Goodge Street 
London WIP 1FJ 
Federation of Student Islamic 
Societies 
of the UK and Eire 
T. Othman 
38 Mapesbury Road 
London NW2 4JD 
Imams and Mosques Council (UK) 
Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza 
20-22 Creffield Road 
London W5 3RP 
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 
Hamid Ismail 
46 Goodge Street 
London W1P 1FJ 
Islamic Council of Europe 
16 Grosvenor Crescent 
London SW1X 7EP 
Islamic Foundation 
Mr SF Ahmad 
Markfield Conference Centre 
Ratby Lane 
Markfield 
Leicester LE6 ORN 
Jamia't Ahl-e-Hadith UK 
Maulana Abdul Hadi Umta 
20 Green Lane 
Small Heath 
Birmingham B9 5DB 
Muslim College 
Dr MA Zaki Badawi 
20-22 Creffield Road 
London W5 3RP 
Muslim Educational Forum 
Mr Mohammad Khalid & 
Mr Yahya Yacob 
93 Court Road 
Balsall Heath 
Birmingham B12 9LQ 
Muslim Law (Shariah) Council 
Maulana Mohammad Shahid Raza 
20-22 Creffield Road 
London W5 3RP 
Muslim Parliament of Great Britain 
Dr M Ghaissudden 
109 Fulham Palace Road 
London W6 8JA 
Muslim Women's Helpline 
London 
UK Islamic Mission 
STH Shah 
202 North Gower Street 
London NW1 2LY 
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Islamic Propagation Centre 
International 
Mr SM Khan 
481 Coventry Road 
Small Heath 
Birmingham B10 OJS 
Union of Muslim Organisations of 
UK 
and Eire (UMO) 
Dr Sayid Aziz Pasha 
109 Camden Hill Road 
London W8 TTL 
Islamic Rights Movement 
Mr A Hussain 
P0 Box 139 
Leicester LE2 2YH 
Young Muslim Organisation UK - 
Central Office 
Mussadiq Ahmad 
54 Fieldgate Street 
London El 1ES 
Islamic Society for the Promotion of Al-Khoei Foundation 
Religious Tolerance in the UK Imam Al-Khoei 
Hasham El Essawy Chevening Road 
20-22 Creffield Road London NW6 6TN 
London W5 3RP 
Jama't Ahl-e-Sunnat UK 
(Association of Sunni Muslims UK) 
Maulana Syed Zahid Hussain 
106 Leslie Road 
Forestfield 
Nottingham NG7 6PR 
International Centre for Islamic 
Studies 
Mr SA Moid 
ICIS House 
144-146 King's Cross Road 
London WC1X 9DH 
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Appendix III 
INTERVIEW TOPICS FOR MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS 
TOPICS: 
Background of the interviewee 
Structure of the organisation 
Aims and values of the organisation 
Methods of the organisation 
Policies and achievements of the organisation 
Question of Muslim identity in the UK 




Your Motivation in working for your organisation. 
Structure of the organisation 
Structure of organisation ( hierarchy, size, decision-making 
process). 
Structure of co-operation with other Muslim organisations 
in Britain and abroad. 
Aims of the organisation 
Values defended by the organisation. 
The aims of your organisation. 
Ideal Muslim participation in the British political system. 
Methods of the organisation 








What do you immediately associate with Wales? 
What are you proud of? 
What makes Wales different from the rest of Britain? 
Do you think there is a unity among British society? 
What do you think about the monarchy? 
What do you think about the reformation of the House of Lords? 
Do you think Wales should become independent? 
What do you immediately associate with Islam? 
What do you immediately associate with the Muslim community in 
Cardiff? 
How would you describe it? 
Do you think they are a part of this society? 
Do you think they have integrated? 
What do you think about the Rushdie Affair? 
How much contact do you have with Muslims? 
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Ph. D. working title: The Integration and Institutionalisation of Islam in Britain 
QUESTIONS %1 yl. V 
oz" 
1) Which political and social values constitute the pillars of British national identity and is there 
a danger that this British identity is segmented into regional and ethnic identities? 
ýkm 
2) Which strategies would you propose to integrate ethnic and Islamic identity into British 
society and which identifications can British society offer Muslims? 
3) How do you envisage the development of British identity in the future? ý. ý tC 





Side A: Muslim Parliament 
Q: How many people approximately work for you, in this organisation? 
We, it is difficult say what you mean by work, paid employees or volunteers. This 
organisation is, basically the backbone of organisation is voluntary workers. We have got, we 
have got lets say hundreds of people actually up and down the country doing very valuable 
work. And the work that they do is anything from fundraising in to counseling, support of the 
community, teaching, setting up schools, etc., etc. And which are voluntary workers, but we do 
have some paid staff, which are mostly in this building, and their number is sort of around 5 
at most, and, and. But major part of the work is done by the team of volunteers, who dedicate 
their time or part of their time. 
Q: And what type of skill do these people have to have, at least those of the core of the 
organisation? 
Well I think that sort of the first most important skill is actually being ideologically sort of 
motivated to work for the improvement of the situation of the Muslims in Britain. And then 
also being sort of religiously inclined. And then communication skills is important. I am going 
over sort of a wide range of, communication skills are important. And also then you go into 
different areas of work, where they have to have those specific skill. Like in fundraising you 
need certain skills, in counselling you need other skills, in administration you need other 
skills and setting up tutorial colleges you need different skills, so those are obviously, for 
those you need specific skills. But the general thing that we want out of people who are 
associated with. us, be it volunteers or workers is to identify with our broad aims and 
objectives. 
Q: And you work together with other organisations, Muslim organisations? 
Yes, we work basically with anyone and by that definition we are more likely to work with 
Muslim organisations. We work with anyone over, to achieve our aim and objective. And yes 
because of that you end up working quite a lot with Muslim organisations. I mean the phone 
call I just had a few minutes ago is regarding a film which is going to be released. And Muslim 
organisations are calling us and asking us to respond because it is yet again demonising 
Muslims. And I will be ending up contacting a lot of other Muslim organisations and actually 
uniting over this issue. And we do that, it is project by project, rather than a structural sort of 
link between ourselves and others. 
Q: Do you also have connections to Muslim organisations abroad? 
Yes, we do have, again because of, I mean for example we are involved in a number of 
international arenas, being from the Human Rights committee, campaigning for prisoners of 
faith, who are people who have been imprisoned because of their belief. We campaign for 
abuse of Human Right, against war crimes and so forth, by that definition we actually have 
to involved with other groups. We also fund raise for Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria and now for 
Lebanon and by that definition we actually do have. a very close working relationship with 
these groups, and Cashmere etc. 
Q: When it comes to the decision-making process, who takes most of the decisions and who is 
consulted for the areas of special topics? 
Our own structure is, we have got a committee, a vice committee where major decisions are, 
goes into that committee and they decide. Then that goes back into the structure of the 
Muslim Parliament before that becomes accepted eventually. But there is another way as 
well, I mean for example we are delegated certain things from the Muslim Parliament by 
campaigning on lets say prisoners of faith, and then the decision on which prisoners of faith 
we should go for at which particular time is actually left to the committee to decide. It does 
not have to go back and forth. So there is a level of a Muslim Parliament, the main body of 
the Muslim Parliament decides the direction, and then the GPC, which is the next, structure, 
it decides the mechanism of how it is going to be done. But then it is actually left to the 
committees to actually decide for themselves on a day to day aspect of what ... it is actually 
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is a communication that needs to be kept open it is in the structure. But then we are sometimes 
from time to time, we deal with issues which have to be responded to very quickly, and then 
we sort of get the approval for these from the MP. If we want to do something and we are not 
certain that this is, needs clarification, we go to the leader and he has the authority to 
actually OK things on that needs to be done, on a emergency basis. 
Q: How many people are on the committee? 
The committee is presently is 17 people. 
Q: Are there Shiah, Sunni ... ? 
Oh yes, we have got different, Shiah, Sunni, Deobandi, so forth and so on. But also we have 
got male, female; we have got Pakistani, Bangladeshi, it is not really, it is a very mixed 
thing. We have got lawyers, we have got unemployed people, we have got barristers, it is, we 
have got doctors, it isss ... People 
have come together because they are interested and 
motivated to do something and they have got the skills to actually help. And you know be it 
that they are academic, or be it somebody who is presently are out of work and actually has a 
lot of time to give and this is ... there 
is no basis of saying you need qualification or a specific 
agenda or sort of a school of thought, there is none of that. We do not deal with those sorts of 
issues, we don't get involved in that sort of arenas, discuss that type of thing. 
Q: When you address the community or you try to gain support for something, how do you 
overcome this sectarian and ethnic division within the community? 
Well all the things that we, issues that we address are the issues that, the issues 
themselves, are across these boundaries. 
Q: So it concerns everybody no matter what ... 
Yes, that is, that is, we don't actually think unity comes in abstract of ... sitting at 
home and 
trying to merge different schools of thought of different cultures together. We think that, for 
example, there is no difference of opinion on the issue Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, on a issue of 
sectarian sort of divisions. Or on the issues of discrimination that is happening to our 
community, who are being put in prison overseas, and abuses of Human Rights and so forth. 
These are, these don't have theological boundaries, so we don't have any problem. We sort of, 
when we raise these issues, we are not raising sectarianism, so anyone could actually comment, 
identify, stand up, for this sort of thing. And historically that has been the. case and it will 
continue to be the case. 
Q: And which group do you focus at, at the community as a whole? 
We go for the whole of the community. We sort of, our campaigning is always for the whole of 
the community, and. We do have a hard core of supporters who are, I mean, I am talking about 
the Human Rights Committee at the moment, hard core of supporters which are around two 
thousand people. And these are the people who actually are involved with us in a variety of 
campaigns that we have done and who are on our mailing list. We, when we lounge a project 
or when we do something major, all of these people will be informed. And then also we work 
through mosques, we work through newspapers, mainstream media and Muslim media. So we 
actually go very very wide. 
Q: Do you find any obstacles through lets say through the European or British environment 
and maybe some Muslim groups which say no we don't think the work of the MP is good or 
constructive? What are the obstacles you generally face? 
It is, there is, I don't think you can ever do anything that is worth while doing without 
having someone not agreeing with you, this is a fact of life. So we get our sort of groups or 
individuals who disagree with us. And this is something that you know, we accept if you 
don't want to get that you stay at home and do nothing. And so, but really we never have had 
any major sort of group or .... 
Q: Also not from the western community, lets say administrative problems, that they try to 
hamper your work? 
Yes they do but they again, you know, I've been sort of a campaigner for quite a long time not 
always within the Muslim community, before I used to go with the mainstream. You can't get 
the right campaign or do campaigns for the rights of people or groups without obstacles from 
the structures. And this is something that is almost if you don't get then your are not doing 
your job properly. 
Q: So what kind of obstacles are there? 
Well, for example you want to get rid of lets say, your campaigning for better rights for 
Muslim community to, for example what we are trying to do is to get the same rights for the 
Muslim community in Britain as is being described on both the International law, and 
discrimination on religious ground is unlawful, and on the European legislation, which again 
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Britain is a signature to. But we are being denied unlike the Jewish community and the Sikh 
community we are not recognised as a group, so the service (delivery or 
liberty) cannot be 
addressed towards our needs. And then there is discrimination, we can't 
have the right of the 
address. Now this is upon the (mental rivalry? ) and the rights we want to get 
for our 
community. But governments as a whole never want to give rights to their people, 
if they got 
to be forced. You know the women, when they won their rights they had to force the 
governments ... Blacks, any group you 
know, the children, you could go through any section of 
community, to get their right they actually had to campaign and fight for that right. 
And we 
are no different, we are doing that and they put obstacles, they try to sort of say that 
OK if 
we give them this right, they are gonna do etceteras, etceteras, demonise us, give us 
half 
measures, take somebody from our community and say oh no, no we have given the right to 
them and what is conserved in the Black community is coca nuts, but people who are one of is 
but equally one of them, this is a blue print of what they do. And they are doing exactly the 
same thing with us at the moment, and this is part of the game that we have to actually gp 
through, before we could force the rights, our rights on them. 
Q: This is a very humorous approach. So how effective do you think your work has been until 
now? 
It has been affective, it has been affective for the fact that, you know, if you compare Britain 
with France or Germany, Muslims here have got much more rights. They are less demonised, 
and the Muslims are taken as more powerful in Britain than Muslims in France. That has been 
partly because of the work that we have done. But we are not happy with that, we don't 
want to concern ourselves with what would have happened if we weren't here. We want to 
actually get the equal right for our community that has been granted to other communities. 
Q: What has been the biggest success so far, were you would say uhh, that has been our best 
project? 
Well, we have had sort of successes I suppose, the recent campaign we did, it was a play 
which was organised, this has been very recent so it is fresh in my mind. There was a play 
which was called "Paki Boy". It was a play which was done by a group of artists, the play 
writer was homosexual, and they were trying to, sort of, bring Islam into that. It was very 
controversial and we, sort of, did a campaign on the media. And within 24 hours the play, the 
section of the play was changed and they wrote a letter and apologised. Now I think, I don't 
say that that was just a success for our community, that was a success for common sense, of not, 
you know, not doing something which will be provoking the community and to create negative 
vibes and force all of us including us and them to spend a lot of negative energy on something 
which was not really any benefit to anyone. Now equally, I think, all the other campaigns 
we do, we don't just see it as us and them, we actually see it as a whole. You know, we want to 
create a society in which we will have equal rights, we will have rights as much as any 
other community, so we would improve the whole structure of the community, so we would 
actually ... our energies, our efforts, our work will 
be a positive one rather than a negative 
one, always as a conflict with the rest of the community. 
Q: Does foreign policy of the UK or Muslim countries have an impact on your policy or topics 
you raise? 
I mean yeas, you can't get away from politics as a human being these days. I mean yes, if 
Serbs sort of go and massacre large numbers of Muslims systematically, then that will affect 
what we are going to do about that, equally when Israelis deliberately target when civilians 
and when bases, we are going to respond and that is going to bring us into conflict with British 
policy and with the Zionist lobby within Britain. But this is not something we are looking 
for, we actually have to, we feel we have to actually stand up for the rights of those people 
who have got no voice. 
Q: How do you raise your money? 
We have got functions of fundraising. And we raise resources both within Britain, mostly 
within Britain, but also our fundraising activities goes overseas and we do have donors who 
come from North America, we've got donors in Hong Kong, you know, they support us. They see 
the work that we do is valuable and they support us. 
Q: And you don't have any conflicts that some of the donators try to influence your policy? 
We don't have major donors of that sort. We fundraise for projects, we don't fundraise for 
policy. You know, whoever gives us money identifies with the project that we are doing. They 
give us the money and we use it for that purpose, you know. We got for example, the war crime 
watch, we have got this campaign, which is prisoners of faith, whoever helps us knows what 
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we are doing, helps us of what we are doing. They don't give us money and force us into a 
policy. 
Q: Who generally identifies the aims of this organisation? 
I think a wide ranging group of people, we have had, I mean overwhelming majority of the 
people who identify are obviously Muslim, but we do have non Muslim who have actually 
identified. From time to time I receive donations and people write a letter and say I am not a 
Muslim but I do believe in what you are doing is right and can I send a donation. And they 
send a donation, we appreciate that, you know and that really touches our heart. But 
overwhelmingly a large number of them are Muslim and they come from all sorts of different 
backgrounds, I mean I have had people sending 50 pence because this is all they could afford. I 
have had cases of people writing a letter and saying look I've bought some new trousers for 
myself but I took these trousers back and I got my money back and because I thought that this 
money is more needed for the work that you do and here is, I am sending you 15 Pounds which 
was the cost of my trousers. And that sort of thing is very moving. And then we do have 
someone who is a business man and sends a view thousand. 
Q: Can any one come up with ideas for projects? 
Yes, I mean we do have different, anybody could join the group and come up with ideas, or 
even write to us and say look I think we should do such and such. One of the projects which is 
in the development right now, we have actually started, is the media monitoring. We have 
set up a media monitoring and well we would prefer to call it media response, because 
monitoring is ... seems to 
be a very negative thing, you just look at what is happening and you 
do nothing about-it. We are actually now getting a large number of people, something in the 
region of two three. hundred people, and we are going to be responding to the different media 
events, and we are doing we are actually in the process of, within the next few weeks, we will 
be doing a leaflet on how to make a complaint about different aspects of media, newspaper, 
radio, television, independent TV, BBC, etc., etc... and all the different avenues open for 
making a complaint and how it should be done, once you have made a complaint, how is it 
going to be dealt with, and all that is going to be put into one booklet. And also within that 
we are going to provide volunteers who will help those individuals to make those complaints 
if they need support. So you know, this is sort of a project which came from the people, they 
wrote to us and said look we've got to do something about this, and this is how we have 
developed it. 
Q: When it comes to the methods to achieve your aims, you have said they vary from 
fundraising to sort of media work... 
It is fundraising, media work and campaigning, I mean for example, recently on Lebanon, we 
wrote a letter, I could get you a copy of it, to every single member of these two thousand, and 
we asked them to do a number of things or one of the number of things: 
1. to help fundraising for emergency relief; 
2. to put pressure on the government, by writing to their MP's, writing to the Prime Minister, 
we even put the phone number of the Prime Minister, Downing Street number 10, and we said 
dial this number and ask them why is it that our government is supporting a terrorist state 
and terrorism. And you know ... 
3. and we asked them to contact every media, local or national and put them under pressure. 
Now that to us, that is more effective than sending 2000 people in the street ... shouting, 2000 
people calling 10 Downing Street, you know, it is much more effective than 2000 people going 
in the street and holding placards. 
Q: And especially it doesn't give you a bad media ... Yes, with the telephone, you phone and put the ... and you know, the idea is that jam the 
phone lines of 10 Downing Street, jam the phone lines of BBC, ITV, you know, when they do 
something, make life difficult for them. And this is a better way of campaigning, and this is 
the sort of thing we prefer to do. And also we do press releases into media, we put ... there is 
not a .. if there are 
days that goes without us being involved with some work with media, 
there is not a week that goes by without three or four involvements of different aspect of 
media, and these all range from our own projects or helping the media to reflect better what 
the needs of our community are, and what perspective of different things are. 
Q: The material I have from you, ends in 93, what other topics did you address, apart from 
what you have just mentioned? 
Are you talking about the Human Rights committee or the Muslim Parliament? 
Q: The Muslim Parliament. 
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Well, the Muslim Parliament, we were talking about the HR committee. The Muslim P. has 
been involved in a number of things, for example, we have just done a major thing on the Home 
Office strategy regarding Muslims, I don't know if you have received that, now that probably 
came out after your last visit, that is quite a major document which is how we see that 
Islam 
and Muslims are being dealt with by not just the British government but also 
European 
government, how they are trying to manipulate the Muslim organisations, and so 
forth. It is 
quite a major work that has been done. And also we do have the tutorial colleges which is 
going ahead, we do have the war crime watch, this sort of project, we do have the Bosnian 
orphans and how we are going to expand it to elsewhere. We have set up a project which is 
supporting the families of those who have died in the cause of Islam, right across the board, 
Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, we have got this project, we are going to extend it to Lebanon and 
to Palestine. This, you know, is our major work, we match up families, so one family here 
supports another family over there, and ... so they become more closer to one another, and this 
is a way of actually linking our community together and also making people here feel 
responsible for people there, this is quite important. 
Q: Can you say that you act as a lobby? 
Yes, we are a pressure group and we act as a lobby, yes. 
Q: I generally want to know, and you can talk about your personal ideas now, how would you 
describe Muslim identity at present in Britain? 
Well, Muslim identity has been, there is an attempt always to dilute Muslim identity and 
this is being done under the umbrella of integration. I don't think someone needs to, you know, 
you would never ask a Black person to become a white because to be integrated into the 
community. You equally don't ask a Communist to become a Capitalist to integrate into the 
community. You don't ask a Muslim to, sort of, give up their belief so they will become 
integrated, what you do, you actually say that this society is for all of us, and this society ... 
each one of us have got a contribution to make, even if some of our ideology is a conflicting one. 
That in itself is not something one should destroy, cleans the other group. And Muslim 
identity is very important because we are considering ourselves living in a society which is a 
multi cultural, multi religious ... 
for us to sort of be able to get the benefit of all the ... our 
efforts, our taxes, etc. , etc., we've got 
to have our identity recognised before our need could be 
addressed. If I am looked upon as Asian then, you know, what is Asian, there is no such thing 
as Asian culture, Asian need, you know, there is no such thing. It is a whole thing, what, 
where is Asia, China is in Asia, Central Asia is in Asia, you know. So you really need to 
address the identity of people as they see their own identity. I see that I have got more in 
eom! Tcn with a black or white or even an oriental Muslim than I have with another person 
who happened to be from the same race as myself, but from a different religion. And I see my 
need be it a place of worship, be it the diet that I eat, be it the, sort of social need, or be it a 
cultural need. Even things like my fun time will be more identifiable with another Muslim 
than another non-Muslim. So all these things actually makes me and my identity what it is. 
And if that is not recognised then I am being oppressed in this society. My children at the 
school won't get their needs addressed or in the hospital, or in social services, etc., etc., so 
that is very important. I see my identity as Muslim and I think on this that identity for all of 
us Muslims is being recognised officially and addressed, we are basically oppressed 
community. 
Q: How do you see the problems of the second generation? Do they sit between two chairs? 
Well they are ... 
I feel sorry for an overwhelming majority of people who have come here or 
have been born in this society. And their families still consider themselves on an ethnic- 
nationalistic, sort of basis. They, the children don't see themselves on those basis, because 
they have never seen so called back home, you know what it is. They are not ... 
in some ways 
they might not even be able to identify and go or live in ... if they go down, 
lets say Pakistan 
or Middle East or anywhere, they will be looked upon more as a tourist than somebody from 
there. So they will not be accepted on that sort of basis, and also that society here does not 
accept them. They become... they end up having some sort of identity crisis and that is a very 
harmful and damaging thing for a teenager to go through, on the top of everything else a 
teenager go through. (interruption by telephone) You see the youth are going through that 
dilemma and they will, you see, they get to a point where they recognise that they would 
never be accepted by society at large. This is a very old fashioned thing in this society that 
people say that you should become integrated. This is something that we are always told 
that you should become integrated. You know, no matter how much you become integrated the 
fact of the matter is that this society is very xenophobic and will never accept anything other 
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than that, that is the bottom line. What we have to change is the attitude of that society 
rather than changing the colour of our hair and the... going back to Michael Jackson, having a 
cream teint making it lighter, wearing contact lenses and this sort of thing. That is not the 
way to do it. The way to do it is actually change this society and also to equipped yourself 
with sort of confidence that you could withstand this sort of society which is far from perfect. 
And we have to live in it, you know. 
Q: Do you think that the Muslim identity of the second and third generation is under threat 
through western influences? 
Actually I don't think so, I actually think that ... yes there are 
bound to be some casualties of 
people loosing themselves completely and I feel sorry for those people because I look at what 
happened in Bosnia. And I see that no matter how integrated you become eventually you are 
going to be ... you are not going to 
be accepted in any case, and this is a lesson that ... a very 
harsh lesson and unfortunately a lot of us have to learn. 
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Appendix VII 
INTERVIEW - CARDIFF 
F. and K. 
Side A 
F. started talking, without a question asked. 
Muslims from the Middle East settled in Persia and various other countries. Whenever they 
settled there they adopted various cultural values, as you can see in India. As far as Western 
culture is concerned, Western culture is not so different. Say that they are in a culture which is 
predominantly pagan or one which is predominantly monotheistic, there is a huge difference. 
See there is a contradiction. We get a moulding of cultures, Muslims behaving like the wider 
society just to say: hey we are like you, we are not that different. And so living in the culture 
that I was brought up in, my culture I suppose is an Asian culture. India, although there are a 
lot of Muslims, there is ... it is 
hard to find any real Muslims here. So my interest was lets not 
upset the community, you know, lets not rock the boat. Lets marry someone who is from the 
continent, with whom I have much more in common and where there is more to look. But what 
I found was that they do not have any real interested in their religion. One thing within the 
Asian community is that do as you are told. You know it is very much like the Buddhists, and 
like the Hindu religion, which focus very much on the worship of the elders. Even to the 
extent that when the husband is older than his wife, the wife has to worship her husband 
like a God. This was bound to have an influence on the Asian Muslim culture. And the 
children which were born here, their parents were brought up in this way. So this generation 
which was brought up in the west, where you have your own freedom, where you are your own 
person, they started to question what their parents were brought up with. Because it is only a 
cultural, a cultural icon, you know, you do this because it is a cultural icon and so a lot of them 
chose to throw all this out of the window. So the other section of the second generation would 
say, ok, well although this is all wrong, religion as such is right, so what does religion really 
say. They have come to go the opposite way. I have kind of gone that way, but before I could 
not really make up my mind which way to go. I could not really feel comfortable with my 
religion being secular, then again I was not that comfortable with the way my religion was. It 
did not quite fit with my ideas of ... 
I: What was ... ? 
Things like listen to your parents, do this if you do not you will be punished, and everything is 
about punishment. It has nothing to do with the love of God, more to do with the fear of God, 
more to do with the fear of authority. It is a very, .. still a 
feudal system. It is still a cast 
system within India, within the Hindu society. If someone is older than you, earns more 
money than you, if someone has a better background than you, these things make them a 
better person. And fortunately within the Muslim society that sort of thing does not exist. 
I: It did not? 
Well, yes I tell you what it is. If they are earning more than you they are considered higher 
up, if they are more educated than you they are considered higher up. And that did not fit to 
my ideas, like things that background is so important. Like for me it was much more 
important that he is a good person. And especially with my grandmother, when I last saw 
her she died of cancer. And then I told her that I was having problems finding the right 
person within my community. She just said to me, look I had a husband from the right 
background, I had wealth, I had everything but I did not have happiness, but that is what 
counts. So that is what really matters and 1do not believe in family background and wealth 
and the social standing, it does not really make you happy at the end of the day. So ok, ... I: Was your grandma in India? 
She was here when she was diagnosed with cancer. And she spent three or four months here. 
I: But she lived in India? 
Yes she lived in India. 
I: So she came here for treatment. 
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That is right. But I was very close to my grandmother. 
So that was the problem, I had to find someone who is religious. Because it was within the 
religion that I found what I was looking for. You should judge people by their motives but not 
by who they are, and so forth. You see the exact contradiction comes here, that although a 11 
Muslims will tell you this they will not necessarily believe this. 
I: Well they may believe it, but may not act accordingly ... 
That is right,. within Asian culture, everyone is not equal, they still look down on a lot of 
people, an the whole, you know. They will go on and glorify, saying: Hattu ul-Alaah, the 
first guy to give the Alzah, you know, companion of the Prophet, blah, blah, blah. The second 
black guy to walk through the house and say hey can I marry your daughter, would be thrown 
out. So it is a dichotomy, it is not, it is not, it is hypocrisy, and I could not stand that. I did not 
like that. I did not want to marry anyone who believes in that. So of course I started looking 
outside of my culture. 
I: Sorry were you already converted before you got to know her? (To K. ) 
K.: Ahh, Yes and no. I mean I had converted to Islam before I married, but it has to be said 
that one of the first Muslims that I did meet, was F.. And so, she did, she was there from the 
beginning. But I do not think that I thought that we would get married at that point, it was 
later on. 
I: Wait, but, do you mind, you (F. ) have lead us up to the marriage, so you (K. ) lead us up to 
the marriage now. 
F.: Your story. 
K.: OK. My background. 
I: Well, you do not have to tell us about, oh actually, yes, yes. You are half Welsh, half 
Greek, yes. 
K.: Yes, my mother is Greek, my father is Welsh. My father is Welsh, half English. And so I 
almost had a, ... two 
different cultures running in my family. Unfortunately my father is 
Atheist and my mother is Greek-Orthodox. So actually I was confronted with different ideas 
of religion in the house, some were very conflicting and confusing. 
I: There was a conflict? 
K.: Mmmm, I think it was. I mean basically, when I was young, say I wanted to go to Church or 
something like that, my father would drop a comment like: what is the point, or this, or that. 
My father would be continuously trying to throw signs my way by saying: listen, you know, 
Darwin says this, so how can religion make sense. Always thinking that this was the 
conflict, between religion and science, you know, that these two are always biting each other. 
And my mother was always, she always tried to give me a good, you know, a Christian 
upbringing. She tried to take me to the Church and, but, in the end one had to give way. And, 
so they both, sort of, sat back and let me take a decision. I was 14,15 then, I was almost old 
enough then to make these kind of decisions for myself. And I decided that science made more 
sense. And so that is where I decided to take my spirituality from at that age. Anyway then I 
went to university. Before I got to university, I had not met any Muslims before. There were no 
other Muslims in my school, because I was educated about 15 miles away from ... , there 
is no 
Asian community there, there is no Muslim community there. And the Asian that I did know, 
his father owned the corner shop. That was literally the way it was. But I had no contact 
with Muslims. When I came to university all that changed. Contact was increased in 10,15 
fold and I was always very out to get my opinions across, I was quite opinionated to say the 
least. And so I entered into a lot of discourses, especially with religious people. Because 
religion was the one thing I could not quite understand, you know, why? What is the point? 
Anyway, so I met F. and other people on my course. And that is when things started to change, 
with me anyway. And, I mean it is quite a long and complicated thing to talk about, you know, 
why I made such a decision, why I decided to change my faith. But I think the main aspect, 
for me at least, was this conflict that had always existed there between science and religion, 
no longer existed, as far as Islam is concerned. It almost lifted this agony. There was no 
conflict and this shocked me quite a lot and it provoked me to learn a lot more about Islam and 
about what it is saying about religion. Until I suppose second and third year and then we 
decided to marry. 
I: And when did you convert? 
K.: That was probably in first year at university, 1995, February. 
F.: Strait after Ramadan. 
K.: Yeah, strait after Ramadan. 
I: And what was the reaction of your parents? 
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K.: Ha, ha, this was mixed. I mean my parents were very good to me. I can understand what 
F. 
says about the morals and the morality of this society. And if this society, Judaic-Christian, 
then morally it is not that different from what Islam is trying to say. I mean the ten 
commandments still hold, the teachings of Jesus still hold and so they could not complain 
with what I was doing morally. I mean, I still had the same morals, 
it was not as if I had 
become a Buddhist or something like this, and decided to twist things completely. You 
know I 
was still saying to my mother, you know, Jesus is still a good person, a good prophet. 
And 
everything that he has to say as far as we know that it is truthful, that 
is very good. I was 
still saying to my father, I have no problem with any of Darwin's theories. 
It is just what he 
says here, I mean, evolution yes, you know, as a concept I can handle evolution. 
But as far as 
creation was concerned, you know, this is where I differ. So, it was not as if I was coming 
into 
direct conflict with my parents. I was almost agreeing with almost everything that they 
have taught me anyway. But eventually this has lead to the situation where it was not 
talked about. There would be no discussion about religion. I would, you know, even if 
1, I, 
... 
the example I would use,... if I sneeze. I mean culturally, religiously a Muslims would say: 
Hamd ul-Illah, OK. I would sneeze in front of my parents and say al-hamd ul-Illah, just out 
of pure habit. And they would say stop preaching. And, you know, I'd take a step 
back from 
this and think, OK, right, and that is where is it, that is where the line has been 
drawn. And 
that is the way it has been until now. I mean my parents have been exceptionally good to me, 
but there is no discussion about religion in the house, what so ever. 
I: May I know how old you two are? 
F.: Cos is 21. Iam25. 
I: So we are the same age, aha. 
K.: I think the biggest conflict was with marriage. 
I: Yes, I wanted to ask, this was a relative quick thing? 
K. and F.: It was, it was very quick. 
K.: I suppose, the decision had to be made, ... 
hastily ... 
because, well, religiously it is not 
easy. I mean, if you do not, ... 
if you are trying to agree with the system, where you do not 
have boyfriends, where you do not have girlfriends, and, you know, getting married is the 
right thing to do ... then 
it was right, considering that I had such a life before that I should 
think about getting married as soon as possible. And so I had a lot of help from a lot of people 
here and a lot of people in Birmingham. And Fs parents were not adverse to the idea of it, 
and so that is how it came about. And, I mean it is interesting how it came about because 
F. 
actually asked me,... ha, ha, sorry to put you on the spot, ... 
but she actually asked me. And it 
was decided that it should be done as quickly as possible. That is how it came about. The only 
bad thing I suppose was the fact that my parents thought that it was too early. I mean they 
love F., and they think that she is the right person, I mean they have to agree with my 
choice, but they did not like how quickly it was done. And they did not like the fact that it 
was done before I have finished my studies. 
I: That is the usual response. 
K.: So that was the only difficulty. But in the end ... my parents still think that 
I should 
have waited, but they are not unhappy with the results either. Because they like the 
stability of the situation and they have accepted F., I would have thought, as one of the 
family. I mean I took her to Greece, in September to see a cousin of mine get married, and you 
know, even there my mothers family in Greece they are very acceptant towards F. and the 
situation. 
I: I think the Greeks also appreciate marriage ... 
F.: But I think things are changing ... 
K: Yes they are. 
F.: I think there would be more resistance there because their associations are of course 
historically with the Turks. And I think it would be like a Serbian man marrying a Bosnian, 
you know that kind of thing. And also within a culture where everyone's business is everyone 
else's business, like in the Asian culture, I think his mother was very hesitant about what she 
is going to say now to her family about, you know, she is ashamed of that it happened. And 
how much was it her fault ... 
because, I mean there was a complex situation earlier on about is 
getting married where it was the case that she blamed the father: had you brought him up a 
Christian this never would have happened, you know. It was very ... 
Laila came up with a ... 
K.: Laila is my sister. She has an interesting name choice, my parents liked the name. 
I: Ha, it was prophetic ... 
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K.: But ah, you know, she is Christian, but she just happens to be called Laila. But, you 
know 
its nice... go on (to F. ) you can tell ... 
F.: yeah, she made a plea that: hold on a second, when he did not want to believe in 
God and 
he did not want to believe in Jesus, you were fine with that, now he wants to believe in 
God 
and he wants to believe in Jesus, you have a problem with this? You know, I think that kind 
of brought a few things home for Cos' mother, which no matter what Cos has said would not 
help. But I think the next thing is that she may fear that Laila may convert and think: oh 
my God then I have lost both my children. Unfortunately she still feels that she has lost Cos. 
F.: Oh, the only reason why I am still calling him Cos is out of pure habit, because his name is 
Constantinos, still is in his Passport, but his name he chose when he converted is K.. And the 
choice for that name is based on a story. It was that man who came up to the Prophet after he 
converted and he did not have a name, just a title, which is un-Islamic. He asked the Prophet 
what should my name be and the Prophet answered, K., which means friend. And there is 
nothing better for a man to be than a friend, so your name will be K.. And Cos chose that name 
because of that. 
K.: Yes, I suppose the name is, I do not know, it is an interesting kind of thing, I suppose it is a 
question of recognition, it is a question of the way you are. Like for instance most of my colleges 
they would call me Costi or Constantin.. I would still be known as Costi. I suppose it is 
interesting then, that when I go to the mosque and where ever else I would be called K.. And 
... 
I do not know, it is not a dual reality, I mean people, ... my colleges still 
know that I am 
Muslim, but you know I have not changed my name to that extent, I have not taken that huge 
leap and changed my passport. Whether I will in the future is the next question. 
I: But how does that make you feel? 
K.: I am perfectly happy with it, because religiously there is no Muslim name, I mean there is 
no such thing as having a Muslim name. I mean you can have names, you can have names 
which would be quite bad, for instance if you would be called King or Lord of something, I 
mean that in Islam would be considered as wrong. But there are no un-Islamic names and there 
are plenty of Muslims who keep their names exactly the way they are. But it was just me, I 
think I like the name, and it was also ... 
I want to use it within ... as I entered the, I suppose 
the Asian society in Birmingham, if they heard something they were familiar with ... 
but 
... 
F.: See this is one side of the story, with his parents. The other side of the story is Islam in 
Birmingham. The society here, within Asian society, the rules and regulations are quite 
different depending on how educated you are. And the nationals who came from India and 
Pakistan are less aggressive but more religious, you know. I was the first person in the 
community of professional Asian doctors and dentists, that got married outside. No one else 
had. And the way that was viewed, and the way my family was looked at, ... 
it was a big 
thing. I mean for my family that was not unusual. My mums two aunts who married Russians 
and my own aunt is half Serbian, half Croatian, part of the family is Uspek, you know, my 
great grand mother was of Turkish decent, no confusion there, no problems, but within the 
Asian community there is definitely a problem. (The thing with the Chinese community and 
the Asian community is that they are incredibly racist, they think they are the best. White 
people have no morals, black people are below them, you know, they are the only ones who 
can ... and they 
have a strange problem with that. And so within the community it was like 
... they did not 
know what to say and they did not know how to react. A lot of them said that 
it was wrong. No one openly said it to us, but we know that they said to each other: but this is 
wrong and I do not believe in it. Which is odd for people who refer to themselves as being 
Muslim. You know they will go into their prayers and they will go and sit down and say this 
is wrong and they are literally making up laws for themselves which are absolutely contrary 
to what they believe within their religion. And how can it possibly be wrong religiously? 
And, and just this though exists. My parents handled it very well, they showed the 
community they supported us a hundred percent, all the way, were very happy with the 
situation. And the community did not know how to react to that. Because usually, the worst 
thing is how could she have hurt her parents so, how could she have gone against her 
parents? But they could see that I was not going against my parents and they did not know 
how to handle that. They were, ... may said: oh 
it is a good thing, it is a good thing, more 
people should be like this, it is a good thing. But you knew when it came to them, it would 
never happen within their own household. And then take it a level further, some said: well, 
I do not believe in this, if our girls marry outside, who are our boys going to marry? You know, 
are they going to bring in white girls? I mean it is not going to be the same, you know and ... so 
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on and so forth. You know one of the doctors actually said: You know, if my son married a 
white girl she just would not fit into the family. She would not know how to make bread the 
way we make it, she would not know how to wear a sari, you know how would she fit into the 
family? And she was just.... You know, I find it highly amusing because my generation of girls 
we do not tend to make bread, we do not tend to wear saris anyway, we tend to be doctors and, 
you know ... it is a very strange, ah, you 
know, it is worth writing a book about it. You know, 
the mentality of the people. 
F. to K.: How did you find it when you first met my relatives and ... 
? 
K.: It was quite a culture shock, especially when you compare it to the Muslims in Cardiff. 
Because the community we have here is more of a mulit-cultural one. 
I: Here in Cardiff? 
K.: Yes, here in Cardiff and the mosque I go to specifically. I mean if you go to the mosque over 
here it is mostly Yemeni. It is a mosque close to university. There are two actually, one of 
them is mostly, ehm, the Gulf Arabs and the other is more Palestinians, Syrians and this kind 
of thing. And they get on really well. And basically, being part of that mosque and society 
where everyone is just a bit more aware of their religion and aware about other peoples 
cultures and society, it is a lot ... 
it is a very open and very beautiful society. If you compare 
that to what you get in say Birmingham, in Asian society, or I suppose you would have found 
it in Bradford, where a lot of Asians live,... just, just simple things .... 
I do not know, I am just 
trying to think of a view examples,... respect for people, respect for your elders, I mean, there 
is respect for piety, you know in this society here, OK. But simple things, like, lets say we sat 
round in a circle within the mosque, and some of us would come in, now everyone would shake 
hands and great the person. But you see the same situation in Birmingham, everyone would be 
obliged to stand up if the person was elder, or if .... And 
it is, it is kind of strange ... 
I: So you would not great a younger? 
K.: Well, you would, but there is a Hadith, a saying of the Prophet, where, you know, it is 
not, it is not you should not do it, it is ... if someone enters the room, I mean yes you great them, 
you say hello, but it is ... you 
know you do not get up and stand up as a sign of respect. It is just 
something that is not done, yet. Asian Muslims all pretend to do it as something as part of 
their ... 
F.: ... respect your elders 
is a big thing among Asians, you know. If your elders are doing 
something wrong you still respect them, you know, it is, it is, your elders cannot do something 
wrong, it is... but within Islam this does not exist. This respect for elders does not exist. It is a 
respect for everyone. Within Islam you can treat someone who is younger than you with the 
same respect as you would treat someone who is older than you. But in Asian society there is a 
hierarchy of age like there is in Chinese society ... and that is a strange thing. I do not 
necessarily believe in it ... 
I believe that respect should be earned or you should respect 
everybody, you know. I do not think that you should just respect somebody because they are 
older. And growing up in Asian society that is a very strange idea to have, you know, ... 
I am 
not quite with it. 
K.: I think that there is also a difference in knowledge and in the amount of knowledge they 
have. It is not that the Asian community is too lazy, it is just that they tend not to be as, I 
suppose, I do not know, as religious I suppose, in a way. If you look at the spread of religious 
people to people who are just following it because that was their parents' religion, it tends to 
be greater in the Asian community than it did here within my community. And I am not saying 
at all that, sort of, non Asian communities are like this, I mean, that would probably be wrong 
to say. And so going back to the original question, it was quite a nerving entering, you know, 
this kind of arena, where people were saying that they were Muslims, yet they were not 
following it to the best of their ability. And it is difficult to get, or not to get frustrated, and 
start saying, you know: You do this wrong and you do this wrong. Or just to sit down and, you 
know, let it go by and think OK well, changes have to be made but maybe there is a better 
way to do it, you know, maybe there is a ... 
just to be slower, or to be more patient and see what 
happens. That is the biggest shock if you like. 
F.: That situation. is false, it is a false situation. And within the next generation you will be 
finding that with my generation of kinds they are making a choice. Either they are finding 
out what is real and are practising whole heartedly or they are finding out what is false ... or 
not bothering to find out, not believing what their parents say, and just going off and drinking 
and having affairs and stuff ... and so forth.. There is a definite, within this generation, a 
split ... we, in fact, ... the majority of the parents prefer it, to be of the second, seculars, because then we do not think properly, we do not question their deeds. It is the ones that 
443 
decide to be more religious, the ones that decide to follow Islam as a religion, that really 
humble the parents. To the extent that they have stopped their kids going to Islamic 
meetings, stopped them mixing with other Muslims, you know, ... 
I: Is this true? 
F.: It is true, it is in Birmingham. 
K.: It is very strange, I mean, I am not sure I would agree with it. 
I: Do you know anybody of .. 
F.: Yes, yes, we do. 
K.: Of our generation, it is very interesting, this split ... 
I: Sorry, have you ever talked to the parents who do not allow their kids to go ... 
F.: Yes. 
I: And what have they said? 
F.: They should be concentrating on their studies, you know, ... that they spend too much time 
studying Islam, where are they going to go with their studies. Where is their studies leading 
to? They way I see, you know,... all they do is come back and be rude to their parents. They gp 
there and they say so and so, and they come back and they accuse us of being this and that and 
the other, and ... 
I: What this, that, and the other? 
F.: You are not praying five times a day, their kids have a problem with this, you know. If 
you are a Muslim, why are you not praying five times a day. If you are a Muslim, why do you 
not behave in a certain way? If you are a Muslim, why are you doing when you know this is 
wrong? You know, that kind of stuff. 
I: And those kind of parents are religious though, according to ... 
F.: ... according to their 
kind of culture, yes. According to their society that they live in, yes. 
I: I mean these same parents would have a big problem if their daughter would marry a non- 
Muslim. 
F.: Oh, oh, definitely, they would definitely have a problem with that. 
I: So they are religious and they would be very unhappy if their children would go astray ... 
F.: ... absolutely ... 
I:... but at the same time ... 
F.: ... they want to 
keep religion where it suits them. If it suits them to be a certain way, it 
suits their community to be a certain way, they will stick to community rules. If the 
community norm is to do something wrong, they will do that wrong, rather than follow their 
religion. The community nonri is to have "bravhani". "Bravhani" is something that is 
developed within the Asians for some strange reasons. It is an invention, it is something that 
has been invented within the religion. It is what happens if someone dies, and all the people 
come round into a place and they start reading the Qur'an. Now that is an invention. It is 
called Bivrat. It is something that you are not supposed to do. You are not supposed to 
innovate your religion. You are not supposed to bring things into it that never existed. That is 
wrong. It can lead to very, very bad things, and they know this. Their children say: listen 
this is bidda, this is wrong. And the children who have become practising Muslims . 
have a 
huge problem with it. If they see something wrong happening within their own household, 
there is nothing they can do about it. So they get angry with their parents, they are like, ... 
you know, they lose respect for their parents. And so the parents see: Ahh, this boy or this 
girl goes to the Islamic society, mixes with Muslims, they come back, and they are rude to is 
and they lose respect for us. Stop them going. This boy, this girl, wants to marry a black 
person, wants to marry someone who is a non Asian, they have met these people at some 
society, they have met them at the mosque, they have met them ... stop them going. And this 
will not happen. You know, this is what parents said, you know, my mother said this, just 
came back from ... people sitting down and saying: we should stop our children going to the 
mosque, we should stop them going to Islamic society meetings, because they come back with 
new ideas and then these ideas are problems for us. 
I: So you can really say that the way Islam is being practised does change. It changes away from this cultural heritage, which the parents have brought from abroad to a very purist, 
kind of back to what Islam really is about. 
K.: Yes. 
F.: Within the group that want to really follow it for what it is. Because these people are 
now mixing with Arabs and with Muslims from this country and with other Muslims. Now, 
and they stand up and say: Oh, so and so and so and so. And the other Muslims are going. 
What are you talking about? They go: Hold on isn't that Islam? And they are going: No! Then 
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they kind of get very confused. You know, it is like, hold on but I 
have learned this all my 
life. And although Cos is the official convert to Islam, I am as much a convert to 
it, as Cos is. 
He just had to learn what Islam is, I had to unlearn all the mistakes and 
learn it again. And 
it was even more complex for me. 
K.: If I can just correct something, you said that their parents would rather want them to 
be 
seculars. I do not think, that is actually what their parents intention was. Their parents 
would rather that their kids were Asian. 
I: Obedient? 
K.: Obedient. Follow their idea of what Islam was, rather than this ... 
F.: The reason I said secular was, just because if you take the children who drink alcohol, 
their parents are OK with this. You know as long as it is hidden, they do not mind ... .I mean 
they know their kids drink. You know, it is OK as long as nobody from the community knows 
this. That is what I mean. Where else, a kid who is going to stand up and say: Hey come on it 
is prayer time, everybody come and pray. This is going to be such a huge embarrassment 
for 
their parents. Look, can you imagine, you know, one of the kids walking into ... all the men, 
sitting in a room, going: come on, it is prayer time, get up, get up. You know, I mean the parents 
would be, oh my God, I do not know him, you know, who is he, he is not my child, you know. 
K.: I don't know, this may be interesting because you are not only dealing with Birmingham 
society which is very Asian. But you are also dealing with this community, the Muslim doctor 
and dentist association, OK. So they are mostly professional, they are mostly educated. Their 
kids go to the private schools, they have generally ... 
F.: ... a 
huge over achievement level, I mean, everyone goes to medical school, everyone tries 
on Cambridge and Oxford, you know, it gets ridiculous... 
K.: ... it gets ridiculous, 
the kids are under a lot of pressure. 
F:: You know, you get a kid who is not so bright, it is very tough on them. They have to 
compete on that level. Immense over-achievement. 
K.: So maybe they are just a strange community. 
F.: I will say one thing else, maybe this is where all this lies. The idea in India, of what 
religion is, is very much: you should wear your trousers a little higher because the prophet 
used to, you should g*ow a beard because the prophet used to, eat 
halal, halal means 
allowed, you should eat the beha meat, only the beha meat, you should, ... you know a 
11 
these kind of things. Their religion revolves around customs and things like that. You know, 
their religion is not whether you smile at someone or whether you are kind to someone, 
whether you go and grow a plant and you water the plant in the gutter. You now it is not that, 
it is very much set rules and things like that. And there is no discourse, you do not discuss 
religion. It is the case of what your parents have said or it has been said, meaning it is said 
and therefore you should commend. It is like I have talked to a couple of people who have 
been Catholics, very much like that. You do no question religion, you just follow it. It is very 
much like that. 
Because their parents have been educated, consultants or sergeants, they were too bright to 
just accept this, so they accepted it because it was easy to do, but they do not really believe in 
it, you know. They have trouble with a son when it does not suit them because it does not 
match. 
K.: Another thing that is most probably worth adding as well is that they on the whole have 
a very poor opinion of the imams. Because the imams position within Asian society is that he 
is the village idiot who is not able to do anything else, so he was made imam. 
I: What? 
F.: Yes, that is the heritage within Asian society, that the village idiot became imam. 
K.: This is not always the case. 
I: In Pakistan? 
F.: In Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in India ... 
K.: This is no joke, this is serious. This is not all the cases, I mean, surely, you can have some 
Asian imams who are very knowledgeable and very wise, but this is the joke, and this is the 
cultural ideas that they have been brought up with. In the village, the person who is not 
going to achieve anything he will become the imam. You know, you can teach him a view 
lines from the Qur'an, teach him Arabic ... F.: ... teach 
him how to lead the prayer ... 
K.: ... and off 
he goes. That is the way it is. 
F.: Trust me, I know from personal experience. When I was taught Arabic as a young person, 
the imam that came to our house to teach, told us that drinking Coke was haram because it 
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was from America and America is a Godless country. And we should drink Muslim drinks like 
water, milk and wasla, is a Pakistani drink which is made from roses. 
I: Rosewater? 
F.: Rosewater and drinks like that. Can you imagine, this is the low level of intellectual 
discussion that Islam in Asia has come to. I mean any child who has a bit of brains is going to 
think, well this religion is a bit stupid, I am not going to follow this. Anc' that is what has 
happened the Asian culture, within working class culture, comer shops, you know. First 
generation, educated, first generation which went to university, that is not a problem, they 
have not come to that. The professional classes like my parents, they did not accept 
something like that as religion and this is why they stick to society as opposed to religion. 
They do not believe religion, they do not know what is right and wrong. They are not 
interested to find out, they have been too busy with their studies, getting their PhD or their 
Masters, or what ever. 
K.: Yes, I suppose the good thing that you do take out of this though is that the next 
generation, ... yes 
OK you do have this big divide between those that are so disillusioned 
with their religion that they do not really believe it and those that are very interested in 
Islam and follow it, but,... as you should I suppose, they know what they are getting into and 
they follow it as right as they can. That is the good thing. You know, there is still this group, 
you know. It does not matter how disillusioned their parents are, they are still going to get on 
the right path. 
F.: I know within the group of my generation, which have chosen Islam as their way of life, 
how much problems they had with their parents and brothers and sisters. Friends of mine, I 
mean she is a doctor, when she decided to wear the headscarf, ... every time her brother 
would see her with it, he snatched it off her head. Problems where mothers, my mother too, 
... there was one 
time when, you know ... why wear a headscarf. My friend especially ... you 
will never find a husband. You look so awful with it. You will never find a husband. And we 
just look at each other, you know. OK don't say anything, don't get into an argument here. And 
lots of things like this. The troubles we had as practising Muslims within. our community 
have been greater than probably outside. And this is happening in a lot of places. We have 
been to a Turkish doctor, he would not employ a girl with a headscarf. This is happening al1 
the time. Girls who decide to wear a headscarf within Turkish Medical School are being 
pushed in the corridors and spat at and all kinds of things. Because Turkey want to be in the 
EC and they feel that these girls bring them back to a past they would rather forget. Same in 
Algeria and even in France it is happening, but Algeria for Gods sake, that is like ninety 
percent Muslim. And it is happening everywhere, it really is. As a practising Muslim you are 
being abused, attacked and all kinds of things, this is very scary, ... by 
Muslims and nan 
Muslims. It is like, I can really appreciate what the Jews have felt like during the Holocaust, 
everywhere you look, every news. 
Side B 
F.: Educated Pakistani women who were housewives. What they find now, especially with 
their children grown up, they tend to find careers. My mother for instance ... I: Did they have to fight for it though? 
F.: No not particularly. 
I: No? 
F.: Not particularly. But a lot of them got married within their education; a lot of them did 
not do what they wanted to have done what ever that was. My mother for instance wanted to 
become a doctor. 
I: Why? 
F.: For various reasons. Father died, you know, they had to get married, you know, time had 
come... 
I: So there was family pressure behind it? 
F.: There was, not necessarily pressure, but certainly, ... r one would pressure them into that 
situation. And this is widespread, this is, you know ... I have heard this story in different 
ways many times. No one pressured them, it was family obligation, not pressure, you know. * It 
was what they felt obliged to do, as opposed to someone saying you must do this, this would 
help, you know. So there is a difference. So they did this and they did that. Now in our 
generation, our mothers thought, we get our education, so we can do what ever we wanted, 
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that is fine. But a lot of us, you know, we want to get married, want 
kids, want to sit down at 
home and be quite happy, you know, in our little, sort of, houses and our 
husbands and are not 
very ambitious, you know. A lot are, you know, but a lot aren't. But the response 
from our 
mothers to that:... you can't do that. How can you be educated and not work? 
How can you be 
... how can you want a kid now, when you could 
be going out and getting a career? How could 
you.... And although my generation actually want kids, and want to settle down and want to 
be this, our mothers are the ones who are saying: No, no, no, you do not want to do that. You 
know. A friend, who's mother is caring said: I know you have been married for three years, but 
don't have a kid. You know. My mother, you know, as I said: Well, nvnA you know, when I 
qualify, if I need to work when I am fifty maybe, when I am bored, I will start working. You 
know I will look after my kids and have a nice dinner, cook food and stuff. My mother is like, 
you know, an atom bomb: what? You have to have a career. You have to make lots of money. 
You have to ... you 
have to.... Why? Why would I want to do that? You know, it is a case of 
... 
but, but, but. And there is no why, it is just that all these emotions have pop up and may 
ideas have installed themselves. Like media has become global around that time, in our 
mothers generation, and good ideas have installed themselves but there was no outlet to 
them. And society has not changed, the outlets are now on their daughters, you know. 
Unfortunately they have not made us ambitious or feminist but they want us to be something. 
They want us to ... it 
is very odd. A friend of mine who is eighteen, you know, she is young, but 
she wants to start looking for a husband. Because she does not want to be twenty-five, alone 
and then start looking, and then find someone when she is thirty, you know. She wants to 
start looking, she feels if she looks young, she will find the best guy. And her mother is like: 
no way! You know, not for another five years. And her mother was married at that age, at 
that age, when this girl wants to start looking, she had already married. But her daughter, 
no way. And it is not so much that the daughters want the freedom and the mothers are not 
helping them. The mothers want something for their daughters which the daughters do not 
want themselves. Very strange. That is the way it is. 
F.: "Being at home, looking after your child and keeping a house, you get no returns for it", you 
know. "And you bring up your children for twenty-five, thirty years of your life and there is 
nothing to show for it". I am like sitting here: how can you say that? Look at. me, look at 
where we ... . 
And for her (F. 's mother) it does not mean anything. And these are not real 
ideas, these are ideas that, you know, put in her, surely she cannot naturally think that way, 
this is impossible, you know. I will say another thing that really worries me, I sit and watch 
TV, most recently, Coke advert, this is probably the most well known one, where this guy, 
who is a work man, walks in and all these women are looking him up and you know, it is like, 
two O'clock tea break ... 
I: Oh, yes ... 
F.: ... you 
know? And he is walking in and they are all, hey, you know. And I just thought 
reverse that. If there was a woman walking in, carrying something and these guys were like 
looking at her, people would be going crazy, you know. What is this? This is turning her into a 
piece of meat, you know. This is, you know, it is like a market, what is she selling the Coke or 
her body? ... and 
blah, blah, you can see what ... 
but that is fine to do that to a guy. You know, 
loads of adverts, ... all these men are 
in a hospital because they have stolen, or they have 
borrowed their girlfriends or wife's car and they have bandages here or they have bandages 
there. If you would turn that around, you know, women beaten up, how would that look? So 
why is it OK to do it to men? 
I: Because they are the stronger ones anyway. Women are officially the weak ones, so if it is 
done to them, it is a strong element beating something that is weak anyway. But a woman 
beating up a man, i. e. someone much stronger, because they do not have little guys, 1,50 tall, 
you know, crippled, who are lying there. You have machos, cool doods, and you know they get 
beaten by a woman, which just shows how daring she is to even attack him. 
F.: This is now, this is now. But where is it going to go. 
I: Yes, that is unbelievable. 
F.: What if I have sons? You know, in twenty years time, where is it going to go? You know, 
what is going to happen to my sons? 
I: Oh, it is terrible, I already know households where women beat men. I mean beat,... 
F.: Yes, apparently that is going up like mad, because I saw a chat-show recently of the first 
time, Samaritans, that phone call, .... For the first time men calling up 
because they have 
been beaten up by their wives, has reached an equal with women calling up. For the first time 
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it has reached an equal, you know. For the first time in London, three years ago, there were 
more male rapes than female rapes. 
1: Excuse me how does this work, was it male by male or male by female? 
F.: Male by male, male by female, guys ... ' 
I: How can you rape a man? 
F.: I do not know, I really do not know, I do not think about it. 
K.: That may be difficult. 
F.: As we have got married a lot of the people have started thinking about looking outside of 
the community. Kids who would not have otherwise considered it because it has never been 
done. Our wedding has set a precedence, sort of, for a preference. And this is, ... as a 
repercussion this guy Tarek, he is a fourth year medical student at Cambridge and he has been 
married to a girl called Suha, Sue, who is Egyptian. And she is a PhD student, so she is older 
than him, which is considered as bad, anyway, and she is also Egyptian, which is odd. So ... 
there we are ... which should 
be interesting, there should be, you know. I would like to see 
how much of the Arab culture prevails, how much of the Asian culture prevails. 
I: But she is British Egyptian? 
F.: She iiis ... British Egyptian, yes. 
She was bought up here. 
All giggle. 
F.: What? brought up here. 
K.: You said bought up here. 
I: No, it is just... 
K.: ... a very 
Welsh thing to say, ha, ha. She picks up my bad grammar, you see. Because I am 
from this part of the country, my English is not that good, my grammar is awful. F. 's grammar 
used to be impeccable, she would not say a word wrong. But since she has been married to me 
she always gets her grammar slightly mixed up. 
F.: I would say Welsh colloquialisms, like bought up is a Welsh thing to say, brought up is 
the British thing to say. 
K.: People get lazy. 
I: What would you immediately associate with Wales in terms of cultural and social values? 
K.: OK, immediately. OK. 
I: I mean you can think about it. 
K.: Certainly Christian, but it would be, ... 
I do not know... they are old people. I mean, the 
Welsh are renowed for being very friendly, very down to earth people, a lot more spiritual, I 
would say, than English people in general. They seem to have clung on to a lot of the older 
values for a lot longer than English people have for instance. That is my opinion, but then I 
am half Welsh, so I would be very biased. 
I: No, but that is important. 
F.: I think it is very much a mining community, hard working down to earth people, low 
education. That is just in short. That is what I think of Welsh people. 
I: And in terms of ... 
how is Wales different from the rest of Britain? 
K.: I would say that the Welsh have a lot in common with the Irish people and the Scottish 
people but they are quite different, no not quite different, they are definitely different from 
the English people. But they have a lot more in common with the Scottish and the Irish 
people. They are all Celts, they are all Celtic nations or Celtic people. So they, ... the one 
thing that links these people is they feel a certain amount of animosity to the English. And ... but they also, ... they still 
have a bit of the old world still left in them, they still have a lot 
of the older values. 
I: Which are? 
K.: A lot more friendly, I mean, if you ask people who come here they feel it more because I do 
not feel it. I do not notice how much more friendly people are here compared to people in 
England. It is amazing, the responses you get, even if you walk into a shop ... F.: Even if you are driving, they give way. They are much nicer. 
K.: Generally nicer people. Even in Cardiff, which is a city, so people here are quite horrible 
compared to people further up the valleys. Just, you know, politeness and they still have a 
family kind of orientation. They are not so much swayed by the media into this modem 
globalisation type of thinking and all this. 
F.: I think those ideas are gone. Because what I know of modern day Wales, I mean the mining 
thing is what the historical, sort of view. But what I see of modem day Wales, I do not know 
that much, but my sisters friends, they all have broken families, they are all drunk on 
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Saturday night and that is all they ever do. And frankly I think it is going to the dogs. 
Because there is just not that much of a future here, where as in England it is ... you know, still 
in the South it is booming. There are still places where everyone is working, where as here 
unemployment is getting higher and higher, education is getting less and less and they are a 11 
alcoholics. 
K.: Probably. I could argue with you, but we do not have so much tape. 
I: No, no please do actually. 
K.: I think you are in danger here, because what you have seen of- my sisters friends, I mean, 
my sisters friends all have a comprehensive education, OK. They are from a part of Wales 
which is notorious for its depression. All the work is gone, there is higher unemployment in 
South Wales. If you go to places like West Wales and North Wales, the people are very 
different, even if you go further up the valley to places like Brakan, the people are very 
different. So you are talking about highly depressed areas. 
F.: I always had the view that most Wales is highly depressed. 
K.: No, it is not. Depressed in what sense? 
F.: You know, OK, OK, you know when you drive through England, and you kind of hit areas 
like Salford, which are nasty, and various other industrial areas like Sheffield which is 
scum, you know, nothing there. But then you also have areas like, sort of, Bath, you also have 
areas like Bristol and Chotnum, and things like that, which are very much still upwardly 
mobile. Where as with Wales, if we, say, drove here back from England. It was either rural 
or depressed, you know, there was no, sort of, up coming area. 
K.: There again you are confused with, ... 
it is not always the rich people that are the nicer 
people. You see, I am talking about a wealth of spirit, of, of, you know, goodness. You are 
talking about a wealth in a monetary sense ... 
F.: ... and education ... K.: ... and education, 
but you see, the two are almost hand in hand. Now that is very different 
to what I am talking about at the minute. 
F.: But surely if your education declined and your monetary system declined, it is only so long 
that your spirit can hold out, as a people. 
K.: That is not always the case. You can be very content with very little. 
F.: I think that, that is what it is with Wales, they are very content with very little. 
K.: Because they always had very little. And I generally think that, yes, that must be it 
with some people. But you are right, I mean, parts of South Wales can be very depressed. 
Where there used to be, you know, a booming industry, it has all disappeared now. They are 
all living in Council estates and there, ... I know, because a lot of my friends are trapped in 
these places, you know what it is like to be kind of "normal" and living with some of these 
people who are really mindless, you know they do not give a dam. It is not a good situation, 
and you should not have this... 
F.: Having said that the university there is one of the best one in the country, no matter how 
much of those people are Welsh, you know. 
K.: No, no, you are talking about Cardiff, and rural areas are very different, alright. You see 
one of the biggest things that shaped Wales, has been the Industrial Revolution, because 
before that Wales was a very poor country. And as the Industrial Revolution came along, 
Wales all of a sudden became one of the richest countries, not only in the UK, but one of the 
richest in the world. At one time Cardiff, this city, was one of the busiest ports in the world. 
Merther, was the largest city in this country. I think it was larger than Cardiff city and it 
was approaching some of the sizes of the English cities. 
F.: And the Marquis of Bute was the richest man in the world. 
K.: Yes, the Marquis de Bute, you know, you have been to Cardiff Castle, he was the richest 
man in the world, you know. That is, that is an amazing place to be. To have that much money 
and to be that renowned and he made it all from the Welsh Industrial Revolution. So, -but of 
course that has gone, that has disappeared. As the coal and the iron had gone the jobs had 
gone and it has become a very depressed area. As far as money has gone, education has gone. 
But you see there are still things to be proud of, for instance the university. Cardiff 
University was built with coal miners money. It was not government subsidised and the coal 
miners had decided that they needed to educate their children. I am not sure what the miners 
called it but basically, they would give a small part of their pay. You know, just a small part, 
just to educate their children, because the knew that unless they concentrated on this, you 
know the coal was eventually going to run out and they would be left with nothing. So if you 
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look at a lot of the libraries in Wales, if you look at, I think the university was partly funded 
in this way, a lot of it was coal miners money, it went towards these institutions. 
F.: That is what really struck me when I came, when I was there and went ohhh, the Welsh, 
they are all coal miners. And Cos just went: uhh! You know, see this before you ... that was 
coal miners money. And I was like wow, it really struck me, you know, that was good, that 
was good. 
K.: There have been, you know, there have been a lot of great politicians that have actually 
come from Wales. Iron Bevan, is one, he, he set up the National Health Service. So if you 
happen to be Welsh and a doctor, then that is something to be proud of. And also David Lloyd 
George, who was the Prime Minister during the First World War, so he was also ... so I am 
quite proud to be Welsh. But there is one thing wrong with the Welsh people, and that is as 
they started getting their heritage and their culture back, you see, there has been a big drive 
to relearn the Welsh language and to grab a lot of what used to be Welsh culture. They have 
become very, almost over celous about it, and so there is this phenomenon of tafia. Where 
basically if you are not Welsh, then you are not going to get the job that you want. If you are 
Welsh speaking then you get better jobs. 
F.: Tafia, that is from the river Taf which runs through, ... and the Mafia, which .... 
So it is 
a large Mafia, but not Mafia in crime but Mafia in Welshness. 
K.: So a large part of this has come about ... 
F.: For instance, I mean, if you are at university they want to know if you can speak Welsh. 
That makes a difference. 
I: Really? That is highly interesting. 
K.: They give you this little slip of paper that says: Are you Welsh speaking? And you either 
tick yes or no. You see and this is not something that is going on direct hospital records because 
otherwise it would be on the records. It is actually on a little slip of paper and you are just 
wandering, OK, where is this going? Who is this for? And I do not actually know who it is 
going to, but it just makes you think. 
I: Well, maybe it is somebody trying to find out and make a statistic. And they have asked 
the university to ... 
K.: Possibly. But then my father works for the Welsh Development Agency, which is, they 
are a Quango. I do not know whether you are familiar with this term. It is a business term 
which means Quasa, autonomous, non governmental body, OK, so they are civil servants but 
they are not. They are responsible for inviting industry into to the country and so ... like a 
Japanese firm wants to move in. They go to the government and say a Japanese firm wants to 
move in we can give them so much in subsidy, can you help us with this, etc., etc.. That is how 
they work. So my father has a lot of dealings with Welsh business people, Welsh councillors, 
Welsh politicians and this is kind of the view he has come to. But there is this, you know ... 
this is shared by a lot of people, that there is an elite group of people in Wales who want 
nothing but Welsh speakers and true Welsh people forming their own little lobby, as it were. 
That is it, if you are not Welsh then you cannot participate. 
F.: You can see the Welsh accent coming through now, can't you. A lobby as it were. 
I: Would you say there is a unity among this society? British society? 
K.: British society, yes, but I think it is disappearing. 
I: Why? 
K.: I think people feel very disillusioned with what has happened. I mean there used to be 
very strong things that would bind us. It is horrible to say but the War, war is an incredible 
binder of people. Because a war happens and you get all this sort of propaganda pulling 
people together. Sorry. But I think a lot of this is gone. And a lot of it has been governmental 
policy. For instance the Scottish have a lot to grit about. I mean if the government wants to 
try out something, they try it out on the Scottish. So I can understand the ... 
I: Poll tax ... K.: ... yes, exactly, poll tax, now it is child curfew, any new taxation schemes. You know, give it to the Scots, see what they think of it. You know they must be really upset. I mean I know 
you have been to Scotland for your trip, so you must know what it is like. But you know, you 
really have to feel ... 
F.: I tell you one thing. The one thing that really binds the Welsh, the Scottish and the Irish 
people is the hatred of the English. One thing that would bind the English is they know that 
the Celts hate them. So you know, the English really get happy about England beating 
Wales, Scotland and Ireland in Rugby matches and that really binds them together and they 
really get happy about that. And the Welsh get really happy you know, when Mel Gibbson 
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wants to make a movie about the Scottish beating the English, you know, things like that. It 
is really not fair, but it is getting stronger and stronger, this hatred for the English. 
K.: And devolution is going to make it worse. You know, recently they want the devolution, 
the Scottish want to be separate, the Welsh want to be separate. 
F.: Now the Cornish hate the English and want to be separate. 
K.: Yes, now this is going to create more problems because all it is going to create, and people 
are not looking ahead, is more nationalism, which is the last thing that Britain needs. And I 
do not know why the politicians, I mean the politicians are just doing it because they 
promised to do it. I do not think that it is a genuine necessity, but they do not need to do it. I do 
not think that it is going to have any advantage, advantages, non that I can see anyway, 
other than, you are going to create more nationalism and you are going to create more 
bureaucracy, which is just going to waste more money and it is a pointless exercise. 
F.: There is a lot of danger in nationalism. 
K.: But that is generally my inquiry. 
F.: There is, you know, ... I strongly believe that you should stand up 
for what is right and 
what is wrong. But nationalism, there is a danger, you know, just to say that so and so deserves 
my allegiance just because we are from the same part of the world. I do not know, but there is a 
big danger about ... that breeds a 
lot of ... a lot of wars are based on nationalism. 
I: Would you support a Welsh independence? 
K.: Ahh, I have just answered the question, no I would not. 
F.: I do not have the right to vote, I am not Welsh. 
K.: There is no concept of being Welsh. I would not support a Welsh independence, unless it 
would be done properly, which I know it cannot be. You know I am very proud of being Welsh 
and I know a lot of Welsh people who would disagree with me on this point, but I would not 
support a Welsh independence. I would not. 
I: What do you think of the monarchy? 
K.: ha, ha, come on you start. OK shall I start? I, I think the monarchy as an institution, we 
should get rid of them, i. e. we should not be giving them anything as far as taxes are 
concerned. And I do not agree with a monarchy system. If they want to stay at Buckingham 
palace, then fine let them stay, but tax them the amount that they should be taxed, not some 
silly amount which they are taxed. If they want to stay as a tourist attraction, then let them 
stay, that is fine but I would have no problem with getting rid of the monarchy, full stop. 
F.: I totally agree. I do not think that they are worth it, you know, I do not think they are 
worth what we pay. I mean recently, I do not know, how much, how much went into that fire? 
K.: That fire, I cannot remember, I do not know. 
F.: Huge amounts of tax payers money, you know, about 16 million, some thing like that, for 
the restoration for the palace, that they stay in for one month of the entire year. I mean 16 
million, how many homeless people would that house? You know, how many persons do they, 
... when you 
look at it from that way it is a social injustice. You know, I do not think that you 
should behead them, I do not think that they have committed any crime, it is not their fault, 
but then you got to stop this. 
K.: They certainly should be run out of the country, as they have been in other parts of Europe. 
F.: The Russians, you know, I do not believe what the French and the Russians did with their 
monarchy, that is not fair, it is not their fault, but then at the same time you know, stop them. 
I: Do you think there is Islamophobia in Britain? 
F.: Yes. 
K.: Yes, there genuinely is. I mean if you look at the press, there is. If you look generally at 
what peoples views are of what Islam is, yes there are. I mean, the evidence is certainly 
pointing for it. And there for it to be enough governmental concern for them to put a committee 
together, it must be there. You know, that is just looking at it from outside of our realm, but 
even if you look at it from within our realm, you can see it. And especially myself, because I, I 
know what it was like before I came into Islam. I know what my feelings were about Muslims 
at this time. And so I definitely know that Islamophobia does exist. I definitely know that 
the preconceptions that people do have and how wrong they are. 
F.: I am pretty much at the full end of it because ever since I started wearing a scarf and going 
out, people, ... things like going into a shop and asking for help, can be, ... you could be ignored. And then Cos would go in there and get a response. And things like that. There were 
many times I literally burst into tears because the people have pushed me in the street or 
looked at me in a certain way or behaved badly. 
K.: But saying that you get very nice responses as well. 
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F.: That is very true. 
K.: It seems to work two ways for some odd reason. People look at you and they are genuinely 
interested, you know, and so they will give you more attention, which 
is 
... 
F.: But all the nice responses I have got have been in return 
for something, like for instance, I 
will never cross by Big Issue sellers without buying something. 
Like if they have three copies 
and it is raining I will buy all three so they can go home, things 
like that. They know me, 
they know who I am, so when, when one of them went to London 
for instance, he said, you 
know, Muslims, what do you say to them? And I said, well you say salam alaykum, you know 
and they reply alaykum samlam. They basically ask some questions. 
So I saw someone when 
we went down to London and I saw some ... and they recognised me 
because they visited some 
friends in Cardiff and stuff, and they shouted out as-salam alaykum. It was so nice to get 
that, you know. You know, oh, alaykum salam, how do you know that? 
You know, this, that 
and the other and I talked to him. Oh, I was in Wales once and I saw you and, ... you 
know. 
And, they know me in Cardiff, they know who I am, they always smile and ... you 
know, and 
things like that. So, that is nice, ... 
if, if some nuns are collecting for a hospital I walk up to 
them and they will, ... oh, thank you and 
they will be really, ... probably nicer to me than 
they would be, say, to someone else. You know, I do not know why, but... 
I: Well, they can associate more with you ... 
F.: ... possibly ... I: You are wearing the same dress. 
F.: Yes, absolutely, you know. So, I mean, that is the whole point, it is a point of being 
associated with believing women- That is the only issue. A lot of people say: oh, it is for your 
own protection. It is not. I have been followed, I have been harassed, ... with hijab on, it is not 
what the Qur'an says. The Qur'an says that you are identified with believing women, and 
you are, you know. So, that is all there is. It is just an identity thing. The same way a lot of 
Christians wear a cross, but ... 
I: Like Madonna, a believing woman. 
F.: Absolutely. Actually you know, I sometimes I, I watch the way that Christianity made 
fun of and abused on TV. I just think, how can they do that? You know, I would not, ... as a non 
Christian, do that. You know, when you see Madonna wearing a cross or did you see pictures 
of, say, nun for the habit, wearing black strippers, ... I just, it really upsets me. I just, you 
know, I just think that is horrible, you know, if I was a Christian, I would feel so upset. 
Because if the Christians do that then who do you blame, you know. Then who do you shout 
at, if your own are people doing that ? 
I: At least not at others. 
I: When you are looking at Britain becoming a multicultural society, where do you think it is 
going to? 
K.: There is a danger and several people will point out that you are going to, ... there 
is a 
problem, OK. If, if you look at Asian business men, they are very successful of what they do, 
OK. If you look at the top ten business men in this country, six of them are Asian. Now that, 
that is an amazing statistic. In such a short time for them to be so successful is incredible. If 
you look at the university entry for Asians, and compare it to the population of Asians in the 
country, the total, ... more of them are getting 
into university, more of them are getting a 
better education, and more of them are getting better jobs, are more successful, etc, etc. And the 
danger of this is that there is going to be more and more nationalism on the part of the 
indigenous population. Where this leads, that is obviously quite worrying. But I think there 
are hopes that it could succeed, there are hopes, but it is still too soon to say. 
F.: I would slightly disagree with that. I think it is becoming more multicultural. I think the 
reason that there is danger is that, I know where you are leading to, what happened to the 
Jews in Germany, how they were very successful, and therefor once things went bad they were 
easiest to blame ... 
K.: That was the comparison that has been put across. 
F.: Yes, the reason I disagree is because I think the British people are not like the German. I 
think they are, they are not that quick to react, they are a lot more ... K.: It is a very fine balance ... F.: ... you do what you do, I do what I do, type of thing. They do not bother as much ... K.: ... there is a very fine balance and it has to be maintained. And this is why Islamophobia 
is on the increase. It has a lot to do with people feeling bothered. 
F.: I do not think that they feel that bothered by Asians, not all Asians are Muslims. But they 
do not behave like Muslims, they drink, they go out, it is ... . 
You see if they were just racists 
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against Asians, that would be Hindu then and Sikhs as well. They are not, they are 
bothered 
about Muslims. You would still have a problem, you know, if you were to walk around wearing 
a Sufi gare. The fact is you do not, you know. 
K.: Yes, I do think there is a long way to go yet, we will see what happens. 
F.: I think technically, you know how colonial rule, and they ruled India for such a long time, 
well I think it is colonial rule and the Asians are rule here. I really think they are, from 
what I have seen. 
I: What do you mean? 
F.: The people who come to clean our house. The receptionists, the cleaners, within the 
people, Asians in Birmingham that I know, they are all English people. And it is like the 
masters over there, except the exact turn around of what it was fifty years ago in India. You 
know, Curry has become the most popular food, you know everything is becoming Asian. I 
think Asians will rule this place. I think that honestly, within two hundred years time they 
will, it will be an Asian culture, or certainly a mish-mash of Asian culture. The same way 
that the Turks ruled the Balkans and the Greeks and so much of their culture has become 
influenced by the Turkish culture, there will be exactly the same in England. England will 
lose a British culture and will have an Anglo-Asian culture in a hundred, maybe fifty years 
time, you can see it go so fast. 
K.: I think that is very far fetched. 
F.: You think so? 
K.: We will see, we will see. 
F.: OK, you know, in fifty years time I would not be surprised if they teach Hindu or Urdu as a 
second language here. 
K.: Oh, no I can see that happening already, I can see Hindi becoming the second language at 
school, because ... 
F.: Urdu in fact because there are more Pakistanis than Indians here. 
K.: ... 
because there are a lot here. 
F.: That is what I think is going to happen. Maybe I am Asian, I am an optimist. 
I: Now, do you think that Islamic values and British values are compatible? 
K.: To a certain extent they have to be, Yes. but certain values, I do not know, which values 
would you be talking about? That is the question. Isn't it ? 
I: Well those you give me. You have to define them. 
K.: The point is, if you consider Britain to be Judaic-Christian as far as its morals are 
concerned, then that is fine, you know, there is nothing wrong with us living here. If, ... the 
only problem I have come up against, the only problem that I have faced is that I could not 
fight for the British Army. That is just something I could not do. If there was a war situation 
and the aggressors were truly aggressors and they were doing wrong and this country was 
under threat, then yes, I would fight. But in a general situation, no, I could not do it. Because, I 
do not know, I do not feel that close to this country, I know the kind of things that this country 
has done before and I know too much about what war has done in the past and the politics 
that drives it, and I am sorry I ... 
I: But you would defend the country if it were attacked? 
K.: I would defend the country if it were attacked, and yes, I would. But ... 
I: But are they compatible in that sense that you can live an Islamic life? And at the same 
time integrate ... 
K.: Yes, you can. I tell you one thing, living here as a Muslim is probably easier to live here as 
a Muslim than anywhere else in the world. 
I: Ah, why is that? 
K.: Ah, that is the interesting point. OK, America, you are living in a society which is just as 
free, OK, you have the same rights you have the same freedom. But there is always this 
problem of it, maybe I am going completely up the wall here, being a police state, etc., etc., . You know, if something goes wrong in America, for instance have you heard of the bombing, 
the public, sort of, anger at Muslims is incredible. I mean, people were having bricks thrown 
through their windows and real hatred against Muslims and as soon as they have discovered 
that it was not a Muslim, you know, it was, oh, it was expected to be that way, but did not 
quite turn out that way. So you know, that is why America is a bit of a problem. Here that just 
would not happen, it just has not happened yet, it is not going to happen because the British 
are this way. It is better to live here, as a Muslim, than in other Muslim countries because 
other Muslim countries mostly, not all of them, are dictatorships. There are no two ways of 
looking at it, if you say something wrong against the government, that is it, you are in trouble. 
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In fact a lot of the people who live here and they say the things that they do, there is no way 
that they could say those things back in their own countries. Because they would be put into 
prison faster than they could say ... 
F.: Masari is with us, out of Saudi ... K.: Yes, so it is, it is possibly easier to live here than anywhere else, just the rights that we 
get. As far as ... I 
do not know, you see, as a Muslim I have to follow the laws of the country, 
and except the laws which are un-Islamic, and I do not think that. there are any laws which 
are un-Islamic. So there is no problem with me living here what so ever. As regards to the 
way the culture is, for instance it is primarily a drinking culture, yes but it is not forcing we to 
do that. You know, so where? ... there 
is no real problem here, you know, so ... 
I do not have 
any problems with living here, I think it is fine. 
F.: Especially, I think, in fact it has done Muslims a lot of good being here. They had to 
redefine themselves out of their cultural limitations ... 
(End of tape). 
Tape 2 
Side A 
... which I think they needed to 
do. And there was something else I was coming to, but I really 
forgot. 
I: Do you also turn out to be, as Muslims in the West, an example for Muslims in their home. 
country? 
F.: I think so. Very much so. I do not know what it is about being ..., oh, that is what I was 
about to say. That I do not know if I would have been this way, have I stayed in India. You 
know, if I would have come to this understanding of my religion and believed in it as a 
believer, not someone who was only brought up with it. I think that is vital. But sorry what 
were you saying, you have asked an important question, then and I have forgotten. 
I: You have answered it. The last question was, whether you are an example for the rest of the 
Muslim world? 
F.: This is what we have found when we went back to India. We found that we had a lot of 
work and we did not know where to start. That was scary. Yes very much, very much so. You 
know there is a study of religions that happens and basically they say that each religion 
goes through certain phases. Do you remember what the group phases were? (to K. ) 
K.: One of them was mythological. 
F.: Yes, that, that was right at the end. OK, but the first stage was the purest phase, you 
know it is the phase were things are the way they it should be. Second phase is the cultural 
phase, were it becomes slightly differentiated depending on where in the world it is. Third 
phase is the mystical phase, yes that is right, mystical phase were it is something which is 
part of your life but it is you know only when you are feeling spiritual, it is not so much a 
whole of your life like culture is. And last phase is the mythical phase were it is really 
literally story telling and that is all it is, you know. And, I think, in India it is getting to the 
mystical/ mythical phase were it is becoming like a mythology in the sense that they have, 
... they 
have a special night during Ramadan (shark ab-badad) which is ... that one night is 
very special because God has said: That night is worth a thousand nights. It is, it is a very 
special night, it is a very truly spiritual night. Now that means you should try and be as close 
to God as possible, it is your one night to really, you know, be placed to him and to pray and 
whatever. But unfortunately in India what they do is they make Halvah. You know halvah? 
You like halvah? (I nodded) And that you know, ... they so pray over the halvah and 
everyone eats the blessed halvah and then they set a little aside for the Prophet and his 
wife. Now this is where it has got to from something which is so truly elevated to something 
so truly earthly, you know. And that is getting, ... and it is so nice that we ... it is nice that we have, still I think, the purest form here because we had to rediscover it. But the population is 
so huge comfng back to India and those places that you really do not know where and when. You know one of the most fundamental beliefs of Islam or any monotheistic religions is the belief in one God. People were asking me there: You know when it says in translations of the Qur'an, we? We made the heavens, we made the earth. Does that not mean that God is more 
than one? Now this question, to even be asked, shows a lack of understanding of the most basic 
belief within the religion. I had to explained to them, no it is the royal we. The translation 
has said we because the royal we is showing respect to God, rather than saying I or .... 
And, it 
is easily explained away but what scares me is that the question had to be asked, ... you know. And things like that. So yes, very much, very much so. 
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I: Do you think that the Muslim community is integrating into British society? 
F.: Yes, definitely. 
K.: Yes. I do not know, it is difficult. 
F.: A list of conduct, more than anything. 
K.: Yes, I think so. Yes, I think there are some things that a Muslim would not do. Muslims on 
the whole would not go to pubs but they will meet people here in other ways. 
I mean they 
will meat them at work, they will invite them to the house and this and that and so they are 
integrating in that sense. But there are certain things which for us are unacceptable, but that 
is fine with society. I think more and more people here, who do have their head screwed on, 
understand this. 
F.: But, but ... You are a convert, there are three that we 
know, so four. We have friends in 
Greece, we have family in Greece, we have family, you know ... in all of Europe in that way. 
Now for each person who has converted repercussions and the integration of, i. e. Muslims 
because that is what he is, into a society which is non-Muslim is huge. And what the 
acceleration of conversions which is happening and everywhere you go, I mean, you walk into 
houses ... we went to someone's 
house just to look at it, these people had like, they were 
Welsh.. I mean they had a Guinness rucksack, but they had a Qur'an by their bedside. And 
they had an "Understanding the Qur'an in Arabic" by their bedside. And so obviously there is 
something going on. Whilst it has become a joke within Eaton, which is one of. the bastions of 
British culture and educational establishment, and Eaton is renowned for producing the 
leaders of this country. The last three head boys of Eaton have converted to Islam, so it has 
become a joke that if you become a head boy then you become a Muslim, you know. So 
obviously it is being integrated at every level. Laila wore Coses shamah. You know shamah? 
It is the traditional Palestinian black and white check scarf. And Cos, ... Laila borrowed it, 
because it is a very warm thing, and she went to school with it. 
K.: This is very old. (showing his shamah) 
I: I was just looking, because I have been to Jerusalem and I have not seen such a nice one. 
K.: This was actually, this was Egyptian, this was, ... 
F.: I have bought it in Jerusalem, at Al-Aksa, and when this was given to me it had the blood 
of someone on it. Someone who had actually died because of their beliefs of Islam. So it is 
quite special. 
K.: Your uncle (to F. ), he has not seen as nice a quality as this. Yes I had the difficulty because 
I like it and it is getting old, so I want to get a new one but it is difficult to find good quality 
because they only make them for the tourists. now. And so we do not want the tourist quality, 
we want the good quality and that is so difficult to find because they keep them for 
themselves. So I have to get friendly with someone. 
F.: What was I saying? 
I: It was about the converts and Eaton. 
F.: Ah, yes, and so it happened that Laila with the shamah on went to school and this, ... is 
the vibes, it is so insular that Cos has never met a Muslim, there were no Asians, no non- 
Welsh people that lived in this insular, value-tight-knit, Welsh society, this girl came up to 
here and said: where did you get this from? And Laila said: oh it is my brothers. This girl 
said: My brother is one of them too. And Laila said: what? A Muslim. You know, Cos used to 
work in a pub, when he converted to Islam he got this job. He had the shamah lying by his 
rucksack, and the landlady in the pub said:... what did she say (to Cos)? 
K.::... so you are one of those, are you? 
F.: He said: yes. And apparently here son has converted to Islam. And this is a very small 
power in a very small place in the world, you know. And when you think about is like this, 
then you think oh, oh, we need to accept Muslims there are a lot of Muslims. And it happens 
necessarily, but then as a Muslim you believe that that will happen anyway because before 
the day of judgement every house will have a Muslim. You know there will be one in every 
house. Now I do not know if house is literal or if house means one in every family, I mean they 
are big. You know, I think that is pretty much close now, you know, one in every family. I do 
not know, because I would guess, you know it is quite a collective climate. 
K.: They get carried away. 
F.: They get carried away. 
K.: There are a view prophetic hadith, you cannot always take them ... for instance there is a 
... this is a language, ... how Arabic is used. 
Strange in a way. There is a prophetic hadith 
were someone's thigh will talk to you. So you know, in the future peoples thighs will talk to 
them. Now everyone thinks, how is your thigh going to talk to you, it is just impossible. You 
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see, the Arabs have this compatible language where by, if you talk about one thing 
then you 
talk about something which is associated with it. For instance 
if you talk about your thigh 
then you could quite easily ... 
F.: For instance in Arabic Coses waist is made out of leather, you know, but it is not, it just got a 
belt on. 
K.: Yes, that is the way ... 
F.: But that is the way Arabic works. 
K.: So if your thigh is talking to you, then you see it could be that you 
have a cellular phone 
and you have it, here, it is attached to a thigh, so your thigh is talking to you. 
That is the 
way the Arabic language would work. You know. 
F.: So how do you explain that to someone who would not know what a cellular phone was? 
You know, how would the Prophet have said: oh, there is going to be cellular phones. And 
people would have said: What do you mean, what are cellular phones? You know. 
K.: But then again it is a prophetic hadith. 
F.: That is right. 
K.: So you should not ... 
F.: I mean that does not matter. You know, I mean what is going to happen, is going to happen, 
you cannot bribe on these things. yes, big deal. 
K.: And also, you know, it could be talking about something completely different but you 
associate it with that. 
F.: This I mean they, they, ... he 
is a very very good talker, you must really listen to him, he 
is called Hans Yusuf Hansen, he is a convert too. He is American, but do not hold that against 
him and ... 
K.: If you go to America, you can do your research in America as well... 
F.: Good idea to go to St. ... is it Santa Fee? 
K.: Something like that. 
F.: Yes, he is powerful and he has said something. He said that the present faith in Islam is 
such that people slice a tomato and they see in Arabic written Allah. And they are all up in 
arms, it is a miracle, it is a miracle, you know, Allah written in a tomato. And he said what 
are you talking about so what it is a freak of nature. If your 
belief relays upon this then what 
is going to happen tomorrow when someone finds a cross in a tomato? You know, you are going 
to become a Christian? If your belief relays upon these things then your belief is very faint. 
That is why Cos is saying: ah but this is a prophetic hadith. As in oh my God the Prophet 
said this and therefore, you know ... and 
if your belief relays upon those things then that is 
not belief that is just mythology, that is just ... that is something else. 
K.: That is the danger. 
F.: That is the danger, and that is why he kept on stressing but it is a prophetic hdith, you 
know, so leave it alone, big deal, that does not mean there is one God. Your belief is that there 
is one God, that is all, you know. 
I: And what do you think of the Rushdie Affair? 
K.: Ahhh, that is interesting. OK, I cannot really say much about this because I have not read 
the Satanic Verses, but you have (to F. ) so you can give your opinion. Because I would not mind 
to give, you see, one thing that I will say, which I think is very important is, I think that the 
Muslims here reacted to it in a very wrong way. I think when some of them were marching 
through the streets burning the Satanic Verses what they should have been doing is marching 
through the streets saying could we have some blasphemy laws please. Because the 
Christians have them, the Jews have them to some extent, so why cannot we have some. And, 
to be, to be honest, a lot of the people who were marching, were marching for a change in the 
blasphemy laws but there were just a view that would spoil it. You know what I mean? 
I: Yes, sure. 
K.: And this, this way of acting really shows a lack of faith. You know, they say this about 
belief and faith, the lower your faith is, the more ... F.: ... fundamentalistic ... K.: ... the more fundamental you become. The more these little things enflame you so much. 
You know, if you have true belief you can be very calm about it and say so what, you know. But 
I mean I have not read the Satanic Verses so go on (to F. ) please. 
F.: There is a lot in there, there is a lot about everything in there, you know. I mean it says 
stuff about like women and how they should be treated like whores, you know, because that is 
the way they are. You know and, it says a lot in there and how ... so I do not see why one group 
should have been more inflamed than another, you know. So there is a lot to be upset about. 
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But this is, this is ... within 
Islam there is freedom of speech. There is not a freedom of 
blasphemy, but then, was that real blasphemy. Was he saying: Oh this is the truth. 
You 
know. No he was not, he was saying, perhaps: This is the Verse of the Qur'an that the 
devil 
would write. And he was saying that this is the satanic verses, like 
for instance if Gods words 
were the Qur'an, the devils words would be this book. You know, that is what he was trying 
to ... in 
fact. I do not think that he is there, I think he is a bit of a weird guy anyway and 
there was a lot in there to be upset about. But there is nothing you can do about that, everyone 
has that right, OK. Only stupid people nun to wave and throw a stone, real people have 
discussions, you know. People who have any intellectual stability have discussions about 
these things. I marched for that, but I marched for the equality. Because if Muslims are 
members of the British public then we also should have the same rights as everyone else. We 
should have the same rights as the Church of England, the Catholic Church, they have 
blasphemy laws for when something gets said against them or their religion, it can be banned 
because it is inciting, you know, hurt or religious prejudice or what ever. And we were just 
marching that it should be the same for the Muslims or for any other religion. And that is the 
thing. There were a group that were burning books but they were a small group. But what 
upsets me is that the media concentrated on them, you know. And I would like to reiterate 
what Cos said, yes. But the people who are fundamentalist about their beliefs they are 
trying to prove something to themselves. They have true lack of belief, were their belief 
relies upon these things, they have to almost prove it to themselves by getting angry and, 
and,... but there is nothing to get angry about. He did not do anything by their ... and you do 
not have to protect God because God does not need your protection. The truth is the truth, you 
know. That is it. You must be truthfully weak if it makes you that angry. And I think Muslims 
have a lot to learn. But see again, they are only half Muslim, they have religion but they do 
not really have religion, they do not really know much about it. They know what they are 
supposed to do and not supposed to do, they know ... they would know how to be proud but not 
know what they are saying, they know how to read Arabic -but not know what they are 
reading, they do not understand it. You know it is like, years and years of reading what is 
written on the ferrets? and not knowing it not understanding it just like that as Hansen said. 
And he is such a great speaker. It is just like a donkey carrying gold on his back, there is no 
real knowledge of the true value of what it has. 
I: Now I only have one more question to you. I mean you can answer it from your perspective. 
Do you never have a problem, I mean that you feel that you are sitting between three 
cultures? 
K.: hum 
I: He is very interesting he has got three. 
F.: Or even four. 
I: Yes he is growing into the fourth one. 
K.: I suppose so. Hem, No. I will say one thing, a lot of the things that I experienced when I 
entered the Asian culture, OK, were things that I experienced within the Greek culture. They 
had a lot of things in common and, you know I can see the good there and see here. And they 
are both good things. And even things about the British culture, I can see what is right there 
and what is good there. So no it does not bother me. But you see, I see myself as quite a tolerant 
person, I do not think that any, many cultures would bother me. I think I could walk in to 
almost any culture and be quite at home with it and quite happy with it, you know it interests 
me. As long as nothing wrong was being done, I mean, if it was a culture that involved child 
sacrifice I would be, I would be pretty worried, you know ... 
I: Yes I understand. 
K.:... but otherwise, you know, I am quite,... I was brought up with a lot of tolerance and so it 
was very easy. 
F.: I have a big problem with Asian culture. 
K.: Yes, F. has a big problem with Asian culture. But I do not, I do n... .I can understand the problems that she has with Asian culture ... I: More so because she is a woman, I suppose. 
K.: I suppose so, yes, yes, I really can understand. 
F.: And also because I do not judge them the same way I judge other cultures, one because I know 
more about it, you know, so I mean, when you see other cultures, like I see. Arab cultures then 
maybe I only see one side of it, you know. But Asian culture I can pretty much all sides of it. 
Too .... it is also I compare it to what it should be, you know, I do not 
kind of have the same 
demands on other. cultures. You know, when I see British culture and they are drunk and stuff 
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then it is a shame. But within Asian culture, when I see something wrong it really makes me 
mad because maybe it is that I care a lot more or maybe it is because the people that are 
suffering are close to me, people I know, they are not some stranger on the road. And also I 
know where they should be mentally and morally and, and how low they have sunk, you 
know. How the mighty have fallen, you know, that kind of thing. And that I think is such a 
shame, and especially when I see young girls who could have been something, you know. Who 
could have been amazing mothers and stuff and what is right and teach their daughters and 
their families. If their parents are ignorant, OK, but they, that drives me up the wall. 
K.: Yes, I think. the only problems that I have had culturally have been when parts of the 
culture have been, as far as my religion was concerned, wrong. For instance, drinking or 
smoking, you know, both of them I see them as being religiously wrong so when I see someone 
drinking or smoking..., well if I, I, I cannot enter a pub with my father, I just could not do it... 
I: But why? You can have an orange juice. 
K.: Yea, I can but it is, it is more the atmosphere that is in the pub than actually doing 
something that is wrong. You see when I go to a Cafe Bar in Greece I feel fine, even if I go to a 
Cafe Bar here I am fine, or restaurants here I am fine. There is still alcohol served on these 
premises but it is the presence of people who are drunk, and that is the problem. 
I: Where it is actually collective. 
K.: Yes, yes. 
F.: This exact issue is important, that ... 
it is 
... that 
it does not matter if you are doing it, it is 
who you are around, you know. That even if, I mean, for instance within Islam, even if you are 
unacceptable of talking about good things, talking about morality and God and stuff, you as a 
Muslim still get the reward ... , you even as a non 
Muslim or anything like that still get the 
reward of the people who are discussing, whether you are participating, whether you agree 
or whether you do not agree, just the fact that you are in a collective which are morally 
higher you still get the benefit of that. You know, you still get the Sal(w)at which is, you 
know, the plus for you. Where as if you, no matter how good you are, if you are ... you are not 
allowed to, you know, whether you are the best of people and you can restrain from drinking 
or, or would never drink or anything like that, you to be in a situation where everyone is drunk 
or everyone is having an orgy whether you participate or not, is wrong. It is not allowed 
because you as a collective are, you know... what ever the influence, whether you participate 
or not, like your mother said, how do you know the other person is not going to do something to 
you. 
End of Interview 
458 
Appendix VIII 
Table 1 R oval ethnic rou distribution o f total I ulation of Great Britain, 1991 Lo 
Percentage of resident population 
Tö 
-Z :1 
tri Black a QQ Q 
0 y M c"0 -t =i ti 
' Fr 
ti 
South 31.4 29.9 56.2 66.3 83.5 56.6 52.9 29.9 63.6 53.3 72.4 57.9 East 
Greater 12.2 10.3 44.6 58.2 77.1 45.2 41.3 18.4 52.7 36.1 57.1 41.7 
London 
East 3.7 3.8 1.4 1.0 1.1 4.0 0.8 1.2 1.0 2.4 1.9 2.6 
Anglia 
south 8.4 8.8 2.1 2.5 1.3 3.7 1.3 0.8 1.4 4.3 2.3 4.3 
West 
West 9.4 9.1 14.1 15.6 2.5 10.5 18.9 20.7 11.9 6.1 5.8 8.4 
West 4.6 4.2 12.4 14.4 1.9 8.8 16.8 18.5 11.1 3.9 4.5 6.5 Midl. 
MC 
East 7.2 7.3 6.2 4.9 1.6 6.0 11.8 3.7 2.6 4.8 3.7 4.9 
Midl. 
Yorks & 8.8 8.9 7.1 4.3 2.3 5.7 4.8 19.9 5.1 5.2 3.7 6.2 
Humber- 
side 
south 2.3 2.4 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.4 0.4 2.8 0.7 1.4 0.7 1.6 
York- 
shire 
West 3.7 3.6 5.4 3.0 1.2 3.7 4.1 16.9 3.7 2.5 2.3 3.6 York- 
shire 
North 11.4 11.6 8.1 4.3 4.4 9.0 6.6 16.2 9.1 11.1 4.5 8.2 West 
Greater 4.6 4.5 4.9 3.4 2.5 5.2 3.5 10.4 7.0 5.3 2.5 4 4 Man- . 
chester 
Mersey- 2.6 2.7 0.9 0.4 1.4 2.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 3.6 0.6 1.9 
side 
North 5.5 5.8 1.3 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.9 2.0 2.2 3.2 1.6 1.8 
Ty nýe & 
Wear 2.0 2.1 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.7 1.8 0.8 0.9 
Wales 5.2 5.4 1.4 0.7 1.3 1.9 0.8 1.2 2.3 3.1 1.9 2.6 
Scotland 9.1 9.5 2.1 0.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 4.4 0.7 6.7 2.3 3.0 
Source: 1991 Census Local Base Statistics within Great Britain. 
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Appendix IX 
Table 2 Regional variations in ethnic composition, within Great Britain 1991 
Percentage of resident population c 
aö 
`` o y Black w 
8 n a Q E! ä 
9 ä 
N Q 
N ~ _ 
"1 
. N ýý1 
_ Cr 
y 
south East 9.9 1.9 1.0 0.6 2.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0 
Greater 20.2 4.4 2.4 1.2 5.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 1.7 1.8 
London 
East 2.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Anglia 
South West 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
West Midt. 8.2 1.5 0.1 0.4 3.1 1.9 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 
West Midl. 14.6 2.8 0.2 0.6 5.5 3.5 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.7 
MC 
East Midi. 4.8 0.6 0.1 0.3 2.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Yorks & 4.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Humber- 
side 
South 2.9 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Yorkshire 
West York- 8.2 0.7 0.1 0.3 1.7 4.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 
shire 
North West 3.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 
Greater 5.9 0.7 0.2 0.4 1.2 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 
Man- 
chester 
Mersey- 1.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 
side 
North 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Tyne & 1.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 Wear 
Wales 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 
Scotland 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Great 5.5 0.9 0.4 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Britain 
Source: 1991 Census Local Base Statistics within Great Britain 
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